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DOE OSTI2020

Environmental, Health and Safety Assessment Application of a Heat Integrated, Post-combustion CO2 Capture System Using Monoethanolamine and Hitachi H3-1 Solvent at the E.W. Brown Coal-fired Power Plant

An Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) Assessment was completed for operation of a pilot scale carbon dioxide (CO2) capture system (CCS) at the Louisville Gas & Electric (LG&E) and Kentucky Utilities (KU) Energy, LLC (LG&E-KU) E. W. Brown Generating Station in Harrodsburg, Mercer County, Kentucky. The pilot system was evaluated using two CO2 capture solvents, monoethanolamine (MEA) and Hitachi’s H3-1 solvent. The purpose of the EH&S Assessment was to determine if there were any unacceptable environmental, health or safety concerns that may prevent operation or environmental permitting of a larger scale pilot scale plant. The assessment included review of process flow diagrams, input and output flow rates for primary materials, literature describing similar processes and chemicals used or created during the process, actual air emission and wastewater test data and air emission calculations. The evaluation included identification of risks related to hazardous chemicals, air emissions, wastewater discharges, solid wastes generated and employee hazards. Most potential EH&S issues that were identified are commonly found and successfully managed at large industrial facilities. No risks were identified that could not be successfully managed or would likely prevent implementation or environmental permitting of the pilot or larger scale plant. Potential exposures and resulting health risks from exposure to low concentrations of nitrosamines generated from degradation of the Hitachi H3-1 and possibly MEA solvents may be a health concern for site workers, but additional investigation is needed to accurately assess this risk. Applying the information gained from operating the pilot plant, performing air emission testing and used solvent testing to a large-scale facility at a commercial coal-fired electric generating plant suggests additional air emission control measures may be necessary to reduce potential site worker health risks and possibly community risks. Depending upon the location and regional air quality, considerable effort may be required to obtain the necessary air permit for construction and operation of a similarly configured large-scale PCCCS facility.

gas separation↗

DOE OSTI2020

Environmental, Health and Safety Assessment Application of a Heat Integrated, Post-combustion CO 2 Capture System Using Monoethanolamine and Hitachi H3-1 Solvent at the E.W. Brown Coal-Fired Power Plant

An Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) Assessment was completed for operation of a pilot scale carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture system (CCS) at the Louisville Gas & Electric (LG&E) and Kentucky Utilities (KU) Energy, LLC (LG&E-KU) E. W. Brown Generating Station in Harrodsburg, Mercer County, Kentucky. The pilot system was evaluated using two CO 2 capture solvents, monoethanolamine (MEA) and Hitachi’s H3-1 solvent. The purpose of the EH&S Assessment was to determine if there were any unacceptable environmental, health or safety concerns that may prevent operation or environmental permitting of a larger scale pilot scale plant. The assessment included review of process flow diagrams, input and output flow rates for primary materials, literature describing similar processes and chemicals used or created during the process, actual air emission and wastewater test data and air emission calculations. The evaluation included identification of risks related to hazardous chemicals, air emissions, wastewater discharges, solid wastes generated and employee hazards. Most potential EH&S issues that were identified are commonly found and successfully managed at large industrial facilities. No risks were identified that could not be successfully managed or would likely prevent implementation or environmental permitting of the pilot or larger scale plant. Potential exposures and resulting health risks from exposure to low concentrations of nitrosamines generated from degradation of the Hitachi H3-1 and possibly MEA solvents may be a health concern for site workers, but additional investigation is needed to accurately assess this risk. Applying the information gained from operating the pilot plant, performing air emission testing and used solvent testing to a large-scale facility at a commercial coal-fired electric generating plant suggests additional air emission control measures may be necessary to reduce potential site worker health risks and possibly community risks. Depending upon the location and regional air quality, considerable effort may be required to obtain the necessary air permit for construction and operation of a similarly configured large-scale PCCCS facility.

