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Annual Report for Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 54, Area G Disposal Facility – Fiscal Year 2015

As a condition to the disposal authorization statement issued to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) on March 17, 2010, a comprehensive performance assessment and composite analysis maintenance program must be implemented for the Technical Area 54, Area G disposal facility. Annual determinations of the adequacy of the performance assessment and composite analysis (PA/CA) are to be conducted under the maintenance program to ensure that the conclusions reached by those analyses continue to be valid. This report summarizes the results of the fiscal year (FY) 2015 annual review for Area G.

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La Hague Legacy Waste Recovery Program: Scope, Progress and Issues -12080

A significant inventory of process waste of varying natures and quantities has been generated during the thirty years of operation of UP2 400 facility on the site of La Hague, France. The retrieval, packaging and final storage of such an inventory has never been achieved before in France and thus requires the design and qualification of new processes, equipment, and waste packages. Following AREVA strategic decisions and French safety authority requirements, the legacy waste program has begun around the year 2000 and is scheduled to be completed around the year 2025. It is under the responsibility of AREVA Site Value Development Project teams. For each category of waste to be recovered, AREVA teams conducted detailed investigations, defined recovery modes, treatment processes, as well as final waste package forms, which they subsequently submitted to French safety and waste management authorities. A Task force initiative was subsequently launched to optimize the program cost and scenario, and lead to an optimization of about 15% of the entire program. The qualification of processes and waste packages required a significant amount of research and development which is now well under way for processes, and scheduled to be completed in 2015. Preparation work has begun on several installations to clear space for the construction of future retrieval facilities, scheduled to begin in the coming three years. La Hague Legacy waste retrieval program represents a significant challenge in the sense that it covers a significant variety and quantity of waste needing recovery and reconditioning, with tight financial objectives and a binding recovery schedule. During the past five years, AREVA SVD successfully conducted design, research, development, and qualification activities which lead to the definition of qualified processes and waste packages for each retrieval program. Preparation work and supplier consultations are now on-going, in order to meet our objectives of beginning retrieval operations in compliance with our commitments to the safety authorities, in 2015 and 2016. (author)

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Development and Testing of Techniques for In-Ground Stabilization, Size Reduction and Safe Removal of Radioactive Wastes Stored in Large Containments in Burial Grounds - 13591

Radioactive waste materials, including Transuranic (TRU) wastes from laboratories have been stored below ground in large containments at a number of sites in the US DOE Complex, and at nuclear sites in Europe. These containments are generally referred to as caissons or shafts. The containments are in a range of sizes and depths below grade. The caissons at the DOE's Hanford site are cylindrical, of the order of 2,500 mm in diameter, 3,050 mm in height and are buried about 6,000 mm below grade. One type of caisson is made out of corrugated pipe, whereas others are made of concrete with standard re-bar. However, the larger shafts in the UK are of the order of 4,600 mm in diameter, 53,500 mm deep, and 12,000 below grade. This paper describes the R and D work and testing activities performed to date to evaluate the concept of in-ground size reduction and stabilization of the contents of large containments similar to those at Hanford. In practice, the height of the Test Facility provided for a test cell that was approximately 22' deep. That prevented a 'full scale mockup' test in the sense that the Hanford Caisson configuration would be an identical replication. Therefore, the project was conducted in two phases. The first phase tested a simulated Caisson with surrogate contents, and part of a Chute section, and the second phase tested a full chute section. These tests were performed at VJ Technologies Test Facility located in East Haven, CT, as part of the Proof of Design Concept program for studying the feasibility of an in-situ grout/grind/mix/stabilize technology for the remediation of four caissons at the 618-11 Burial Ground at US Department of Energy Hanford Site. The test site was constructed such that multiple testing areas were provided for the evaluation of various tools, equipment and procedures under conditions that simulated the Hanford site, with representative soils and layout dimensions. (authors)

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Non-Operational Property Evaluation for the Hanford Site River Corridor - 12409

