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Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Crop Evaluation Research for Environmental Strategies (CERES) Remote Sensing 2008 Project Activities

In recent years, the use of Plant Incorporated Protectant (PIP) corn by American producers has been increasing dramatically. PIP corn contains genetically inserted traits that produce toxins in the plant that provide narrowly targeted protection against specific insect pests. The plant producing t oxms can offer significant reductions in the application of broad -spectrum pesticides that have ecological and human health consequences. PIP corn as a percentage of total corn acreage planted in the US is expected to continue to increase as these protective traits are "stacked" with other desirable traits by seed companies, and producers are seeing considerable increases in corn yield as a result. The introduction of corn as a bio-fuel source for ethanol has increased production by over 6 million hectares in 2007. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), which is responsible for the registration of PIP crops under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, views the use of PIP corn as positive. Broad spectrum pesticide use has declined since the PIP traits have been introduced. As the agricultural landscape sees a higher percentage of corn acres using the PIP technology, the risk of the targeted insect pest populations developing resistance to the toxins, thereby rendering the in will increase as well. This result would negate the effectiveness of the PIP corn traits and could reduce production of a US field corn crop valued at $33 billion dollars in 2006 and place US food and now energy security at risk. Concerns over insect pest resistance development to PIP traits have led the USEPA to team with NASA and the Institute for Technology Development (ITD) to develop geo-spatial technologies designed to proactively monitor the corn production landscape for insect pest infestation and possible resistance development. USEPA resistance management simulation models are combined with NASA remote sensi ng products to monitor the corn landscape for resistance development. The two agencies have entered into an agreement which could potentially lead to the development of next generation NASA sensors that will more specifically address the requirements of the USEPA's resistance development strategy and offer opportunities to study the ever changing ecosystem complexities. The USEPA/NASA/ITD team has developed a broad research project entitled CERES (Crop Evaluation Research for Environmental Strategies). CERES is a research effort leading to decision support system tools that are designed to integrate multi-resolution NASA remote sensing data products and USEPA geo -spatial models to monitor the potential for insect pest resistance development from the regional to the landscape and then to the field level.

Casas, Joseph C.↗

TU-FG-BRB-01: Dual Energy CT Proton Stopping Power Ratio Calibration and Validation with Animal Tissues

Purpose: The conversion of Hounsfield Unit (HU) to proton stopping power ratio (SPR) is a main source of uncertainty in proton therapy. In this study, the SPRs of animal tissues were measured and compared with prediction from dual energy CT (DECT) and single energy CT (SECT) calibrations. Methods: A stoichiometric calibration method for DECT was applied to predict the SPR using CT images acquired at 80 kVp and 140 kVp. The dual energy index was derived based on the HUs of the paired spectral images and used to calculate the SPRs of the materials. Tissue surrogates with known chemical compositions were used for calibration, and animal tissues (pig brain, liver, kidney; veal shank, muscle) were used for validation. The materials were irradiated with proton pencil beams, and SPRs were deduced from the residual proton range measured using a multi-layer ion chamber device. In addition, Gafchromic EBT3 films were used to measure the distal dose profiles after irradiation through the tissue samples and compared with those calculated by the treatment planning system using both DECT and SECT predicted SPRs. Results: The differences in SPR between DECT prediction and measurement were −0.31±0.36% for bone, 0.47±0.42% for brain, 0.67±0.15% for liver, 0.51±0.52% for kidney, and −0.96±0.15% for muscle. The corresponding results using SECT were 3.1±0.12%, 1.90±0.45%, −0.66±0.11%, 2.33±0.21%, and −1.70±0.17%. In the film measurements, average distances between film and calculated distal dose profiles were 0.35±0.12 mm for DECT calibration and −1.22±0.12 mm for SECT calibration for a beam with a range of 15.79 cm. Conclusion: Our study indicates that DECT is superior to SECT for proton SPR prediction and has the potential to reduce the range uncertainty to less than 2%. DECT may permit the use of tighter distal and proximal range uncertainty margins for treatment, thereby increasing the precision of proton therapy.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Deep Learning Systems for Increased Safeguards Surveillance Review Productivity

