Results for “space debris mitigation” — Page 6

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRS2011

Engineering and Technology Challenges for Active Debris Removal

After more than fifty years of space activities, the near-Earth environment is polluted with man-made orbital debris. The collision between Cosmos 2251 and the operational Iridium 33 in 2009 signaled a potential collision cascade effect, also known as the "Kessler Syndrome", in the environment. Various modelling studies have suggested that the commonly-adopted mitigation measures will not be sufficient to stabilize the future debris population. Active debris removal must be considered to remediate the environment. This paper summarizes the key issues associated with debris removal and describes the technology and engineering challenges to move forward. Fifty-four years after the launch of Sputnik 1, satellites have become an integral part of human society. Unfortunately, the ongoing space activities have left behind an undesirable byproduct orbital debris. This environment problem is threatening the current and future space activities. On average, two Shuttle window panels are replaced after every mission due to damage by micrometeoroid or orbital debris impacts. More than 100 collision avoidance maneuvers were conducted by satellite operators in 2010 to reduce the impact risks of their satellites with respect to objects in the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) catalog. Of the four known accident collisions between objects in the SSN catalog, the last one, collision between Cosmos 2251 and the operational Iridium 33 in 2009, was the most significant. It was the first ever accidental catastrophic destruction of an operational satellite by another satellite. It also signaled the potential collision cascade effect in the environment, commonly known as the "Kessler Syndrome," predicted by Kessler and Cour-Palais in 1978 [1]. Figure 1 shows the historical increase of objects in the SSN catalog. The majority of the catalog objects are 10 cm and larger. As of April 2011, the total objects tracked by the SSN sensors were more than 22,000. However, approximately 6000 of them had yet to be fully processed and entered into the catalog. This population had been dominated by fragmentation debris throughout history. Before the anti-satellite test (ASAT) conducted by China in 2007, the fragmentation debris were almost all explosion fragments. After the ASAT test and the collision between Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251, the ratio of collision fragments to explosion fragments was about one-to-one. It is expected that accidental collision fragments will further dominate the environment in the future.

Liou, Jer-Chyi↗

NASA NTRS2006

Establishment and Implementation of a Close Approach Evaluation and Avoidance Process for Earth Observing System Missions

In the fall of 2004, the Earth Science Mission Operations Project tasked the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSPC) Flight Dynamics Analysis Branch with establishment of a process to protect the high-value Earth Observing System (EOS) missions (Terra, Aqua, and Aura) from close approaches with space debris and other orbiting objects. An agreement between GSFC and the United States Strategic Command was put in place so that close approach predictions would be routinely generated. This paper describes the ESMO conjunction assessment process for the EOS satellites. Process details, including tools and algorithms developed, are discussed. Particular details for a predicted close approach between Terra and a piece of space debris that resulted in the execution of a debris avoidance maneuver are included. This close approach example is described in detail fiom the first screening identification through execution of the mitigation maneuver to illustrate both the process and lessons learned fiom its implementation.

Newman, Lauri↗

NASA NTRS2019

Root Cause Classification of Breakup Events 1961-2018

This paper uses the updated NASA “History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations 15th Edition,” to examine and categorize the root cause of historical breakup events to the greatest degree possible. Classes of debris progenitors have evolved, as many classes of Cold War-era spacecraft are now extinct, only to be replaced by new classes of payloads and rocket bodies statistically likely to experience debris-producing events. The efficacy of international debris mitigation implementation and root cause/fault tree analyses and lessons learned is examined in relation to the breakup of satellite classes or specific events. In select cases, the remaining on-orbit inventory of specific classes is identified in the context of possible future events. The environmental impact of these specific classes is examined and compared to nominal space environment projections. When appropriate, recommendations for debris remediation are made for specific satellite classes.

Anz-Meador, P.↗

NASA NTRS1992

The possible effects of the natural and induced space environment on the optical and thermal properties of EOS surfaces

Space missions, including that of EOS (Earth Observing System), will continue to be subjected to both the natural and induced space environment. The concerns associated with this fact will not go away. The NASA and DoD have recognized the need for long-life stability of materials and structures to the space environment. The major areas of interest include: thermal cycling, UV degradation, space radiation exposure, orbital debris, atomic oxygen erosion, and contamination control. Having flown a number of space environmental effects monitors, SAIC has developed both a data base to understand the magnitude of this problem and mitigation techniques to reduce the impact.

