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Fission Gas Measurements in Spent Fuel: Literature Review

The fission-derived noble gases, xenon(Xe) and krypton(Kr), have long been proposed as a tool for supporting nuclear safeguards and declarations verification. A vast body of literature outlines how these non-reactive fission gases released during reactor operation and shutdowns correlate to burnup level, power history, other reactor specifications and reprocessing activities. However, irradiation conditions can vary appreciably both radially and axially within a fuel pin.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

IER 517: Molybdenum Critical Experiment Design [Slides]

In nuclear fuels, U-Mo metallic fuels are used in new space reactor designs and new research reactor fuels. MITR, MURR, and NBSR reactors plan on converting from different HEU fuels to a U-Mo HALEU fuel. In spend nuclear fuel, 95 Mo is one of the 15 main absorbing fission products in irradiated LWR fuel. This makes it important for criticality safety studies in transportation and reprocessing. In structural materials. Molybdenum is found commonly in alloys that make up the structural materials of nuclear reactors such as type 316 SS. Molybdenum helps to improve high temperature performance and corrosion resistance.

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Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay

There are a variety of reasons for quantifying plutonium (Pu) in spent fuel such as independently verifying the Pu content declared by a regulated facility, making shipper/receiver mass declarations, and quantifying the input mass at a reprocessing facility. As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, NA-241 has recently funded a multilab/university collaboration to determine the elemental Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies. This research effort is anticipated to be a five year effort: the first part of which is a two years Monte Carlo modeling effort to integrate and down-select among 13 nondestructive assay (NDA) technologies, followed by one year for fabricating instruments and then two years for measuring spent fuel. This paper gives a brief overview of the approach being taken for the Monte Carlo research effort. In addition, preliminary results for the first NDA instrument studied in detail, delayed neutron detection, will be presented. In order to cost effectively and robustly model the performance of several NDA techniques, an"assembly library" was created that contains a diverse range of pressurized water reactor spent fuel assemblies (burnup, enrichment, cooling time) similar to that which exists in spent pools today and in the future, diversion scenarios that capture a range of possible rod removal options, spatial and isotopic detail needed to accurately quantify the capability of all the NDA techniques so as to enable integration. Integration is being designed into this study from the beginning since it is expected that the best performance will be obtained by combining a few NDA techniques. The performance of each instrument will be quantified for the full assembly library in three different media: air, water and borated water. In this paper the preliminary capability of delayed neutron detection will be quantified for the spent fuel library for all three media. The 13 NDA techniques being researched are the following: Delayed Gamma, Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation, Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer, Neutron Multiplicity, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence, Passive Prompt Gamma, Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity, Self-integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry, Total Neutron (Gross Neutron), X-Ray Fluorescence, 252Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron Detection.

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APPLICATION OF ABSORPTION SPECTROSCOPY TO ACTINIDE PROCESS ANALYSIS AND MONITORING

The characteristic strong colors of aqueous actinide solutions form the basis of analytical techniques for actinides based on absorption spectroscopy. Colorimetric measurements of samples from processing activities have been used for at least half a century. This seemingly mature technology has been recently revitalized by developments in chemometric data analysis. Where reliable measurements could formerly only be obtained under well-defined conditions, modern methods are robust with respect to variations in acidity, concentration of complexants and spectral interferents, and temperature. This paper describes two examples of the use of process absorption spectroscopy for Pu analysis at the Savannah River Site, in Aiken, SC. In one example, custom optical filters allow accurate colorimetric measurements of Pu in a stream with rapid nitric acid variation. The second example demonstrates simultaneous measurement of Pu and U by chemometric treatment of absorption spectra. The paper concludes with a description of the use of these analyzers to supplement existing technologies in nuclear materials monitoring in processing, reprocessing, and storage facilities.