Nuclear safeguards inspectors expend significant time and maintain intense focus in reviewing video surveillance for safeguards relevant events. To increase efficiency and reduce the time burden of safeguards inspectors performing surveillance data review, this paper presents a novel deep learning (DL) systems concept to integrate generalized DL models into the safeguards surveillance review workflow. The Agency is investigating several DL algorithms for object recognition, localization, tracking, and flagging relevant activities. The project team is working closely with nuclear safeguards inspectors to identify review use cases (based on specific safeguards objectives) and collect their associated requirements. We focused on CANDU and LWR Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and their associated dry storage areas as these present a particularly heavy burden on the inspector surveillance review process due to the number of these facilities under safeguards worldwide. Initial DL algorithm results on safeguards data are promising. Using a convolutional neural network, the team attained a mean average precision (mAP) of 92.9% identifying and localizing spent fuel (SF) casks from a 475 surveillance image dataset. Further, the team had initial success in training a recurrent neural network to identify reactor area activities in video clips, successfully indicating when SF casks enter or exit a pool. We discuss how such DL algorithms would be integrated into the Next Generation Surveillance Review (NGSR) software application. Another issue impacting review productivity is the long time inspectors may have to wait when running these algorithms in NGSR. We present a concept to pre-process remotely collected surveillance data with DL models as the data arrives to IAEA headquarters so that results are already available when starting a new review in NGSR. The proposed DL system concept shows a pathway and workflow for increasing an inspector’s surveillance review productivity by quickly and accurately identifying declared and undeclared safeguards relevant objects and activities in large quantities of surveillance imagery data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗

BN-350 unattended safeguards system current status and initial fuel movement data

The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor facility in Aktau, Kazakhstan continues to provide safeguards monitoring data as the spent fuel disposition project transitions from wet fuel storage to dry storage casks. Qualitative data from the initial cask loading procedures has been released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is presented here for the first time. The BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, operated as a plutonium-producing facility from 1973 W1til 1999. Kazakhstan signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1994, and shortly afterwards the IAEA began safeguarding the reactor facility and its nuclear material. Slnce the cessation of reactor operations ten years ago, the chief proliferation concern has been the spent fuel assemblies stored in the pond on-site. By 2002, all fuel assemblies in wet storage had been repackaged into proliferation-resistant canisters. From the beginning, the IAEA's safeguards campaign at the BN-350 included a constant unattended sensor presence in the form of UNARM which monitors nuclear material activities at the facility in the absence of inspector presence. The UNARM equipment at the BN-350 was designed to be modular and extensible, allowing the system to adapt as the safeguards requirements change. This has been particularly important at the BN-350 due to the prolonged wet storage phase of the project. The primary function of the BN-350 UNARM system is to provide the IAEA with an independent, radiation-centric Containment and Surveillance (C&S) layer in addition to the standard seals and video systems. The UNARM system has provided continuous Continuity of Knowledge (COK) data for the BN-350's nuclear material storage areas in order to ensure the validity of the attended measurements during the lifetime of the project. The first of these attended measurements was characterization of the spent fuel assemblies. This characterization utilized the Spent Fuel Coincidence Counter (SFCC) instrument [ref] to measure neutron multiplicity and calculate Pu mass. These calculated masses were then compared to modeling simulation of the assemblies as well as declarations from the facility in order to baseline the amount of material under IAEA safeguards [ref]. Once the baseline was established, bundles of four or six assemblies were repackaged into proliferati n-resistant canisters. This provided an additional physical barrier to material diversion and provided further protection by choosing assemblies for each canister so that the overall dose rate met self-protection requirements. Each of the canisters were then characterized using a similar technique to the SFCC, but with the Spent Fuel Attribute Monitor (SPAM) instnunent (ref). The data from these measurements were then used to calculate an attribute proportional to the total Pu mass in each canister. This attribute was then compared to the know Pu mass of each assembly in order to verify the accuracy of SPAM. In the event that COK is lost, the SPAM detector remains positioned to reverify Pu content of individual canisters without requiring the canister to be opened.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Long-term Moisture Adsorption in Packaged Plutonium Oxide

