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NASA NTRS1995

Hubble Space Telescope nickel-hydrogen battery testing: An update

The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) began testing the HST Ni-H2 Six Battery Test and the 'Flight Spare Battery' Tests approximately one year before the launch of the HST. These tests are operated and reported on by the MSFC, but are managed and funded by Goddard Space Flight Center in direct support of the HST program. The HST Ni-H2 batteries are built from Eagle Picher RNH-90-3 cells. The HST EPS (electrical power system) is a direct energy transfer power system. The HST Ni-H2 Six Battery Test is a breadboard of the HST EPS. The batteries in the test are composed of test module cells and packaged into three battery modules identical to the flight modules. This test is the HST EPS testbed. The 'Flight Spare Battery' Test is a simulation of one of the six battery channels on the HST. The cells in the test are from the flight spare lot of cells, which are the same lot of cells that three of the six HST flight batteries are made from. This test is the battery life test for the HST program.

Whitt, Thomas H.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Time Course of the Response of Myofibrillar and Sarcoplasmic Protein Metabolism to Unweighting of the Soleus Muscle

Contributions of altered in vivo protein synthesis and degradation to unweighting atrophy of the soleus muscle in tail-suspended young female rats were analyzed daily for up to 6 days. Specific changes in myofibrillar and sarcoplasmic proteins were also evaluated to assess their contributions to the loss of total protein. Synthesis of myofibrillar and sarcoplasmic proteins was estimated by intramuscular (IM) injection and total protein by intraperitoneal (IP) injection of flooding doses of H-3-phenylaianine. Total protein loss was greatest during the first 3 days following suspension and was a consequence of the loss of myofibrillar rather than sarcoplasmic proteins. However, synthesis of total myofibrillar and sarcoplasmic proteins diminished in parallel beginning in the first 24 hours. Therefore sarcoplasmic proteins must be spared due to a decrease in their degradation. In contrast, myofibrillar protein degradation increased, thus explaining the elevated degradation of the total pool. Following 72 hours of suspension, protein synthesis remained low, but the rate of myofibrillar protein loss diminished, suggesting a slowing of degradation. These various results show acute loss of protein during unweighting atrophy is a consequence of decreased synthesis and increased degradation of myofibrillar proteins, and sarcoplasmic proteins are spared due to slower degradation, likely explaining the sparing of plasma membrane receptors. Based on other published data, we propose that the slowing of atrophy after the initial response may be attributed to an increased effect of insulin.

Munoz, Kathryn A.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Advanced Self-Calibrating, Self-Repairing Data Acquisition System

An improved self-calibrating and self-repairing Data Acquisition System (DAS) for use in inaccessible areas, such as onboard spacecraft, and capable of autonomously performing required system health checks, failure detection. When required, self-repair is implemented utilizing a "spare parts/tool box" system. The available number of spare components primarily depends upon each component's predicted reliability which may be determined using Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) analysis. Failing or degrading components are electronically removed and disabled to reduce power consumption, before being electronically replaced with spare components.

Pedro J Medelius↗

NASA NTRS2004

Application of Solar Electric Propulsion to a Comet Surface Sample Return Mission

Current NSTAR (planned for the Discovery Mission: Dawn) and NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster based propulsion systems were compared for a comet surface sample return mission to Tempe1 1. Mission and systems analyses were conducted over a range of array power for each propulsion system with an array of 12 kW EOL at 1 AU chosen for a baseline. Engine configurations investigated for NSTAR included 4 operational engines with 1 spare and 5 operational engines with 1 spare. The NEXT configuration investigated included 2 operational engines plus 1 spare, with performance estimated for high thrust and high Isp throttling modes. Figures of merit for this comparison include Solar Electric Propulsion dry mass, average engine throughput, and net non-propulsion payload returned to Earth flyby.

