SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
High voltage potential (Hipot) and module frame continuity tests are important parts of determining the suitability of solar modules for deployment into large arrays for electrical power production. Since field arrays operate at hundreds of volts above (or below) ground potential at some point in the field, it is necessary to assure adequate voltage isolation of the solar cell circuits.
This paper is predominantly a nontechnical discussion of some significant aspects of the initial flight qualification and operational maintenance of the flight control system software for the X-29A technology demonstrator. Flight qualification and maintenance of complex, embedded flight control system software poses unique problems. The X-29A technology demonstrator aircraft has a digital flight control system which incorporates functions generally considered too complex for analog systems. Organizational responsibilities, software assurance issues, tools, and facilities are discussed.
A discussion is presented of some significant aspects of the initial flight qualification and operational maintenance of the flight control system softward for the X-29A technology demonstrator. Flight qualification and maintenance of complex, embedded flight control system software poses unique problems. The X-29A technology demonstrator aircraft has a digital flight control system which incorporates functions generally considered too complex for analog systems. Organizational responsibilities, software assurance issues, tools, and facilities are discussed.
The reliability and quality assurance system and procedures used in developing test equipment for the Lunar Experiment projects are described. The subjects discussed include the following: (1) documentation control, (2) design review, (3) parts and materials selection, (4) material procurement, (5) inspection procedures, (6) qualification and special testing, and failure modes and effects analysis.
The Phoenix Mars mission involves delivering a stationary science lander on to the surface of Mars in the polar region within the latitude band 65 deg N to 72 deg N. Its primary objective is to perform in-situ and remote sensing investigations that will characterize the chemistry of the materials at the local surface, subsurface, and atmosphere. The Phoenix spacecraft was launched on August 4, 2007 and will arrive at Mars in May 2008. The lander includes a suite of seven (7) science instruments. This mission is baselined for up to 90 sols (Martian days) of digging, sampling, and analysis. Operating at the Mars polar region creates a challenging environment for the Phoenix landed subsystems and instruments with Mars surface temperature extremes between -120 deg C to 25 deg C and diurnal thermal cycling in excess of 145 deg C. Some engineering and science hardware inside the lander were qualification tested up to 80 deg C to account for self heating. Furthermore, many of the hardware for this mission were inherited from earlier missions: the lander from the Mars Surveyor Program 2001 (MSP'01) and instruments from the MSP'01 and the Mars Polar Lander. Ensuring all the hardware was properly qualified and flight acceptance tested to meet the environments for this mission required defining and implementing an environmental assurance program that included a detailed heritage review coupled with tailored flight acceptance testing. A heritage review process with defined acceptance success criteria was developed and is presented in this paper together with the lessons learned in its implementation. This paper also provides a detailed description of the environmental assurance program of the Phoenix Mars mission. This program includes assembly/subsystem and system level testing in the areas of dynamics, thermal, and electromagnetic compatibility, as well as venting/pressure, dust, radiation, and meteoroid analyses to meet the challenging environment of this mission.
The implementation of additive manufacturing techniques to produce critical spaceflight systems is well underway. These technologies will be a key contributor to developing both launch vehicles and spacecraft that will play a crucial role in delivering the first woman and first person of color to the surface of the moon in 2025. To assist in the assurance of flight readiness, NASA has created comprehensive certification based standards for mature technologies for both metallic and nonmetallic materials.
This paper presents NEML2, an open-source, high-performance library developed for constitutive material modeling, designed to support the flexible and modular development of models for complex material behavior. Building on the foundational structure of its predecessor, NEML, the NEML2 library introduces significant improvements, including enhanced vectorization, automatic differentiation, and seamless integration with PyTorch, facilitating the application of machine learning techniques in material simulations. NEML2 provides a C++ backend with Python bindings, enabling users to create custom material models that can be executed efficiently on both CPU and GPU platforms. The library also supports coupling with Multiphysics simulation frameworks like MOOSE, making it suitable for realistic simulations involving coupled physical processes. Rigorous quality assurance through unit and regression testing ensures the reliability of results, while the extensible, user-friendly design encourages collaboration and reproducibility across the scientific community. This paper provides an overview of NEML2’s architecture, core features, and applications, highlighting its impact on accelerating material qualification and advancing computational methods in materials science.
