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At least 109 records · Page 6

INL Alpha Background Radiation Study

Radiological emergencies that result in the dispersion of radioactive materials to the environment require the deployment of field monitoring teams to determine the quantity and location of the dispersed radioactive material. This information is utilized by the emergency operations center to aid in determining the appropriate protective action recommendations. The background alpha emission rates from normal environmental surfaces of soil, concrete and asphalt as measured by portable instrumentation used by field monitoring teams are not well documented. Idaho National Laboratory conducted a study of the alpha radiation background levels of the environmental surfaces in eastern Idaho to determine the normal background rates. Results for normal dry surfaces and those wetted by precipitation were measured and reported.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Recent Advances in Nuclear Forensic Chemistry

Nuclear forensics is a rapidly growing field with a widespread impact on global nonproliferation. From the beginning, nuclear forensic capabilities have been inextricably bound to existing limitations within chemistry and materials science. As nuclear forensics has continued to develop as a unique field of research, new advances in chemistry have revolutionized our ability to rapidly and quantitatively analyze radioactive materials for attribution. In particular, microanalytical techniques originally developed for nanoscience, such as micro-XRF, SIMS, and SEM-EDX, have enabled spatially resolved chemical analyses to be performed with only nanograms of material. Such techniques have redefined the paradigm for pre- and postdetonation nuclear forensics, as large quantities of material are no longer necessary for full characterization and attribution. This Review explains how modern nuclear forensic techniques have developed from their origins in chemistry and provides real-world examples of how these techniques have been used to characterize radioactive materials, including fallout from nuclear detonations such as the 1945 Trinity test.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Characterisation of Specimens from a Former Soviet Thorium Processing Facility to Support Site Remediation

The former Prydniprovski Chemical Plant (PChP) is a large ex-soviet nuclear materials processing site of roughly 260 hectares, located in central Ukraine. PcHP was in operation between 1948 and 1991 for the purposes of processing uranium and thorium ore into ore concentrate. During its operational lifetime, tens of millions of tonnes of radioactive waste was generated on the site. A consequence of these activities, coupled with the mismanagement of the resulting radioactive materials and by-products, is that approximately 45% of the southern part of the site has become radioactively contaminated. This area comprises some 100-200 buildings and structures, many of which are in a state of disrepair and dereliction. Around 20 of these buildings are heavily radioactively contaminated, with radiation levels from a few μSv/hr to a maximum of 4 mSv/hr reported. The European Commission is currently working with the Ukraine Ministry of Energy and Coal Use and the Nuclear Regulator to improve radiological safety and security at the site. In order for these remediation works to proceed, the site management needs to characterise the radioactive materials that are held there. As part of this activity, the team from the University of Bristol have undertaken a survey of one of the most heavily contaminated buildings, collecting a selection of in situ material samples. A suite of complimentary materials characterisation techniques (e.g. X-ray Fluorescence, Raman Spectroscopy, etc) have been deployed in order to determine the radionuclides and composition of the compounds present. Characterisation of these samples will allow the operators of the chemical plant to go forward with remediation works within the building.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Low Activity Waste Tuning Feed Material Testing VSL-18R4350-1 (Final Report)

High level waste (HLW) from the Hanford tank farms will be retrieved and transferred to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The waste will be pretreated to separate the soluble chemical salts (mostly sodium nitrate/nitrite and sodium hydroxide) from the bulk of the radioactive materials. This decontaminated salt solution is the low activity waste (LAW) stream which constitutes most of the total waste volume. The remaining HLW contains most of the radioactive materials but a fraction of the volume. Each of these waste streams is directed to an independent processing facility where the waste is mixed with glass forming chemicals (mostly silica and borax or boric acid) and fed into the melters for stabilization by conversion into glass. The molten glass is poured into stainless steel containers to produce packages for disposal: local shallow burial for the LAW containers and a future geologic repository for the HLW containers. The LAW facility melters produce significant quantities of NOx-laden off-gas that require abatement in accordance with 10 CFR 830 and air emission requirements. The NOx emissions also pose a safety risk. The LAW facility commissioning sequence requires that the melters be operated and process control loops tuned prior to introducing waste or waste feed materials that produce NOx. Therefore, a temporary or permanent system architecture is needed that provides a feed supply to the melters for the purpose of melter testing and off-gas tuning that does not result in the production of significantly hazardous off-gas products.

