Integration Probabilistic Risk Assessment Models with the Digital Engineering Ecosystem
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In this volume, volume 4 (of five volumes), the discussion is focussed on the system models and related data references and has the following subsections: space shuttle main engine, integrated solid rocket booster, orbiter auxiliary power units/hydraulics, and electrical power system.
In order to meet the space transportation needs for a new century, America's National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has implemented an Integrated Space Transportation Plan to produce safe, economical, and reliable access to space. One near term objective of this initiative is the design and development of a next-generation vehicle and launch system that will transport crew and cargo to and from the International Space Station (ISS), the Orbital Space Plane (OSP). The OSP system is composed of a manned launch vehicle by an existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). The OSP will provide emergency crew rescue from the ISS by 2008, and provide crew and limited cargo transfer to and from the ISS by 2012. A key requirement is for the OSP to be safer and more reliable than the Soyuz and Space Shuttle, which currently provide these capabilities.
This paper provides an overview of the U.S. space nuclear power system launch approval process as defined by the two separate requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum No. 25 (PD/NSC-25).
The Shuttle is a very reliable vehicle in comparison with other launch systems. Much of the risk posed by Shuttle operations is related to fundamental aspects of the spacecraft design and the environments in which it operates. It is unlikely that significant design improvements can be implemented to address these risks prior to the end of the Shuttle program. The model will continue to be used to identify possible emerging risk drivers and allow management to make risk-informed decisions on future missions. Potential uses of the SPRA in the future include: - Calculate risk impact of various mission contingencies (e.g. late inspection, crew rescue, etc.). - Assessing the risk impact of various trade studies (e.g. flow control valves). - Support risk analysis on mission specific events, such as in flight anomalies. - Serve as a guiding star and data source for future NASA programs.
It is important to the Space Shuttle Program (SSP), as well as future manned spaceflight programs, to understand the early mission risk and progression of risk as the program gains insights into the integrated vehicle through flight. The risk progression is important to the SSP as part of the documentation of lessons learned. The risk progression is important to future programs to understand reliability growth and the first flight risk. This analysis uses the knowledge gained from 30 years of operational flights and the current Shuttle PRA to calculate the risk of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) at significant milestones beginning with the first flight. Key flights were evaluated based upon historical events and significant re-designs. The results indicated that the Shuttle risk tends to follow a step function as opposed to following a traditional reliability growth pattern where risk exponentially improves with each flight. In addition, it shows that risk can increase due to trading safety margin for increased performance or due to external events. Due to the risk drivers not being addressed, the risk did not improve appreciably during the first 25 flights. It was only after significant events occurred such as Challenger and Columbia, where the risk drivers were apparent, that risk was significantly improved. In addition, this paper will show that the SSP has reduced the risk of LOCV by almost an order of magnitude. It is easy to look back afte r 30 years and point to risks that are now obvious, however; the key is to use this knowledge to benefit other programs which are in their infancy stages. One lesson learned from the SSP is understanding risk drivers are essential in order to considerably reduce risk. This will enable the new program to focus time and resources on identifying and reducing the significant risks. A comprehensive PRA, similar to that of the Shuttle PRA, is an effective tool quantifying risk drivers if support from all of the stakeholders is given.
The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.
This slide presentation reviews the Integrated Medical Model (IMM) database, which is an organized evidence base for assessing in-flight crew health risk. The database is a relational database accessible to many people. The database quantifies the model inputs by a ranking based on the highest value of the data as Level of Evidence (LOE) and the quality of evidence (QOE) score that provides an assessment of the evidence base for each medical condition. The IMM evidence base has already been able to provide invaluable information for designers, and for other uses.
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This presentation summarizes the concepts, development, and application of NASA's Bone Fracture Risk Module (BFxRM). The overview includes an assessmnet of strenghts and limitations of the BFxRM and proposes a numebr of discussion questions to the panel regarding future development avenues for this simulation system.
The objective of this presentation is to discuss the PRA process and the reliability engineering discipline, their differences and similarities, and how they are used as complimentary analyses to support design and flight decisions.
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Quantitative results for aerospace engineering problems are influenced by many sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty analysis aims to make a technical contribution to decision-making through the quantification of uncertainties in the relevant variables as well as through the propagation of these uncertainties up to the result. Uncertainty can be thought of as a measure of the 'goodness' of a result and is typically represented as statistical dispersion. This paper will explain common measures of centrality and dispersion; and-with examples-will provide guidelines for how they may be estimated to ensure effective technical contributions to decision-making.
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