As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats and swarms), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be discussed: (1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, (2) A discussion of emerging assurance methods to reduce overdesign as well emerging model based mission assurance (MBMA) concepts. center dot Example scenarios will be described as well as consideration for trading traditional versus alternate methods.
In-situ airframe sensors have long been considered a potential solution for structural health monitoring that could change the design, certification, operation and maintenance paradigms of flight vehicles. In this approach, large networks of sensors covering the entire, or most of, an airframe throughout its operational lifetime would support real-time decisions on airworthiness and obviate the need to overbuild components or perform multiple cycles of structural qualification testing and inspections. This concept would go beyond the current practice of placing select sensors in strategic locations or relying on such sensors only during airframe qualification flights and inspections. For vehicles in the emerging urban air mobility space, reducing weight associated with overbuilds and shortening down-time associated with inspections are critical for improving safety and affordability. In practice, the wide-scale use of in-situ sensors as primary assurance for structural health has not been demonstrated to be feasible or the best solution. A sensor integration testbed was developed as a platform to evaluate the potential of multiple sensor types to enable decision making on airworthiness. We report on the initial runs of this testbed with multiple sensors attached to a common test article. Metal foil strain gauges, eddy current, fiber optic, guided wave (acoustic emission and ultrasonic)and carbon nanotube roving sensors were affixed to the test article. Baseline as well as post damage initiation and fatiguing data are presented and discussed. Despite the relative simplicity of the test article, the interpretation of the as-captured test data was generally not conclusive or did not have wide enough coverage. This result emphasizes the challenges and current limitations both in testing and the practical broad application of embedded sensors as the determinative elements in critical decision making on wide-scale structural health.
In-situ airframe sensors have long been considered a potential solution for structural health monitoring that could change the design, certification, operation, and maintenance paradigms of flight vehicles. In this approach, large networks of sensors covering the entire, or most of, an airframe throughout its operational lifetime would support real-time decisions on airworthiness and obviate the need to overbuild components or perform multiple cycles of structural qualification testing and inspections. This concept would go beyond the current practice of placing select sensors in strategic locations or relying on such sensors only during airframe qualification flights and inspections. For vehicles in the emerging urban air mobility space, reducing weight associated with overbuilds and shortening down-time associated with inspections are critical for improving safety and affordability. In practice, the wide-scale use of in-situ sensors as primary assurance for structural health has not been demonstrated to be feasible or the best solution. A sensor integration testbed was developed as a platform to evaluate the potential of multiple sensor types to enable decision making on airworthiness. We report on the initial runs of this testbed with multiple sensors attached to a common test article. Metal foil strain gauges, eddy current, fiber optic, guided wave (acoustic emission and ultrasonic) and carbon nanotube roving sensors were affixed to the test article. Baseline as well as post damage initiation and fatiguing data are presented and discussed. Despite the relative simplicity of the test article, the interpretation of the as-captured test data was generally not conclusive or did not have wide enough coverage. This result emphasizes the challenges and current limitations both in testing and the practical broad application of embedded sensors as the determinative elements in critical decision making on wide-scale structural health.
Interest in generalization of the physical environment experienced by NASA hardware from the natural Earth environment (on the launch pad), man-made environment on Earth (storage acceptance an d qualification testing), the launch environment, and the space environment, is ed to find commonality among our hardware in an effort to reduce cost and complexity. NASA is entering a period of increase in its number of planetary missions and it is important to understand how our qualification requirements will evolve with and track these new environments. Environmental conditions are described for NASA projects in several ways for the different periods of the mission life cycle. At the beginning, the mission manager defines survivability requirements based on the mission length, orbit, launch date, launch vehicle, and other factors . such as the use of reactor engines. Margins are then applied to these values (temperature extremes, vibration extremes, radiation tolerances, etc,) and a new set of conditions is generalized for design requirements. Mission assurance documents will then assign an additional margin for reliability, and a third set of values is provided for during testing. A fourth set of environmental condition values may evolve intermittently from heritage hardware that has been tested to a level beyond the actual mission requirement. These various sets of environment figures can make it quite confusing and difficult to capture common hardware environmental requirements. Environmental requirement information can be found in a wide variety of places. The most obvious is with the individual projects. We can easily get answers to questions about temperature extremes being used and radiation tolerance goals, but it is more difficult to map the answers to the process that created these requirements: for design, for qualification, and for actual environment with no margin applied. Not everyone assigned to a NASA project may have that kind of insight, as many have only the environmental requirement numbers needed to do their jobs but do not necessarily have a programmatic-level understanding of how all of the environmental requirements fit together.
