Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “software vulnerabilities”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

A secure measurement unit for an inspection system used in nuclear arms-control verification

Verification of arms control treaties may require information barriers to protect sensitive data acquired during the verification process. These information barriers are commonly implemented in software, but must store and operate on data that are vulnerable to attack and tampering. Here, we present a new Secure Measurement Unit based on a modified pipeline SAR ADC architecture. The idea is to move the information barrier back into the digitization process so that prohibited data is never created. A prototype 65nm CMOS Secure Measurement Unit (SMU) was tested using U-235, U-238, Co-60, Cs-137 and Am-241 sources. Here, the prototype accurately digitized allowable signals while being immune to side-channel attacks on signals within preset forbidden regions.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

On Self-Security of Grid-Interactive Smart Inverters

The capability to exchange information with utility operators, aggregators, and nearby smart devices can make a grid-interactive inverter an intelligent cyber-physical device. However, the capability of exchanging information can also put the inverters at the risk of insecure operation. In this paper, possible software manipulations into the inverters are studied to understand their vulnerability to cyberattacks. Moreover, the state-of-the-art system-level and device-level cyber-defense measures are discussed, and advantages and drawbacks of each technique are provided. Studies show that a reference model can be implemented in device-level security to effectively examine incoming setpoints for detecting and preventing malicious or harmful actions. This paper particularly underlines the significance of device-level self-security and its advantages for grid-interactive inverters. Finally, recommendations for future studies are provided.

Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
DOE OSTI2026

OpenSAMPL: An Open Source Library for Timing and Synchronization Measurements and Analytics

Today's power grid operators are implementing timing and synchronization solutions that provide resilience to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) vulnerabilities. These vendor-specific solutions often come with additional software applications that are designed to monitor that vendor's synchronization performance data. However, resilient timing architectures often resulting in multi-vendor solutions, including approaches that blend terrestrial clocks with space-based subscription services. In such an environment, collecting, analyzing, and visualizing data from a variety of sources within a single platform was heretofore not possible. To address this need, the US Department of Energy's Center for Alternative Synchronization and Timing (CAST) developed OpenSAMPL, the Open Synchronized Analytics and Monitoring Platform, an open-source Python framework for processing, loading, and observing clock measurement data from distributed devices. OpenSAMPL enables the ingestion of diverse clock-probe sources into a scalable time-series database and applies robust analytics. OpenSAMPL currently supports two vendor data pipelines, and will be extended to more in the near future, enabling seamless monitoring of a variety of timing and synchronization devices in a common environment.

Grant, Josh [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000163475060)↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automated Addressing Failure Detection for Multiplexer Systems

Multiplexers are electronic devices which select between several input signals and deliver an output signal. Also known as data selectors or mux, multiplexers are commonly used in circuit design to provide signal switching, simplify hardware and manufacturing, and decrease cost. Systems which use a digital mux as a switch or selector are vulnerable to events called addressing failures, arising in hardware or software. An addressing failure results in the system requesting, or the mux delivering, a data signal other than the one intended. The unintended use of this erroneous signal may lead to system-level failures. This paper discusses a novel method of automatic detection for addressing failures, utilizing multiplexer channelization and a monitoring algorithm.

multiplexer↗
DOE OSTI2024

Modernizing the Legacy Fission Wire Measurement System for the Advanced Test Reactor-Critical Facility

