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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Considerations regarding the Use of Computer Vision Machine Learning in Safety-Related or Risk-Significant Applications in Nuclear Power Plants

With the advancements made to date in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), significant potential exists to utilize AI capabilities for nuclear power plant (NPP) applications. AI can replicate human decision making and it is usually faster and more accurate than humans. For implementations that impact critical NPP applications (e.g., safety-related or non-safety systems that potentially affect overall plant risk), a deeper safety analysis of the AI methods is necessary. AI applied to NPP operations could resemble the use of digital I&C (DI&C) because such applications involve digital computer hardware and custom-designed software that input plant data, execute complex software algorithms, and output the results to a system or licensed human operator to potentially provoke an action. For AI methods to be compliant with current safety requirements for DI&C, AI compatibility must be evaluated, and AI-related gaps may exist that prevent the prompt deployment of AI in NPPs. This effort aims to evaluate how example AI technologies align with the DI&C safety framework, and discusses how they could be analyzed, modeled, tested, and validated in a manner similar to typical DI&C technologies. Because AI is a broad field that encompasses areas such as machine learning (ML), natural language processing, and computer vision, this research focused on a subset of methods categorized as the computer vision ML (CVML) methods. This report explores two CVML use cases, gauge reading and fire watch, considered relevant to the DI&C standards, as they could play a safety-critical role. For the gauge reading use case, a CVML-enabled technology that can read gauges at oblique angles is utilized. For the fire watch use case, a CVML-enabled technology is utilized that migrates fire watch from a manual (human) approach to automated fire detection. These use cases are mainly intended to give context to the CVML system discussion. This effort assumes the worst-case scenario, with the CVML system being used to replace a safety-related or risk-significant system, thus requiring evaluation. Evaluating CVML against most of the relevant safety requirements for DI&C yielded several CVML-specific considerations due to the uniqueness of its characteristics in comparison with typical DI&C systems. For example, CVML models often employ commonly used (open-source) datasets, and it is not always possible to determine the level of overlap among open-source datasets. Therefore, the independence of the developed CVML models when demonstrating diversity is questionable, therefore creating vulnerability to common cause failure (CCF). The design verification process is also impacted since the data overlap could result in overestimation of the software validation and verification (V&V) performance results. Section 2 of this report evaluates a list of the identified CVML-specific characteristics and discusses the resulting considerations and potential solutions in the context of each referenced requirement. A summation is provided in Section 3. This report is not to be used as a guideline. It was developed to identify and consider issues in the implementation of ML technologies used to augment activities that may have a bearing on plant operation. The report draws parallels to the use of DI&C technologies, for which many standards are available to guide their use in nuclear plant operation. It considers the technologies and some of the potential implications of their use in safety-related applications but is not intended to address regulatory or licensing related issues.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
NASA NTRS1989

Safety policy and requirements for payloads using the space transportation system

The safety policy and requirements are established applicable to the Space Transportation System (STS) payloads and their ground support equipment (GSE). The requirements are intended to protect flight and ground personnel, the STS, other payloads, GSE, the general public, public-private property, and the environment from payload-related hazards. The technical and system safety requirements applicable to STS payloads (including payload-provided ground and flight supports systems) during ground and flight operations are contained.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2024

Considerations for Improving the Technoeconomic Viability of Heat Pipe Microreactors by Employing a Functional Containment Approach

The economic cost of a microreactor is being investigated by leveraging MARVEL cost information in conjunction with some simplified design and analysis activities to present a hypothetical, yet feasible, option for investigation. This bottom-up cost estimate for a hypothetical commercial microreactor will be used to provide guidance to the industry and research communities regarding where priorities should be set to improve the viability of broad microreactor deployment. To support the design and analysis activities required to present a feasible option, some understanding of maximum accidental radionuclide releases and consequences is needed to provide bounding estimates on containment or confinement systems for radionuclide retention. To estimate fission product barrier and retention performance, a gaussian plume dose and dispersion model is employed, with isotopic inventories being propagated between barriers assuming conservative fractional release rates. Demonstrably conservative meteorological assumptions are also assumed. Standard reference release rates are assumed where safety requirements could be easily and economically employed. Results are provided in units of total effective dose equivalent as a function of distance from the release (i.e., the reactor). Initial results indicate that the hypothetical microreactor will likely need to credit the fuel cladding and at least one other barrier, or combination of barriers, to ensure public health and safety as required during a postulated accident. This approach is referred to as “functional containment,” since no single barrier will be relied upon for satisfying regulatory requirements and fundamental safety functions for radionuclide retention. Finally, a set of barrier options are provided so that future economic analyses can select the most viable design path.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2019

