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DOE OSTI2016

Instrumentation Cables Test Plan

A fire at a nuclear power plant (NPP) has the potential to damage structures, systems, and components important to safety, if not promptly detected and suppressed. At Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant on March 22, 1975, a fire in the reactor building damaged electrical power and control systems. Damage to instrumentation cables impeded the function of both normal and standby reactor coolant systems, and degraded the operators’ plant monitoring capability. This event resulted in additional NRC involvement with utilities to ensure that NPPs are properly protected from fire as intended by the NRC principle design criteria (i.e., general design criteria 3, Fire Protection). Current guidance and methods for both deterministic and performance based approaches typically make conservative (bounding) assumptions regarding the fire-induced failure modes of instrumentation cables and those failure modes effects on component and system response. Numerous fire testing programs have been conducted in the past to evaluate the failure modes and effects of electrical cables exposed to severe thermal conditions. However, that testing has primarily focused on control circuits with only a limited number of tests performed on instrumentation circuits. In 2001, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) conducted a series of cable fire tests designed to address specific aspects of the cable failure and circuit fault issues of concern1. The NRC was invited to observe and participate in that program. The NRC sponsored Sandia National Laboratories to support this participation, whom among other things, added a 4-20 mA instrumentation circuit and instrumentation cabling to six of the tests. Although limited, one insight drawn from those instrumentation circuits tests was that the failure characteristics appeared to depend on the cable insulation material. The results showed that for thermoset insulated cables, the instrument reading tended to drift and fluctuate, while the thermoplastic insulated cables, the instrument reading fell off-scale rapidly. From an operational point of view, the latter failure characteristics would likely be identified as a failure from the effects of fire, while the former may result in inaccurate readings.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2019

Status Report on Development of TREAT Water Loop

The Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility is a graphite based transient test reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). TREAT started operation in 1959 and performed thousands of transient irradiations for the primary purpose of nuclear fuel safety research. TREAT operations were suspended in 1994, and then, several years later, resumed reactor operations in 2017 to support development of advanced nuclear fuels. TREAT’s more recent historic focus had been for transients with relevance to sodium cooled fast spectrum reactors. TREAT’s first year of modern experiment work performed in 2018, however, saw the demonstration of new kinds of transients focused on light water reactor (LWR) needs including reactivity initiated accidents (RIA) and loss of coolant accidents (LOCA). The successful outcome of these efforts confirmed TREAT’s viability as a transient neutron source for LWR safety research. Since TREAT’s core is air cooled and provides no “built-in” thermal hydraulic boundary conditions for tests specimens, efforts have been underway to establish water-environment capabilities for testing specimens. Small static water capsules have been established to support single rod RIA testing where transient heating is brief. Similarly, deployment of enhanced water capsules with blowdown capability is nearing completion to support single rod LOCA testing. With careful experiment design these capsules can provide representative temperature response histories and water phase transitions for some experiment parameters. The capsule approach is appropriate for cost-effective early phase phenomena identification studies on novel fuels, or when the important test variables are thought to be fairly well understood so that they can be precisely targeted (such as they are for current fleet fuels with moderate burnup UO2 in uncoated zirconium alloy cladding). Due to lack of forced convection, however, the capsule approach cannot achieve representative temperature histories in all regions of the test fuel simultaneously (e.g. cladding and fuel centerline temperatures) while providing representative timing in water phase transitions. Nor can the capsule approach provide appropriate hydraulic conditions for multi-rod bundle testing. For these reasons, design and development has been undertaken for the TREAT Water-Environment Recirculating Loop (TWERL).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

