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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Adaptive Cyber-Physical Resilience for Building Control Systems

The main goal of the project is to develop an AI-based process layer cybersecurity suite for detection, isolation and mitigation of cyber-attack effects on operation of building energy management systems (BEMS). The following constituent key technologies were developed under the program towards fulfilling the program objectives: (1) developed a high fidelity BEMS testbed for generation of training data and validation of developed technologies; (2) developed a physics informed ML based attack detection and localization module (ADL) capable of detecting high impact stealthy attacks (HISA - attacks causing 30% energy utilization but no immediate visible impact otherwise) with 98% accuracy; (3) developed a methodology to determine ’representative days’ to limit the data required for training; (4) developed a virtual sensing system that can reconstruct affected sensors with 10% error for the same HISA set; (5) developed a resilient model predictive control system that can continue operation of the BEMS without jeopardizing stability for the HISA set; and (6) integrated and deployed all the constituent modules and demonstrated the efficacy of the technology in real-time in a hardware in loop simulation.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Design and Development of a High Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed

In order to ensure that future critical infrastructure systems are resilient to various types of such advanced and persistent threats, it is important to develop and integrate tailored solutions that holistically address cyber-attack detection and mitigation in a timely manner such that adverse system impacts that impact a large population are avoided. Further, it is essential to create environments that allow control, protection and communication to exist within a realistic environment to analyze the effects of adverse conditions and system operating modes. This project aims to establish a high-fidelity testbed environment for modeling and simulating a single microgrid all the way up to a network of microgrids along with baseline controls, protection, and associated cyber communication. This is an important activity because accurately modeling and simulating the various power-electronics-based DERs and loads in a microgrid is critical to adequately capturing their behaviors over a wide range of off-normal conditions, as well as to evaluate the resilience of the system using the developed controls. The work presented in this report focuses on the process of building this high-fidelity testbed and the associated experimentation it enables. The model enables the creation of high-fidelity use cases and associated datasets that have been used extensively within the initiative to study resilience and support novel control development and prototyping. The work heavily leverages existing capability that is part of the high-fidelity cyber-physical system experimentation lab to create a power hardware-in-the-loop setup. The report also details the creation of an automated model building platform that can enable high-fidelity real-time models to be built without much effort allowing existing low-fidelity models to be analyzed in higher fidelity. Lastly, the report also discusses efforts center around scaling to large complex power system models to make the experimentation more effective.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Programmable intrusion detection for distributed energy resources in cyber–physical networked microgrids

We present a programmable intrusion detection method is presented to identify the malicious attacks to distributed energy resources (DERs) in the cyber-physical networked microgrids. The proposed method injects small programmable signals into the system and uses the response to identify abnormal conditions. Because of the low or even zero inertia induced by integrations of DER power-electronic-interfaces, microgrids have very limited resilience capability; and thus, being sensitive to attacks. One microgrid's malfunction caused by attacks can easily propagate to its neighboring systems when several microgrids are connected, leading to catastrophic electricity supply failures. Through the presented method, malicious intrusions can be effectively detected, located, and defended for securing microgrids. Theoretical derivations are provided to define the programmable detection rules. The detection rule is easy and flexible to update, making it difficult for attack actors to gain the knowledge of the detection rules, in order to avoid being detected. Numerical results on a cyber-physical networked microgrids system show that the proposed method is effective and efficient in precisely locating intrusion attacks to the microgrids system.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Emerging Trends and Systemic Issues Influencing Today’s U.S. Electric Grid