Operational lifetime extensions of existing research reactors have emphasized the need for refurbishment, replacements, and upgrades to supporting equipment and instrumentation. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), which entered service in 1967, has recently completed the sixth core internals change-out and has scheduled operations until at least 2040. Reactor maintenance and operational risk management is critically important in the research reactor community, however supporting measurement systems sometimes get overlooked when maintenance is planned. The Fission Wire Measurement System (FWMS) is a custom measurement system designed in the 1960s to measure the beta-particle activity of irradiated uranium-aluminum fission wires. This measurement is conducted to determine the fission rate profile of the Advanced Reactor Test Critical (ATR-C) facility. The ATR-C is an open-pool, low-power test reactor that was purpose driven to resemble ATR and is used to qualify experiment configurations and verify core models prior to full-power experiment irradiations in ATR. A power distribution measurement in ATR-C uses uranium-aluminum wires that are distributed throughout the ATR-C core to validate simulation and modeling results. These measurements require 340 to 1500 wires to be irradiated and measured within a 12-hour window. The activity of the wires is measured in the required time with the FWMS, which was put into service in 1965 at the Radiation Measurements Laboratory (RML). The system consists of 4 measurement channels and one reference channel, each with a 2-pi proportional gas flow detector and the measurement channels each have an automated sample changer. This legacy system is crucial to the continued operations of ATR and has undergone some minor hardware upgrades since 1965, however the system presently relies on custom control boards, custom gas ion chambers, analog amplifiers/discriminators, and a user interface (UI) for the system written in outdated code. Much of the equipment and software is custom with no commercial replacements or support and limited documentation. The existing control software requires an operating system that is no longer supported, creating more vulnerabilities to continued operations. A project is underway with a third-party vendor to design, build, and document a new control and data acquisition system (CDAS) for the FWMS. The new upgrade will replace the control system, computer, UI, sample changer motors, and main power supply while maintaining the interface with existing detector hardware. The upgraded system will be operated in parallel with the current hardware and software to conduct validation testing. This equipment upgrade demonstrates the commitment at ATR to ensuring successful operations and potential future research reactors at INL.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies – GETs and HPCs Session 2: Advanced Power Flow Control and Transmission Topology Optimization

The INL TADA GETs Cohort Session 2, held on November 7, 2025, conducted in collaboration with ScottMadden, focused on two core Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs): Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC) and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO). These technologies are pivotal in enhancing grid flexibility, reliability, and cybersecurity resilience. APFC, particularly through modular FACTS devices like Modular Static Synchronous Series Compensators (M-SSSCs), enables dynamic voltage injection to reroute power flows. The session highlighted the deployment benefits of APFC, such as rapid installation, minimal civil works, and re-deployability. Regulatory drivers like FERC Order 2023 mandate the inclusion of Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs) in interconnection studies. Case studies from Central Hudson, CAISO, and National Grid (UK) demonstrated APFC’s effectiveness in congestion relief and cost savings. The session also addressed cybersecurity concerns, including firmware vulnerabilities, SCADA integration risks, and supply chain dependencies. Participants engaged in interactive exercises to rank cybersecurity and supply chain risks, emphasizing the need for robust digital assurance strategies. TTO involves software-based reconfiguration of transmission networks to optimize power flow without new infrastructure. The session showcased its operational value, with examples from SPP, PJM, and MISO showing significant congestion cost reductions. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities were discussed, particularly in API security and software supply chains, referencing incidents like SolarWinds and attacks on Danish utilities. Digital assurance exercises explored worst-case scenarios, attack paths, and mitigation responsibilities between vendors and utilities. Reliability challenges such as algorithm stability, vendor dependency, and operator trust were also examined. Cross-cutting themes emphasized the importance of digital assurance tools, including Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) and hardware-in-loop testing. Human performance, training, and operational confidence were identified as critical enablers of technology adoption. The session concluded with a preview of Session 3, which will focus on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and risk-based cybersecurity tools. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Vulnerabilities in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Applications and Data

Artificial intelligence (AI) applications driven by machine learning (ML) are transformational technologies within the international nuclear security regime. Advancements realized by AI—faster and improved data insights, more efficient and automated processes, reductions in human error—enable nuclear security applications such as behavior analysis for insider threat mitigation, source tracking of stolen nuclear material, and facial recognition software for physical protection. In addition to the advantages, however, there are also inherent vulnerabilities and threats associated with its use and risk mitigations must be built into any AI/ML-enabled systems. This work provides a background on AI and ML and different data types used in the field, including open-source intelligence information (OSINT) that is discoverable by AI tools and application data that are used by AI tools for decision-making and automation. Current and potential AI applications and vulnerabilities related to their use within the nuclear security regime are also discussed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Geospatial Capabilities to Couple Hazard and Social Vulnerability Data in Water Distribution Criticality Analysis