NEPP Mission Statement: Provide NASAs leadership for developing and maintaining guidance for the screening, qualification, test, and reliable usage of electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts by NASA, in collaboration with other government Agencies and industry.
Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) instruments are a large component of nuclear material (NM) measurement at LANL. Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Group (SAFE-NMCA) personnel in the Safeguards Division are responsible for oversight of the instruments used for material accountability measurements. It is the responsibility of SAFE-NMCA to ensure that all instruments are operating as expected and can produce quality measurements to provide assurance that requirements of the DOE approved NMCA Plan are being met.
Recent successes in NASA planetary science missions has shown that long-lived missions can yield significant science return. These missions, despite their longevity, were not planned to operate beyond their deign life. For example, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter has a design life of 2-3 years, and yet we are entering its 14th year on orbit. Spacecraft longevity in practice has been related to: 1) mission class; 2) did we test it long enough and resolve all the anomalies to be beyond the early failure curve; 3) consumables budgets, and 4) how components are de-signed and tested. Mission class has been perceived as one of the primary ways to drive longevity. But higher mission class is a significant cost and mission driver. Parts selection only from the limited military standard parts and extensive parts qualification adds to development time and cost. Largely redundant (often erroneously interpreted as fully redundant) adds to launch mass and increases testing complexity (which may reduce the amount of testing in the nominal con-figuration). Lower Risk Posture (reflected in a higher mission class) drives significant additional processes and quality assurance analyses. Higher mission class also drives significantly greater sparing and life testing costs. This discussion focuses on whether this is indeed the best way to achieve longevity efficiently or whether there are more efficient ways to achieve longevity. Empirical evidence shows that lower mission classes that implement effective risk reduction and selective redundancy generally results in long life at a lower Spacecraft bus cost. By evaluating redundancy careful-ly, spacecraft cost can be lowered which can enable a more capable payload. Risk of the mission is highly dependent on the complexity of the mission and is only loosely dependent on Class of Mission. High complexity missions can have many single point failures and require the development of new technology, while lower class mission can have lower risk by baselining or incorporating: (selective) redundancy, fault-tolerant design, design for minimum risk, ability to reset, and/or design for graceful degradation. The team met with Goddard Space Flight Center Space Systems Mission Operations leaders to discuss which avionics have proven in flight to be the most reliable and which have had lifetime issues. The paper proposes a list of components to focus on for redundancy for a long-lived lunar mission. Reliability numbers are presented for both single string and dual string missions. The history of life-time performance versus planned mission life according to mission class is presented. A mission with well thought out selective redundancy and effective on the ground test program, can be expected to last well beyond its mission lifetime and provided enhanced return for the community. This approach minimizes project expenditures that do not retire significant risk and allows the project to focus risk mitigation efforts on those risks that will have a significant likelihood of threatening mission success. This is aided by keeping the amount of technology maturation and mission complexity low, while focusing effort on ensuring all component stress-ing parameters well within the bounds of their capabilities.
Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) methodologies against Total Ionizing Dose (TID) degradation impose rigorous statistical treatments for data from a part's Radiation Lot Acceptance Test (RLAT) and/or its historical performance. However, no similar methods exist for using "similarity" data - that is, data for similar parts fabricated in the same process as the part under qualification. This is despite the greater difficulty and potential risk in interpreting of similarity data. In this work, we develop methods to disentangle part-to-part, lot-to-lot and part-type-to-part-type variation. The methods we develop apply not just for qualification decisions, but also for quality control and detection of process changes and other "out-of-family" behavior. We begin by discussing the data used in ·the study and the challenges of developing a statistic providing a meaningful measure of degradation across multiple part types, each with its own performance specifications. We then develop analysis techniques and apply them to the different data sets.