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Acidic dissolution behavior of U containing ZrO2–MgO ceramics

This study explores the possibility of dissolving zirconia-magnesia inert matrix fuel containing uranium oxide as a fissile material and plutonium homolog and erbium oxide as a burnable poison with nitric and sulfuric acid as a potential first step in a reprocessing scheme. The progress of the dissolution is followed by monitoring the amount of material in solution by inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectroscopy, assessing the speciation of the material by time resolved laser fluorescence spectroscopy, and determining and quantifying the crystalline phases present in the remaining residue by X-ray diffraction. This study has shown a linear incongruent dissolution of the cubic zirconia phase in concentrated nitric acid under certain chemical compositions, while the magnesium oxide phase is completely soluble. In sulfuric acid uranium, erbium, and magnesium are soluble to different extents while zirconium forms a colloidal suspension that conglomerates and settles out of solution. The feasibility of the dissolution of zirconia-magnesia inert matrix fuel with nitric and sulfuric acid for reprocessing is discussed.

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Summary Report on the Fuel Performance Modeling of the AFC-2A, 2B Irradiation Experiments

The primary objective of this work at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is to determine the fuel and cladding temperature history during irradiation of the AFC-2A, 2B transmutation metallic fuel alloy irradiation experiments containing transuranic and rare earth elements. Addition of the rare earth elements intends to simulate potential fission product carry-over from pyro-metallurgical reprocessing. Post irradiation examination of the AFC-2A, 2B rodlets revealed breaches in the rodlets and fuel melting which was attributed to the release of the fission gas into the helium gap between the rodlet cladding and the capsule which houses six individually encapsulated rodlets. This release is not anticipated during nominal operation of the AFC irradiation vehicle that features a double encapsulated design in which sodium bonded metallic fuel is separated from the ATR coolant by the cladding and the capsule walls. The modeling effort is focused on assessing effects of this unanticipated event on the fuel and cladding temperature with an objective to compare calculated results with the temperature limits of the fuel and the cladding.

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Postirradiation examination on metallic fuel in the AFC-2 irradiation test series

In this paper, irradiation experiments on metallic fuel alloys containing rare earth additions to simulate potential carry-over from pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and minor actinide additions were performed in the Idaho National Laboratory Advanced Test Reactor. These tests were designated AFC-2A and AFC-2B. Additionally irradiation experiments were also performed on metallic fuel alloys containing minor actinide additions that were fabricated by different techniques. These tests were designated AFC-2E. These pins were removed from the reactor after achieving burnups between 6 and 11% fission per initial heave metal atom. Examination of these pins revealed that they were unintentionally operated beyond their desired power and temperature conditions. Highlights from the postirradiation examination of these experiments is discussed. A variety of issue contributed to the poor performance of these irradiation tests including capsule design, reactor power variations and fabrication issues. While all the issues contributed, the major issue was determined to be unanticipated variations in reactor power. Through comparisons between these experiments and historical off-normal experiments, it was possible to conclude bound the operating temperatures of these experiments. There likely was some in-pile melting in the rare earth addition experiments (AFC-2A, AFC-2B), but it is not likely that there was in-pile melting in the fabrication technique experiments (AFC-2E).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Transmutation Dynamics: Impacts of Multi-Recycling on Fuel Cycle Performances

From a physics standpoint, it is feasible to sustain continuous multi-recycle in either thermal or fast reactors. In Fiscal Year 2009, transmutaton work at INL provided important new insight, caveats, and tools on multi-recycle. Multi-recycle of MOX, even with all the transuranics, is possible provided continuous enrichment of the uranium phase to ~6.5% and also limitting the transuranic enrichment to slightly less than 8%. Multi-recycle of heterogeneous-IMF assemblies is possible with continuous enrichment of the UOX pins to ~4.95% and having =60 of the 264 fuel pins being inter-matrix. A new tool enables quick assessment of the impact of different cooling times on isotopic evolution. The effect of cooling time was found to be almost as controlling on higher mass actinide concentrations in fuel as the selection of thermal versus fast neutron spectra. A new dataset was built which provides on-the-fly estimates of gamma and neutron dose in MOX fuels as a function of the isotopic evolution. All studies this year focused on the impact of dynamic feedback due to choices made in option space. Both the equilibrium fuel cycle concentrations and the transient time to reach equilibrium for each isotope were evaluated over a range of reactor, reprocessing and cooling time combinations. New bounding cases and analysis methods for evaluating both reactor safety and radiation worker safety were established. This holistic collection of physics analyses and methods gives improved resolution of fuel cycle options, and impacts thereof, over that of previous ad-hoc and single-point analyses.