gas separation↗

DOE OSTI2021

Implementing Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: An Exercise in ICS Security Application

Distributed wind is unique and fast-growing component of the energy production mix, but cybersecurity for distributed wind is not well developed. In this presentation, we will introduce distributed wind as an example of difficult-to-secure critical infrastructure. We will first provide background on distributed wind architectures, applications, and stakeholder roles. We will explain the need and challenges for cybersecurity for distributed wind, pointing to both academic studies and real-world events. The key component of the presentation will discuss recommendations for different aspects of security, such as risk assessments, communications, and access control, that specifically call out considerations that apply uniquely to distributed wind. We will discuss what sets distributed wind apart from other ICS and energy applications, and how to account for these features in a comprehensive security plan. This process is demonstrative of the type of analysis needed to adapt traditional security guidelines and standards to narrow and focused applications.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

Downscaling and bias-correction contribute considerable uncertainty to local climate projections in CMIP6

Abstract Efforts to diagnose the risks of a changing climate often rely on downscaled and bias-corrected climate information, making it important to understand the uncertainties and potential biases of this approach. Here, we perform a variance decomposition to partition uncertainty in global climate projections and quantify the relative importance of downscaling and bias-correction. We analyze simple climate metrics such as annual temperature and precipitation averages, as well as several indices of climate extremes. We find that downscaling and bias-correction often contribute substantial uncertainty to local decision-relevant climate outcomes, though our results are strongly heterogeneous across space, time, and climate metrics. Our results can provide guidance to impact modelers and decision-makers regarding the uncertainties associated with downscaling and bias-correction when performing local-scale analyses, as neglecting to account for these uncertainties may risk overconfidence relative to the full range of possible climate futures.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Automatic Generation of Event Trees and Fault Trees: A Model-Based Approach

In the past few decades, the increasing complexity of modern engineering systems has been driven by the integration of a large number of components whose operations may involve many disciplines (e.g., thermal hydraulics, plant operations, cybersecurity). Most computational tools used by industry and regulators for system safety and reliability assessments are still based on the traditional fault tree (FT) and event tree (ET) approach, which may not be able to capture complex interactions among system constituents. The use of simulation tools has widely increased in the past few decades to improve the fidelity of the reliability and safety analyses. However, the direct use of simulation tools as part of dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) methods is not getting traction since (1) modeling the whole system under consideration with DPRA methods may be computationally expensive and unnecessary, and (2) the manual integration of DPRA models into existing state-of-practice probabilistic risk assessment models (i.e., based on FTs and ETs) can be time consuming and prone to errors. Here, in this paper we propose a procedure to overcome this limitation by presenting several algorithms designed to automatically construct subsystem ETs and FTs from DPRA methods for integration into an existing ET/FT system model.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Identifying University Chemicals That Pose Security Risks: A Simple Qualitative Approach

Various laboratory-focused tools and methodologies for completing a safety risk assessment have been published, yet few similar resources to address chemical security exist. Herein, we describe a chemical security risk assessment case study at a university in a developing country. In this case study, we demonstrate a chemical security risk assessment for a university chemistry department, using an original inventory of 645 entries which was condensed to 295 chemicals after removing duplicates and erroneous entries. We then prioritized to highlight 83 chemicals of interest based on hazardous or dual-use properties that could lead to unacceptable consequences. We further refined to a list of 34 high-risk chemicals that required action, 48 chemicals that may need further justification and consideration for additional protection, and 1 chemical that did not need further consideration for additional protection.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2025