In 2018, the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE-NNSA) began implementing dilute and dispose to remove 34 metric tons (MT) of surplus weapons grade plutonium from the US stockpile. Under this plan, surplus plutonium material is converted into plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) before being stored in metal containers and sent to the DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The dilute and dispose project was implemented as a more cost-effective method for abiding by the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) between the USA and Russia, as compared to producing mixed oxide fuel (MOX). The PMDA was originally signed in 2000 and amended in 2010.2 The disassembly of pits and conversion to PuO 2 as part of dilute and dispose is carried out through the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The dilute portion of dilute and dispose is carried out at Savannah River Site (SRS). With this program in place, it is necessary to ensure the safe, long-term storage of the PuO 2 generated during this process until final disposal at WIPP is accomplished.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Constitutive and inducible oleoresin defenses share genetic architectures and mechanisms in Pinus taeda

The oleoresin defense system of loblolly pine (Pinus taeda) protects trees from insects and pathogens and is an important source of renewable biofuels and chemicals, but the genetic basis of oleoresin production is poorly understood. We characterized the genetic architecture of oleoresin flow, resin canal number, stem wood terpene content, and monoterpene composition in two clonal populations of P. taeda. We used quantitative genetic analyses, genome-wide association studies (GWASs), multiplex network learning, and gene expression profiling to elucidate shared gene networks underlying defense traits and to identify high-quality candidates for breeding and engineering loblolly pine. Genetic analyses revealed polygenic inheritance and trait-to-trait correlations provide strong evidence for shared genes regulating constitutive and induced oleoresin flow. We identified 236 single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with oleoresin flow, resin canal number, and terpene composition and highlight candidate genes likely involved in terpene biosynthesis, cambial meristem reprogramming, and pathogen perception and immune signaling. Fourteen GWAS candidates were methyl jasmonate-responsive in tissues where resin canals initiate and terpene production occurs. Integrating quantitative genetics, GWAS, gene expression, and multiplex network analyses enabled the prioritization of high-quality candidate genes. This work advances the development of more resilient loblolly pine optimized for ecological performance, renewable chemical, and biofuel production.

genome-wide association study↗

AOI [1] Advanced Manufacturing of Ceramic Anchors with Embedded Sensors for Process and Health Monitoring of Coal Boilers

Researchers at West Virginia University (WVU) developed methods to fabricate and test ceramic anchors with an embedded sensor technology for monitoring the health and processing conditions within pulverized coal (PC) and fluidized-bed combustion (FBC) boiler systems. The technology included the development of advanced manufacturing processes for 2D/3D printing electroceramic (conductive ceramic) sensor designs within the ceramic anchor microstructure during the manufacturing process. This advanced manufacturing process would allow for the precise control of local microstructure and composition in order to engineer layer-by-layer any protective and electrically active materials within the refractory anchor. This 3D printing technology would permit the rapid and controlled design of the refractory microstructure and embedded sensor design throughout the volume of the ceramic anchor. The work also included a method to interconnect the sensors to boiler shell through the anchor clamp, where the sensor signals will be processed by low-power electronics and transmitted wirelessly to a central processing hub. The end-goal of the program was to produce a ceramic anchor sensor system which would be ready for implementation within a coal boiler, and/or other similar refractory liner systems (such as that in the glass and metal manufacturing areas). The project objectives were to: 1) Define the chemical and microstructural stability, in addition to the electrical properties, of oxide and non-oxide ceramic composites to be embedded within the ceramic anchor compositions that may operate up to 1400ºC; 2) Develop and implement the 2D/3D printing technology to pattern and control the microstructure of the ceramic anchor and embedded sensor circuits; 3) Develop an interconnect technology which will permit easy installation of the ceramic anchors and signal collection at the boiler shell; 4) Develop low power analog electronics and wireless communication hardware to efficiently collect the sensor signal at each processing unit and transmit data to a central hub for data analysis; 5) Demonstrate the smart ceramic anchor system for temperature and liner fracture within a high-temperature processing unit, such as a boiler furnace or glass melting furnace floor/wall liner.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