Cupples, Mike↗

NASA NTRS2007

Repair of Electronics for Long Duration Spaceflight

To reduce mission risk, long duration spaceflight and exploration activities will require greater degrees of self-sufficiency with regards to repair capability than have ever been employed before in space exploration. The current repair paradigm of replacing Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) of malfunctioning avionics and electronic hardware will be impractical, since carrying all of the spares that could possibly be needed for a long duration mission would require upmass and volume at unprecedented and unacceptable levels. A strategy of component-level repair for electronics, however, could significantly reduce the mass and volume necessary for spares and enhance mission safety via a generic contingency capability. This approach is already used to varying degrees by the U.S. Navy, where vessels at sea experience some similar constraints such as the need for self sufficiency for moderately long time periods, and restrictions on volume of repair spares and infrastructure. The concept of conducting component-level repairs of electronics in spacecraft requires the development of design guidelines for future avionics (to enable repair), development of diagnostic techniques to allow an astronaut to pinpoint the faulty component aboard a vastly complex vehicle, and development of tools and methodologies for dealing with the physical processes of replacing the component. This physical process includes tasks such as conformal coating removal and replacement, component removal, replacement, and alignment--all in the difficulty of a reduced gravity environment. Further, the gravitational effects on the soldering process must be characterized and accounted for to ensure reliability of the newly repaired components. The Component-Level Electronics-Assembly Repair (CLEAR) project under the NASA Supportability program was established to develop and demonstrate the practicality of this repair approach. CLEAR involves collaborative efforts between NASA s Glenn Research Center, Langley Research Center, Johnson Space Center, the National Center for Space Exploration Research, and the U.S. Navy. The project goals are 1) develop and demonstrate a manually-operated electronics repair capability to be conducted in a spacecraft environment; and 2) develop guidelines for designs of electronics that facilitates component-level repair for future space exploration efforts. This multi-faceted program utilizes a cross-disciplinary approach to examine pre- and post-repair diagnostics, conformal coating removal and replacement, component soldering, and electronics design for supportability. These areas are investigated by a combination of trade studies, ground based testing, reduced gravity aircraft testing, and actual spaceflight testing on the International Space Station (ISS) in multiple experiments. This paper details the efforts of this program, with emphasis on early trade study results, ground-based efforts, and two upcoming ISS experiments.

Pettegrew, Richard D.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Engine Development Design Margins Briefing Charts

New engines experience durability problems after entering service. The most prevalent and costly is the hot section, particularly the high-pressure turbine. The origin of durability problems can be traced back to: 1) the basic aero-mechanical design systems, assumptions, and design margins used by the engine designers, 2) the available materials systems, and 3) to a large extent, aggressive marketing in a highly competitive environment that pushes engine components beyond the demonstrated capability of the basic technology available for the hardware designs. Unfortunately the user must operate the engine in the service environment in order to learn the actual thrust loading and the time at max effort take-off conditions used in service are needed to determine the hot section life. Several hundred thousand hours of operational service will be required before the demonstrated reliability of a fleet of engines or the design deficiencies of the engine hot section parts can be determined. Also, it may take three to four engine shop visits for heavy maintenance on the gas path hardware to establish cost effective build standards. Spare parts drive the oerator's engine maintenance costs but spare parts also makes lots of money for the engine manufacturer during the service life of an engine. Unless competition prevails for follow-on engine buys, there is really no motivation for an OEM to spend internal money to improve parts durability and reduce earnings derived from a lucrative spare parts business. If the hot section life is below design goals or promised values, the OEM migh argue that the engine is being operated beyond its basic design intent. On the other hand, the airframer and the operator will continue to remind the OEM that his engine was selected based on a lot of promises to deliver spec thrust with little impact on engine service life if higher thrust is used intermittently. In the end, a standoff prevails and nothing gets fixed. This briefing will propose ways to hold competing engine manufacturers more accountable for engine hot section design margins during the entire Engine Development process as well as provide tools to assess the design temperature margins in the hot section parts of Service Engines.