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Decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, a Shift in Paradigm for Terminating Safeguards on Process Holdup

INMM Abstract 51st Annual Meeting Decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, a Shift in Paradigm for Terminating Safeguards on Process Holdup The Fuel Process Building at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) is being decommissioned after nearly four decades of recovering high enriched uranium from various government owned spent nuclear fuels. The separations process began with fuel dissolution in one of multiple head-ends, followed by three cycles of uranium solvent extraction, and ending with denitration of uranyl nitrate product. The entire process was very complex, and the associated equipment formed an extensive maze of vessels, pumps, piping, and instrumentation within several layers of operating corridors and process cells. Despite formal flushing and cleanout procedures, an accurate accounting for the residual uranium held up in process equipment over extended years of operation, presented a daunting safeguards challenge. Upon cessation of domestic reprocessing, the holdup remained inaccessible and was exempt from measurement during ensuing physical inventories. In decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, the Idaho Cleanup Project, which operates the INTEC, deviated from the established requirements that all nuclear material holdup be measured and credited to the accountability books and that all nuclear materials, except attractiveness level E residual holdup, be transferred to another facility. Instead, the decommissioning involved grouting the process equipment in place, rather than measuring and removing the contained holdup for subsequent transfer. The grouting made the potentially attractiveness level C and D holdup even more inaccessible, thereby effectually converting the holdup to attractiveness level E and allowing for termination of safeguards controls. Prior to grouting the facility, the residual holdup was estimated by limited sampling and destructive analysis of solutions in process lines and by acceptable knowledge based upon the separations process, plant layout, and operating history. The use of engineering estimates, in lieu of approved measurement methods, was justified by the estimated small quantity of holdup remaining, the infeasibility of measuring the holdup in a highly radioactive background, and the perceived hazards to personnel. The alternate approach to quantifying and terminating safeguards on process holdup was approved by deviation.

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Using NDA Techniques to Improve Safeguards Metrics on Burnup Quantification and Plutonium Content in LWR SNF

Globally, there exists a long history in reprocessing in evaluation of the shipper/receiver difference (SRD) on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) received and processed. Typically, the declared shipper s values for uranium and plutonium in SNF (based on calculations involving the initial manufacturer s data and reactor operating history) are used as the input quantities to the head-end process of the facility. Problems have been encountered when comparing these values with measured results of the input accountability tank contents. A typical comparison yields a systematic bias indicated as a loss of 5 7 percent of the plutonium (Pu) and approximately 1 percent for the uranium (U). Studies suggest that such deviation can be attributed to the non-linear nature of the axial burnup values of the SNF. Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Texas A&M University are co-investigating the development of a new method, via Nondestructive Assay (NDA) techniques, to improve the accuracy in burnup and Pu content quantification. Two major components have been identified to achieve this objective. The first component calculates a measurement-based burnup profile along the axis of a fuel rod. Gamma-ray data is collected at numerous locations along the axis of the fuel rod using a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector designed for a wide range of gamma-ray energies. Using two fission products, 137Cs and 134Cs, the burnup is calculated at each measurement location and a profile created along the axis of the rod based on the individual measurement locations. The second component measures the U/Pu ratio using an HPGe detector configured for relatively low-energy gamma-rays including x-rays. Fluorescence x-rays from U and Pu are measured and compared to the U/Pu ratio determined from a destructive analysis of the sample. This will be used to establish a relationship between the measured and actual values. This relationship will be combined with the burnup analysis results to establish a relationship between fission product activity and Pu content. It is anticipated that this new method will allow receiving facilities to make a limited number of NDA, gamma-ray, measurements to confirm the shipper declared values for burnup and Pu content thereby improving the SRD.

