Office of Fuel Cycle Technologies used fuel disposition campaign storage and transportation activities.
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The use of radioactive sources in different applications and practices gives rise to various types of RWs that may be detrimental to human health and the environment if not properly managed. Since early sixties of the last century, radioisotopes have found diversified and incremental uses in Bangladesh in the field of medicine, industry, agriculture, food irradiation, research and education and so on. Currently, the country is operating nuclear facilities like 3 MW TRIGA research reactor (TRR), radioisotope production (RIP) facility as well as particle accelerators. Recently, the country has decided to establish nuclear power plants in order to cope with its increasing demand of electric power. The first nuclear power plant is anticipated to come into operation by 2021-2022. Consequently, a notable amount and range of RWs including DSRSs are being expected to be generated from these diversified applications of radioactive materials in near future. Bangladesh has limited facilities and capabilities to manage the RWs which are being currently generated from the conventional activities and practices with radioactive materials. However, the country is also working to improve its necessary capabilities and infrastructures for the management of RWs expected to be generated from both conventional and nuclear activities in future in a comprehensive, integrated and safer manner, ensuring that no undue burden is imposed on present and future generations and on the environment. This paper illustrates the current activities as well as its future plans on the management of RWs and DSRSs in the country. (authors)
This report fulfills the M2 milestone M2FT-13PN0912022, “Stranded Sites De-Inventorying Report.” In January 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued the Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (DOE 2013). Among the elements contained in this strategy is an initial focus on accepting used nuclear fuel from shutdown reactor sites. This focus is consistent with the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, which identified removal of stranded used nuclear fuel at shutdown sites as a priority so that these sites may be completely decommissioned and put to other beneficial uses (BRC 2012). Shutdown sites are defined as those commercial nuclear power reactor sites where the nuclear power reactors have been shut down and the site has been decommissioned or is undergoing decommissioning. In this report, a preliminary evaluation of removing used nuclear fuel from 12 shutdown sites was conducted. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, and San Onofre. These sites have no other operating nuclear power reactors at their sites and have also notified the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission that their reactors have permanently ceased power operations and that nuclear fuel has been permanently removed from their reactor vessels. Shutdown reactors at sites having other operating reactors are not included in this evaluation.
The global nuclear power industry, and to a lesser extent, the decommissioning and demolition of old nuclear weapons plants, obviously present challenges to those in the radioactive waste management field. Some if not many of these challenges have already been dealt with, and resolved, in the steel industry, including its recycling component. This paper presents proven state-of-the-art radiation detection systems used in steel and related recycling facilities, emphasizing current, reliable and flexible technologies for characterization, volume reduction, and remote handling of recyclable solid wastes contaminated and, just as important, not contaminated, with a wide range of radioactive isotopes. It will also cover features of remotely operated waste handling equipment effective in reducing or eliminating exposure of workers engaged in decontamination and demolition work on active and/or inactive nuclear installations. The industry group identified above has a long-standing policy regarding any radioactivity in potentially recyclable as well as waste materials it receives: if it is detected, it is rejected. The US Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA) put it this way in one of their Public Policy Statements: 'SMA members have not, and will not, accept scrap that is known to be radioactively contaminated' (emphasis included in the original) (1). This policy, adopted around the globe, obviously has major implications for decommissioning and demolition projects. To put it bluntly, if rad-contaminated metal, concrete, or other materials are sent to a facility for possible recycling, reuse or even disposal, they may well be rejected. If so, the materials will be returned to the generator--at the generator's cost-and a new solution will have to be found. This also results in additional costs for the generator. Facilities in the steel making and metal recycling industries have access to, and routinely count on, a wide range of proven detection technologies and techniques for monitoring incoming shipments and sorting the materials in them. The approaches range from using sensitive handheld instruments for pinpointing and isolating small devices such as isotope-containing gauges and radium dials all the way up to technologies effective for