Wildfire and power grid nexus in a changing climate

Global wildfire events have had increasingly severe impacts in recent years, particularly in the western USA, driven by extreme fire-weather conditions, fuel accumulation and multiple ignition sources. Wildfires sparked by power lines tend to be larger and more destructive, as they often occur during high winds, which accelerate the spread of fires. Moreover, efforts to contain wildfires frequently result in power outages, causing considerable economic disruption. Here, in this Review, we examine wildfire risks related to power-line-induced ignitions, infrastructure damage, climate-induced environmental impacts, grid operational risks, real-time grid management risks, vegetation management risks, and financial and funding risks in the context of a changing climate and their interdependence with power grid infrastructures. We then explore the resilience of power grids under wildfire threats, looking at risk analysis, prediction and mitigation strategies. The Review also shares practical insights and experiences in the USA to inform researchers, policymakers and industry professionals.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Failure Mechanism Traceability and Application in Human System Interface of Nuclear Power Plants using RESHA

In recent years, there has been considerable effort to modernize existing and new nuclear power plants with digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C). However, there has also been considerable concern both by industry and regulatory bodies for the risk and consequence analysis of these systems. Of particular concern are digital common cause failures (CCFs) specifically related to software defects. These “misbehaviors” by the software can occur in both the control and monitoring of a system. While many new methods have been proposed to identify potential software failure modes, such as Systems-theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), etc., these methods are focused primarily on the control action pathway of a system. In contrast, the information feedback pathway lacks unsafe control actions (UCAs), which are typically related to software basic events; thus, assessment of software basic events in such systems is unclear. In this work, we present the idea of intermediate processors and unsafe information flow (UIF) to help safety analysts trace failure mechanisms in the feedback pathway and how they can be integrated into a fault tree for improved assessment capability. The concepts presented are demonstrated in two comprehensive case studies, a smart sensor integrated platform for unmanned autonomous vehicles and another on a representative advanced human system interface (HSI) for safety critical plant monitoring. The qualitative software basic events are identified, and a fault tree analysis is conducted based on a modified Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) methodology. The case studies demonstrate the use of UIF and intermediate processors in the fault tree to improve traceability of software failures in highly complex digital instrumentation feedback. The improved method can also clarify fault tree construction when multiple component dependencies are present in the system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Failure Mechanism Traceability and Application in Human System Interface of Nuclear Power Plants using RESHA

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Numerical Simulations of Geologic Storage Reservoir Management to Support Risk Mitigation Evaluation

This report provides a detailed description of a set of numerical simulations that represent reservoir behavior over time in response to different operational decision scenarios for detection of potential leakage and reduction or avoidance of leakage impact at a hypothetical geological carbon storage (GCS) site. These simulations serve as the basis for a series of GCS leakage risk forecasts that are to be developed using the National Risk Assessment Partnership’s Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM), and a demonstration of a simple decision support workflow for evaluation of mitigation strategies based on results of those system model forecasts. This risk assessment and decision support study is forthcoming. Four injection scenarios were considered: a constant rate carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) injection case (base case), a case with CO 2 injection rate adjustment, a case with early termination of injection operations, and a case with brine extraction. CO 2 injection operations were controlled to ensure that the pressure transient remains below the defined manageable reservoir fracture pressure, with consideration shown to hypothetical locations within the modeled spatial domain where the overburden was weaker and lower transient pressure increases were allowable. Additionally, a brine extraction alternative was considered as a reservoir management and risk mitigation option to reduce reservoir pressure, steer the plume away from any hypothetical geohazard such as fault as needed, and enhance storage capacity. Such operational actions contribute to risk management overtime. This study explores the potential utility of reservoir management for risk reduction at GCS sites. This study shows that the injection design may modify the time to CO 2 breakthrough at a legacy well; in particular, these results show that brine extraction can add value for mitigating risk both by delaying leakage and reducing pressure build-up. For the scenario considered, both pressure plots and pressure distributions demonstrate that pressure build-up was decreased by 3% with brine extraction. Additionally, extraction of brine afforded enhancement of CO 2 storage capacity by 5% compared to the base case. These findings suggest that brine extraction has substantial potential to steer the risk-related reservoir effects away from known geohazards (e.g., faults and legacy wells) by conducting pressure transient effects and CO 2 plume movement toward the production well. Injection rate adjustment scenarios considered in this study show potential value for managing both reservoir pressure transients and CO 2 plume behavior. Operational actions for reducing injection and/or early termination of injection (as compared to the base case), however, require careful design; tailoring both the extent and timing of injection rate adjustment over the injection and post-injection operational period must be thoroughly planned to balance maximizing storage and minimizing subsurface environmental risk. The study also gives preliminary consideration to the effectiveness that monitoring strategy may play in providing useful information to inform reservoir management decisions for risk reduction. Two types of monitoring were considered: 1) pressure build-up or pressure transient; and 2) potential leakage detection from a CO 2 mass or plume. Four hypothetical legacy wells, two plugged and two abandoned, were placed in the model domain. Monitoring along these wells was measured over time in individual stacked reservoir formations and shale formations to support risk mitigation decisions, especially operational decisions that assisted in risk reduction. These simulations will serve as the basis for a series of GCS leakage risk forecasts that are to be developed using NRAP’s Open-IAM, and demonstration of a simple decision support workflow for comparative assessment of mitigation alternatives based on results of those system model forecasts. This risk assessment and decision support study is forthcoming.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