United States Department of Energy severe accident research following the Fukushima Daiichi accidents

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has played a major role in the U.S. response to the events at Fukushima Daiichi. During the first several weeks following the accident, U.S. assistance efforts were guided by results from a significant and diverse set of analyses. In the months that followed, a coordinated analysis activity aimed at gaining a more thorough understanding of the accident sequence was completed using laboratory-developed, system-level best-estimate accident analysis codes, while a parallel analysis was conducted by U.S. industry. A comparison of predictions for Unit 1 from these two studies indicated significant differences between MAAP and MELCOR results for key plant parameters, such as in-core hydrogen production. On that basis, a crosswalk was completed to determine the key modeling variations that led to these differences. In parallel with these activities, it became clear that there was a need to perform a technology gap evaluation on accident-tolerant components and severe accident analysis methodologies with the goal of identifying any data and/or knowledge gaps that may exist given the current state of light water reactor (LWR) severe accident research and augmented by insights from Fukushima. In addition, there is growing international recognition that data from Fukushima could significantly reduce uncertainties related to severe accident progression, particularly for boiling water reactors. On these bases, a group of U. S. experts in LWR safety and plant operations was convened by the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) to complete technology gap analysis and Fukushima forensics data needs identification activities. The results from these activities were used as the basis for refining DOE-NE's severe accident research and development (R&D) plan. Finally, this paper provides a high-level review of DOE-sponsored R&D efforts in these areas, including planned activities on accident-tolerant components and accident analysis methods.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Summary of the Preliminary Optical ICHMI Design Study: A Preliminary Engineering Design Study for a Standpipe Viewport

This summary report examines an in-vessel optical access concept intended to support standoff optical instrumentation, control and human-machine interface (ICHMI) systems for future advanced small modular reactor (AdvSMR) applications. Optical-based measurement and sensing systems for AdvSMR applications have several key benefits over traditional instrumentation and control systems used to monitor reactor process parameters, such as temperature, flow rate, pressure, and coolant chemistry (Anheier et al. 2013). Direct and continuous visualization of the in-vessel components can be maintained using external cameras. Many optical sensing techniques can be performed remotely using open optical beam path configurations. Not only are in-vessel cables eliminated by these configurations, but also sensitive optical monitoring components (e.g., electronics, lasers, detectors, and cameras) can be placed outside the reactor vessel in the instrument vault, containment building, or other locations where temperatures and radiation levels are much lower. However, the extreme AdvSMR environment present challenges for optical access designs and optical materials. Optical access is not provided in any commercial nuclear power plant or featured in any reactor design, although successful implementation of optical access has been demonstrated in test reactors (Arkani and Gharib 2009). This report outlines the key engineering considerations for an AdvSMR optical access concept. Strict American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) construction codes must be followed for any U.S. nuclear facility component (ASME 2013); however, the scope of this study is to evaluate the preliminary engineering issues for this concept, rather than developing a nuclear-qualified design. In addition, this study does not consider accident design requirements. In-vessel optical access using a standpipe viewport concept serves as a test case to explore the engineering challenges and performance requirements for sodium fast reactor (SFR) and high-temperature gas reactor (HTGR) AdvSMR applications. The expected environmental conditions for deployment are reviewed for both AdvSMR designs. Optical and mechanical materials that maximize component lifetime are evaluated for the standpipe viewport design under these conditions. Optical components and opto-mechanical designs that provide robust optical-to-metal seals and stress-free optical component mounting are identified, and then key performance specifications are developed for a sapphire optical viewport concept. Design strategies are examined that protect the internal optical surfaces from liquid-coolant condensation and impurity deposits. Finally, a conceptual standpipe viewport design that is suggestive of how this concept could be assembled using standard nuclear-qualified pipe components, is presented.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Study on Evaluation of Project Management Data for Decommissioning of Uranium Refining and Conversion Plant - 12234