With increasing shifts from vertically integrated to horizontally structured operations and from centralized to distributed electric power delivery, today’s electric power grid (the “grid”) operators and designers face the challenge of creating an architecture that accommodates a host of diverse requirements. The grid’s modes of operation must address concerns of reliability and stability, new deployments of renewable energy sources, threats from cyber-attacks and natural disasters, and increasingly distributed system operations. Grid modernization calls for a reliable, affordable, sustainable, agile, secure, and resilient grid. However, the modernization of the U.S. power grid is hampered by mounting complexity and diverging objectives from owners and operators and is consequently risky and fraught with potential missteps. Flawed architecture, design, and implementation will lead to stranded investments and lost opportunities. A principled approach to minimize risk and develop a robust grid of the future is to begin with a sound architecture for the grid to inform the design process. Architecture development starts with the context of influencing factors that provide constraints as well as driving goals. This report provides the context of emerging trends and cross-cutting systemic issues in the U.S. electric power grid and serves as a vital input for grid architecture development.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy (Final Project Report)

This project establishes a Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy with the objective of designing and operating a cyber-physical testbed for wind energy farms (WEFs) that enables comprehensive cybersecurity research. The testbed incorporates a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system connected to turbine models via industrial-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs). It supports side-channel data acquisition, implementation and analysis of various cyberattack scenarios, and development of attack detection, mitigation, and best-practice guidance tailored to wind energy systems. During the project, the team expanded the number and fidelity of mathematical turbine models (MTMs), integrated these models with SCADA infrastructure, and deployed a scaled physical turbine and associated sensors. High-resolution operational and side-channel data streams were collected and used to refine machine-learning (ML)-based attack detection systems and to extend the WindCRAFT framework to multi-turbine threat scenarios. The project demonstrated a realistic, scalable environment for evaluating cyber threats, validated attack detection approaches using enriched datasets, and identified new multi-turbine and inter-turbine communication attack vectors. The resulting testbed, models, and security mechanisms provide a foundation for ongoing R&D and deployment of cyber-resilient offshore wind energy systems.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Resilient Operating Constraints for Power Distribution Systems under Setpoint Attacks

Integration and operation of distributed generation (DG) and energy storage (ES) in power distribution systems are enabled by communication networks and embedded sensor and control devices that increase the vulnerability of the systems to cyber-threats, broadening the attack surface and making adversary actions more unpredictable. This paper proposes a methodology that uses ellipsoidal approximations to quantify the potential damage caused by successful attacks that affect, directly or indirectly, the desired operation setpoints and may drive the power distribution operation to unsafe states by violating the limits of voltage or line flows. More specifically, a new methodology is introduced to find the optimal non-symmetric operating constraints that can be imposed to each DG and ES in order to guarantee that the power distribution system is resilient to any malicious setpoints. The proposed method takes as inputs the system topology, DG and ES capabilities, and load limits to solve a convex optimization problem formulated using linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) and the power flow equations. The proposed solution is agnostic to the attacker's action or load profile and it does not require any assumption about the location or means of the attack. The numerical results on a test distribution feeder with several DG and ES illustrate how the proposed resilient operating constraints guarantee the security of the power distribution system under setpoint attacks.

Giraldo, Jairo↗
DOE OSTI2020

Resilient Distributed Field Estimation

We study resilient distributed field estimation under measurement attacks. A network of agents or devices measures a large, spatially distributed physical field parameter. An adversary arbitrarily manipulates the measurements of some of the agents. Each agent's goal is to process its measurements and information received from its neighbors to estimate only a few specific components of the field. Here, we present SAFE, the saturating adaptive field estimator, a consensus + innovations distributed field estimator that is resilient to measurement attacks. Under sufficient conditions on the compromised measurement streams, the physical coupling between the field and the agents' measurements, and the connectivity of the cyber communication network, SAFE guarantees that each agent's estimate converges almost surely to the true value of the components of the parameter in which the agent is interested. Finally, we illustrate the performance of SAFE through numerical examples.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Physical Security and Resiliency Analysis Testbed for Critical Microgrids with IEEE 2030.5: Preprint

IEEE 2030.5, also known as the Common Smart Inverter Standard (CSIP) is a protocol that specifies the interface between the end user and the smart grid. This standard was proposed recently, and provides many functions which if implemented incorrectly might lead to vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a cyber-physical microgrid testbed using OpenDSS and IEEE 2030.5 that can be used to study the performance of the CSIP protocol various scenarios. For critical microgrid installations, it is essential that the critical loads are served in spite of multiple contingencies. A resiliency analysis is performed for a military microgrid to study its performance and the results are analyzed.