A resilience analysis of a water distribution system is greatly enhanced by the integration of up-to-date geospatial data describing the water system, hazards, and surrounding community. The Water Network Tool for Resilience (WNTR), an open-source Python package designed to simulate and analyze the resilience of water distribution systems, was recently updated to incorporate geographic information system (GIS) data into the resilience analysis. This paper describes the GIS capabilities and includes a case study using the drinking water distribution system model for a large city in Pennsylvania. The case study focuses on potential pipe damage from landslides and on pipes that are particularly difficult to repair. The analysis couples data on hazards, social vulnerability, and the location of emergency services to identify and prioritize high-impact critical infrastructure for mitigation. Results demonstrate that pipes can be prioritized for mitigation based on water shortage and vulnerable populations that are affected. In conclusion, the methods can be adopted for general use and are available as part of the WNTR software.

GIS, landslide↗
NASA NTRS1997

Electrical alternans during rest and exercise as predictors of vulnerability to ventricular arrhythmias

This investigation was performed to evaluate the feasibility of detecting repolarization alternans with the heart rate elevated with a bicycle exercise protocol. Sensitive spectral signal-processing techniques are able to detect beat-to-beat alternation of the amplitude of the T wave, which is not visible on standard electrocardiogram. Previous animal and human investigations using atrial or ventricular pacing have demonstrated that T-wave alternans is a marker of vulnerability to ventricular arrhythmias. Using a spectral analysis technique incorporating noise reduction signal-processing software, we evaluated electrical alternans at rest and with the heart rate elevated during a bicycle exercise protocol. In this study we defined optimal criteria for electrical alternans to separate patients from those without inducible arrhythmias. Alternans and signal-averaged electrocardiographic results were compared with the results of vulnerability to ventricular arrhythmias as defined by induction of sustained ventricular tachycardia or fibrillation at electrophysiologic evaluation. In 27 patients alternans recorded at rest and with exercise had a sensitivity of 89%, specificity of 75%, and overall clinical accuracy of 80% (p <0.003). In this patient population the signal-averaged electrocardiogram was not a significant predictor of arrhythmia vulnerability. This is the first study to report that repolarization alternans can be detected with heart rate elevated with a bicycle exercise protocol. Alternans measured using this technique is an accurate predictor of arrhythmia inducibility.

Clinical Trial↗
NASA NTRS2003

Managing information technology security risk

Information Technology (IT) Security Risk Management is a critical task for the organization to protect against the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of IT resources. As systems bgecome more complex and diverse and and attacks from intrusions and malicious content increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage IT security risk. This paper describes a two-pronged approach in addressing IT security risk and risk management in the organization: 1) an institutional enterprise appraoch, and 2) a project life cycle approach.

security toolset↗
NASA NTRS2002

Predicting System Accidents with Model Analysis During Hybrid Simulation

Standard discrete event simulation is commonly used to identify system bottlenecks and starving and blocking conditions in resources and services. The CONFIG hybrid discrete/continuous simulation tool can simulate such conditions in combination with inputs external to the simulation. This provides a means for evaluating the vulnerability to system accidents of a system's design, operating procedures, and control software. System accidents are brought about by complex unexpected interactions among multiple system failures , faulty or misleading sensor data, and inappropriate responses of human operators or software. The flows of resource and product materials play a central role in the hazardous situations that may arise in fluid transport and processing systems. We describe the capabilities of CONFIG for simulation-time linear circuit analysis of fluid flows in the context of model-based hazard analysis. We focus on how CONFIG simulates the static stresses in systems of flow. Unlike other flow-related properties, static stresses (or static potentials) cannot be represented by a set of state equations. The distribution of static stresses is dependent on the specific history of operations performed on a system. We discuss the use of this type of information in hazard analysis of system designs.