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Development of local-power-free, remote α -particle detection using optical fibers

We demonstrate the application of fluorescence optical fiber coupled to a telecom grade fiber as a sensor for alpha particles using alpha-specific ZnS(Ag) scintillation materials whose wavelength is down-shifted into a low-loss region of the telecom grade fiber transmission band. Telecom-grade fiber optics offer a solution for sensing alpha radiation in deep repositories and cask storage for radioactive materials due to the stability of SiO 2 under normal environmental conditions and its relative radiation hardness at low radiation doses. Long-term nuclear waste storage facilities require sensors for the detection of leakage of radioactive materials that are maintenance-free, do not require power and can survive with no ‘wear out’ mechanisms for decades. By accomplishing the wavelength transformation, we maximize efficiencies in the detection of α-particles and signal transport and can detect alpha scintillation at distances on the order of >1 km with a sensor that is ~3% efficient and can be easily scaled as a sensor array. This paper describes the construction and testing of the sensor including manufacture of the controlled thickness films, verification of the wavelength shift from 450 to 620 nm and optimization of the sensitivity as a function of thickness. We also model the relative sensitivity of the film as a function of film thickness, and we demonstrate a signal-to-noise ratio of 10 at a range of greater than 1 km.

alpha particles↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

CASTOR THTR/AVR Containment Review

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)Radioactive Material Packaging and Transportation Review Team (herein referred to as ‘LLNL Staff’) was tasked with the technical review and confirmatory analysis of the containment analysis and corresponding leakage test implementation procedure for the CASTOR®THTR/AVR radioactive material transportation package with the AVR contents.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

The effect of metals on zeolite crystallization kinetics with relevance to nuclear waste glass corrosion

Abstract Geologic disposal of vitrified radioactive material is planned in several countries, but there are remaining uncertainties related to the long-term stability of glass exposed to groundwater. Specifically, the crystallization of aluminosilicate zeolite minerals can accelerate the rate at which glass corrodes and radioactive material is released into the biosphere. In this study, we identify elemental species that may accelerate or suppress zeolite formation using a protocol to examine their effects on zeolite synthesis over a three-day duration. Our results are consistent with previous works demonstrating glass corrosion acceleration in the presence of calcium. Furthermore, we identify two elements—tin and lithium—as inhibitors of zeolite P2 (gismondine, or GIS type) nucleation and, thus, promising components for promoting the long-term durability of glass waste forms.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

2021 ROMANIA TRANSPORT SECURITY TABLE-TOP EXERCISE (TTX) – LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES

During the period of 15-18 March 2021, the IAEA conducted a national workshop addressing the security of radioactive material in transport. The workshop was jointly hosted by the Romanian regulatory authority and the General Inspectorate of Romanian Gendarmerie. The workshop assisted Romania in improving its capability to evaluate the ability of response forces to counter a malicious act against radioactive material in transport. The event consisted of briefings, exercises, a demonstration of transport security equipment, and a transport security table-top exercise (TTX). The workshop was conducted in a virtual-hybrid format in such a way as to meet the COVID-19 related requirements in compliance with Romania’s guidelines. This paper provides an overview of the workshop’s activities, lessons-learned, and good practices related to the transport security TTX exercises.

Maican, Catalin↗

Using the CAP88 Plume Model & Dose Assessment Code for the FTWC Project

The Environmental Protection & Compliance Division (EPC) uses the Clean Air Act Assessment Package – 1988 (CAP88) plume model and dose assessment code to evaluate measured emissions or projected emissions of airborne radionuclides from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) facilities. This software package will use facility data (e.g., stack height and exit velocity), emissions parameters (chemical form and quantity), and environmental data (wind speed and direction) to predict downwind concentrations of radioactive material and subsequent dose to a member of the public at that location. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has approved CAP88 for use in demonstrating compliance with the Radionuclide NESHAP2, that portion of the Clean Air Act addressing emissions of airborne radioactive material from Department of Energy facilities. EPC Division has two procedures which discuss the use of CAP88.

