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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1999

XV-15 Tiltrotor Low Noise Approach Operations

Acoustic data have been acquired for the XV-15 tiltrotor aircraft performing approach operations for a variety of different approach profile configurations. This flight test program was conducted jointly by NASA, the U.S. Army, and Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI) in June 1997. The XV-15 was flown over a large area microphone array, which was deployed to directly measure the noise footprint produced during actual approach operations. The XV-15 flew realistic approach profiles that culminated in IGE hover over a landing pad. Aircraft tracking and pilot guidance was provided by a Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) and a flight director system developed at BHTI. Approach profile designs emphasized noise reduction while maintaining handling qualities sufficient for tiltrotor commercial passenger ride comfort and flight safety under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) conditions. A discussion of the approach profile design philosophy is provided. Five different approach profiles are discussed in detail -- 3 deg., 6 deg., and 9 deg. approaches, and two very different 3 deg. to 9 deg. segmented approaches. The approach profile characteristics are discussed in detail, followed by the noise footprints and handling qualities. Sound exposure levels are also presented on an averaged basis and as a function of the sideline distance for a number of up-range distances from the landing point. A comparison of the noise contour areas is also provided. The results document the variation in tiltrotor noise due to changes in operating condition, and indicate the potential for significant noise reduction using the unique tiltrotor capability of nacelle tilt.

Conner, David A.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Architecture Synthesis and Reduced-Cost Architectures for Human Exploration Missions

Development of architectures for human exploration missions has been pursued in the international aerospace community for a long time. This paper attempts a different approach and way of looking at architectures. Most of the emphasis is on lunar architectures with a brief look at Mars. The first step is to set forth overarching gods in order to understand origins of requirements. Then, principles and guidelines are developed for architecture formulation. It is argued that safety and cost are the primary factors. Alternative mission profiles are examined for adherence to the principles, and specific architectures formulated according to the guidelines. The guidelines themselves indicate preferred evolution paths from lunar to Mars architectures. Results of example calculations are given to illustrate the process, and an evolution path is recommended. Safety and cost criteria tend to conflict, but it is shown that cost-efficient architectures can be enhanced for good safety ratings at modest cost.

Woodcock, Gordon↗
NASA NTRS2011

Doppler Radar Profiler for Launch Winds at the Kennedy Space Center (Phase 1a)

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) received a request from the, NASA Technical Fellow for Flight Mechanics at Langley Research Center (LaRC), to develop a database from multiple Doppler radar wind profiler (DRWP) sources and develop data processing algorithms to construct high temporal resolution DRWP wind profiles for day-of-launch (DOL) vehicle assessment. This document contains the outcome of Phase 1a of the assessment including Findings, Observations, NESC Recommendations, and Lessons Learned.

Murri, Daniel G.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2025

Loading Capacity and Dilute Nitric Acid Rinse of Diglycolamide Resin for the Recovery of Transplutonium and Rare Earth Elements from Mark-18A Targets

N,N,N′,N′-tetraoctyldiglycolamide (TODGA) as a resin (“DGA resin”) produced by Eichrom Technologies will be used by Savannah River National Laboratory for the indiscriminate extraction of trivalent actinides and rare earth elements with the intent of recovering Cm and Am from dissolved irradiated 242 Pu Mark-18A targets in 7 to 9 M nitric acid. The extracted constituents will be recovered as an oxide by direct thermal decomposition of the loaded resin followed by calcination of the resultant residue. The characteristics of DGA resin with non-radiological feed simulant representative of the anticipated feed in the Mark-18A process, with Sm and Nd as surrogates for Cm and Am, respectively, including breakthrough point and saturation capacity were evaluated in this work. Additionally, this work examined the losses from the loaded resin by rinsing the resin bed with dilute acid to reduce the nitrate concentration in the resin bed prior to thermal decomposition operations to improve the safety posture of the process. A resin loading profile was developed, and the resin was determined to have a trivalent metal saturation capacity of 74 μmol/mL resin under the experimental conditions evaluated. Following a wash of the loaded resin bed with fresh 8 M HNO 3 , the trivalent metals retained was reduced to 68 μmol/mL resin, which represents the practical capacity of the resin for the Mark-18A process. Lighter lanthanides breakthrough the resin well before the saturation capacity is reached. Rinsing the saturated resin bed with 0.26 M HNO 3 was found to result in a rapid reduction in retention of rare earth elements by the resin. After 2.8 bed volumes of dilute acid rinse, the mean resin bed free acid concentration was reduced to 0.28 M and 3.1 bed volumes of dilute acid rinse resulted in a reduction of the cumulative rare earth element retention to 52 μmol/mL of resin.