Maag, Carl R.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA's Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs

Over the past 50 years, various NASA communities have contributed significantly to maturing NASA s meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD)1 programs to their current state. As a result of these community efforts, and to NASA s credit, NASA s MMOD programs and models are now widely used and respected by the providers and users of both government and commercial satellites, nationally as well as internationally. Satellites have been redesigned to protect critical components from MMOD damage by moving critical components from exterior surfaces to deep inside a satellite s structure. Orbits are monitored and altered to minimize the risk of collision with tracked orbital debris. MMOD shielding added to the International Space Station (ISS) protects critical components and astronauts from potentially catastrophic damage that might result from smaller, untracked debris and meteoroid impacts. The space shuttle, as it orbited Earth, and whether docked to the ISS or not, was optimally oriented to protect its fragile thermal protection and thermal radiation systems from MMOD damage. In addition, astronauts inspected its thermal protection system for MMOD damage before the shuttle reentered Earth s atmosphere; Orion, NASA s capsule to carry astronauts to low Earth orbit, includes designs to mitigate the threat of MMOD damage and provide increased safety to the crew. When a handful of reasonable assumptions are used in NASA s MMOD models, scenarios are uncovered that conclude that the current orbital debris environment has already reached a "tipping point." That is, the amount of debris - in terms of the population of large debris objects, as well as overall mass of debris in orbit - currently in orbit has reached a threshold where it will continually collide with itself, further increasing the population of orbital debris. This increase will lead to corresponding increases in spacecraft failures, which will only create more feedback into the system, increasing the debris population growth rate. The increase thus far has been most rapid in low Earth orbit (LEO), with geosynchronous Earth orbits (GEOs) potentially suffering the same fate, but over a much longer time period. The exact timing and pace of this exponential growth are uncertain, but the serious implications of such a scenario require careful attention because of the strategic importance of U.S. space operations. The Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget contracted with the National Research Council for a study to perform three tasks: review NASA s MMOD programs and efforts, recommend in which of those NASA should increase or decrease its effort or change focus, and determine whether NASA should pursue work in any new MMOD areas. The official letter requesting the study and the full statement of task for the Committee for the Assessment of NASA s Orbital Debris Programs are in Appendixes A and B, respectively.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2000

The Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 3A Contamination Control Program

After nearly 10 years on-orbit, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) external thermal control materials and paint have degraded due to exposure to the low Earth orbit environment. This presented a potentially large on-orbit contamination source (particles and/or debris). Contamination mitigation techniques were developed to augment existing on-orbit servicing contamination controls. They encompassed mission management, crew training, and crew aids and tools. These techniques were successfully employed during the HST Servicing Mission 3A, December 1999.

Hansen, Patricia A.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Cost and Benefit Analysis of Mitigating, Tracking, and Remediating Orbital Debris

Orbital debris may collide with crewed and robotic spacecraft, placing them at risk. The wide range of debris, from 9,000-kilogram rocket bodies to millions of millimeter-size debris, has led to a similarly wide range of proposed actions for addressing the risks posed by debris. However, the costs and benefits of these actions have historically been unknown. This is a challenge for decision makers who are choosing which actions to support through technology development or policy changes. NASA’s Office of Technology, Policy, and Strategy is addressing these technical and economic uncertainties by building a capability to (1) complete rigorous calculations of the net present value of each action, (2) identify an optimal portfolio of actions to reduce risk, and (3) quantitatively analyze policies related to space sustainability. This report describes our progress toward that capability and to solicit feedback from the space and economic communities. Our previous work, referred to here as Phase 1, assessed the costs and benefits of performing debris remediation on operationally relevant timescales. The current analysis contains major updates to the risk model used in Phase 1 and expands the breadth of actions considered to include mitigating the creation of debris, improving the ability to track debris, and more methods for cleaning up existing debris. We demonstrate that our approach of measuring risks in dollars allows for the effectiveness of seemingly incommensurate actions to be compared and generates insights that other approaches to measuring risk have missed.