Burnup↗

UP2 400 High Activity Oxide Legacy Waste Retrieval Project Scope and Progress-13048

The High Activity Oxide facility (HAO) reprocessed sheared and dissolved 4500 metric tons of light water reactor fuel the fuel of the emerging light water reactor spent fuel between 1976 and 1998. Over the period, approximately 2200 tons of process waste, composed primarily of sheared hulls, was produced and stored in a vast silo in the first place, and in canisters stored in pools in subsequent years. Upon shutdown of the facility, AREVA D and D Division in La Hague launched a thorough investigation and characterization of the silos and pools content, which then served as input data for the definition of a legacy waste retrieval and reconditioning program. Basic design was conducted between 2005 and 2007, and was followed by an optimization phase which lead to the definition of a final scenario and budget, 12% under the initial estimates. The scenario planned for the construction of a retrieval and reconditioning cell to be built on top of the storage silo. The retrieved waste would then be rinsed and sorted, so that hulls could subsequently be sent to La Hague high activity compacting facility, while resins and sludge would be cemented within the retrieval cell. Detailed design was conducted successfully from 2008 until 2011, while a thorough research and development program was conducted in order to qualify each stage of the retrieval and reconditioning process, and assist in the elaboration of the final waste package specification. This R and D program was defined and conducted as a response and mitigation of the major project risks identified during the basic design process. Procurement and site preparatory works were then launched in 2011. By the end of 2012, R and D is nearly completed, the retrieval and reconditioning process have been secured, the final waste package specification is being completed, the first equipment for the retrieval cell is being delivered on site, while preparation works are allowing to free up space above and around the silo, to allow for construction which is scheduled to being during the first semester of 2013. The elaboration of the final waste package is still undergoing and expected to be completed by then end of 2013, following some final elements of R and D required to demonstrate the full compatibility of the package with deep geological repository. The HAO legacy waste retrieval project is so far the largest such project entering operational phase on the site of La Hague. It is on schedule, under budget, and in conformity with the delivery requirements set by the French Safety Authority, as well as other stakeholders. This project paves the way for the successful completion of AREVA La Hague other legacy waste retrieval projects, which are currently being drafted or already in active R and D phase. (authors)

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Refining a Novel Process Monitoring Method to Safeguard Continuously Cycling Designs Using Isotopic Ratios

In advanced reactor (AR) designs, a common feature is continuous chemical processing and circulation of the nuclear material. This work bridges a significant measurement gap in safeguarding reactors with circulating fuel or continuous refueling by leveraging and building on the isotope ratio method first developed by our team under an FY21 Advanced Reactors International Safeguards Engagement (ARISE) project (Uribe et al. 2021). In circulating fuel designs, the radioisotope inventory changes from traditional effects (e.g., radioactive decay, fission) but also includes material transport due to pressure and temperature gradients. Such designs may also require regular or continuous additions or removals during operation, which significantly increases the rate of inventory change compared to traditional pressurized water reactor (PWR)s. Thus, directly tracking the nuclear inventory is ineffective since the isotopes are continuously added and removed. The isotope ratio method instead focuses on detecting changes to the input and output flows of radioisotopes. Previous work showed that for well-chosen pairs of isotopes, the isotopic ratio provides a sensitive and lasting indicator of deviation from normal conditions (e.g., startup, shutdown, diversion). The isotope ratio method is a process monitoring method with potential for application in for forward-looking approaches to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The original process monitoring method was developed for a specific case—the decay tank of a thorium-fueled molten salt breeder reactor. In this expanded work, we explored other types of reactors and processes with nonstationary (e.g., flowing) nuclear material, which are difficult to safeguard with traditional methods because of the transient nature of the systems. The goal of the present work is to generalize the isotope ratio method for use in processes with continuously flowing nuclear material. All continuous processes have an average time for isotopes to be replaced in the system. The isotope ratio method works by choosing radioisotopes with half-lives both above and below the processing time. The present work seeks to explore which isotopes are suitable for the method by simulating the nuclear inventory, radioisotope emissions, and detector responses for several classes of advanced reactors. While the method can in principle be applied to other processes (e.g., enrichment or reprocessing facilities), the present work limits scope to ARs with continuously flowing fuel. Section 2 details the mathematics supporting the isotope ratio method, and Section 3 introduces the representative ARs selected for this work. Section 4 discusses how each reactor was analyzed, and Section 5 showcases the results for each representative reactor. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks and suggests pathways for further analysis.