Transplutonium separations↗
DOE OSTI2022

Suppression of toroidal Alfvén eigenmodes by the electron cyclotron current drive in KSTAR plasmas

Advanced operation scenarios such as high poloidal beta ( β P ) or high q min are promising concepts to achieve the steady-state high-performance fusion plasmas. However, those scenarios are prone to substantial Alfvénic activity, causing fast-ion transport and losses. Recent experiments with the advanced operation scenario on KSTAR tokamak have shown that the electron cyclotron current drive (ECCD) is able to mitigate and suppress the beam-ion driven toroidal Alfvén eigenmodes (TAEs) for over several tens of global energy confinement time. Co-current directional intermediate off-axis ECCD lowers the central safety factor slightly and tilts the central q -profile shape so that the continuum damping in the core region increases. Besides, the rise of central plasma pressure and increased thermal-ion Landau damping contribute to TAE stabilization. While the TAEs are suppressed, neutron emission rate and total stored energy increase by approximately 45% and 25%, respectively. Fast-ion transport estimated by TRANSP calculations approaches the classical level during the TAE suppression period. Substantial reduction in fast-ion loss and neutron deficit is also observed. Subsequently, enhancement of fast-ion confinement by suppressing the TAEs leads to an increase of non-inductive current fraction and will benefit the sustainment of the long-pulse high-performance discharges.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
NASA NTRS1981

Practical aspects of instrumentation system installation, volume 13

A review of factors influencing installation of aircraft flight test instrumentation is presented. Requirements, including such factors as environment, reliability, maintainability, and system safety are discussed. The assessment of the mission profile is followed by an overview of electrical and mechanical installation factors with emphasis on shock/vibration isolation systems and standardization of the electric wiring installation, two factors often overlooked by instrumentation engineers. A discussion of installation hardware reviews the performance capabilities of wiring, connectors, fuses and circuit breakers, and a guide to proper selections is provided. The discussion of the installation is primarily concerned with the electrical wire routing, shield terminations and grounding. Also inclued are some examples of installation mistakes that could affect system accuracy. System verification procedures and special considerations such as sneak circuits, pyrotechnics, aircraft antenna patterns, and lightning strikes are discussed.

Borek, R. W.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Analysis of Near Simultaneous Jimsphere and AMPS High Resolution Wind Profiles