Jericho Locke↗

NASA NTRS2013

Calculating and Mitigating the Risk of a Cut Glove to a Space Walking Astronaut

One of the high risk operations on the International Space Station (ISS) is conducting a space walk, or an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA). Threats to the space walking crew include airlock failures, space suit failures, and strikes from micro ]meteoroids and orbital debris (MM/OD). There are risks of becoming untethered from the space station, being pinched between the robotic arm and a piece of equipment, tearing your suit on a sharp edge, and other human errors that can be catastrophic. For decades NASA identified and tried to control sharp edges on external structure and equipment by design; however a new and unexpected source of sharp edges has since become apparent. Until recently, one of the underappreciated environmental risks was damage to EVA gloves during a spacewalk. The ISS has some elements which have been flying in the environment of space for over 14 years. It has and continues to be bombarded with MM/OD strikes that have created small, sharp craters all over the structure, including the dedicated EVA handrails and surrounding structure. These craters are capable of cutting through several layers of the EVA gloves. Starting in 2006, five EVA crewmembers reported cuts in their gloves so large they rendered the gloves unusable and in some cases cut the spacewalk short for the safety of the crew. This new hazard took engineers and managers by surprise. NASA has set out to mitigate this risk to safety and operations by redesigning the spacesuit gloves to be more resilient and designing a clamp to isolate MM/OD strikes on handrails, and is considering the necessity of an additional tool to repair strikes on non ]handrail surfaces (such as a file). This paper will address how the ISS Risk Team quantified an estimate of the MM/OD damage to the ISS, and the resulting likelihood of sustaining a cut glove in order to measure the effectiveness of the solutions being investigated to mitigate this risk to the mission and crew.

Castillo, Theresa↗

NASA NTRS2023

Orbital Debris Quarterly News, August 2023

- IOC II Announces Program and Venue - Continuing Development of ISO Debris Mitigation Standards - DAS Release - MEO Releases New Example Library - Updated Flux Interpolation in ORDEM - Evolution of Major Debris Clouds in LEO - ODPO Receives the 2022 Agency Group Achievement Honor Award - Upcoming Meetings - Orbital Debris Environment Plot - Space Missions and Satellite Box Score

Heather Cowardin↗

NASA NTRS2024

Cost and Benefit Analysis of Mitigating, Tracking, and Remediating Orbital Debris

Presentation accompanying the technical report with the same name. The abstract for the report and the full study is repeated below. Orbital debris may collide with crewed and robotic spacecraft, placing them at risk. The wide range of debris, from 9,000-kilogram rocket bodies to millions of millimeter-size debris, has led to a similarly wide range of proposed actions for addressing the risks posed by debris. However, the costs and benefits of these actions have historically been unknown. This is a challenge for decision makers who are choosing which actions to support through technology development or policy changes. NASA’s Office of Technology, Policy, and Strategy is addressing these technical and economic uncertainties by building a capability to (1) complete rigorous calculations of the net present value of each action, (2) identify an optimal portfolio of actions to reduce risk, and (3) quantitatively analyze policies related to space sustainability. This report describes our progress toward that capability and to solicit feedback from the space and economic communities. Our previous work, referred to here as Phase 1, assessed the costs and benefits of performing debris remediation on operationally relevant timescales. The current analysis contains major updates to the risk model used in Phase 1 and expands the breadth of actions considered to include mitigating the creation of debris, improving the ability to track debris, and more methods for cleaning up existing debris. We demonstrate that our approach of measuring risks in dollars allows for the effectiveness of seemingly incommensurate actions to be compared and generates insights that other approaches to measuring risk have missed.

Jericho Locke↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Jettison and Disposal from Near Rectilinear Halo Orbits, Part 1: Theory

The proposed Gateway spacecraft in a Near Rectilinear Halo Orbit (NRHO) will be a human outpost in cislunar space. The baseline mission may experience the deployment of visiting vehicles, cubesats, and on-orbit debris. Departure from the NRHO and cislunar space is nontrivial due to the complex gravitational environment that persists in and around Gateway. Long-term disposal orbits in heliocentric space offer safe destinations for deployed objects. To mitigate risks associated with conjunctions between Gateway and deployed objects, strategies to identify risk-avoidant paths to heliocentric space are necessary for Gateway mission operations.

Stephen T. Scheuerle↗

NASA NTRS2008

Mitigating Aviation Communication and Satellite Orbit Operations Surprises from Adverse Space Weather

Adverse space weather affects operational activities in aviation and satellite systems. For example, large solar flares create highly variable enhanced neutral atmosphere and ionosphere electron density regions. These regions impact aviation communication frequencies as well as precision orbit determination. The natural space environment, with its dynamic space weather variability, is additionally changed by human activity. The increase in orbital debris in low Earth orbit (LEO), combined with lower atmosphere CO2 that rises into the lower thermosphere and causes increased cooling that results in increased debris lifetime, adds to the environmental hazards of navigating in near-Earth space. This is at a time when commercial space endeavors are posed to begin more missions to LEO during the rise of the solar activity cycle toward the next maximum (2012). For satellite and aviation operators, adverse space weather results in greater expenses for orbit management, more communication outages or aviation and ground-based high frequency radio used, and an inability to effectively plan missions or service customers with space-based communication, imagery, and data transferal during time-critical activities. Examples of some revenue-impacting conditions and solutions for mitigating adverse space weather are offered.