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Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

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THE INTEGRATED EQUIPMENT TEST FACILITY AT OAK RIDGE AS A NONPROLIFERATION TEST LOOP

The apparent renaissance in nuclear power has resulted in a new focus on nonproliferation measures. There is a lot of activity in development of new measurement technologies and methodologies for nonproliferation assessment. A need that is evolving in the United States is for facilities and test loops for demonstration of new technologies. In the late 1970s, the Fuel Recycle Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was engaged in advanced reprocessing technology development. As part of the program, the Integrated Equipment Test (IET) facility was constructed as a test bed for advanced technology. The IET was a full-scale demonstration facility, operable on depleted uranium, with a throughput capacity for 0.5 Mt/d. At the front end, the facility had a feed surge vessel, input accountability tank, and feed vessel for the single cycle of solvent extraction. The basic solvent extraction system was configured to use centrifugal contactors for extraction and scrub and a full-size pulsed column for strip. A surge tank received the solvent extraction product solution and fed a continuous operating thermo-syphon-type product evaporator. Product receiving and accountability vessels were available. Feed material could be prepared using a continuous rotary dissolve or by recycling the product with adjustment as new feed. Continuous operations 24/7 could be realized with full chemical recovery and solvent recycle systems in operation. The facility was fully instrumented for process control and operation, and a full solution monitoring application had been implemented for safeguards demonstrations, including actual diversion tests for sensitivity evaluation. A significant effort for online instrument development was a part of the program at the time. The fuel recycle program at Oak Ridge ended in the early 1990s, and the IET facility was mothballed. However, the equipment and systems remain and could be returned to service to support nonproliferation demonstrations. This paper discusses the status of the facility and operations.

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Nondestructive Spent Fuel Assay Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

Quantifying the isotopic composition of spent fuel is an important challenge and essential for many nuclear safeguards applications, such as independent verification of the Pu content declared by a regulated facility, shipper/receiver measurements, and quantifying isotopic input masses at a reprocessing facility. As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, NA-241 has recently funded a multilab/university collaboration to investigate a variety of nondestructive methods for determining the elemental Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies. Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is one of the methods being investigated. First modeling studies have been performed to investigate the feasibility of assaying a single fuel pin using a bremsstrahlung photon source. MCNPX modeling results indicate that NRF signals are significantly more intense than the background due to scattered interrogation photons even for isotopes with concentrations below 1percent. However, the studies revealed that the dominant contribution to the background is elastic scattering, which is currently not simulated by MCNPX. Critical to this effort, we have added existing NRF data to the MCNPX photonuclear data files and are now able to incorporate NRF physics into MCNPX simulations. Addition of the non-resonant elastic scattering data to MCNPX is in progress. Assaying fuel assemblies with NRF poses additional challenges: photon penetration through the assembly is small and the spent fuel radioactive decay and neutron activity lead to significantly higher backgrounds. First modeling studies to evaluate the efficacy of NRF for assaying assemblies have been initiated using the spent fuel assembly library created at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