Malin, Jane T.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity and Digital Components: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment

The report “America’s Strategy to Secure the Supply Chain for a Robust Clean Energy Transition” lays out the challenges and opportunities faced by the United States in the energy supply chain as well as the federal government plans to address these challenges and opportunities. It is accompanied by several issue-specific deep dive assessments, including this one, in response to Executive Order 14017 “America’s Supply Chains,” which directs the Secretary of Energy to submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector industrial base. The Executive Order is helping the federal government to build more secure and diverse U.S. supply chains, including energy supply chains. As the energy sector has become more globalized and increasingly complex, digitized, and even virtualized, its supply chain risk for digital components – the software, virtual platforms and services, and data – in energy systems has evolved and expanded. All digital components in U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable and may be subject to cyber supply cha in risks stemming from a variety of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts. This includes digital components in all systems within the ESIB, namely those systems operated by asset owners across different energy subsectors (e.g., electricity, oil and natural gas, and renewables) and the systems operated by a worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development and design, produce, operate, and maintain energy sector systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet U.S. energy requirements. Supply chain risks for digital components including software, virtual platforms and services, and data have grown in recent years as increasingly sophisticated cyber adversaries have targeted exploiting vulnerabilities in these digital assets. Supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment and Coordination of EVSE Cybersecurity Standards

Cybersecurity certification programs for Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) are fragmented due to no single certification covering all aspects of the device and additionally the existence of multiple programs and under different levels of regulation. These devices are also confronted by the intricate assembly of product software, firmware, and hardware. Devices contain both logical and physical interfaces. These multifaceted devices have vulnerabilities at many levels and interconnect with other potentially vulnerable systems including the electric vehicle, the cloud where data and payment information are stored, and the electric grid and electric grid equipment including utilities. Of the EVSE certification programs that are found, none are directly for the cybersecurity of EVSE. Many standards are for safety, specifically battery safety, some are cybersecurity standards for other types of equipment and can be modeled for EVSE. In specific, ISA/IEC 62443 is found to be significantly in line with EVSE security needs and will be used in future testing to certify EVSE and help guide the project to demonstrate where gaps exist, where strengths lie in the standard and how this can be used to lead the certification efforts in harmonizing EVSE cybersecurity standards. In addition, there are multiple efforts that are currently seeking to build EVSE standards or revise existing standards to address gaps. This effort is seeking to establish a cybersecurity program for EVSE that will inform customers and help increase the level of security across products and state EVSE procurements to achieve consistency across different jurisdictions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Connecting Mission Profiles and Radiation Vulnerability Assessment

Radiation vulnerability assessment early in spacecraft development is cheaper and faster than in late development phases. RGENTIC and SEAM are two software platforms that can be coupled to provide this type of early assessment. Specifically, RGENTIC is a tool that outputs descriptions of radiation risks based on a selected mission environment and the system’s electronic part portfolio, while SEAM models how radiation-induced faults in electronic parts propagate through a system. In this work, we propose a spacecraft evaluation flow where RGENTIC’s outputs, which are radiation vulnerabilities of electronic parts for a given mission, become inputs to SEAM, resulting in an automatic part-type template palette presented to users so that they can easily begin modeling the occurrence and propagation of radiation-induced faults in their spacecraft. In this context, fault propagation modeling shows how radiation effects impact the spacecraft’s electronics.