large volumes and weights of contaminated construction and demolition material. In this latter realm, the most suitable, robust, and field-proven system for decommissioning and demolition work is a radiation detection system fitted to a grappling and/or magnetic device, known as the Crickets{sup TM} technology, which automatically scans bulk material with no added effort or time in material handling operations. Highly versatile, a Crickets{sup TM} system can be put to work on any material-handling system, including grapples handling volumes ranging from 1 up to 18 cubic yards, while detecting radioactivity in real-time over a very wide dose range, from nSv to Sv levels. Other field-proven real-time measuring radiation detection devices can be fixed to conveyor belts with traverse speeds up 3 meters/second, also measuring in real time and over the same dose range, allowing both recyclable and waste materials with a pre-set level of radioactivity to be diverted off the belt. Finally, there are highly sensitive radiation portal installations for detecting radiation from materials being transported by vehicles, including those with roll-offs, dump trailers, and other containers, again in real-time and for the same dose ranges. For vehicles, the speed must be carefully controlled-the vehicles need to travel from 5 to 10 km/h through the scanning zone to ensure that maximum detection capability is maintained. When radiation detection systems at recycling and steel making facilities detect radioactive material in an incoming shipment, these facilities have a zero tolerance for accepting the cargo. Therefore, it is imperative that material from a demolition operation that is slated to be sent for recycling or other reuse be checked at the point of demolition at similar detection levels to avoid possible rejection later of a shipment because of its radioactivity. In addition to measuring overall radiation levels (for example, total gamma), when necessary, combinations of different radiation detection media can be used to detect the presence and intensities of specific isotopes such as U-235, Cs-137, Co-60, Am-241, etc., again in real-time and over a similar dose range. These detection technologies can be fixed or transportable. More important for the rad-waste management profession, this overall systems approach can be tailored and adapted during use on-site in any dismantling, demolition or remediation project, to allow materials to be thoroughly scanned before being released to the recycling stream for reuse, or to appropriate long-term storage and disposal facilities. Potentially recyclable materials with contamination such as steel beams and rebar will set off alarms at recycling facilities, resulting in unnecessary added expenses to the generator, primarily due to increased transportation costs, time delays and additional rad-waste handling and disposal charges. Additionally, there are situations where relatively lightly contaminated materials, once identified and appropriately characterized, can be reused in new construction applications, such as concrete from demolition being used in the base layer for roads or recycled steel used for repair or construction of bridges. In other cases, specific smaller volumes can be sent to specialized rad-waste disposal sites. These radiation detection systems can also be custom tailored to ensure proper handling and disposition of contaminated materials destined for reuse in specific applications where, for example, acceptable levels of radioactivity in NORM or TENORM can be reused or safely disposed of. (authors)
Both of the genuinely sustainable (breeder) nuclear fuel cycles (IFR - Integral Fast Reactor - and MSBR - Molten Salt Breeder Reactor -) studied by the USA's national laboratories would generate high level reprocessing waste (HLRW) streams consisting of a relatively small amount ( about 4 mole %) of fission product halide (chloride or fluoride) salts in a matrix comprised primarily (about 95 mole %) of non radioactive alkali metal halide salts. Because leach resistant glasses cannot accommodate much of any of the halides, most of the treatment scenarios previously envisioned for such HLRW have assumed a monolithic waste form comprised of a synthetic analog of an insoluble crystalline halide mineral. In practice, this translates to making a 'substituted' sodalite ('Ceramic Waste Form') of the IFR's chloride salt-based wastes and fluoroapatite of the MSBR's fluoride salt-based wastes. This paper discusses my experimental studies of an alternative waste management scenario for both fuel cycles that would separate/recycle the waste's halide and immobilize everything else in iron phosphate (Fe-P) glass. It will describe both how the work was done and what its results indicate about how a treatment process for both of those wastes should be implemented (fluoride and chloride behave differently). In either case, this scenario's primary advantages include much higher waste loadings, much lower overall cost, and the generation of a product (glass) that is more consistent with current waste management practices. (author)