DOE OSTI2022

International assessment of priority environmental issues for land-based and offshore wind energy development

Non-technical summary A substantial increase in wind energy deployment worldwide is required to help achieve international targets for decreasing global carbon emissions and limiting the impacts of climate change. In response to global concerns regarding the environmental effects of wind energy, the International Energy Agency Wind Technical Collaborative Program initiated Task 34 – Working Together to Resolve Environmental Effects of Wind Energy or WREN. As part of WREN, this study performed an international assessment with the global wind energy and environmental community to determine priority environmental issues over the next 5‒10 years and help support collaborative interactions among researchers, developers, regulators, and stakeholders. Technical summary A systematic assessment was performed using feedback from the international community to identify priority environmental issues for land-based and offshore wind energy development. Given the global nature of wind energy development, feedback was of interest from all countries where such development is underway or planned to help meet United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change targets. The assessment prioritized environmental issues over the next 5–10 years associated with wind energy development and received a total of 294 responses from 28 countries. For land-based wind, the highest-ranked issues included turbine collision risk for volant species (birds and bats), cumulative effects on species and ecosystems, and indirect effects such as avoidance and displacement. For offshore wind, the highest-ranked issues included cumulative effects, turbine collision risk, underwater noise (e.g. marine mammals and fish), and displacement. Emerging considerations for these priorities include potential application to future technologies (e.g. larger turbines and floating turbines), new stressors and species in frontier regions, and cumulative effects for multiple projects at a regional scale. For both land-based and offshore wind, effectiveness of minimization measures (e.g. detection and deterrence technologies) and costs for monitoring, minimization, and mitigation were identified as overarching challenges. Social media summary Turbine collisions and cumulative effects among the international environmental priorities for wind energy development.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reevaluation of Radiation-Protection Standards for Workers and the Public Based on Current Scientific Evidence