Bentz, Chuck↗

NASA NTRS2005

Solid Freeform Fabrication of Composite-Material Objects

Composite solid freeform fabrication (C-SFF) or composite layer manufacturing (CLM) is an automated process in which an advanced composite material (a matrix reinforced with continuous fibers) is formed into a freestanding, possibly complex, three-dimensional object. In CLM, there is no need for molds, dies, or other expensive tooling, and there is usually no need for machining to ensure that the object is formed to the desired net size and shape. CLM is a variant of extrusion-type rapid prototyping, in which a model or prototype of a solid object is built up by controlled extrusion of a polymeric or other material through an orifice that is translated to form patterned layers. The second layer is deposited on top of the first layer, the third layer is deposited on top of the second layer, and so forth, until the stack of layers reaches the desired final thickness and shape. The elements of CLM include (1) preparing a matrix resin in a form in which it will solidify subsequently, (2) mixing the fibers and matrix material to form a continuous pre-impregnated tow (also called "towpreg"), and (3) dispensing the pre-impregnated tow from a nozzle onto a base while moving the nozzle to form the dispensed material into a patterned layer of controlled thickness. When the material deposited into a given layer has solidified, the material for the next layer is deposited and patterned similarly, and so forth, until the desired overall object has been built up as a stack of patterned layers. Preferably, the deposition apparatus is controlled by a computer-aided design (CAD) system. The basic CLM concept can be adapted to the fabrication of parts from a variety of matrix materials. It is conceivable that a CLM apparatus could be placed at a remote location on Earth or in outer space where (1) spare parts are expected to be needed but (2) it would be uneconomical or impractical to store a full inventory of spare parts. A wide variety of towpregs could be prepared and stored on spools until needed. Long-shelf-life towpreg materials suitable for such use could include thermoplastic-coated carbon fibers and metal-coated SiC fibers. When a spare part was needed, the part could be fabricated by CLM under control by a CAD data file; thus, the part could be built automatically, at the scene, within hours or minutes.

Wang, C. Jeff↗

NASA NTRS2011

Reliability Impacts in Life Support Architecture and Technology Selection

Equivalent System Mass (ESM) and reliability estimates were performed for different life support architectures based primarily on International Space Station (ISS) technologies. The analysis was applied to a hypothetical 1-year deep-space mission. High-level fault trees were initially developed relating loss of life support functionality to the Loss of Crew (LOC) top event. System reliability was then expressed as the complement (nonoccurrence) this event and was increased through the addition of redundancy and spares, which added to the ESM. The reliability analysis assumed constant failure rates and used current projected values of the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) from an ISS database where available. Results were obtained showing the dependence of ESM on system reliability for each architecture. Although the analysis employed numerous simplifications and many of the input parameters are considered to have high uncertainty, the results strongly suggest that achieving necessary reliabilities for deep-space missions will add substantially to the life support system mass. As a point of reference, the reliability for a single-string architecture using the most regenerative combination of ISS technologies without unscheduled replacement spares was estimated to be less than 1%. The results also demonstrate how adding technologies in a serial manner to increase system closure forces the reliability of other life support technologies to increase in order to meet the system reliability requirement. This increase in reliability results in increased mass for multiple technologies through the need for additional spares. Alternative parallel architecture approaches and approaches with the potential to do more with less are discussed. The tall poles in life support ESM are also reexamined in light of estimated reliability impacts.

Lange, Kevin E.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Assessment of Service Life for Regenerative ECLSS Resin Beds

The International Space Station (ISS) Water Processor Assembly (WPA) and Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) manage and process water at various levels of cleanliness for multiple purposes. The effluent of theWPA and the influent of the OGA require water at very high levels of purity. The bulk of the water purification that occurs in both systems is performed by consumable activated carbon and ion exchange resin beds. Replacement beds must be available on orbit in order to continue the ISS critical processes of water purification and oxygen generation. Various hurdles exist in order to ensure viable spare resin beds. These include the characteristics of resin beds such as: storage environment, shelf life requirements, microbial growth, and variations in the levels and species of contaminants the beds are required to remove. Careful consideration has been given to match water models, bed capacities and spares traffic models to ensure that spares are always viable. The results of these studies and considerations, in particular, how shelf life requirements affect resin bed life management, are documented in this paper.