Tobiska, W. Kent↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Cost and Benefit Analysis of Orbital Debris Remediation, Mitigation,Tracking, and Characterization

Orbital debris may collide with crewed and robotic spacecraft, placing them at risk. The wide range of debris, from 9,000-kilogram rocket bodies to millions of millimeter-size debris, has led to a similarly wide range of proposed actions for addressing the risks posed by debris. However, the costs and benefits of these actions have historically been unknown. This is a challenge for decision makers who are choosing which actions to support through technology development or policy changes. NASA’s Office of Technology, Policy, and Strategy is addressing these technical and economic uncertainties by building a capability to (1) complete rigorous calculations of the net present value of each action, (2) identify an optimal portfolio of actions to reduce risk, and (3) quantitatively analyze policies related to space sustainability. This report describes our progress toward that capability and to solicit feedback from the space and economic communities. Our previous work(Colvin, Karcz, and Wusk. 2023), referred to here as Phase 1, assessed the costs and benefits of performing debris remediation on operationally relevant timescales. The current paper summarizes the work of Locke and Colvin (2024), which contains major updates to the risk model used in Phase 1 and expands the breadth of actions considered to include mitigating the creation of debris, improving the ability to track debris, and more methods for cleaning up existing debris. We demonstrate that our approach of measuring risks in dollars allows for the effectiveness of seemingly incommensurate actions to be compared and generates insights that other approaches to measuring risk have missed.

Orbital Debris↗

NASA NTRS1995

Secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) analysis of hypervelocity microparticle impact sites on LDEF surfaces

Two dimensional elemental ion maps have been recorded for hundreds of microparticle impact sites and contamination features on LDEF surfaces. Since the majority of the analyzed surfaces were metal-oxide-silicon (MOS) impact detectors from the Interplanetary Dust Experiment, a series of 'standard' and 'blank' analyses of these surfaces are included. Hypervelocity impacts of forsterite olivine microparticles on activated flight sensors served as standards while stylus and pulsed laser simulated 'impacts' served as analytical blanks. Results showed that despite serious contamination issues, impactor residues can be identified in greater than 1/3 of the impact sites. While aluminum oxide particles could not be detected on aluminum surfaces, they were detected on germanium surfaces from row 12. Remnants of manmade debris impactors consisting of paint chips and bits of metal were identified on surfaces from LDEF Rows 3 (west or trailing side), 6 (south), 9 (ram or leading side), 12 (north) and the space end. Higher than expected ratios of manmade microparticle impacts to total microparticle impacts were found on the space end and the trailing side. These results were consistent with time-tagged and time-segregated microparticle impact data from the IDE and other LDEF experiments. A myriad of contamination interferences were identified and their effects on impactor debris identification mitigated during the course of this study. These interferences include pre-, post and inflight deposited surface contaminants as well as indigenous heterogeneous material contaminants. Non-flight contaminations traced to human origins, including spittle and skin oils, contributed significant levels of alkali-rich carbonaceous interferences. A ubiquitous layer of in-flight deposited silicaceous contamination varied in thickness with location on LDEF, even on a micro scale. In-flight deposited (low velocity) contaminants include urine droplets and bits of metal film from eroded thermal blankets.

Simon, C. G.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance

As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches may occur that need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron. However the conjunction screening process in use by the 19th was developed over 30 years ago and was not designed with automation in mind, so screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process. Many operators assume that automated maneuver planning must be real-time; however this time between planning and execution to allow for screening is possible if planned for during system design. In an effort to speed up the screening process, NASA has developed a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings. This prototype system was necessitated to support the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of 4 cubesats that planned to fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation, both performing automated maneuvering. Without screening of the planned maneuvers, the two constellations risked a collision. Once converted from a prototype to an operational system, this capability will greatly help smallsats, for example those that are planning to test propulsive capabilities, by allowing fast turnaround feedback to ensure safety form collision with other objects. This paper describes the existing CA process, the prototype real-time capability, and results from the experiment that tested the prototype.

Matthew Hejduk↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance

As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However, the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches will occur that may need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron; screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process in advance of maneuver execution in case one screening is missed and the next needs to be used. In an effort to speed up the screening process to benefit spacecraft using automated maneuvering, a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings has been developed in support of the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of four cubesats that fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation. Both of these constellations perform automated maneuvering, so without screening the planned maneuvers before execution, the two constellations would risk a collision. This paper describes the traditional conjunction assessment (CA) process, the prototype real-time CA screening capability, plans for the experiment to test the prototype, and next steps.

conjunction assessment↗