President Trump’s recent executive orders to “Usher in a Nuclear Renaissance,” coupled with the global pledge to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050, underscore nuclear energy’s importance to national security and economic prosperity. This renewed interest has prompted efforts to spur nuclear-energy deployment, including assessing factors impeding it. One issue that has previously been identified as adding to the cost of nuclear energy is excessively conservative requirements, including those related to radiation protection. This technical review, therefore, examines current radiation-protection standards that were established decades ago when more limited data were available and nuclear-energy expansion was not a national priority. The review focuses on scientific evidence regarding the health effects of ionizing radiation at annual doses of 10,000 mrem or less. The review evaluates epidemiological studies, radiobiological research, and positions of relevant professional organizations to assess whether such doses result in discernable or observable increases in negative health outcomes. The review also surveys the literature related to economic and practical implications of current radiation-protection standards and practices. Based on this assessment, we propose maintaining an annual occupational whole-body dose limit of 5,000 mrem/yr and eliminating all “as low as reasonably achievable” requirements and limits below this threshold. This change could potentially reduce radiation-protection costs by millions of dollars annually for each reactor, as well as decrease the overall costs and correct misconceptions about the risks associated with all nuclear technologies. The evidence further supports future consideration of a 10,000 mrem/yr limit that would maintain appropriate safety margins while further reducing protection costs. Similarly, given the data and that the average annual radiation dose per person in the U.S. is 620 mrem, we believe the public dose limits of 100 mrem/yr are unnecessarily restrictive; increasing to 500 mrem/yr would maintain substantial safety margins—a factor of 10 below the occupational limit—while reducing regulatory burdens and associated bureaucracy. While we acknowledge ongoing scientific debate and encourage continued research on the health effects of ionizing radiation, our review indicates current frameworks are overly conservative. These overly stringent limits not only impose unnecessary economic burdens without corresponding health benefits but also divert safety focus and resources from more important considerations. Although this study was motivated by nuclear-power considerations, reforms to radiation-protection requirements have significant positive implications for other areas, such as nuclear medical applications, environmental remediation, nuclear-waste management and disposal, and industrial applications of nuclear technologies.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2022

BayoTech Risk and Modeling Support of NM Gas Site

The BayoTech hydrogen generation system has been evaluated in terms of safety considerations at the NM Gas site. The consequence of a leak in different components in the system was evaluated in terms of plume dispersion and overpressure. Additionally, the likelihood of a leak scenario for different hydrogen components was identified. The worst-case plume dispersion cases, full-bore leaks, resulted in relatively large plumes. However, these cases were noted to be far less likely than the partial break cases that were evaluated. The partial break cases resulted in nearly negligible plume lengths. Similarly, the overpressure analysis of the full-bore break scenarios resulted in much larger overpressures than the partial break cases (which resulted in negligible overpressure at the lot line). There were several cases evaluated in the analysis that represented leak scenarios from both hydrogen and natural gas sources. Generally, the natural gas leak scenarios resulted in a smaller horizontal impact than that of hydrogen leaks. The worst-case consequence from a hydrogen leak resulted from the compressors, storage pods, or dispensing system. To consider the safety features that may isolate the leak, the consequence was evaluated at different times after the leak event to show the reduction of pressure. After 2 seconds, the plume dispersion from this event is contained within the perimeter of the site. The worst-case consequences show that the plume may disperse to adjacent facilities and to the street. When considering both likelihood and consequence, the risk may be considered low because the maximum frequency of a full-bore leak from any component within the hydrogen compound is 8.2 E-5/yr. This means that a full-bore leak is expected to occur less than once every 10,000 years. The risk can be further reduced by implementing mitigative countermeasures, such as CMU walls along the sides of the equipment compound. This would reduce the overall consequence of the worst-case dispersion scenarios (horizontal impact of plume). In terms of siting and safety analysis, the NFPA 2 code was used to provide a high-level evaluation of the current site plan. The most limiting equipment in terms of set-back distance are the compressors/storage units because of the high-pressure hydrogen. The site layout was evaluated for an acceptable location for the compression/storage unit based on NFPA 2 set-back distances. It is important to note that the NFPA 2 set-back distances consider both likelihood and consequence. This is important because the worst-case results evaluated herein also represent the least likely leak scenario. Other site-specific considerations were evaluated, including the parking shade structure with photovoltaic cells and refueling vehicles. These issues were dispositioned and determined to not present a safety risk.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Fuel Cell Electric Bus Hydrogen Storage and Refueling Facility