Presented is an explanation of the use of the Initial Criticality Assessment (ICA) technique, a triage process for prioritizing required Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs), for the European Service Module's main propulsion system's hot-fire test bed at White Sands New Mexico. Rather than instinctively performing many FMEAs of subsystems, or one large system level FMEA where every subcomponent is analyzed, the ICA guided an informed analysis of only the hardware that had a large impact to hazards. The low criticality hardware was documented via the ICA and no FMEA was performed; the work could then focus on the high criticality hardware. Thus a savings of Program resources was achieved. The experiences gained in creating these ICAs for this international collaborative project confirmed that the need for continuous communication across the technical teams is one of the greatest areas of emphasis. The European Space Agency (ESA) is developing the European Service Module (ESM), with its primary contractor, Airbus Defence and Space in Germany, for delivery to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The module will be equipped with a total of 21 engines to support NASA’s Orion spacecraft: one U.S. Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System-Engine (OMS-E), eight auxiliary thrusters and 12 smaller RCS (Reaction Control System) thrusters. The main ESM propulsion system, used for large translational maneuvers, consists of one OMS-E... To qualify the design of the ESM propulsion subsystem (PSS) an all-steel Propulsion Qualification Module (PQM) structure is used to test the propulsion systems on Orion, including “hot firing” of the OMS engine, thrusters, and RCS. The PQM has been developed as a hot-fire test bed to be tested at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). One of the objectives of the testing is to assure that the OMS-E can be safely operated with the PQM. Testing will also demonstrate that the PQM can set the proper upstream pressures and temperatures for the OMS-E to operate nominally given the PQM has never been tested in hot-fire operation with OMS-E before. In order to safely conduct the test campaign, hardware such as the engine subassembly, fluid feed lines, valves, electrical power lines, instrumentation, stiff links, installation Ground Support Equipment (GSE), and diffuser [whose objectives are to collect the exhaust of the OMS-E to actively cool down the exhaust gases, reduce thermal exchanges, and create a vacuum at OMS-E level before igniting], had to be analyzed for any hazards and failure modes.
SUMMARY The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Graphite Research and Development (GRD) Program is conducting a series of six experiments to quantify the effects of irradiation on nuclear-grade graphite. This report documents the qualification of irradiation monitoring data for the fifth experiment, High Dose Graphite-1 (HDG-1). Qualified monitoring data are required by the ART program to support the design and licensing of the first high-temperature reactor (HTR) nuclear plant. Data are classified as Qualified if they meet the usage requirements described in the experiment planning and quality assurance (QA) documents, Failed if they do not meet those requirements and provide no usable information, or Trend if they do not fully meet all requirements but still provide useful information subject to an assessment of how any deficiencies may affect a particular use of the data. HDG-1 irradiation began with Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Cycle 168B on August 24, 2020, and concluded after Cycle 173C on January 27, 2025. The HDG-1 capsule was removed from the reactor core twice—during core internal change (CIC) Cycle 170A and powered axial locator mechanism (PALM) Cycle 172A—to prevent overheating of the graphite specimens during high-power PALM cycles. The capsule was therefore irradiated during a total of seven normal ATR cycles: 168B, 169A, 171A, 171B, 173A, 173B, and 173C. Irradiation monitoring data evaluated in this report include thermocouple (TC) temperature, gas flow rate, gas moisture, gas pressure, specimen load, and graphite stack displacement. Temperature. A total of 14,508,065 TC temperature records were captured. Of these, 13,901,785 (95.8%) are Qualified and 606,280 (4.2%) are Failed. The principal source of failed temperature data was the instrument failure of TC-9 (Zone 2) on June 24, 2024, and TC-10 (Zone 1) on July 5, 2024, near the end of Cycle 173A, which resulted in 595,554 Failed readings. An additional 379 missing values and 10,347 slightly negative values from TC-13 during ATR outages are also Failed. Neither