Effect of Medical System Size on Predicted Medical Risk and Medical System Design Considerations for an Extended Duration Lunar Mission
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Ariana M Nelson↗
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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Green Propulsion : A NASA GSFC Assessment
In the ever-changing paradigm of efficient and capable spacecraft design, scientific missions continue pushing spacecraft subsystems to deliver effective solutions to meet challenging new mission/spacecraft applications. From an in-space storable liquid chemical propulsion perspective, monopropellant hydrazine is a dependable propellant. Bi-propellant architectures offer even superior performance, but add the complexity of a hypergolic fuel (hydrazine/ mono-methyl hydrazine) and oxidizer (Nitrogen Tetroxide/ mixed oxides of nitrogen) dual tank combination. These propulsion system designs (mono-propellant and bi-propellant) have high heritage, high propellant throughput qualified engines, widely tested material compatibility, qualified fluid delivery commercial-off-the-shelf components, known handling practices, and repeatable performance in successfully delivering on mission requirements. NASA and the broader propulsion community have historically selected hypergolic propellants for most mission applications. The space propulsion community has learned to successfully handle these highly toxic and hazardous materials, navigate the regulated use and the associated safety protocols, personnel protective equipment, and unique training standards – all requisite for loading spacecraft propulsion systems with hypergolic propellants. The question now arises as to what is next for in-space chemical propulsion? Is there an alternative, or even replacement, to the reliable hypergolic fluids, or propellant alternatives that promise increased mission benefits? With the evolution and proven advancements in innovative in-space green propellant technologies capable of delivering benefits to scientific missions, concern over the reliability and infusibility of this higher performing and safer to handle class of propellants is waning. As NASA science missions move forward with the potential flight infusion of green propulsion, NASA and the broader propulsion community are working to address remaining gaps in hardware development, reliability, performance, unique operational considerations, and risk mitigations for high value scientific assets.
Henry W. Mulkey↗
The Effect of Mission Duration on Predicted Medical Risk and Medical System Design Considerations for an Extended Duration Lunar Mission
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Arian Anderson↗
Using Risk Assessment Methodologies to Meet Management Objectives
Current decision making involves numerous possible combinations of technology elements, safety and health issues, operational aspects and process considerations to satisfy program goals. Identifying potential risk considerations as part of the management decision making process provides additional tools to make more informed management decision. Adapting and using risk assessment methodologies can generate new perspectives on various risk and safety concerns that are not immediately apparent. Safety and operational risks can be identified and final decisions can balance these considerations with cost and schedule risks. Additional assessments can also show likelihood of event occurrence and event consequence to provide a more informed basis for decision making, as well as cost effective mitigation strategies. Methodologies available to perform Risk Assessments range from qualitative identification of risk potential, to detailed assessments where quantitative probabilities are calculated. Methodology used should be based on factors that include: 1) type of industry and industry standards, 2) tasks, tools, and environment 3) type and availability of data and 4) industry views and requirements regarding risk & reliability. Risk Assessments are a tool for decision makers to understand potential consequences and be in a position to reduce, mitigate or eliminate costly mistakes or catastrophic failures.
DeMott, D. L.↗
Space Station logistics policy - Risk management from the top down
Considerations are presented in the area of risk management specifically relating to logistics and system supportability. These considerations form a basis for confident application of concurrent engineering principles to a development program, aiming at simultaneous consideration of support and logistics requirements within the engineering process as the system concept and designs develop. It is shown that, by applying such a process, the chances of minimizing program logistics and supportability risk in the long term can be improved. The problem of analyzing and minimizing integrated logistics risk for the Space Station Freedom Program is discussed.