It is necessary to understand the safety implications and risk mitigation options for fuel cell electric bus fleet deployment, especially for related facilities responsible for operations such as production, storage, compression, and dispensing of hydrogen for use by the buses. In this report, we present a quantitative risk assessment for a potential fuel cell electric bus fleet that was motivated by efforts to improve resilience at the Portland International Airport but can be applicable to a range of hydrogen case studies and use cases. We estimated risk for a facility that produces, stores, compresses, and dispenses hydrogen for the fleet of buses, with a focus on individual risk to people in terms of annual frequency of fatality. We considered the frequency of hydrogen leaks that could result in harmful physical outcomes like jet fires or explosions, and the consequences of those outcomes for people. We created customized fault trees to calculate the frequencies of different sizes of leaks and event sequence diagrams to calculate ignition probabilities for the various leak sizes. We also leveraged the HyRAM+ toolkit to use these inputs to calculate overall risk for the facility, which we separated into one section responsible for producing, storing, and compressing hydrogen, and one section responsible for dispensing the hydrogen to the buses. We found that the dispensing area seemed to have a higher risk than the production/storage/compression area of the facility, largely because of the inclusion of a component with a high leak frequency (the heat exchanger used to cool the hydrogen before entering the vehicle, to prevent overheating and expansion of hydrogen in the onboard tank). For the example production and refueling facility we evaluated and the data we used for the analysis, the leak frequency had a larger impact on the risk differences between the two sections on the facility, compared to the physical outcome consequence, which was slightly different due to the varying fuel conditions, but not substantially different. Actions can be taken to prevent these hazards (e.g., lowering leak frequencies in system components) or to mitigate the consequences if they do occur (e.g., installing barriers to protect people if ignition events occur). The choice of which actions to take depends not only on safety considerations but also on space, time, staffing, feasibility, and financial constraints. Therefore, the quantitative risk assessment approach can help understand relative risk contributions from different components, leak sizes, consequences, and human actions, to prioritize risk reduction strategies and balance these parameters. The outcomes of this report may be useful for a variety of stakeholders working in the hydrogen, transportation, vehicle, and aviation sector, including those responsible for aspects like facility design, operations, and regulations. There is not a single value of risk that determines whether a hypothetical system is “safe” or not. The insights about risk mitigations may be leveraged, and the quantitative risk assessment approach can be applied to other case studies to understand risk priorities and contributions specific to different FCEB and hydrogen facility uses.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2020

eRHIC Design Update

The future electron-ion collider (EIC) aims at an electron-proton luminosity of 10³³ to 10³⁴ cm⁻² sec⁻¹ and a center-of-mass energy range from 20 to 140 GeV. The eRHIC design has been continuously evolving over a couple of years and has reached a considerable level of maturity. The concept is generally conservative with very few risk items which are mitigated in various ways.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Redefining Net-Zero Water for Resilient Aquifers

Groundwater has long been a critical source of potable water, supplying one-third of all global water withdrawals and providing strategic reserves in times of drought (Konikow, 2012; Famiglietti, 2014). The risk in relying on groundwater is that it is often pumped at rates far greater than it can be naturally replenished. With increasing population and a changing climate, the depletion of potable water supplies has become an ever-growing concern (Srinivasan et al., 2012). Recently, the concept of “resilience” has been applied to groundwater, leaving many questions to be explored in terms of what resilience should mean for aquifers (Foster and MacDonald, 2014; Grönwall and Oduro-Kwarteng, 2017). The term is commonly used to indicate resilience to impacts of climate change specifically, but here we consider resilience in the context of more general water insecurity. Relatedly, the concept of “sustainable yield” has emerged in an attempt to determine a metric that can ensure the long-term resilience of groundwater systems, but the definition is fraught with inherent uncertainties and its quantification poses challenges (Rudestam and Langridge, 2014; Grönwall and Oduro-Kwarteng, 2017). At the heart of these concepts is a focus on sustainable management of aquifers. A sustainable approach to managing groundwater resources usually involves balancing long-term abstraction with the long-term recharge taking into account the needs for environmental flows and implementing drought-preparedness measures (Robins et al. 2006; Foster and MacDonald, 2014). At a high level, a sustainable balance of groundwater abstraction versus aquifer recharge may be considered “Net Zero” (NZ) or “Net Positive” (NP) in cases where recharge is equal to or in excess of abstraction, respectively. However, NZ/NP water management programs that address these concerns have varied definitions of compliance, which include considerations for the application at hand (ILFI, 2020; USGBC, 2020). Locations with high risk of low or poor water supply may be particularly interested in pursuing NZ/NP water. The AQUEDUCT Water Risk Atlas (World Resources Institute, 2019) indicates long-term availability, providing risk levels for quantity and quality of water at specific locations across the globe, for existing and predicted future conditions. This paper follows the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) NZ water definition adopted by the U.S. Army for use at their installations, including Army Reserve Centers (ARCs). This definition also relates to the U.S. Army’s current focus on water resilience, which includes short-term and long-term availability of water resources.