The high-resolution wind profile of the Automated Meteorological Profiling System (HRAMPS) is the proposed replacement for the Jimsphere measurement system used to support NASA Shuttle launches from the Eastern Test Range (ETR). Samples of twenty-six ETR near simultaneous Jimsphere and HRAMPS wind profiles were obtained for Shuttle program HRAMPS certification studies. Shuttle systems engineering certification is to ensure that spacecraft and launch vehicle systems performance and safety evaluations for each launch (derived from flight simulations with Jimsphere wind profile data bases) retain their validity when HRAMPS profiles are used on day-of-launch (DOL) in trajectory and loads simulations to support the commit-to-launch decision. This paper describes a statistical analysis of the near simultaneous profiles. In principle the differences between a Jimsphere profile and an HRAMPS profile should be attributed to tracking technology (radar versus GPS tracking of a Jimsphere flight element) and the method for derivation of wind vectors from the raw tracking data. In reality, it is not technically feasible to track the same Jimsphere balloon with the two systems. The aluminized Mylar surface of the standard Jimsphere flight element facilitates radar tracking, but it interferes with HRAMPS during simultaneous tracking. Suspending a radar reflector from an HRAMPS flight element (Jimsphere without aluminized coating) does not produce satisfactory Jimsphere profiles because of intermittent radar returns. Thus, differences between the Jimsphere and HRAMPS profiles are also attributed to differences in the trajectories of separate flight elements. Because of small sample size and a test period limited to one winter season, test measurements during extreme high winds aloft could not have been expected and did not occur. It is during the highest winds that the largest differences between Jimsphere and HRAMPS would occur because the distance between flight elements would be larger. Jimsphere radar tracking noise increases as a function of balloon displacement downrange. The Jimsphere data processing compensates for tracking signal/noise degradation by increasing the smoothing interval. The Jimsphere wind profile effective resolution is a function of downrange distance and altitude, whereas the effective resolution of the HRAMPS should be independent of those variables. The procedure used for editing Jimsphere spikes in Shuttle DOL profiles was not implemented for the Jimsphere profile measurements during the AMPS field tests. For this analysis a code was developed that essentially mimics DOL Jimsphere spike editing. Jimsphere profiles have somewhat more noise in the wavelength range less than 200m defined as the noise floor. No differences between Jimsphere and HRAMPS wind profile pairs have been found that would support denial of HRAMPS certification for application in Shuttle DOL applications. The reliability of the HRAMPS system, which is an important certification issue, is not addressed in this study.

Adelfang, S. I.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Identification of Safety Metrics for Airport Surface Operations

A large fraction of safety incidents occurs on the ground during airport surface operations. Although these incidents are mostly non-fatal with a few exceptions, they are high profile incidents that remain a source of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), major airlines, and other stakeholders of the National Airspace System (NAS). These incidents have historically been mitigated by implementing changes to regulations, policies, and procedures over time. This approach has minimized but not eliminated the risk of occurrences. It is thus important to develop integrated techniques to assess, model, and prevent these incidents by analyzing the risk and likelihood of occurrence and communicating results of the analysis to decision-making personnel who can mitigate and prevent incidents in real time. The research presented in this report builds on prior work of researchers at the NASA Ames Research Center who developed an automated framework, Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM), to enable monitoring and prediction of the safety of the NAS. In the RTSM framework, hazards to flight are translated to safety metrics such as wake vortex encounters or loss of separation, that can be modeled and analyzed offline and also predicted and monitored in real time (online). The intent of this report is to integrate predictable incidents that occur during surface and ground operations into the safety portfolio of the RTSM project by (i) identifying suitable information sources from which ground incidents can be studied, (ii) developing safety metrics correlated with surface operations, and (iii) recommending suitable data sources that can be quantified and used for the computation of pertinent safety metrics.

ground operations↗
NASA NTRS2018

Identification of Safety Metrics for Airport Surface Operations

A large fraction of safety incidents occurs on the ground during airport surface operations. Although these incidents are mostly non-fatal with a few exceptions, they are high profile incidents that remain a source of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), major airlines, and other stakeholders of the National Airspace System (NAS). These incidents have historically been mitigated by implementing changes to regulations, policies, and procedures over time. This approach has minimized but not eliminated the risk of occurrence of safety incidents. It is thus important to develop integrated techniques to assess, model, and prevent these incidents by analyzing the risk and likelihood of occurrence and communicating results of the analysis to decision-making personnel who can mitigate and prevent incidents in real time. The work presented in this paper builds on a previously developed architecture for safety, Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM), to enable monitoring and prediction of the safety of the NAS. In the RTSM framework, hazards to flight are translated to safety metrics such as wake vortex encounters or loss of separation, that can be modeled and analyzed offline and also predicted and monitored in real time (online). The intent of this paper is to integrate predictable incidents that occur during surface and ground operations into the safety portfolio of the RTSM project by (i) identifying suitable information sources from which ground incidents can be studied, (ii) developing safety metrics correlated with surface operations, and (iii) recommending suitable data sources that can be quantified and used for the computation of pertinent safety metrics.

safety↗
DOE OSTI2026

Variability of MHD instabilities in benign termination of high-current runaway electron beams in the JET and DIII-D tokamaks