Cloud, Dale L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

[MaRS Project]

The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.

Aruljothi, Arunvenkatesh↗

NASA NTRS2017

Supportability Challenges, Metrics, and Key Decisions for Future Human Spaceflight

Future crewed missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) represent a logistical challenge that is unprecedented in human space flight. Astronauts will travel farther and stay in space for longer than any previous mission, far from timely abort or resupply from Earth. Under these conditions, supportability { defined as the set of system characteristics that influence the logistics and support required to enable safe and effective operations of systems { will be a much more significant driver of space system lifecycle properties than it has been in the past. This paper presents an overview of supportability for future human space flight. The particular challenges of future missions are discussed, with the differences between past, present, and future missions highlighted. The relationship between supportability metrics and mission cost, performance, schedule, and risk is also discussed. A set of pro- posed strategies for managing supportability is presented (including reliability growth, uncertainty reduction, level of repair, commonality, redundancy, In-Space Manufacturing (ISM) (including the use of material recycling and In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) for spares and maintenance items), reduced complexity, and spares inventory decisions such as the use of predeployed or cached spares - along with a discussion of the potential impacts of each of those strategies. References are provided to various sources that describe these supportability metrics and strategies, as well as associated modeling and optimization techniques, in greater detail. Overall, supportability is an emergent system characteristic and a holistic challenge for future system development. System designers and mission planners must carefully consider and balance the supportability metrics and decisions described in this paper in order to enable safe and effective beyond-LEO human space flight.

Owens, Andrew C.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Oxygen Storage Tanks Are Feasible for Mars Transit

The Mars transit tanks will probably be titanium lined, composite over wrapped pressure vessels (COPVs) similar to those used in the space shuttle and International Space Station(ISS). Since the mass of a storage tank is proportional to the mass of the gas it contains, the required oxygen will use about the same mass of tanks regardless of the number and size ofthe tanks. Using existing relatively small COPVs is possible. Pressure vessels can fail due torupture and leakage but no failures have occurred in space and the expected failure rates are very low. Since one or two spare tanks are required for reliability, using smaller tanks can reduce the total mass. For a Mars round trip, the mass of oxygen and tanks including spares is roughly equal to the mass of the ISS Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) and its spares. Since the OGA must orbit Mars and be returned to Earth, while half the storage tanks are emptied on the way to Mars and can be abandoned, storage tanks have a significant launch mass advantage over the OGA. Storage tanks are simpler, more reliable,and have fewer failure modes than an OGA. They would have smaller design and development costs and need less crew time and maintenance. Oxygen storage tanks are feasible for Mars transit and are attractive compared to the ISS OGA.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ECLSS Does Not Exist in a Vacuum: Integrated Analysis is Necessary to Inform System Architecture Decisions

Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) architecture selection has profound implications for mission cost and mass extending far beyond the ECLSS itself. Similarly, other mission architecture decisions – particularly involving transportation systems – can influence optimal ECLSS architectures. Loop closure influences requirements for water, oxygen, and other consumables. System maintainability and reliability influences spares mass and risk. System, consumables, and spares mass interact with transportation system architectures and propellant demands and propulsion element sizing. All these interactions with other systems must be considered when evaluating ECLSS options. Analyses that focus only on maximizing ECLSS loop closure – or minimizing ECLSS mass, or minimizing ECLSS life cycle cost – may lead to sub-optimal or even counterproductive system architecture and investment decisions at the mission level. For example, an ECLSS architecture that minimizes ECLSS lifecycle cost but results in excessively high logistics mass could lead to significantly increased transportation system costs or make interplanetary transportation infeasible. Increased loop closure could result in higher development costs and higher mass if system/spares mass increases outweigh consumables reduction. In addition, systems mass and consumables mass are not directly comparable and have different impacts on propellant requirements, as consumables mass changes over the course of the mission. This paper presents an integrated analysis examining the overall impact of different ECLSS and transportation architectures on mass for a crewed Mars mission, including the habitat and transportation systems as well as consumables, spares, and propellant. Key observations are discussed, along with opportunities for further sensitivity analysis and model development. Overall, ECLSS development activities must consider their impacts at the mission level, as part of an integrated system, rather than in isolation.