Paules, Granville↗
Risk Analysis for Remote Operation of Microreactors
Microreactors are a subset of advanced nuclear reactors that can be factory fabricated, transportable, and self-regulating. They have the potential to be used in microgrids, rural and remote areas, or emergency response applications, replacing fossil fuel sources like diesel generators and enabling sustainable energy generation. In order to make microreactor operation cost-effective, it is likely that remote communications will be needed to reduce the number of personnel required to be on site. While remote operation of energy generation and other industrial control systems is common in other industries, it is not yet adopted in the nuclear community and has many perceived and actual risks. In this paper, the severity of the risks introduced by remote operations for microreactors are explored. The primary changes in the operations involve the addition of a remote communications network and a certification system for data and controls. These changes lend themselves to considerations of cyber risks, whether unintentional or adversarial, but the assessment considers not just cyber risks introduced, but also how physical and human factors-based risks will impact the remote operations system and change the overall risk profile. This initial assessment indicates that there are standard cyber and mitigation measures that can be put in place so the risk of doing remote operations does not dramatically increase compared to local operations. This evaluation is a critical step in the process of evaluating if remote operations of microreactors is a suitable solution to meet future sustainable grid needs
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Propensity and Risk Assessment for Solar Particle Events: Consideration of Integral Fluence at High Proton Energies
For future space missions with longer duration, exposure to large solar particle events (SPEs) with high energy levels is the major concern during extra-vehicular activities (EVAs) on the lunar and Mars surface. The expected SPE propensity for large proton fluence was estimated from a non-homogeneous Poisson model using the historical database for measurements of protons with energy > 30 MeV, Phi(sub 30). The database includes a continuous data set for the past 5 solar cycles. The resultant SPE risk analysis for a specific mission period was made including the 95% confidence level. In addition to total particle intensity of SPE, the detailed energy spectra of protons especially at high energy levels were recognized as extremely important parameter for the risk assessment, since there remains a significant cancer risks from those energetic particles for large events. Using all the recorded proton fluence of SPEs for energies >60 and >100 MeV, Phi(sub 60) and Phi(sub 100), respectively, the expected propensities of SPEs abundant with high energy protons were estimated from the same non-homogeneous Poisson model and the representative cancer risk was analyzed. The dependencies of risk with different energy spectra, for e.g. between soft and hard SPEs, were evaluated. Finally, we describe approaches to improve radiation protection of astronauts and optimize mission planning for future space missions.
Kim, Myung-Hee↗
Overview and Recommendations for Cyber Risk Assessment in Nuclear Power Plants
Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are being deployed in nuclear power plants (NPPs) for both existing and advanced reactor designs. As I&C systems become more digitized to allow features like near autonomous control and remote operation, they introduce greater cyber risk to NPPs. Cyberattacks targeting industrial control systems (ICSs) are growing in both qualities and capabilities, which indicates that cybersecurity needs to be an integral part of risk assessment in the industry. Although there are some risk assessment methods in traditional information technology (IT) cybersecurity, the differences between IT and ICS cybersecurity make it infeasible to apply these risk assessment methods directly to ICSs. Some research has focused on risk assessment methods for ICSs, but few studies focus on applications to NPPs. Ideal risk frameworks for the nuclear industry are dynamic and account for system dependencies; this survey review focuses on such risk assessment methods both in and outside the nuclear field. In this article, the major challenges in cybersecurity risk assessment research are pointed out, and further research suggestions and considerations for cyber risk assessment in I&C systems are identified.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
A Probability Model of Decompression Sickness at 4.3 Psia after Exercise Prebreathe
Exercise PB can reduce the risk of decompression sickness on ascent to 4.3 psia when performed at the proper intensity and duration. Data are from seven tests. PB times ranged from 90 to 150 min. High intensity, short duration dual-cycle ergometry was done during the PB. This was done alone, or combined with intermittent low intensity exercise or periods of rest for the remaining PB. Nonambulating men and women performed light exercise from a semi-recumbent position at 4.3 psia for four hrs. The Research Model with age tested the probability that DCS increases with advancing age. The NASA Model with gender hypothesized that the probability of DCS increases if gender is female. Accounting for exercise and rest during PB with a variable half-time compartment for computed tissue N2 pressure advances our probability modeling of hypobaric DCS. Both models show that a small increase in exercise intensity during PB reduces the risk of DCS, and a larger increase in exercise intensity dramatically reduces risk. These models support the hypothesis that aerobic fitness is an important consideration for the risk of hypobaric DCS when exercise is performed during the PB.