SMR Containment Cable and Electrical Penetration Assembly System

GAIN Project CRADA Number NFE-21-08839, entitled “SMR Containment Cable and EPA System” was initiated by the partnership of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Engineered Solutions Group (ESG) to test an ESG-designed Electrical Penetration Assembly and Containment Cabling System Qualified for not only SMR technologies, but also Advanced Reactors design. An Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) is a component used to allow electrical power and signal conductors as well as optical fiber through the nuclear reactor’s containment structure while maintaining a pressure barrier. The EPA ensures the containment's integrity both during the normal operation and also accident conditions by providing a sealed passage for power and signals. This project was undertaken to fill the equipment gap of EPA and Cabling Systems that require much more severe environmental requirements than legacy plant applications present due to their smaller containment volumes that result in high energy densities compared to legacy designs. This high energy density results in severe accident environments and also more severe normal operating conditions.This document describes cost effective approaches to qualify a unique EPA for Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technologies as legacy LWR EPA technologies will likely have inherent material performance insufficiencies. The DBA profiles for SMRs (and some Advanced Reactor Technologies) are more severe than the legacy qualification requirements making the design of the qualification testing system challenging as the temperatures and pressures can approach the limits permitted by ASME Pressure Vessel Code, as well as accident temperatures exceeding the capability of polymeric gaskets and dielectrics. Small Modular Reactors are designed to have, as the name suggests, modularity which implies sized for factory fabrication and subsequent assembly at the power plant site. SMR containment is much smaller than a legacy Light Water Reactor containment. The containment walls are likely to be comprised of stainless steel. Qualifying Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) through these steel vessels are of interest in this work. Methods are presented here that discuss critical safety and cost effectiveness for these SMR EPA’s test systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS1992

A rule-based system for real-time analysis of control systems

An approach to automate the real-time analysis of flight critical health monitoring and system status is being developed and evaluated at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility. A software package was developed in-house and installed as part of the extended aircraft interrogation and display system. This design features a knowledge-base structure in the form of rules to formulate interpretation and decision logic of real-time data. This technique has been applied for ground verification and validation testing and flight testing monitoring where quick, real-time, safety-of-flight decisions can be very critical. In many cases post processing and manual analysis of flight system data are not required. The processing is described of real-time data for analysis along with the output format which features a message stack display. The development, construction, and testing of the rule-driven knowledge base, along with an application using the X-31A flight test program, are presented.

Larson, Richard R.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Artificial Gravity for Mars Missions: The Different Design and Development Options

One of the major impediments to human Mars missions is the development of appropriate countermeasures for long term physiological response to the micro-gravity environment. A plethora of countermeasure approaches have been advanced from strictly pharmacological measures to large diameter rotating spacecraft that would simulate a 1-g environment (the latter being the most conservative from a human health perspective). The different approaches have significantly different implications not only on the overall system design of a Mars Mission Vehicle (MMV) but on the necessary earth-orbiting platform that would be required to qualify the particular countermeasure system. it is found that these different design options can be conveniently categorized in terms of the order of magnitude of the rotation diameter required (100's, 10's, 1's, 0 meters). From this, the different mass penalties associated with each category can be generally compared. The overall objective of the countermeasure system should be to maximize crew safety and comfort, minimize exercise protocol time (i.e., the time per day that each crew member would have to participate in the exercise/countermeasure), maximize countermeasure effectiveness, and minimize the associated system mass penalty of the Mars Mission Vehicle (in terms of fraction of IMLEO - Injected Mass in Low Earth Orbit).

Murbach, Marcus↗

NASA NTRS2001

An Approach to Establishing System Benefits for Technology in NASA's Hypersonics Investment Area

NASA's has established long term goals for access-to-space. The third generation launch systems are to be fully reusable and operational around 2025. The goals for the third generation launch system are to significantly reduce cost and improve safety over current systems. The Advanced Space Transportation Program (ASTP) Office at the NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL has the agency lead to develop space transportation technologies. Within ASTP, under the Hypersonics Investment Area, third generation technologies are being pursued. The Hypersonics Investment Area's primary objective is to mature vehicle technologies to enable substantial increases in the design and operating margins of third generation RLVs (current Space Shuttle is considered the first generation RLV) by incorporating advanced propulsion systems, materials, structures, thermal protection systems, power, and avionics technologies. The paper describes the system process, tools and concepts used to determine the technology benefits. Preliminary results will be presented along with the current technology investments that are being made by ASTP's Hypersonics Investment Area.

Hueter, Uwe↗

DOE OSTI2017

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Coupling SCALE with DAKOTA for Axial Burnup Profiles Assessment in Burnup Credit