The Hanford Site River Corridor consists of the former reactor areas of the 100 Areas and the former industrial (fuel processing) area in the 300 Area. Most of the waste sites are located close to the decommissioned reactors or former industrial facilities along the Columbia River. Most of the surface area of the River Corridor consists of land with little or no subsurface infrastructure or indication of past or present releases of hazardous constituents, and is referred to as non-operational property or non-operational area. Multiple lines of evidence have been developed to assess identified fate and transport mechanisms and to evaluate the potential magnitude and significance of waste site-related contaminants in the non-operational area. Predictive modeling was used for determining the likelihood of locating waste sites and evaluating the distribution of radionuclides in soil based on available soil concentration data and aerial radiological surveys. The results of this evaluation indicated: 1) With the exception of stack emissions, transport pathways associated with waste site contaminants are unlikely to result in dispersion of contaminants in soil away from operational areas, 2) Stack emissions that may have been associated with Hanford Site operations generally emitted short-lived and/or gaseous radionuclides, and (3) the likelihood of detecting elevated radionuclide concentrations or other waste sites in non-operational area soils is very small. The overall conclusions from the NPE evaluation of the River Corridor are: - With the exception of stack emissions to the air, transport pathways associated with waste site contaminants are unlikely to result in dispersion of contaminants in soil away from operational areas. While pathways such as windblown dust, overland transport and biointrusion have the potential for dispersing waste site contaminants, the resulting transport is unlikely to result in substantial contamination in non-operational areas. - Stack emissions that may have been associated with Hanford Site operations generally emitted short-lived and/or gaseous radionuclides; these radionuclides either would have decayed and would be undetectable in soil, or likely would not have deposited onto Hanford Site soils. A small fraction of the total historical emissions consisted of long-lived particulate radionuclides, which could have deposited onto the soil. Soil monitoring studies conducted as part of surveillance and monitoring programs do not indicate a build-up of radionuclide concentrations in soil, which might indicate potential deposition impacts from stack emissions. Aerial radiological surveys of the Hanford Site, while effective in detecting gamma-emitting nuclides, also do not indicate deposition patterns in soil from stack emissions. - The surveillance and monitoring programs also have verified that the limited occurrence of biointrusion observed in the River Corridor has not resulted in a spread of contamination into the non-operational areas. - Monitoring of radionuclides in ambient air conducted as part of the surveillance and monitoring programs generally show a low and declining trend of detected concentrations in air. Monitoring of radionuclides in soil and vegetation correspondingly show declining trends in concentrations, particularly for nuclides with short half lives (Cs-137, Co-60 and Sr-90). - Statistical analysis of the geographical distribution of waste sites based on man -made features and topography describes the likely locations of waste sites in the River Corridor. The results from this analysis reinforce the findings from the Orphan Site Evaluation program, which has systematically identified any remaining waste sites within the River Corridor. - Statistical analysis of the distribution of radionuclide concentrations observable from aerial surveys has confirmed that the likelihood of detecting elevated radionuclide concentrations in non-operational area soils is very small; the occurrences and locations where potentially elevated concentrations may be found are discussed below. In addition, statistical analysis showed that there is a relatively high probability (>50%) that concentrations of Cs-137 higher than background (3.9 Bq/kg or 1.05 pCi/g) are located outside of the operational portion of the 100-BC, 100-K, and 100-N Areas. This observation is based on modeled concentrations in soil derived from aerial radiography data. However, the extent is limited to a few meters from the respective facilities fence lines or known operational activities. Evaluation of the extent of contamination is being conducted as part of the RI process for each decision area. No unanticipated waste sites were identified either from the OSE program or statistical analysis of waste site proximity to known features. Based on the evaluation of these multiple lines of evidence, the likelihood of identifying waste sites or contaminant dispersal from Hanford site operations into non-operational areas can be considered very small. (authors)

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International Approaches for Nuclear Waste Disposal in Geological Formations: Report on Fifth Worldwide Review

The goal of the Fifth Worldwide Review is to document evolution in the state-of-the-art of approaches for nuclear waste disposal in geological formations since the Fourth Worldwide Review that was released in 2006. The last ten years since the previous Worldwide Review has seen major developments in a number of nations throughout the world pursuing geological disposal programs, both in preparing and reviewing safety cases for the operational and long-term safety of proposed and operating repositories. The countries that are approaching implementation of geological disposal will increasingly focus on the feasibility of safely constructing and operating their repositories in short- and long terms on the basis existing regulations. The WWR-5 will also address a number of specific technical issues in safety case development along with the interplay among stakeholder concerns, technical feasibility, engineering design issues, and operational and post-closure safety. Preparation and publication of the Fifth Worldwide Review on nuclear waste disposal facilitates assessing the lessons learned and developing future cooperation between the countries. The Report provides scientific and technical experiences on preparing for and developing scientific and technical bases for nuclear waste disposal in deep geologic repositories in terms of requirements, societal expectations and the adequacy of cases for long-term repository safety. The Chapters include potential issues that may arise as repository programs mature, and identify techniques that demonstrate the safety cases and aid in promoting and gaining societal confidence. The report will also be used to exchange experience with other fields of industry and technology, in which concepts similar to the design and safety cases are applied, as well to facilitate the public perception and understanding of the safety of the disposal approaches relative to risks that may increase over long times frames in the absence of a successful implementation of final dispositioning.