Challenges and Opportunities of International Cooperation for Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) on the European Service Module (ESM) of the Orion Program

ESA is providing the ESM to NASA for the Orion Program in accordance with the Implementing Arrangement (IA) established between the two Agencies in 2012. This IA is a barter agreement, in which ESA provides Service Module vehicles for the first two flights of Orion in exchange for two servicing missions to the ISS. This arrangement has provided opportunities and challenges to both communities. It represents an important opportunity for ESA to build on its experience in the development and operations of ATV and play an active role in the development and flight of a manned space vehicle. This paper will explore some of the unique aspects of this arrangement as it affects Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA).The assessment of ESM compliance with applicable safety requirements is the responsibility of the Joint Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP). The JSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering and SMA organizations co-chair this Panel. Previously, Safety has chaired, with Engineering as a member of the Panel. Inclusion of Engineering as a co-chair has offered greater leverage within the technical community. Second, the JSERP includes a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety (PA/S) organizations. This recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership.Another source of both opportunity and challenge is the differing experience base of ESA and NASA. NASA has decades of experience in manned spaceflight, dating back to the Mercury program and following through Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, Skylab, Shuttle and the International Space Station. The risk posture for manned missions is much more rigorous than for unmanned missions. ESA brings a wealth of knowledge as well, with their flights of Ariane and Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), development and operation of the Columbus module on ISS, and satellite programs. The result is that both parties have developed paradigms related to risk and failure that contribute to ESM discussions.Orion represents humanity's first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) in over fifty years. Much of that experience is captured in program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous spacecraft with attendant safety-related issues.This paper will explore these and other challenges as we approach the flight of the first Orion vehicle.

Ciancone, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Shared Assurance Model for Safety

NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (nongovernmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA is how to determine the commercial provider's transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements while at the same time allowing the provider the flexibility to demonstrate compliance. This will be accomplished through the use of Shared Assurance and Risk Based Assessment by NASA thus shifting more responsibility to the Provider. This model will be the focus of this presentation.

Programmatic safety requirements↗
NASA NTRS1991

Controlling hazardous energy sources (lockout/tagout)

The minimum requirements as established by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard 29 CFR 1910.147 are discussed for preventing the unexpected operation of equipment or release of energy which could cause injury to personnel, damage to equipment, harm to the environment, or loss or compromise of test data. Safety requirements both for government and contractor personnel are explained for potentially hazardous energy sources during work operations at LeRC (Cleveland and Plum Brook Stations). Basic rules are presented to ensure protection against harmful exposures, and baseline implementation requirements are discussed from which detailed lockout/tagout procedures can be developed for individual equipment items. Examples of energy sources covered by this document include electrical, pneumatic, mechanical, chemical, cryogenic, thermal, spring tension/compression suspended or moving loads, and other potentially hazardous sources. Activities covered by this standard include, but are not limited to, construction, maintenance, installation, calibration, inspection, cleaning, or repair.

Dominguez, Manuel B.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Health, safety and environmental requirements for composite materials

The health, safety and environmental requirements for the production of composite materials are discussed. The areas covered include: (1) chemical identification for each chemical; (2) toxicology; (3) industrial hygiene; (4) fire and safety; (5) environmental aspects; and (6) medical concerns.