Systems Analysis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Trajectory, Habitat, and Logistics Analysis and Trade Study for Human Mars Missions

Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) architecture selection has profound implications for mission cost and mass extending far beyond the ECLSS itself. Similarly, other mission architecture decisions – particularly involving transportation systems – can influence optimal ECLSS architectures. Loop closure influences requirements for water, oxygen, and other consumables. System maintainability and reliability influences spares mass and risk. System, consumables, and spares mass interact with transportation system architectures and propellant demands and propulsion element sizing. All these interactions with other systems must be considered when evaluating ECLSS options. Analyses that focus only on maximizing ECLSS loop closure – or minimizing ECLSS mass, or minimizing ECLSS life cycle cost – may lead to sub-optimal or even counterproductive system architecture and investment decisions at the mission level. For example, an ECLSS architecture that minimizes ECLSS life cycle cost but results in excessively high logistics mass could lead to significantly increased transportation system costs or make interplanetary transportation infeasible. Increased loop closure could result in higher development costs and higher mass if system/spares mass increases outweigh consumables reduction. In addition, systems mass and consumables mass are not directly comparable and have different impacts on propellant requirements, as consumables mass changes over the course of the mission. This paper presents an integrated analysis examining the overall impact of different ECLSS and transportation architectures on mass for a crewed Mars mission, including the habitat and transportation systems as well as consumables, spares, and propellant. Key observations are discussed, along with opportunities for further sensitivity analysis and model development. Overall, ECLSS development activities must consider their impacts at the mission level, as part of an integrated system, rather than in isolation.

Mars↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Trajectory, Habitat, and Logistics Analysis and Trade Study for Human Mars Missions

Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) architecture selection has profound implications for mission cost and mass extending far beyond the ECLSS itself. Similarly, other mission architecture decisions – particularly involving transportation systems – can influence optimal ECLSS architectures. Loop closure influences requirements for water, oxygen, and other consumables. System maintainability and reliability influences spares mass and risk. System, consumables, and spares mass interact with transportation system architectures, including propellant demands and propulsion element sizing. All these interactions with other systems must be considered when evaluating ECLSS options. Analyses that focus only on maximizing ECLSS loop closure – or minimizing ECLSS mass, or minimizing ECLSS life cycle cost – may lead to sub-optimal or even counterproductive system architecture and investment decisions at the mission level. For example, an ECLSS architecture that minimizes ECLSS life cycle cost but results in excessively high logistics mass could lead to significantly increased transportation system costs or make interplanetary transportation infeasible. Increased loop closure could result in higher development costs and higher mass if system/spares mass increases outweigh consumables reduction. In addition, systems mass and consumables mass are not directly comparable and have different impacts on propellant requirements, as consumables mass changes over the course of the mission. This paper presents an integrated analysis examining the overall impact of different ECLSS and transportation architectures on Earth departure mass for a crewed Mars mission, including the habitat and transportation systems as well as consumables, spares, and propellant. Key observations are discussed, along with opportunities for further sensitivity analysis and model development. Overall, ECLSS development activities must consider their impacts at the mission level, as part of an integrated system, rather than in isolation.