TC-9 nor TC-10 was used as a temperature-control TC, and their failures did not compromise capsule condition monitoring. Correlation analysis of all 13 TCs found no evidence of virtual junction formation. Control chart analysis revealed clear downward drift of approximately 80°C for TC-6 (Zone 3) relative to other stable TCs, and possible downward drift of approximately 60°C for TC-13 relative to the Zone 5 control TC (TC-1), though TC-13 remained consistent with the Zone 2 control TC (TC-12). Gas flow. A total of 20,088,090 gas flow rate records were captured. Of these, 19,941,463 (99.3%) are Qualified and 146,627 (0.7%) are Failed due to missing values. All argon, helium, and total gas flow data were within expected ranges throughout the irradiation. Gas moisture. A total of 1,116,005 outlet gas moisture values were captured. Of these, 1,101,421 (98.7%) are Qualified and 14,584 (1.3%) are Failed, comprising 14,556 out-of-range values and 28 missing values. The out-of-range moisture values exceeded 22,000 ppmv for approximately 1 week at the beginning of Cycle 173A, when accumulated moisture evaporated after the capsule was retrieved from water storage during PALM Cycle 172A and reinserted into the east flux trap. Moisture levels returned to below 25 ppmv for the remaining three cycles, and the transient high-moisture event did not affect the integrity of specimen irradiation. Gas pressure. A total of 7,812,035 gas pressure values were captured. Of these, 6,642,048 (85.0%) are Qualified and 1,169,987 (15.0%) outlet pressure values are Failed, comprising 718,537 zero outlet pressure values due to sensor failure from Cycle 168B through Cycle 171B, 54,550 missing values, and 396,900 too-low outlet pressure values, ranging from 1.1 to 1.6 psia after sensor replacement during Cycle 173A. Load. A total of 6,696,030 load values were captured. Of these, 6,694,580 (99.98%) are Qualified and 1,450 (0.02%) are Failed due to missing values. Applied loads to the six specimen stacks were stable throughout the irradiation. Stack displacement. A total of 6,696,030 displacement values were captured. Of these, 5,713,297 (85.32%) are Qualified and 3,781 (0.06%) are Failed due to missing values. Stack displacement increased consistently throughout the irradiation, reaching approximately 3.08 in. for Channels 5 and 6 by the end of irradiation. 978,952 (14.62%) substantially elevated displacements observed for Channel 6 beginning in Cycle 171A and for Channel 5 beginning in Cycle 173A are assigned Trend status. Raising pressure. A total of 1,115,999 raising pressure values were captured. Of these, 1,115,430 (99.95%) are Qualified and 569 (0.05%) are Failed due to missing values. Ram pressure. A total of 6,696,030 ram pressure values were captured. Of these, 6,692,249 (99.95%) are Qualified and 3,484 (0.05%) are Failed due to missing values. Stack raising was perf
The Aerospace industry has a long history of using low density polyurethane and polyurethane-modified isocyanurate foam systems as lightweight, low cost, easily processed cryogenic Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) for ascent vehicles. The Thermal Protection System of the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET) is required so that quality liquid cryogenic propellant can be supplied to the Orbiter main engines and to protect the metal structure of the tanks from becoming too hot from aerodynamic heating, hence preventing premature break-up of the tank. These foams are all blown with CFC-1 I blowing agent which has been identified by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as an ozone depleting substance. CFCs will not be manufactured after 1995, Consequently, alternate blowing agent substances must be identified and implemented to assure continued ET manufacture and delivery. This paper describes the various testing performed to select and qualify HCFC-1 41 b as a near term drop-in replacement for CFC-11. Although originally intended to be a one for one substitution in the formulation, several technical issues were identified regarding material performance and processability which required both formulation changes and special processing considerations to overcome. In order to evaluate these material changes, each material was subjected to various tests to qualify them to meet the various loads imposed on them during long term storage, pre-launch operations, launch, separation and re-entry. Each material was tested for structural, thermal, aeroshear, and stress/strain loads for the various flight environments each encounters. Details of the development and qualification program and the resolution of specific problems are discussed in this paper.