Some of nuclear facilities that would no longer be required have been decommissioned in JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency). A lot of nuclear facilities have to be decommissioned in JAEA in near future. To implement decommissioning of nuclear facilities, it was important to make a rational decommissioning plan. Therefore, project management data evaluation system for dismantling activities (PRODIA code) has been developed, and will be useful for making a detailed decommissioning plan for an object facility. Dismantling of dry conversion facility in the uranium refining and conversion plant (URCP) at Ningyo-toge began in 2008. During dismantling activities, project management data such as manpower and amount of waste generation have been collected. Such collected project management data has been evaluated and used to establish a calculation formula to calculate manpower for dismantling equipment of chemical process and calculate manpower for using a green house (GH) which was a temporary structure for preventing the spread of contaminants during dismantling. In the calculation formula to calculate project management data related to dismantling of equipment, the relation of dismantling manpower to each piece of equipment was evaluated. Furthermore, the relation of dismantling manpower to each chemical process was evaluated. The results showed promise for evaluating dismantling manpower with respect to each chemical process. In the calculation formula to calculate project management data related to use of the GH, relations of GH installation manpower and removal manpower to GH footprint were evaluated. Furthermore, the calculation formula for secondary waste generation was established. In this study, project management data related to dismantling of equipment and use of the GH were evaluated and analyzed. The project management data, manpower for dismantling of equipment, manpower for installation and removal of GH, and secondary waste generation from GH were considered. Establishment of the calculation formula for dismantling of each kind of equipment makes it possible to evaluate manpower for dismantling the whole facility. However, it is not easy to prepare calculation formula for all kinds of equipment that exist in the facility. Therefore, a simpler evaluation method was considered to calculate manpower based on facility characteristics. The results showed promise for evaluating dismantling manpower with respect to each chemical process. For dismantling of contaminated equipment, a GH has been used for protection of the spread of contamination. The use of a GH increases manpower for installation and removal of GH etc. Moreover, structural materials of the GH such as plastic sheets, adhesive tape become a burnable secondary waste. To create an effective dismantling plan, it is necessary to carefully consider use of a GH preliminarily. Thus, an evaluation method of project management data such as manpower and secondary waste generation was considered. The results showed promise for evaluating project management data of GH by using established calculation formula. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improving the Estimates of Waste from the Recycling of Used Nuclear Fuel - 13410

Estimates are presented of wastes arising from the reprocessing of 50 GWD/tonne, 5 year and 50 year cooled used nuclear fuel (UNF) from Light Water Reactors (LWRs), using the 'NUEX' solvent extraction process. NUEX is a fourth generation aqueous based reprocessing system, comprising shearing and dissolution in nitric acid of the UNF, separation of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium using solvent extraction in a development of the PUREX process using tri-n-butyl phosphate in a kerosene diluent, purification of the plutonium and uranium-plutonium products, and conversion of them to uranium trioxide and mixed uranium-plutonium dioxides respectively. These products are suitable for use as new LWR uranium oxide and mixed oxide fuel, respectively. Each unit process is described and the wastes that it produces are identified and quantified. Quantification of the process wastes was achieved by use of a detailed process model developed using the Aspen Custom Modeler suite of software and based on both first principles equilibrium and rate data, plus practical experience and data from the industrial scale Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at the Sellafield nuclear site in the United Kingdom. By feeding this model with the known concentrations of all species in the incoming UNF, the species and their concentrations in all product and waste streams were produced as the output. By using these data, along with a defined set of assumptions, including regulatory requirements, it was possible to calculate the waste forms, their radioactivities, volumes and quantities. Quantification of secondary wastes, such as plant maintenance, housekeeping and clean-up wastes, was achieved by reviewing actual operating experience from THORP during its hot operation from 1994 to the present time. This work was carried out under a contract from the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and, so as to enable DOE to make valid comparisons with other similar work, a number of assumptions were agreed. These include an assumed reprocessing capacity of 800 tonnes per year, the requirement to remove as waste forms the volatile fission products carbon-14, iodine-129, krypton-85, tritium and ruthenium-106, the restriction of discharge of any water from the facility unless it meets US Environmental Protection Agency drinking water standards, no intentional blending of wastes to lower their classification, and the requirement for the recovered uranium to be sufficiently free from fission products and neutron-absorbing species to allow it to be re-enriched and recycled as nuclear fuel. The results from this work showed that over 99.9% of the radioactivity in the UNF can be concentrated via reprocessing into a fission-product-containing vitrified product, bottles of compressed krypton storage and a cement grout containing the tritium, that together have a volume of only about one eighth the volume of the original UNF. The other waste forms have larger volumes than the original UNF but contain only the remaining 0.1% of the radioactivity. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford nuclear reservation. Workers had to pass through metal detectors when they arrived at the plant and materials leaving the plant had to be scanned for security reasons. Whereas other high-security nuclear materials were shipped from the PFP to Savannah River, S.C. as part ofa Department of Energy (DOE) program to consolidate weapons-grade plutonium, it was determined that the SIF should remain onsite pending disposition to a national repository. Nevertheless, the SIF still requires a high level of security that the PFP complex has always provided. With the 60-year PFP mission of producing and storing plutonium concluded, the environmental cleanup plans for Hanford call for the demolition of the 63-building PFP complex. Consequently, if the SIF remained at PFP it not only would have interfered with the environmental cleanup plans, but would have required $100 million in facility upgrades to meet increased national security requirements imposed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A new smaller and more cost-effective area was needed to store this material, which led to the SIF Project. Once the SIF project was successfully completed and the SIF was safely removed from PFP, the existing Protected Area at PFP could be removed, and demolition could proceed more quickly without being encumbered by restrictive security requirements that an active Protected Area requires. The lightened PFP security level brought by safely removing and storing the SIF would also yield lowered costs for deactivation and demolition, as well as reduce overall life-cycle costs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Bubbler Design Updates for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