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IRAD-MPE Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats (Day 1) [Slides]

This module is designed to enhance awareness regarding radiological and nuclear security threats and the types of radioactive materials that can be used for criminal purposes or terrorist acts. The goals are to: (1) Review the Threat Assessment Process for MPEs, (2) Recognize Potential Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats, (3) Understand the basics of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Devices (RED), (4) Learn about Medical, Commercial, and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) sources, and (5) Understand the term Material Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Development of the Mobile Systems for Conditioning of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Serbia - 20105

Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)

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Minimum Detectable Quantity Calculation for Radiation Portal Monitors

The minimum detectable quantity of a radiation portal monitor is the smallest amount of radioactive material that can be detected passing through the monitor (with a specified detection probability). The minimum detectable quantity is a function of many factors, including isotope, velocity, distance between pillars, height of portal and vehicle, source distribution and position, background radiation, background suppression, detector volume and positions, detector efficiency, decision metrics and algorithms, the presence of NORM (naturally occurring radioactive material), and alarm thresholds. Experimentally testing a radiation portal monitor to failure for all combinations of these factors is extremely time-consuming and often cost prohibitive. This document outlines a straightforward method for quickly estimating the minimum detectable quantity for moving sources over a large variety of conditions with a minimal number of static measurements. The document also describes a proof of concept software application that the International Atomic Energy Agency has designed based on the described method that can be used by Member States to estimate a monitor’s minimum detectable quantity.

Blessinger, Christopher S.↗

Cryogenic tracer irradiation facility at the university of Texas at Austin

We report on a cryogenic gas irradiation facility in the 1.1 MW TRIGA reactor at The University of Texas at Austin. The system was designed to produce radioactive xenon and argon for environmental studies, and it can be applied to produce other gaseous radiotracers. The system design includes modeling accident scenarios to ensure operation does not risk damage to the reactor and minimizes risk of release of radioactive material. In conclusion, the SCALE code was used to model a 30-day irradiation of one liter of Xe-126 and the predicted activity is 0.9 Ci of Xe-127 at irradiation end.

Ar-37↗

General Employee Radiological Training: 24 Month Refresher (Course #47968)

GERT is required by the 10 CFR 835, the Federal Regulation on Radiation Protection that we follow here at LANL. It’s the training for non Rad Workers who may enter Radiological Controlled Areas (RCAs) and Radioactive Material Areas (RMAs) in an unescorted manner. If your work assignment requires access to areas posted for higher radiological hazards like Radiological Buffer Areas (RBAs), Radiation Areas, Contamination Areas, and others you are required to have Rad Worker training. Once you complete this training you will be qualified to access RCAs and RMAs at LANL without an escort. However, you are not qualified to operate radiation producing devices, work with radioactive material, or do work where you may receive greater than 100 mrem of exposure in a year.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Laser ablation spectrometry for studies of uranium plasmas, reactor monitoring, and spent fuel safety

Nuclear security is one of the defining challenges of our time. Nuclear threats range from deliberate dispersal of radioactive material to contaminate the vital infrastructure to diversion and smuggling of special nuclear material for clandestine nuclear programs and nuclear terrorism, respectively. There is an associated need to develop and sustain the nuclear forensics capabilities, which requires the understanding of complex processes that occur in plasmas of nuclear materials. The area of nuclear safety has seen a resurgence of public interest, and there is a concomitant need to safely store used nuclear fuel and detect structural material failure in nuclear power systems, especially in innovative reactor designs envisioned for future adoption. Laser-produced plasmas are complicated extreme environments that can generate intense and rich, highly specific signatures of nuclear and radiological materials, which can then be explored in a wide range of applications. They include interdiction and rapid detection of nuclear materials, including their isotopic composition, detection over long distances, laboratory simulation of weapons effects, monitoring the condition of structural materials in dry cask storage containers, and novel instrumentation for nuclear power systems. We present a compilation of recent representative examples of the application of laser spectroscopy, and laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in particular, to nuclear safety and security problems. A case is made that spectroscopic techniques based on laser-produced plasmas offer complementary, and sometimes unique, capabilities that motivate the continued exploration of their efficient production and understanding of the signatures they produce

(020.3260) Isotope shifts, (140.3440) Laser-induce↗

2019 Public Debate on the French Waste Plan - 20181

For the first time, a public debate has preceded the preparation of the National Radioactive Materials and Waste Management Plan (PNGMDR). This debate, which took place over 5 months from 17 April to 25 September, was held by decision of the French National Public Debate Commission (CNDP), an independent administrative authority responsible for public participation in major projects and plans/programmes with environmental impacts. To organise and lead the debate, the CNDP appointed a Special Commission. (authors)

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