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Enhanced LAW Glass Correlation - Phase 1

About 50 million gallons of high-level mixed waste is currently stored in underground tanks at the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site in the State of Washington. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will provide DOE’s Office of River Protection (ORP) with a means of treating this waste by vitrification for subsequent disposal. The tank waste will be separated into low- and high-activity waste fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed in an engineered facility on the Hanford site while the IHLW product is designed for acceptance into a national deep geological disposal facility for high-level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements with respect to protection of the environment before they can be accepted for disposal. Acceptable glass formulations for vitrification of Hanford low activity waste (LAW) must meet a variety of product quality, processability, and waste loading requirements. To this end, The Vitreous State Laboratory (VSL) at The Catholic University of America (CUA) developed and tested a number of glass formulations during Part A, Part B1 and Part B2 of the WTP development program. The testing resulted in the selection of target glass compositions for the processing of eight of the Phase I LAW tanks. The selected glass compositions were tested at the crucible scale to confirm their compliance with ILAW performance requirements. Duramelter 100 (DM100) and LAW Pilot Melter tests were then conducted to demonstrate the viability of these glass compositions for LAW vitrification at high processing rates.

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CH Packaging Program Guidance

The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II), a HalfPACT shipping package, and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), HalfPACT SARP, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificates of Compliance (C of C) 9218 and 9279, respectively. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SARP or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of Cs state: "each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." They further state: "each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP charges the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) management and operating (M&O) contractor with assuring packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8. Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21 regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document provides the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT packaging. The intent of these instructions is to standardize operations. All users will follow these instructions or equivalent instructions that assure operations are safe and meet the requirements of the SARPs.

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Licensing and Operation of BEA Research Reactor Package for Fuel, Source and Target Payloads - 19198

The Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA) Research Reactor Package (BRR Package) is currently in use for a variety of payload types and operational scenarios. The BRR Package is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), under Certificate of Compliance (CoC) number USA/9341/B(U)F-96. The original packaging design, testing, and safety analysis activities were conducted by Orano Federal Services (Orano FS, formerly AREVA Federal Services) for the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), operated by the Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). One package was built and delivered to the INL in 2009, and has seen routine use since that time, primarily by DOE University Research Reactor programs. This paper will provide a history and description of the original design and licensing of the package and subsequent amended applications for the addition of new payloads. Each additional payload type provided unique design, operational, and licensing challenges - these challenges will be discussed, and the results and lessons learned presented will be beneficial for application in other radioactive material packaging projects. (authors)

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Improvements realized on the cryogenic solution called NiThrow{sub TM}

The economic, environmental, social and societal constraints have pushed the nuclear industry to develop new dismantling and decommissioning (D and D) techniques in order to meet the current industrial requirements. Since 5 years, AREVA, in partnership with Air Liquide, has been working on a new cryogenic solution that can be used to achieve the main important D and D operations (i.e. cutting, surface decontamination and concrete scrabbling). This solution, called NiThrow{sup TM}, is based on the Nitrocision LLC concept and consists in spraying highly pressurized liquid nitrogen (3500 bar) at a very low temperature (-140 deg. C) onto a surface. The main advantage in using liquid nitrogen instead of water is due to its rapid conversion into gaseous nitrogen that will avoid the generation of liquid effluent. The preliminary trials made in France at Saint Ouen l'Aumone and at the AREVA SICN facility by using NiThrow{sup TM} appeared to be very interesting and promising in terms of effectiveness, reduction of the dosimetry (i.e. ALARA principle) and adaptability to the different types of surfaces and materials to be treated. On an other hand, they also highlighted a couple of defects like a lack of reliability that is not compatible with a safety use in a nuclear environment. In 2009, with the aim of fixing all these issues, AREVA decided to start an extensive R and D program. This work has been essentially focused on the lancing tool, the insulation and the flexibility of the liquid nitrogen distribution network, but also on the design and the manufacturing of a waste collection unit and a dedicated carrier. Today, these R and D efforts have been totally completed. and resulted to the publication of 3 patents. Also, the collaboration, with Air Liquide and the American company Conco allows AREVA to propose to its customers a safe and reliable solution for their cleaning operations in France and all over the world. (authors)