Richard H. Nederlande↗
NASA NTRS2000

Reducing Software Security Risk Through an Integrated Approach

This paper discusses new joint work by the California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the University of California at Davis sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop a security assessment instrument for the software development and maintenance life cycle.

risk matrix↗
NASA NTRS2014

Scalable Asset Discovery, Vulnerability Scanning, and Penetration Testing for Remote Sites and Wireless Spectrums Utilizing an Embedded Linux Plug - PwniPlug and the Raspberry Pi B+ as a Sample Pen Test

All devices attached to the NASA KSC network are subject to security vulnerability scanning and/or penetration testing. In today's changing environment, vulnerable and/or unprotected systems can easily be overlooked. Systems that are not properly managed can become a potential threat to the operational integrity of our systems and networks. This includes all NASA (internal and external) information systems within NASA KSC Internet Protocol (IP) address space, and NASA KSC facilities. The Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) recommends that all NASA Centers and information systems be subject to penetration testing on a regular interval in accordance with the guidelines identified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). (ITS-HBK-2810.04-02A) Protecting information and equipment at NASA is an area of increasing concern. In addition to the CPU's on the network; Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are especially vulnerable because these systems have lacked standards, use embedded controllers with little computational power and informal software, are connected to physical processes, have few operators, and are increasingly also being connected to corporate networks. The scope of work is comprised of several individual components which together build upon previous work by Drew Branch, NASA KSC Intern. The Pwn Plug is the selected COTS (Commercial-Off-The-Shelf) device chosen to test simplification of mandatory IT Security tasks. The device will be utilized to provide services to NASA KSC and enable an assessment of infrastructure soundness and regulatory compliance in an efficient, economical, and business responsive manner. The Pwn Plug is designed as a pen testing appliance which provides a hardware platform that can support commercial penetration testing efforts at significantly reduced costs. The expected outcomes are: 1) External Penetration Testing, 2) Social Engineering, 3) Procedural Documentation, 4) Recommended Remediation Action Plan, 5) System Retest & Remediation Attestation and 6) Final Reports, out briefing and Presentation. Due to physical and material constraints beyond intern and mentor control, the project was redefined as a working pen-test scenario. Limitations of lab availability and tools dictated an academic exercise. This report was developed within the scenario guidelines suggested by the project mentor. The guidelines were to be creative in developing a Pen Test program for a client.

Penetration Testing↗
DOE OSTI2023

DER Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis

Solar photovoltaic (PV) cybersecurity is a growing field of research. As deployments of solar PV have increased, cyber risk has also increased. Utility solar PV installations, however, are not required to comply with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) plan unless they meet a minimum generation threshold of 75 MW. Individual residential-scale solar PV deployments will not meet that generation threshold and are therefore excluded from the NERC CIP requirements. With most solar installations less than 75 MW, solar PV has been deployed with minimal oversight and highly variable cybersecurity maturity. The resources that comprise the digital supply chain can include software, code, data, and other digital components. But as clean energy technologies advance, cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities continue to evolve and grow in sophistication. Supply chain cybersecurity represents a critical area for ensuring safe operations as the U.S. moves toward a clean energy future.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2023

Supply Chain Cybersecurity Recommendations for Solar Photovoltaics

Solar photovoltaic (PV) cybersecurity is a growing field of research. As deployments of solar PV has increased, cyber risk has also increased. However, utility solar PV installations are not required to comply with North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) unless they meet a minimum generation threshold of 75 Megawatts (MW). Individual residential scale solar PV deployments will not meet that generation threshold and are therefore excluded from NERC CIP requirements. With most solar installations below 75MW, solar PV has been deployed with minimal oversight and highly variable cybersecurity maturity. The resources that make up the digital supply chain can include software, code, data, as well as other digital components. However as clean energy technology advances, cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities continue to evolve and grow in sophistication. Solar PV faces a unique challenge in which it can be deployed in residential buildings and purchased by a consumer directly. This makes the supply chain of PV a unique challenge, where responsible parties for cybersecurity vary widely depending on the type of solar PV being deployed. Supply chain cybersecurity for solar PV represents a critical area for ensuring safe operations as the U.S. moves towards a clean energy future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