Hazer, Kathleen A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

End User Acceptance - Requirements or Specifications, Certification, Testing

NASA follows top level safety requirement of two-failure tolerance (t hree levels of controls or design for minimum risk) to all catastroph ic hazards in the design of safe li-ion batteries for space use. ? R igorous development testing at appropriate levels to credible offnominal conditions and review of test data. ? Implement robust design con trols based on test results and test again to confirm safety at the a ppropriate levels. ? Stringent testing of all (100%) flight batteries (from button cells to large batteries).

Jeevarajan, Judith↗
NASA NTRS1996

System Guidelines for EMC Safety-Critical Circuits: Design, Selection, and Margin Demonstration

Demonstration of required safety margins on critical electrical/electronic circuits in large complex systems has become an implementation and cost problem. These margins are the difference between the activation level of the circuit and the electrical noise on the circuit in the actual operating environment. This document discusses the origin of the requirement and gives a detailed process flow for the identification of the system electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) critical circuit list. The process flow discusses the roles of engineering disciplines such as systems engineering, safety, and EMC. Design and analysis guidelines are provided to assist the designer in assuring the system design has a high probability of meeting the margin requirements. Examples of approaches used on actual programs (Skylab and Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster) are provided to show how variations of the approach can be used successfully.

Lawton, R. M.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Space Station Furnace Facility. Volume 2: Requirements Definition and Conceptual Design Study. Appendix 3: Environment Analysis

A Preliminary Safety Analysis (PSA) is being accomplished as part of the Space Station Furnace Facility (SSFF) contract. This analysis is intended to support SSFF activities by analyzing concepts and designs as they mature to develop essential safety requirements for inclusion in the appropriate specifications, and designs, as early as possible. In addition, the analysis identifies significant safety concerns that may warrant specific trade studies or design definition, etc. The analysis activity to date concentrated on hazard and hazard cause identification and requirements development with the goal of developing a baseline set of detailed requirements to support trade study, specifications development, and preliminary design activities. The analysis activity will continue as the design and concepts mature. Section 2 defines what was analyzed, but it is likely that the SSFF definitions will undergo further changes. The safety analysis activity will reflect these changes as they occur. The analysis provides the foundation for later safety activities. The hazards identified will in most cases have Preliminary Design Review (PDR) applicability. The requirements and recommendations developed for each hazard will be tracked to ensure proper and early resolution of safety concerns.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2009

A Review of State-of-the-Art Separator Materials for Advanced Lithium-Based Batteries for Future Aerospace Missions

As NASA embarks on a renewed human presence in space, safe, human-rated, electrical energy storage and power generation technologies, which will be capable of demonstrating reliable performance in a variety of unique mission environments, will be required. To address the future performance and safety requirements for the energy storage technologies that will enhance and enable future NASA Constellation Program elements and other future aerospace missions, advanced rechargeable, lithium-ion battery technology development is being pursued with an emphasis on addressing performance technology gaps between state-of-the-art capabilities and critical future mission requirements. The material attributes and related performance of a lithium-ion cell's internal separator component are critical for achieving overall optimal performance, safety and reliability. This review provides an overview of the general types, material properties and the performance and safety characteristics of current separator materials employed in lithium-ion batteries, such as those materials that are being assessed and developed for future aerospace missions.

Bladwin, Richard S.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Investigation of Structural Factors of Safety for the Space Shuttle

A study was made of the factors governing the structural design of the fully reusable space shuttle booster to establish a rational approach to select optimum structural factors of safety. The study included trade studies of structural factors of safety versus booster service life, weight, cost, and reliability. Similar trade studies can be made on other vehicles using the procedures developed. The major structural components of a selected baseline booster were studied in depth, each being examined to determine the fatigue life, safe-life, and fail-safe capabilities of the baseline design. Each component was further examined to determine its reliability and safety requirements, and the change of structural weight with factors of safety. The apparent factors of safety resulting from fatigue, safe-life, proof test, and fail-safe requirements were identified. The feasibility of reduced factors of safety for design loads such as engine thrust, which are well defined, was examined.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