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Material Recover and Waste Form Development--2016 Accomplishments

The Material Recovery and Waste Form Development (MRWFD) Campaign under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fuel Cycle Technologies (FCT) Program is responsible for developing advanced separation and waste form technologies to support the various fuel cycle options defined in the DOE Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap, Report to Congress (April 2010). This MRWFD accomplishments report summarizes the results of the research and development (R&D) efforts performed within MRWFD in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. Each section of the report contains an overview of the activities, results, technical point of contact, applicable references, and documents produced during the FY. This report briefly outlines campaign management and integration activities but primarily focuses on the many technical accomplishments of FY 2016. The campaign continued to use an engineering-driven, science-based approach to maintain relevance and focus.

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RCRA closure at the Connecticut Yankee atomic power company Haddam neck plant - 15655

From 1968 through 1996 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) operated the Haddam Neck Plant (HNP) at 362 Injun Hollow Road, East Hampton, Connecticut. In 1980 CYAPCO applied to be a permitted generator and storage facility for hazardous waste and was issued a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part A Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facility Permit. During the operational period, the HNP produced more than 110 billion kilowatt-hours of energy. In 1996, CYAPCO decided to close and decommission the HNP. Decommissioning activities began in 1998 and were successfully completed in 2007 in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and the CYAPCO License Termination Plan. As part of the closure process for the HNP, closure of the RCRA permit under the RCRA Corrective Action Program (CAP) was required. From 2002 through 2007, under the RCRA CAP, CYAPCO completed investigations and remediation work to address environmental impacts resulting from chemical usage at the HNP. The RCRA CAP was conducted under the regulatory authority of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (CTDEEP). In the fall of 2014, the RCRA closure process was completed, and CYAPCO, with concurrence from USEPA, was issued a Letter of Completion from the CTDEEP signifying completion of the RCRA closure process. The paper discusses the RCRA closure process completed at the HNP, including the investigation, remediation, groundwater monitoring, and closure activities completed to achieve closure of the HNP under the RCRA requirements. (authors)

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Tank Inspection NDE Results for Waste Tanks 25, 26, 33, 34, 41 and 50 (FY2019)

In-service inspection is an essential element of a comprehensive structural integrity program for the carbon steel waste tanks at the Savannah River Site. Inspection confirms the effectiveness of corrosion controls used to preclude localized and general corrosion of the tanks. Ultrasonic inspection (UT) is used to detect general wall thinning, pitting and interface attack, as well as vertically oriented cracks through inspection of an 8.5 inch wide strip extending over the accessible height of the primary tank wall and knuckle regions. selected welds are also inspected for cracking parallel or perpendicular to the weld. The inspections were performed from the annular space of the Type III/IIIA waste storage tanks. The ISI Program calls for thickness mapping and crack detection scans on specified areas of the tank covering all present and historic waste interface levels and selected welds with particular emphasis on the highest stress region of the tank.

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Lessons Learned from FUSRAP - 16200

The US DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) is the long-term steward for 90 sites remediated under numerous regulatory regimes including the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites. In addition, LM holds considerable historical information, gathered in the 1970's, to determine site eligibility for remediation under FUSRAP. To date, 29 FUSRAP sites are in LM's inventory of sites for long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M), and 25 are with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for remediation or in the process of being transitioned to LM. It is forecasted that 13 FUSRAP sites will transfer from the USACE to LM over the next 10 years; however, the timing of the transfers is strongly dependent upon federal funding of the ongoing remedial actions. Historically, FUSRAP sites were generally cleaned up for unrestricted industrial use or remediated to the cleanup standards at that time, and their use remained unchanged. Today, these sites as well as the adjacent properties are now changing or envisioned to have changes in land use, typically from industrial to commercial or residential uses. The implication of land-use change affects DOE's LTS and M responsibility for the sites under LM stewardship as well as the planning for the additional sites scheduled to transition in time. Coinciding with land-use changes at or near FUSRAP sites is an increased community awareness of these sites. As property development increases near FUSRAP sites, the general public and interested stakeholders regularly inquire about the sufficiency of cleanups that impact their neighborhoods and communities. LM has used this experience to address a series of lessons learned to improve our program management in light of the changing conditions of our sites. We describe these lessons learned as (1) improved stakeholder relations, (2) enhanced LTS and M requirements for the sites, and (3) greater involvement in the transition process. (authors)