This paper presents a computational study that demonstrates the application of the SCALE code system in conjunction with the Design Analysis Kit for Optimization and Terascale Applications (DAKOTA) for the analysis of key factors influencing the evaluation of burnup credit (BUC) in pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The primary objective of this analysis is to characterize the model by utilizing parameterization, uncertainty quantification, and optimization studies. Using this approach, we can comprehensively assess the system and conduct informed predictive studies. This study highlights the effectiveness of the SCALE code system integrated within the DAKOTA framework in terms of efficiency and capability. With the coupling of the burnup code ORIGAMI with the CSAS or TSUNAMI-3D sequence embedded in a DAKOTA analysis, we can characterize the factors that influence the k eff of PWR 17x17 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the GBC-32 computational benchmark cask for the assessment of BUC in criticality safety analysis. The coupling methodology used in this study is not exclusive to BUC analysis. However, the choice to apply this methodology to the BUC problem is particularly significant because of the diverse range of aspects it encompasses in nuclear criticality safety analyses. This problem presents a unique opportunity to explore and address multiple facets of such analyses related to BUC and illustrates the capability of the SCALE code system with DAKOTA. This analysis makes use of historical reference data for the axial burnup profile, where the entire space within the bounds is considered. Both SCALE and DAKOTA are currently integrated in the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling Simulation (NEAMS) Workbench code system, which has a user-friendly graphical interface that simplifies the setup of simulations and configuration of input parameters as well as the visualization of simulation results.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2017

International Approaches for Nuclear Waste Disposal in Geological Formations: Geological Challenges in Radioactive Waste Isolation—Fifth Worldwide Review

The overall objective of the Fifth Worldwide Review (WWR-5) is to document the current state-of-the-art of major developments in a number of nations throughout the World pursuing geological disposal programs, and to summarize challenging problems and experience that have been obtained in siting, preparing and reviewing cases for the operational and long-term safety of proposed and operating nuclear waste repositories. The scope of the Review is to address current specific technical issues and challenges in safety case development along with the interplay of technical feasibility, siting, engineering design issues, and operational and post-closure safety. In particular, the chapters included in the report present the following types of information: the current status of the deep geological repository programs for high level nuclear waste and low- and intermediate level nuclear waste in each country, concepts of siting and radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management in different countries (with the emphasis of nuclear waste disposal under different climatic conditions and different geological formations), progress in repository site selection and site characterization, technology development, buffer/backfill materials studies and testing, support activities, programs, and projects, international cooperation, and future plans, as well as regulatory issues and transboundary problems.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2017

Advanced Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methodology: Development of Beta 1.0 MASTODON Toolset

Design of nuclear power plant (NPP) facilities to resist natural hazards has been a part of the regulatory process from the beginning of the NPP industry in the United States, but has evolved substantially over time. The original set of approaches and methods was entirely deterministic in nature and focused on a traditional engineering margins-based approach. However, over time probabilistic and risk-informed approaches were also developed and implemented in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidance and regulation. A defense-in-depth framework has also been incorporated into US regulatory guidance over time. As a result, today, the US regulatory framework incorporates deterministic and probabilistic approaches for a range of different applications and for a range of natural hazard considerations. Although the US regulatory framework has continued to evolve over time, the tools, methods and data available to the US nuclear industry to meet the changing requirements have not kept pace. Notably, there is room for improvement in the tools and methods available for external event probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which is the principal assessment approach used in risk-informed regulations and risk-informed decision-making applied to natural hazard assessment and design. Development of a new set of tools and methods that incorporate current knowledge, modern best practice, and state-of-the-art computational resources would lead to more reliable assessment of facility risk and risk insights (e.g., the plant elements and accident sequences that are most risk-significant), with less uncertainty and reduced conservatisms. Development of the next generation tools and methods for external events PRA is ongoing under the Risk Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) technical pathway. The RISMC toolkit development centers on integration of the tools and methods under a common framework, MOOSE. These tools and methods make use of existing and newly developed tools and methods, coupled with the experience and data gained in the past decades, to define and analyze more realistic risk assessment models. Specific focus in this report is on the capability to model seismic risk using advanced SPRA methods. Over the last year, significant capability has been added to Mastodon to simulate 3-D wave passage effects through nonlinear soil. Verification has demonstrated the capability of Mastodon to model wave passage effects in 1-D, 2-D, and 3-D. Methods have been developed to incorporate probabilistic floor response capabilities. Additional capability will be added to Mastodon over the next year to implement a robust gapping and sliding element for cyclic shaking, web-based verification and user manuals, stochastic finite elements, and frequency independent damping. Verification of added capabilities has occured in parallel with code writing activities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS2004

Classification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. UAS Classification/Categorization for Certification