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Impact of Reprocessed Uranium Management on the Homogeneous Recycling of Transuranics in PWRs

This article presents the results of a neutronics analysis related to the homogeneous recycling of transuranics (TRU) in PWRs with a MOX fuel using enriched uranium instead of depleted uranium. It also addresses an often, if not always, overlooked aspect related to the recycling of TRU in PWRs, namely the use of reprocessed uranium. From a neutronics point of view, it is possible to multi-recycle the entirety of the plutonium with or without neptunium and americium in a PWR fleet using MOX-EU fuel in between one third and two thirds of the fleet. Recycling neptunium and americium with plutonium significantly decreases the decay heat of the waste stream between 100 to 1,000 years compared to those of an open fuel cycle or when only plutonium is recycled. The uranium present in MOX-EU used fuel still contains a significant amount of 235 uranium and recycling it makes a major difference on the natural uranium needs. For example, a PWR fleet recycling its plutonium, neptunium and americium in MOXEU needs 28 percent more natural uranium than a reference UO 2 open cycle fleet generating the same energy if the reprocessed uranium is not recycled and 19 percent less if the reprocessed uranium is recycled back in the reactors, i.e. a 47 percent difference.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nonproliferation Uncertainties, a Major Barrier to Used Nuclear Fuel Recycle in the United States

A study and comparison of the goals and understandings of nonproliferation authorities with those of used nuclear fuel (UNF) recycle advocates have uncovered (1) some of the basic reasons for the creation of uncertainties by each of the parties, (2) why these uncertainties have become a major barrier to a decision to recycle UNF components in the United States, and (3) what steps can be taken to clarify these uncertainties. Recent papers and viewpoints expressed by nonproliferation authorities and technical consultants were reviewed, summarized, and compared with results of recent fuel cycle systems analyses made at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 1 Similarities and differences were identified, including both technical and policy factors. Nonproliferation authorities and a few UNF recycle advocates have recognized that the reprocessing technologies used for UNF component recycle do not offer significant nonproliferation differences; thus, the methods used can be chosen on some other basis, such as process efficiency, maturity, and/or economics. This paper reviews the safeguards implications beyond the simple assessment of UNF recycle technology selection. Differences in understanding that led to uncertainty barriers to UNF recycle include (1) the vulnerability of unseparated UNF, (2) the effects of time factors on production and accumulation of fissile plutonium isotopes and decay of the ?self-protecting radiation barrier,? (3) the chemistry of UNF components and relative ease of separation, and (4) the significant differences in commercialscale ?safeguards-by-design? UNF recycle facilities and smaller-scale covert operations. Application of safeguards-by-design and engineered safeguards can provide the defense-in-depth necessary for sufficient safeguards. Establishing these requirements for governing acceptable commercial UNF component recycle is essential.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Development for fissile assay in recycled fuel using lead slowing down spectrometer

A future nuclear energy system is under development to turn spent fuels produced by PWRs into fuels for a SFR (Sodium Fast Reactor) through the pyrochemical process. The knowledge of the isotopic fissile content of the new fuel is very important for fuel safety. A lead slowing down spectrometer (LSDS) is under development to analyze the fissile material content (Pu{sup 239}, Pu{sup 241} and U{sup 235}) of the fuel. The LSDS requires a neutron source, the neutrons will be slowed down through their passage in a lead medium and will finally enter the fuel and will induce fission reactions that will be analysed and the isotopic content of the fuel will be then determined. The issue is that the spent fuel emits intense gamma rays and neutrons by spontaneous fission. The threshold fission detector screens the prompt fast fission neutrons and as a result the LSDS is not influenced by the high level radiation background. The energy resolution of LSDS is good in the range 0.1 eV to 1 keV. It is also the range in which the fission reaction is the most discriminating for the considered fissile isotopes. An electron accelerator has been chosen to produce neutrons with an adequate target through (e{sup -},γ)(γ,n) reactions.

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