Conkin, Johnny↗
Risk to Ecological Resources on Burial Waste Sites on the Hanford Site, Washington - 20248
The US and other nations have a large nuclear and chemical waste remediation task remaining from World War II, the Cold War, and industrial activities. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has the largest task in the U.S., with Hanford (Washington State) being the most contaminated site, with the longest and most costly cleanup program projected to extend to the end of the century. One of the greatest remediation problems at Hanford are the burial waste facilities, some of which are inside the 200 Areas on the Central Plateau, while others are outside the 200 Areas. These areas are associated with waste sites, pipes, and contaminated trenches, posing technical cleanup challenges to meet DoE's remediation goals, including protection of human health and the environment commensurate with Tri- Party Agreement and current regulatory requirements. In this paper we select one of the legacy waste sites (the BC Cribs and Trenches) as a case study to explore how risk to ecological resources varies during and as a consequence of remediation on sites primarily considered legacy waste sites. We used the risk methodology developed by the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) during the Hanford Site-wide Risk Review. The CRESP methodology included evaluating the risk to receptors, including human health, the Columbia River, groundwater, and ecological and cultural resources. The risk evaluation process for ecological receptors included defining the boundaries of each evaluation unit (EU) to be remediated, definition of a suitable buffer area that might be affected, and consideration of the known resource value based on field work. This information, coupled with known remediation options or strategies, allowed us to develop a risk rating for ecological resources. Site risks were evaluated on a scale of 'not discernible' to 'very high' risk. Consideration of the risks at the buried waste sites was complicated by uncertainties in remediation methods and the degree of restoration that would occur as part of the remediation process. We use the BC Cribs and Trenches as a case study to explore why the risks are low currently but increase during remediation. The current 'not discernible to low' risk rating is due to the lack of high quality ecological resources on the BC Cribs and Trenches EU, except for edge areas (with some state-listed species). During remediation the risks increase to 'medium', mainly due to high quality resources on adjacent buffer lands, which could be disrupted during active remediation. Medium and high quality resources on the edge of the site are continuous with higher quality native shrub-steppe habitat on the buffer. Ecological resources on some of the areas surrounding the 200 East and West Areas are some of the highest quality shrub-steppe areas on the Hanford Site, and risk to these resources could be prevented by planning before and during remediation to minimize disruption. For example, lay down areas for the BC Cribs and Trenches can be minimized by careful planning. Heavy truck and other vehicular traffic can be minimized. Spread of the noxious weeds now on some of the site can be prevented, and the spread of invasive species into the site (particularly near undisturbed shrub-steppe habitat) can be reduced. Further, the areas around and between the 200 East and West Areas have been largely undisturbed and can serve as a source of seeds and propagules for any revegetation that occurs as part of the remediation process. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Reducing Design Risk Using Robust Design Methods: A Dual Response Surface Approach
Space transportation system conceptual design is a multidisciplinary process containing considerable element of risk. Risk here is defined as the variability in the estimated (output) performance characteristic of interest resulting from the uncertainties in the values of several disciplinary design and/or operational parameters. Uncertainties from one discipline (and/or subsystem) may propagate to another, through linking parameters and the final system output may have a significant accumulation of risk. This variability can result in significant deviations from the expected performance. Therefore, an estimate of variability (which is called design risk in this study) together with the expected performance characteristic value (e.g. mean empty weight) is necessary for multidisciplinary optimization for a robust design. Robust design in this study is defined as a solution that minimizes variability subject to a constraint on mean performance characteristics. Even though multidisciplinary design optimization has gained wide attention and applications, the treatment of uncertainties to quantify and analyze design risk has received little attention. This research effort explores the dual response surface approach to quantify variability (risk) in critical performance characteristics (such as weight) during conceptual design.
Unal, Resit↗
Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective
Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.
Lessons Learned↗
Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective
Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.
Lessons Learned↗
Relating space radiation environments to risk estimates
A number of considerations must go into the process of determining the risk of deleterious effects of space radiation to travelers. Among them are (1) determination of the components of the radiation environment (particle species, fluxes and energy spectra) which will encounter, (2) determination of the effects of shielding provided by the spacecraft and the bodies of the travelers which modify the incident particle spectra and mix of particles, and (3) determination of relevant biological effects of the radiation in the organs of interest. The latter can then lead to an estimation of risk from a given space scenario. Clearly, the process spans many scientific disciplines from solar and cosmic ray physics to radiation transport theeory to the multistage problem of the induction by radiation of initial lesions in living material and their evolution via physical, chemical, and biological processes at the molecular, cellular, and tissue levels to produce the end point of importance.
Curtis, Stanley B.↗
Human Health and Performance Considerations for Exploration of Near-Earth Asteroids (NEA)
This poster paper reviews the Astronaut health and performance issues for a Near Earth Asteroid (NEA) mission. Risks and other considerations are grouped into four categories and they are characterized for criticality.