Benign termination, in which magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) instabilities deconfine runaway electrons (REs) following hydrogenic injections, is a promising strategy for mitigating dangerous RE loads after disruptions. Recent experiments on the Joint European Torus (JET) have explored this scenario at higher pre-disruptive plasma currents than are achievable on other devices, revealing challenges in obtaining benign terminations at I p ≥2.5 MA. This work analyzes the evolution of these high-current RE beams and their terminating MHD events using fast magnetic sensor measurements and EFIT equilibrium reconstructions for approximately 40 JET and 20 DIII-D tokamak discharges. On JET, unsuccessful non-benign terminations occur at low edge safety factor (q edge ≈ 2), and are preceded by intermittent, non-terminating MHD events at higher rational qedge. Trends in the internal inductance I i indicate more peaked RE current profiles in the high-I p non-benign population, which may hinder successful recombination through re-ionization of the companion plasma. In contrast, benign terminations on JET typically occur at higher q edge ≥3 and exhibit less peaked RE current profiles. DIII-D displays a broader range of terminating edge safety factors, again correlated with the measured values. Across both tokamaks, the RE current peaking is therefore found to determine which MHD instability boundary is encountered, a result confirmed by linear resistive MHD modeling with the CASTOR3D code. Measured growth rates are similar for benign and non-benign cases, indicating that ideal MHD timescales at low density after hydrogenic injection do not alone explain efficient RE deconfinement. Instead, non-benign cases are most readily characterized by their comparably lower overall MHD perturbation amplitudes δB. These observations suggest that the interplay between ideal and resistive dynamics governs the termination process, with implications for extrapolating benign RE termination to high-I p reactor scenarios.

MHD instabilities↗
NASA NTRS1991

Nuclear safety for the space exploration initiative

The results of a study to identify potential hazards arising from nuclear reactor power systems for use on the lunar and Martian surfaces, related safety issues, and resolutions of such issues by system design changes, operating procedures, and other means are presented. All safety aspects of nuclear reactor power systems from prelaunch ground handling to eventual disposal were examined consistent with the level of detail for SP-100 reactor design at the 1988 System Design Review and for launch vehicle and space transport vehicle designs and mission descriptions as defined in the 90-day Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) study. Information from previous aerospace nuclear safety studies was used where appropriate. Safety requirements for the SP-100 space nuclear reactor system were compiled. Mission profiles were defined with emphasis on activities after low earth orbit insertion. Accident scenarios were then qualitatively defined for each mission phase. Safety issues were identified for all mission phases with the aid of simplified event trees. Safety issue resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were compiled. Resolution approaches for those safety issues not covered by the SP-100 program were identified. Additionally, the resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were examined in light of the moon and Mars missions.

Dix, Terry E.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluating kratom alkaloids using PHASE

Kratom is a botanical substance that is marketed and promoted in the US for pharmaceutical opioid indications despite having no US Food and Drug Administration approved uses. Kratom contains over forty alkaloids including two partial agonists at the mu opioid receptor, mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragynine, that have been subjected to the FDA’s scientific and medical evaluation. However, pharmacological and toxicological data for the remaining alkaloids are limited. Therefore, we applied the Public Health Assessment via Structural Evaluation (PHASE) protocol to generate in silico binding profiles for 25 kratom alkaloids to facilitate the risk evaluation of kratom. PHASE demonstrates that kratom alkaloids share structural features with controlled opioids, indicates that several alkaloids bind to the opioid, adrenergic, and serotonin receptors, and suggests that mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragynine are the strongest binders at the mu opioid receptor. Subsequently, the in silico binding profiles of a subset of the alkaloids were experimentally verified at the opioid, adrenergic, and serotonin receptors using radioligand binding assays. The verified binding profiles demonstrate the ability of PHASE to identify potential safety signals and provide a tool for prioritizing experimental evaluation of high-risk compounds.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Thermal Analysis of an In-Space Heat Shield Exposed to a Rocket Plume During Stage Separation