CVSS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-informed Engineering Microgrid Analysis Tool

The Cyber-Informed Engineering Microgrid Analysis Tool (CIEMAT) leverages the Department of Energy’s Cyber-Informed Engineering to prompt engineering designers and operators through an analysis of the critical functions to be supported by a microgrid installations, the criticality of those functions, the impacts of denial, disruption or misuse of those functions on the microgrid and dependent functions, and the mitigations which could best prevent impacts to those functions resulting from cyber attack. Through use of this tool, microgrid designers and operators can quickly identify appropriate engineering mitigations to limit impacts from cyber attack and functions where engineering and operational staff can prioritize and guide the application of cybersecurity protections to best support the resiliency of the system.

Wright, VirginiaL [Idaho National Laboratory (INL)↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-informed Engineering Battery Analysis Tool

The Cyber-Informed Engineering Battery Analysis Tool (CIEBAT) leverages the Department of Energy’s Cyber-Informed Engineering to prompt engineering designers and operators through an analysis of the critical functions to be supported by a BESS installation, the criticality of those functions, the impacts of denial, disruption or misuse of those functions within the BESS system, and the mitigations which could best prevent impacts to those functions resulting from cyber attack. Through use of this tool, BESS designers and operators can quickly identify appropriate engineering mitigation opportunities to limit impacts from cyber attack and functions where engineering and operational staff can prioritize and guide the application of cybersecurity protections to best support the resiliency of the system.

Lampe, BenjaminR [Idaho National Laboratory (INL),↗
DOE OSTI2026

Discovering the Most Severe K-Point Failure Based on Reinforcement Learning: Preprint

Smart devices are essential to ensure the stability of the power grid and resilience to intermittent energy production. However, smart devices can also be the target of cyber adversaries that may exploit false data injection attacks (FDIAs) to induce unstable grid conditions. A practical consideration of FDIA mitigation approaches is addressed here: given a finite available budget, for which smart device should cyber-threat mitigation be deployed first? In this work, this question is answered by identifying the so-called most-sensitive devices, i.e., the devices that, if compromised, can let an adversary induce the most serious grid instabilities. The method proposed utilizes an adversarial reinforcement learning (RL) framework to identify the k-mostsensitive smart devices (here, smart inverters). The adversarial agent can tamper with the compromised inverters' active and reactive operating power setup points, with the goal of maximizing voltage deviations. Numerical results show that the proposed RL method finds the optimal attack scenarios for 1-point failure and the near-optimal solution for the 2-point case. Additionally, the proposed RL method achieves an 8.8 speed-up ratio in running time compared to the brute force method for the 2-point case.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing grid reliability and resilience through novel DER control, total situational awareness and integrated distribution-transmission representation

High penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) can lead to overvoltage and thermal violations, miscoordination of protection devices and potential adverse control interactions. The challenges are exacerbated by a lack of operator situational awareness of behind-the-meter DERs, and T&D interactions. Furthermore, the large attack surface of a DER environment creates significant cyber security challenges. The motivation is to address these barriers. The main goal is to enable extreme levels of DERs in distribution systems while simultaneously enhancing their reliability and resiliency. This is achieved by a data-driven approach for operation, planning and control of distribution systems with total situational awareness and real-time DER control enabled by a network of edge intelligent devices, a cloud-based analytical platform, and secure communications.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Inferring adversarial behaviour in cyber‐physical power systems using a Bayesian attack graph approach