Category, class, and type designations are primary means to identify appropriate aircraft certification basis, operating rules/limitations, and pilot qualifications to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). The question is whether UAS fit into existing aircraft categories or classes, or are unique enough to justify the creation of a new category/class. In addition, the characteristics or capabilities, which define when an UAS becomes a regulated aircraft, must also be decided. This issue focuses on UAS classification for certification purposes. Several approaches have been considered for classifying UAS. They basically group into either using a weight/mass basis, or a safety risk basis, factoring in the performance of the UAS, including where the UAS would operate. Under existing standards, aircraft must have a Type Certificate and Certificate of Airworthiness, in order to be used for "compensation or hire", a major difference from model aircraft. Newer technologies may make it possible for very small UAS to conduct commercial services, but that is left for a future discussion to extend the regulated aircraft to a lower level. The Access 5 position is that UAS are aircraft and should be regulated above the weight threshold differentiating them from model airplanes. The recommended classification grouping is summarized in a chart.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2014

Cutting More than Metal: Breaking Through the Development Cycle

NASA is advancing a new development approach and new technologies in the design construction, and testing of the next great launch vehicle for space exploration. The ability to use these new tools is made possible by a learning culture able to embrace innovation, flexibility, and prudent risk tolerance, while retaining the hard-won lessons learned through the successes and failures of the past. This paper provides an overview of the Marshall Space Flight Center's new approach to launch vehicle development, as well as examples of how that approach has been leveraged by NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) Program to achieve its key goals to safety, affordability, and sustainability.

Singer, Christopher E.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of Irradiation Structural Behavior on Thermal Hydraulics Safety Analysis to Support MURR LEU Conversion

The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) located in Columbia, Missouri is one of six U.S. High Performance Research Reactors (USHPRR), including one critical facility, that is actively collaborating with U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M3) Office of Reactor Conversion and Uranium Supply to convert from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU; ≥20 wt% U-235) to low-enriched uranium (LEU; <20 wt% U-235) fuel. A new type of very high-density LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and 10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo) is expected to allow the conversion to LEU of MURR, as well as four other USHPRR. MURR has been working with the Reactor Conversion Pillar at Argonne to perform fuel element design and fuel cycle performance analyses, steady-state thermal hydraulics safety analysis, and accident safety analyses in preparation for the conversion of MURR and to support a preliminary safety analysis report for conversion to LEU fuels. Subsequent analyses have also been performed, including transition cycles where all-fresh LEU fuel elements are introduced upon conversion and progressing through reactor operations the core is brought to equilibrium. Thermal hydraulics safety analyses performed as part of the above have employed an assumption on channel gap reduction due to burnup-related phenomena including fuel swelling, irradiation creep, and oxide layer buildup. Recently, a series of structural analyses have been performed on the MURR LEU fuel plates and an element due to significant differences between the plate and element designs of the MURR HEU and LEU fuels. In addition, NUREG-1537 indicates that structural phenomena are to be evaluated. Two separate types of structural analyses were performed for the MURR LEU fuel element: fluid-structure interaction (FSI) and irradiation thermo-mechanical. The FSI analysis evaluated the effects of hydraulic forces on the MURR LEU fuel element to quantify the flow-induced plate deflection, and a minimal impact to the channel gap thickness was predicted under prototypic and bounding conditions. The irradiation thermo-mechanical analysis evaluated the effects of fuel swelling, irradiation creep, and thermal expansion for the MURR LEU plates and the element for prototypic thermal and irradiation conditions based on a high-fidelity approach multiphysics approach. Overall, this thermo-mechanical analysis predicts smaller gap thickness changes in previously limiting regions. Larger changes are predicted in the middle of channels, and for end channels where power density is not typically a maximum. An additional thermo-mechanical analysis was performed for the outermost HEU fuel plate, which showed a similar magnitude of deflection as the outermost LEU plate. Due to substantial differences between the channel gap reductions assumed for the previous safety analyses and those predicted by the irradiation thermo-mechanical analysis, a need to evaluate their impact on the thermal hydraulics safety analyses arose. This report presents the results from the steady-state safety analyses for normal operation as well as the accident analyses for the two most limiting accident scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS1997