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Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 130: Storage Tanks Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 130: Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 130 are located within Areas 1, 7, 10, 20, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site. Corrective Action Unit 130 is comprised of the following CASs: • 01-02-01, Underground Storage Tank • 07-02-01, Underground Storage Tanks • 10-02-01, Underground Storage Tank • 20-02-03, Underground Storage Tank • 20-99-05, Tar Residue • 22-02-02, Buried UST Piping • 23-02-07, Underground Storage Tank This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective action investigations and provides data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 130 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implemented any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation-derived wastes. From August 4 through September 30, 2008, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 130, Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, confirm that no residual contamination is present, and properly dispose of wastes. Constituents detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels to identify COCs for CAU 130. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities indicates that no further action is necessary because no COCs were identified at any CAU 130 CAS. Debris removal from these CASs was considered a best management practice because no contamination was detected. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at all CAU 130 CASs. • A Notice of Completion to DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 130. • Corrective Action Unit 130 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

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Results of Re-evaluation of FEPs Related to Implementing the ABD Glass Program

The Savannah River Site plans to reprocess defense spent nuclear fuel currently stored in their L-Basin via the Accelerated Basin Deinventory (ABD) Program. The previous plan for the L-Basin spent nuclear fuel was to dispose of it directly in the federal repository without reprocessing. Implementing the ABD Program will result in final disposal of approximately 900 fewer canisters of defense spent nuclear fuel and the production of approximately 521 more canisters of vitrified high-level waste glass with some specific differences from the planned high-level waste glass. Because the 235U in the L-Basin spent nuclear fuel is not intended to be recovered, the fissile mass loading of the vitrified high-level glass waste form to be produced must be increased above the current value of 897 g/m 3 to a maximum of 2,500 g/m 3 . Therefore, implementing the ABD Program would produce a variant of high-level waste glass—the ABD glass—that needs to be evaluated for future repository licensing, which includes both preclosure safety and postclosure performance. This report describes the approach to and summarizes the results of an evaluation of the potential effects of implementing the ABD Program at the Savannah River Site on the technical basis for future repository licensing for a generic repository that is similar to Yucca Mountain and for one that is fully generic. This evaluation includes the effects on preclosure safety analyses and postclosure performance assessment for both repository settings. The license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository (DOE 2008), which is serving as a framework for this evaluation, concluded that the proposed Yucca Mountain repository would meet all applicable regulatory requirements. The evaluation documented in this report found that implementing the ABD Program is not expected to change that conclusion for a generic repository similar to Yucca Mountain or for a generic repository with respect to the preclosure safety analyses. With respect to the postclosure performance of a generic repository, no concerns were identified.

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Hanford Waste End Effector Phase I Test Report

This test plan describes the Phase 1 testing program of the Hanford Waste End Effector (HWEE) at the Washington River Protection Solutions’ Cold Test Facility (CTF) using a Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)-designed testing setup. This effort fulfills the informational needs for initial assessment of the HWEE to support Hanford single-shell tank A-105 retrieval. This task will install the HWEE on a PNNL-designed robotic gantry system at CTF, install and calibrate instrumentation to measure reaction forces and process parameters, prepare and characterize simulant materials, and implement the test program. The tests will involve retrieval of water, sludge, and hardpan simulants to determine pumping rate, dilution factors, and screen fouling rate.

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ANNUAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TANK INSPECTION PROGRAM 2008

Aqueous radioactive wastes from Savannah River Site (SRS) separations and vitrification processes are contained in large underground carbon steel tanks. Inspections made during 2008 to evaluate these vessels and other waste handling facilities along with evaluations based on data from previous inspections are the subject of this report.

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Transportation Implications of a Closed Fuel Cycle.

Transportation for each step of a closed fuel cycle is analyzed in consideration of the availability of appropriate transportation infrastructure. The United States has both experience and certified casks for transportation that may be required by this cycle, except for the transport of fresh and used MOX fuel and fresh and used Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) fuel. Packaging that had been used for other fuel with somewhat similar characteristics may be appropriate for these fuels but would be inefficient. Therefore, the required neutron and gamma shielding, heat dissipation, and criticality were calculated for MOX and ABR fresh and spent fuel. Criticality would not be an issue, but the packaging design would need to balance neutron shielding and regulatory heat dissipation requirements.

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