net zero water, HUC12, Saipan, American Samoa, Mau↗

DOE OSTI2022

Computational Tools and Workflows for Quantitative Risk Assessment and Decision Support for Geologic Carbon Storage Sites: Progress and Insights from the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership

The 2005 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on CCS raised the profile of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) as an important technology for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. CCS is now recognized as a key component of most climate change mitigation scenarios. Since publication of that report the international research, development, and deployment (RD&D) community has advanced key technical aspects, clarified regulatory requirements, explored value chain and infrastructure solutions, and developed incentive paradigms to enable and promote large-scale deployment of CCS. These efforts have included research to better characterize geologic storage resources, to improve injection performance and storage efficiency, to assess and manage subsurface environmental risks, and to advance monitoring technologies to assure system conformance. These efforts have helped to build confidence in the viability of geologic carbon storage (GCS), but stakeholder concerns about long-term risks and liability associated with GCS remain a hurdle to broad acceptance and large-scale deployment of CCS. Since 2010, the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) – a research collaboration between five contributing national laboratories – has worked to establish and demonstrate methods and tools to quantify and manage the subsurface environmental risks associated with GCS, amidst uncertainty. This work supports the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management Carbon Transport and Storage Program’s goal of advancing safe and secure commercial-scale GCS deployment. To address the technical challenge of simulating the physical response of the GCS site to large-scale CO2 injection, NRAP has adopted an approach that relies on coupling computationally efficient reduced-order and/or data-driven proxy models of important system components (i.e., storage reservoir, sealing caprock, leakage pathways, intermediate formations, overlying groundwater aquifers, and the atmosphere) in integrated assessment framework. That integrated model of the physical system is complemented with fit-for purpose functionality to support site characterization and risk-related decisions. The recently released NRAP Phase II toolset includes the Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) for evaluation of trends in leakage risk and potential impact, tools to support monitoring design optimization (Designs for Risk Evaluation and Management – DREAM v3.0 and Passive Seismic Monitoring Tool - PSMT), and tools for state of stress evaluation (State-of-Stress Analysis Tool - SOSAT) and forecasting induced seismicity risk. The NRAP team has also released a pair of reports describing conceptual workflows to incorporate physics-based, quantitative risk assessment into many of the design, planning, operation, and closure decisions for GCS projects. An online catalogue highlights published studies where these tools and methods are demonstrated. In this presentation, the utility of these products to assess risks and address key stakeholder questions will be highlighted through examples, and related insights about the safety and security of geologic carbon storage in qualified storage sites will be discussed. The prospect of rapid, large-scale deployment of GCS technology to aggressively reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions requires careful consideration of interference between multiple commercial-scale storage projects within a basin. Going forward, NRAP is expanding and adapting site-scale risk quantification tools and methods to enable assessment of risks and inform management decisions for basin-scale deployment. Increasingly, this work will leverage next-generation approaches for surrogate modelling, fast prediction, and advanced visualization enabled by machine learning and artificial intelligence to promote virtual learning, scenario evaluation, and augment risk-based decision making.

quantitative risk assessment, geologic carbon stor↗