The accurate monitoring of molten salt compositions is crucial for nuclear safeguards, particularly in the context of mixtures used in molten salt reactors as well as pyroprocessing. However, for nuclear material accountancy in actinide bearing molten salts, the solution volume is also needed to determine the total mass of material in the salt. This study explores the effectiveness of two bubbler configurations, triple and single, for density and level measurements within these molten salts for salt volume determinations. The triple bubbler system utilizes three gas dip-tubes strategically positioned at different heights within the molten salt. With this design, the molten salt level, density, and surface tension can be determined simultaneously. The single bubbler configuration, on the other hand, relies on a dynamic single dip-tube to determine the density and level. Both configurations will be tested in aqueous solutions as well as in LiCl-KCl and NaCl-MgCl2 molten salts between 450°C and 750°C. Dip-tube diameters and bubbler inferences will also be explored. A new bubbler is being designed based on results. The findings of this study will provide valuable insights into the optimal bubbler design and configuration for ensuring representative sampling of molten salt compositions in nuclear safeguards applications. This will contribute to enhanced accountability and transparency in the monitoring of actinide bearing molten salts, promoting nuclear safeguards objectives.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 1, January-March 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 A Decision Support System for Maintenance Management of a Boiling-Water Reactor Power Plant, J. H. Shen, A. Ray, and S. Levine; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 12 On Prediction of the Ignition Potential of Uranium Metal and Hydride, M. Epstein, W. Luangdilok, M. G. Plys, and H. K. Fauske; 26 An Overview of the Primary Parameters and Methods for Determining Condensation Heat Transfer to Containment Structures, J. Green and K. Almenas; DESIGN FEATURES: 49 Modem Tornado Design of Nuclear and Other Potentially Hazardous Facilities, J. D. Stevenson and Y. Zaho; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 73 1994 Accident Sequence Precursor Program Results, R. J. Belles, J. W. Cletcher, D. A. Copinger, B. W. Dolan, J. W. Minarick, and P. D. O'Reilly; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 93 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AlChE) Spring 1997 National Meeting; 94 European Safety and Reliability Association International Conference on Safety and Reliability ESREL ’97; 95 Criticality Safety Challenges in the Next Decade; 96 21st International Symposium on the Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management; 84 The Authors; 88 Letter to the Editor; 90 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 36.

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Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

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