Abstract Highly connected smart power systems are subject to increasing vulnerabilities and adversarial threats. Defenders need to proactively identify and defend new high‐risk access paths of cyber intruders that target grid resilience. However, cyber‐physical risk analysis and defense in power systems often requires making assumptions on adversary behaviour, and these assumptions can be wrong. Thus, this work examines the problem of inferring adversary behaviour in power systems to improve risk‐based defense and detection. To achieve this, a Bayesian approach for inference of the Cyber‐Adversarial Power System (Bayes‐CAPS) is proposed that uses Bayesian networks (BNs) to define and solve the inference problem of adversarial movement in the grid infrastructure towards targets of physical impact. Specifically, BNs are used to compute conditional probabilities to queries, such as the probability of observing an event given a set of alerts. Bayes‐CAPS builds initial Bayesian attack graphs for realistic power system cyber‐physical models. These models are adaptable using collected data from the system under study. Then, Bayes‐CAPS computes the posterior probabilities of the occurrence of a security breach event in power systems. Experiments are conducted that evaluate algorithms based on time complexity, accuracy and impact of evidence for different scales and densities of network. The performance is evaluated and compared for five realistic cyber‐physical power system models of increasing size and complexities ranging from 8 to 300 substations based on computation and accuracy impacts.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗
DOE OSTI2026

Engineering Controls Database

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber–physical vulnerability and resiliency analysis for DER integration: A review, challenges and research needs

High penetration of renewable and sustainable Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into the traditional distribution system requires a well-coordinated control strategy for the improvement of system-wide reliability and resiliency. Implementation of such a holistic control architecture requires a flexible, near real-time, and bi-directional communication framework for facilitating the participation of various agents in a multi-vendor heterogeneous smart grid. While the sustainability of energy generation is ensured, this exposes the smart grid to extrinsic cyber threats, and appropriate defense mechanism(s) must be deployed to guarantee continued reliability and resiliency of the power grid. Further, the comprehensive literature review presented in this paper discusses the latest trends in the DER control schemes with fast communication requirements and their accompanying cyber–physical vulnerabilities. These control schemes are compared and contrasted for various traits. A three-level DER system architecture has been depicted, facilitating the deployment of these control schemes. The current developments of standard communication protocols, key security mechanisms, and best practices along major standards and guidelines are explored. The impacts of different attack types with miscellaneous DER functions based on various control schemes and associated mitigation solutions are also provided. Finally, challenges and future research directions for limiting cyber-power susceptibility to enhance resiliency are summarized. The work presented here will help us enabling a cyber-resilient and sustainable smart electric grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Generative Vulnerability Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are highly susceptible to malicious attacks due to their complex dynamics and interconnectivity. A comprehensive understanding of their vulnerabilities is essential for designing effective resilience measures. This paper presents a data-driven attack generative system for evaluating the vulnerability of CPS. The proposed approach formulates the vulnerability assessment problem as determining the feasibility of a specific attack set based on two boundary functions that represent the effectiveness and stealthiness of attacks. The attack generative model is trained using a custom loss function, with two universal approximators designed to learn the effectiveness and stealthiness functions simultaneously. Theoretical results for successful generation and asymptotic convergence of the resulting training algorithm are given. As a result, the proposed approach is evaluated via numerical simulation of an IEEE 14-bus system and gas pipeline systems, demonstrating its viability in learning how to attack nonlinear CPS and identify potential vulnerabilities.

Computer systems organization↗
DOE OSTI2020

Deconstructing the Nuclear Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface

The nuclear supply chain cyber-attack surface is a large, complex network of interconnected stakeholders and activities. The global economy has widened and deepened the supply chain resulting in larger numbers of geographically dispersed locations and increased difficulty ensuring the authenticity and security of digital assets. Although the nuclear industry has made significant strides in securing facilities from cyber-attacks, the supply chain remains vulnerable. This paper provides further details on each of the elements in the Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface, including supply chain lifecycle activities, key stakeholders, touchpoints, and attack types. Deconstructing this attack surface provides insights into supply chain threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. These insights will lead to improvements in cybersecurity supply chain risk analysis, development of new cybersecurity supply chain processes and tools, and enhancement of overall supply chain resilience.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