Calculation of Glycolate Concentration Factors Across the 242-25H (3H) Evaporator System

Two models were developed to predict glycolate concentration factors across the 242-25H (3H) Evaporator system. The first model, identified as the Unrestricted Evaporation Model, was designed to evaluate concentration of typical 3H feed material to relatively high densities in order to calculate the concentration factor of glycolate in a given feed stream. This model may be used to understand the potential of glycolate to concentrate from a generic feed material through the 3H system. The second model, identified as the Holistic Evaporation Model, was designed to evaluate the evaporation of dilute, glycolate-containing Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) waste with the requirement that high silicon concentrations typical of recycle material require dilution to adhere to current technical safety requirements. This model may be used to understand the potential of glycolate from DWPF recycle material to concentrate as a result of feeding through the 3H system.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS1975

Retrieval of the HEAO-C spacecraft with Space Shuttle

A plan has been developed to retrieve the HEAO-C spacecraft from orbit with the Space Shuttle in the early 1980s. The initial HEAO-C orbit altitude must be increased to provide additional lifetime. A simple passive stabilization mode, using gravity gradient and aerodynamic torques, is used for long-term storage. Most of the modifications required for Orbiter compatibility result from manned safety requirements and the structural mounting. There is a positive disconnect of all power before entering the Orbiter bay, and pressure vessels are monitored continuously. Structural equipment is added in the Orbiter bay to receive and stow the Observatory.

Mitchell, D. H.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Design and Development of a Regenerative Blower for Space Suit Ventilation

The ventilation subsystem in future space suits will require a dedicated ventilation fan. The unique requirements for the ventilation fan, including stringent safety requirements and the ability to increase output to operate in buddy mode, combine to make a regenerative blower an attractive technology choice. This paper describes progress in the design, development, and testing of a regenerative blower designed to meet requirements for a ventilation subsystem for future space suit life support. Analysis methods were developed for the blower s complex internal flows and impeller geometries were identified that enable significant improvements in blower efficiency. Performance predictions were verified by test, measuring aerodynamic efficiencies of 45% at operating conditions that correspond to the ventilation fan s design point. A compact motor/controller was developed to drive the blower efficiently at low rotating speed (4500 rpm). Finally, a low-pressure oxygen test loop was assembled to demonstrate the blower s reliability under prototypical conditions.

Izenson, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2011

Design and Development of a Regenerative Blower for EVA Suit Ventilation

Ventilation subsystems in future space suits require a dedicated ventilation fan. The unique requirements for the ventilation fan - including stringent safety requirements and the ability to increase output to operate in buddy mode - combine to make a regenerative blower an attractive choice. This paper describes progress in the design, development, and testing of a regenerative blower designed to meet requirements for ventilation subsystems in future space suits. We have developed analysis methods for the blower s complex, internal flows and identified impeller geometries that enable significant improvements in blower efficiency. We verified these predictions by test, measuring aerodynamic efficiencies of 45% at operating conditions that correspond to the ventilation fan s design point. We have developed a compact motor/controller to drive the blower efficiently at low rotating speed (4500 rpm). Finally, we have assembled a low-pressure oxygen test loop to demonstrate the blower s reliability under prototypical conditions.

Izenson, Michael G.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Model-Driven Development of Safety Architectures

We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.

Safety case↗
NASA NTRS1973

Nuclear safety considerations for the design of a shuttle launched 500 to 2000 watt isotope Brayton power system.

An extensive study was conducted to evaluate the safety requirements for the design of a heat source assembly for use in a shuttle launched, isotope Brayton electric power system for the 500-W(e) to 2 kWe range. The assembly is a self-contained package which supplies heat to a power conversion system. A typical mission profile for a shuttle launched, earth orbital mission was assumed. Critical mission accidents were identified and evaluated to determine their impact upon the design of the Heat Source Assembly. Earth-orbital decay reentry analyses were performed to demonstrate survivability of the heat source. Safety design requirements were developed to ensure survivability under credible accident conditions including loss of the power conversion system in orbit.

Garate, J. A.↗