An Approach to Building a Traceability Tool for Software Development

It is difficult in a large, complex computer program to ensure that it meets the specified requirements. As the program evolves over time, a11 program constraints originally elicited during the requirements phase must be maintained. In addition, during the life cycle of the program, requirements typically change and the program must consistently reflect those changes. Imagine the following scenario. Company X wants to develop a system to automate its assembly line. With such a large system, there are many different stakeholders, e.g., managers, experts such as industrial and mechanical engineers, and end-users. Requirements would be elicited from all of the stake holders involved in the system with each stakeholder contributing their point of view to the requirements. For example, some of the requirements provided by an industrial engineer may concern the movement of parts through the assembly line. A point of view provided by the electrical engineer may be reflected in constraints concerning maximum power usage. End-users may be concerned with comfort and safety issues, whereas managers are concerned with the efficiency of the operation. With so many points of view affecting the requirements, it is difficult to manage them, communicate information to relevant stakeholders. and it is likely that conflicts in the requirements will arise. In the coding process, the implementors will make additional assumptions and interpretations on the design and the requirements of the system. During any stage of development, stakeholders may request that a requirement be added or changed. In such a dynamic environment, it is difficult to guarantee that the system will preserve the current set of requirements. Tracing, the mapping between objects in the artifacts of the system being developed, addresses this issue. Artifacts encompass documents such as the system definition, interview transcripts, memoranda, the software requirements specification, user's manuals, the functional specifications, design reports, and system code. Tracing helps 1) validate system features against, the requirement specification, 2) identify error sources and, most importantly, 3) manage change. With so many people involved in the development of the system, it becomes necessary to identify the reasons behind the design requirements or the implementation decisions. This paper is concerned with an approach that maps documents to constraints that capture properties of and relationships between the objects being modeled by the program. Section 2 provides the reader with a background on traceability tools. Section 3 gives a brief description of the context monitoring system on which the approach suggested in this paper is based. Section 4 presents an overview of our approach to providing traceability. The last section presents our future direction of research.

Delgado, Nelly↗

DOE OSTI2019

Working fluid selection for organic Rankine cycle power generation using hot produced supercritical CO 2 from a geothermal reservoir

Geothermal heat mining simulations using supercritical CO 2 (sCO 2 ) were performed in this research. Working fluid selection criteria for power generation using sCO 2 from a geothermal reservoir are then presented for subcritical, superheated and supercritical organic Rankine cycles (ORCs). Meanwhile, method of working fluid classification for ORC is proposed. To get the most feasible ORC design, this study introduces the concept of “turning point” for isentropic and dry working fluids, as well as minimum turbine inlet temperature for wet working fluids. A thermodynamic model was developed with capabilities to obtain the optimal working fluid mass flow rate, evaporation temperature, superheated temperature, and supercritical pressure, to evaluate the thermal performance of the three ORC approaches using hot produced sCO 2 . With this model, thirty potential working fluids with critical temperatures in the range from 50 to 225 °C were screened for utilizing hot produced sCO 2 considering physical properties, environmental and safety impacts, and thermodynamic performances. Finally, the thermodynamic results were compared for all possible working fluids.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

Development of a Pre-Combustion CO 2 Capture Process Using High-Temperature PBI Hollow-Fiber Membranes

The overall objective of this project was to evaluate the advantages of transformational polybenzimidazole (PBI) polymer hollow-fiber membrane (HFM)-based, carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture and purification technology at bench-scale using an actual coal-derived syngas stream from a coal gasification facility. The project was carried out over two budget periods. The technical objectives in Budget Period 1 (BP1) included preparing HFs and modules and upgrading the available skid for field testing. The technical objectives for BP2 were to field-test the skid unit with actual coal-derived syngas from an oxygen-blown gasifier to obtain performance data, update the Techno-Economic Analysis (TEA) that would assist with future process scale-up, and provide information on the design of a small pilot-scale test unit. The goal was to advance the PBI-HFM CO 2 capture and gas separation system for pre-combustion applications beyond second-generation economic performance predictions and make progress toward meeting overall fossil energy performance goals of CO 2 capture with 95% CO 2 purity at a cost of electricity (COE) 30% less than baseline capture approaches. The research program was designed with progressive technical tasks leading to both dynamic and steady-state testing of the PBI-HFM skid with actual coal-derived syngas. The work plan was to: (1) fabricate sufficient Generation-2 (GEN-2) fibers for module fabrication; (2) upgrade the fiber skid to accommodate large fiber modules for bench-scale field testing; (3) conduct dynamic and steady-state testing with coal-derived syngas from an oxygen-blown gasifier and obtain system performance data; (4) perform a TEA and environmental, health, and safety (EH&S) assessment; (5) update the State-Point Data Table, Technology Gap Analysis (TGA), and Technology Maturation Plan (TMP); (6) uninstall and return the test skid to the Recipient’s facilities; and (7) submit a Final Report that describes the results and analysis of the project research effort.

03 NATURAL GAS↗