Mars↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis and Optimization of Test Plans for Advanced Exploration Systems Reliability and Supportability

Future crewed exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) will operate farther from Earth and be logistically isolated for longer than any previous human spaceflight mission. Under these conditions, supportability and reliability willbestronger drivers of mission mass and risk than they have been in the past. Items with high failure rates, or uncertain failure rates, can result in high spares mass requirements and/or high risk on deep space missions. Testing is a critical element of system development which provides the opportunity to identify and resolve design issues, defects, or other failure modes before they cause problems during a mission. Reliability growth programs can reduce failure rates by identifying and remove failure modes via design changes, and long-duration life testing can provide valuable data to reduce failure rate estimate uncertainty and verify (to some level of confidence) that components are as reliable as expected. Testing activities take time and resources, however, and must be incorporated into program plans in order to be fully effective. This paper presents an integrated reliability test plan analysis and optimization methodology, which has been used to inform Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Life Support Systems (LSS) ground test planning for future missions. The methodology determines the optimal number of test units to purchase and allocation of test time –split between reliability growth and uncertainty reduction testing –across a given set of items in order to minimize spares mass for a given mission under constraints on total test cost and schedule. Model outputs also include expected spares mass after testing and the expected number of modifications or refurbishments during testing, both of which can inform program planning. Discussion of the model, conclusions, and future work are also presented.

Testing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis and Optimization of Test Plans for Advanced Exploration Systems Reliability and Supportability

Testing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Surface Hardness Testing of Mobile Launcher 1 (ML-1) Vehicle Support Posts (VSP) Following Artemis I Launch Exposure

Following the successful launch of Artemis I on November 16th, 2022 (Fig 1), a surface hardness assessment was performed on the eight primary VSPs (Figs. 2, 3) located on the Zero Deck of the ML. This assessment was performed as part of an instrument investigation for strain gauges installed on VSP interior surfaces that had a “strange reaction”. This report does not address the VSP strain gauge investigation, but rather VSP structural integrity for future service (Artemis II, III, …). Surface hardness measurements were taken to assess the strength of the ASTM A148 steel castings to confirm thermal exposure from launch had not reannealed the VSPs. However unlikely, it is possible high temperature may have heated and tempered (reannealed) the VSPs, resulting in a change of built-in stresses. This loss in built-in stress may explain the change in off-set measured by the strain gauges. Initial hardness measurements were made at two interior surfaces of VSPs near the strain gauges and the corresponding exterior surfaces (engine hole-facing). Field hardness measurements on the exterior, engine hole surface-facing surfaces for all eight VSPs ranged from 175 to 226 HB/P, well below the minimum hardness of 302 Brinell (HB). Opposing interior surface hardness measurements near strain gauges ranged from 264 to 358 HB/P. In all cases for flight VSPs, a drop in interior-to-exterior hardness ranging from 70 to 132 HB/P was measured. Surface hardness measurements were then made on the two spare VSPs not exposed to launch temperatures for baseline comparison. These two spare VSPs had a drop in Brinell hardness from interior to exterior surfaces ranging from 3 to 17 HB/P. The large interior-to-exterior delta hardness for eight flight VSPs but not for the two spare VSPs suggests launch exposure temperatures softened the exterior surfaces, raising two questions: 1) Are the VSPs compromised for future use, and 2) How deep is the exterior surface softening effect? To address concerns of low surface hardness values at non-critical exterior surfaces, additional field surface hardness measurements were taken at high-stress locations on VSP3: Both door jams, back radius, and internal left and right radius near the base. These values came in well above the required minimum hardness (317 to 365 HB/P). For a more representative pre-launch versus post-launch surface hardness comparison, VSP Acceptance Data Packages (ADPs) were reviewed, and hardness measurements were made at the same eight original locations on VSP3 where hardness measurements were made at the foundry. To determine the degree of softening, 1/8” of material was machined away at three exterior surfaces of engine hole-facing side (Fig. 4). A significant increase in surface hardness was measured ranging from 50 to 86 HB/P. Values at these three locations were still slightly below the required minimum hardness, so an additional 1/8” material was machined away, and hardness values were retaken. At the ¼” depth, hardness values increased to 321 to 324 HB/P. These values fall above the required minimum, concluding surface hardness testing. Rationale for VSP continued use was reached with no restrictions during a Chief Engineering Review based on hardness values exceeding minimum at critical locations and subsurface locations for VSP #3.

Artemis I↗