Thermal analyses were conducted to evaluate the thermal response of various individual materials and multi-layer configurations for an in-space heat shield exposed to a rocket plume during stage separation. Frequently used, readily available thermal protection materials consisting of cork, carbon cloth phenolic (CCP), and silica cloth phenolic (SCP) were selected for an initial screening analysis. SCP was chosen as the primary material for further evaluation using an updated thermal environment calculated using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) results. A multi-layer configuration consisting of SCP providing erosion resistance and a Nomex honeycomb providing thermal protection was then evaluated as a solution for more mass-efficient performance. Pyrolysis depth, bondline temperature, back-side temperature, and a thermal factor of safety were used to define the necessary material thickness profile. Adhesives were included in the analyses with considerations for maximum temperature and application method. One dimensional thermal analyses at several stations along the heat shield surface were performed for the initial screening and follow-on analyses. The methodology used standard processes and computer programs applicable to solid rocket motor internal insulation and nozzle thermal analysis such as Chemical Equilibrium and Applications (CEA), Aerotherm Chemical Equilibrium (ACE), Momentum/Energy Integral Technique (MEIT), and Insulation Thermal Response and Ablation Code (ITRAC). The baseline SCP/Nomex honeycomb multi-layer configuration thermal performance predictions satisfied the objectives with an acceptable mass estimate for the design maturity. The EA9673 film adhesive and SCP resin were the best performing bonding agents considered for the SCP/Nomex honeycomb and Nomex honeycomb/structural substrate interfaces. The baseline mass estimate was lowest when the resin was the bonding agent due to the higher maximum service temperature. These thermal analyses evaluated typical internal and external nozzle materials using a calculated thermal environment and heat loads that were lower than a typical rocket motor internal environment but greater than standard external aeroheating.

Andrew T Hiatt↗
NASA NTRS2016

Construction of Supersonic Flight Dynamics Test (SFDT-2) Vehicle Monte Carlo Splashdown Footprints for Use in Range Safety and Recovery Planning

Overview of Low Density Supersonic Decelerator (LDSD) SFDT-2 ( Supersonic Flight Dynamics Test-2) flight profile; Description of Monte Carlo flight dynamics simulations performed; Modeling and uncertainties; Results with statistical prediction of test vehicle splashdown location; Use of Monte Carlo results for range safety and recovery planning.

Strauss, Bill↗
DOE OSTI2023

Impact of Thermal Scattering Law on Similarity Assessment in Light-Water or Polyethylene-Moderated Systems [Slides]

This presentation found validation efforts revealed noticeable differences in c k for light-water and polyethylene moderated systems when compared to PST-002-001. Additionally, although 1 H-H 2 O and 1 H-poly use the same cross section and covariance data, the treatment of TSLs in SCALE lead to no contribution to ck between polyethylene application and benchmark experiment. When H 2 O contribution were removed the difference in c k appears to come from 239 Pu chi. Sensitivity profiles and data-induced uncertainty confirmed that the polyethylene application was more closely resembling the benchmark experiment. Specific differences between similar systems can be accounted for and examined to help understand differences in similarity (c k ) between systems was a conclusion reached by this presentation.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
NASA NTRS2002

Advanced Range Safety System for High Energy Vehicles

The advanced range safety system project is a collaboration between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the United States Air Force to develop systems that would reduce costs and schedule for safety approval for new classes of unmanned high-energy vehicles. The mission-planning feature for this system would yield flight profiles that satisfy the mission requirements for the user while providing an increased quality of risk assessment, enhancing public safety. By improving the speed and accuracy of predicting risks to the public, mission planners would be able to expand flight envelopes significantly. Once in place, this system is expected to offer the flexibility of handling real-time risk management for the high-energy capabilities of hypersonic vehicles including autonomous return-from-orbit vehicles and extended flight profiles over land. Users of this system would include mission planners of Space Launch Initiative vehicles, space planes, and other high-energy vehicles. The real-time features of the system could make extended flight of a malfunctioning vehicle possible, in lieu of an immediate terminate decision. With this improved capability, the user would have more time for anomaly resolution and potential recovery of a malfunctioning vehicle.

Claxton, Jeffrey S.↗