Steinberg, Susan L.↗
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Decision Making During Spacecraft Operations
Decisions made during the operational phase of a space mission often have significant and immediate consequences. Without the explicit consideration of the risks involved and their representation in a solid model, it is very likely that these risks are not considered systematically in trade studies. Wrong decisions during the operational phase of a space mission can lead to immediate system failure whereas correct decisions can help recover the system even from faulty conditions. A problem of special interest is the determination of the system fault protection strategies upon the occurrence of faults within the system. Decisions regarding the fault protection strategy also heavily rely on a correct understanding of the state of the system and an integrated risk model that represents the various possible scenarios and their respective likelihoods. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling is applicable to the full lifecycle of a space mission project, from concept development to preliminary design, detailed design, development and operations. The benefits and utilities of the model, however, depend on the phase of the mission for which it is used. This is because of the difference in the key strategic decisions that support each mission phase. The focus of this paper is on describing the particular methods used for PRA modeling during the operational phase of a spacecraft by gleaning insight from recently conducted case studies on two operational Mars orbiters. During operations, the key decisions relate to the commands sent to the spacecraft for any kind of diagnostics, anomaly resolution, trajectory changes, or planning. Often, faults and failures occur in the parts of the spacecraft but are contained or mitigated before they can cause serious damage. The failure behavior of the system during operations provides valuable data for updating and adjusting the related PRA models that are built primarily based on historical failure data. The PRA models, in turn, provide insight into the effect of various faults or failures on the risk and failure drivers of the system and the likelihood of possible end case scenarios, thereby facilitating the decision making process during operations. This paper describes the process of adjusting PRA models based on observed spacecraft data, on one hand, and utilizing the models for insight into the future system behavior on the other hand. While PRA models are typically used as a decision aid during the design phase of a space mission, we advocate adjusting them based on the observed behavior of the spacecraft and utilizing them for decision support during the operations phase.
dynamic fault trees↗
Bridging the Divide between Safety and Risk Management for your Project or Program
This presentation will bridge the divide between these separate but overlapping disciplines and help explain how to use Risk Management as an effective management decision support tool that includes safety. Risk Management is an over arching communication tool used by management to prioritize and effectively mitigate potential problems before they concur. Risk Management encompasses every kind of potential problem that can occur on a program or project. Some of these are safety issues such as hazards that have a specific likelihood and consequence that need to be controlled and included to show an integrated picture of accepted) mitigated, and residual risk. Integrating safety and other assurance disciplines is paramount to accurately representing a program s or projects risk posture. Risk is made up of several components such as technical) cost, schedule, or supportability. Safety should also be a consideration for every risk. The safety component can also have an impact on the technical, cost, and schedule aspect of a given risk. The current formats used for communication of safety and risk issues are not consistent or integrated. The presentation will explore the history of these disciplines, current work to integrate them, and suggestions for integration for the future.
Lutomski, Mike↗
Behavioral responses of fish to a current-based hydrokinetic turbine under mutliple operational conditions
There is significant international interest in developing current-based marine and hydrokinetic (MHK) technologies to capture the power of tidal energy. However, concerns have been raised regarding the ecological effects of these projects on fish, including the risk of blade collision and behavioral impacts such as the disruption of migratory behavior and food acquisition and displacement from preferred habitats. In this study, we conducted mobile hydroacoustic surveys to track fish as they approached a tidal turbine deployed in Cobscook Bay, Maine. There was a significant decline in fish numbers with decreasing distance to the turbine, beginning approximately 140 m from the turbine. Similar declines were not observed at control transects or when the turbine was not spinning. The decline in fish numbers appeared to be the result of horizontal displacement, not vertical, movements to avoid the turbine. Noise rather than visual cues or flow field disturbance seemed to be a likely explanation for the reduced number of fish near the turbine. This finding, combined with near-field blade collision studies indicating a low probability of encounter, suggests that a single turbine poses a low collision risk to pelagic fish and that a single turbine is likely to result in minimal behavioral responses by fish. However, the risk may be different with additional devices, which will become more relevant as commercial-scale MHK arrays come under consideration. Therefore, the risks associated with commercial-scale operations will ultimately have to be evaluated to fully understand the ecological impacts of MHK devices.
42 ENGINEERING↗