During the final phase of a long-term project, a total of 80 TRU waste drums at ORNL have been retrieved from a below-grade storage vault in which they have remained untouched for about 25 years. The drums, which house material generated from past ORNL operations, are now stored and ready for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, located on Highway 95 in Oak Ridge. The Transuranic Waste Processing Center will process and ship the drums to WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for disposal. Workers lifted the drums one-by-one from the underground storage vault with a 110-ton crane over a one-week period in October 2017. Although the physical work was performed in one week, years of detailed planning preceded the fieldwork. A key obstacle needed to be overcome before the project could safely proceed. This obstacle involved the need to ensure controls were developed for the Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) potential. DDT refers to a phenomenon in ignitable mixtures of a flammable gas and air (or oxygen) when a sudden transition takes place from a deflagration type of combustion to a detonation type of explosion. Basically, these drums, under certain circumstances, have a potential to detonate and overpressurize. Extensive analysis of the drums verified that detonation, while unlikely, was possible. Of the total 103 drums that were retrieved or moved in preparation for retrieval, 18 had DDT potential. Extensive security requirements were also necessary, due to the nature of the material, and this added another layer of complexity to the fieldwork. Prior to retrieving the drums from the underground storage vault, space needed to be made for them within the various above-grade facilities. Inventory and security requirements dictated what could be stored where, and the first step of the field work involved a number of drum movements in preparation for storage of the newly retrieved drums. This effort involved moving 21 drums already in the storage area to facilitate the addition of the newly retrieved ones. The retrieval project required a total of 107 critical lifts using the 110-ton crane, under 3 critical lift plans. The TRU waste storage facility is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility and is managed under an extensive Documented Safety Analysis. The TRU retrieval project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D and included three Implementation Verification Reviews, two Management Assessments, one Readiness Assessment, and seven mock-ups in preparation for the field work. Despite being stored for 25 years, the drums were in good shape due to the integrity of the facilities where the drums were stored. Of the 80 drums that were retrieved, 12 were placed in special containers called 'overpacks' based on their content. The drums were removed safely and without incident, thanks to a lot of preparation and the efforts of a highly skilled team. Lessons learned through the DDT control development and the drum retrieval and overpacking process could be beneficial to others having to manage similar drums of TRU waste. (authors)
As the need to perform deactivation and decommissioning (D and D) of the most challenging nuclear facilities worldwide is growing, facilitating the integration of state-of-the-art, cutting edge technologies will be critically important to safely, effectively, and efficiently complete this mission. However, end users in the field face significant obstacles to integrating new technologies into cleanup initiatives. By leveraging the development of international standards and testing protocols, the risks associated with implementing new technologies can be mitigated and further support the need to update existing directives and guidance handbooks to account for the tremendous recent advancements in technology development. The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International's E10.03 Subcommittee on Radiological Protection for D and D of Nuclear Facilities and Components has begun the development of standard specifications and uniform testing protocols designed to support the nuclear industry's testing and evaluation requirements for D and D technologies. The vision of the E10.03 Subcommittee is to promulgate operationally relevant, uniform testing protocols that can be leveraged by the various technology innovation and development programs across the nuclear environmental management community, and support decision makers and end users with common references in the selection and employment of those standards and associated technologies. These standards could also serve as the basis for updating existing directives and guidance documents such as the various DOE handbooks to better account for the role of cutting edge technology, and facilitate / expedite lab to market efforts that result in improved returns on investment (ROIs) for technology development programs. (authors)
To ensure long-term safety and performance, geological nuclear waste repositories require low-permeability barriers such as bentonite buffers and/or shale host rock. Shale is not only known for its low permeability but also for its trend to undergo time-dependent deformation (i.e., creep), which could heal damage, but the effects of shale creep on the long-term performance of nuclear waste repositories have not been clearly understood. In particular, the anisotropic nature of shale (i.e., bedding) could have a significant effect on its creep behavior, and consequently, on the long-term performance of nuclear waste repositories. In this research, numerical simulations were carried out with the objective of showing the effects of anisotropic shale creep on the stress and permeability evolution of a generic geological nuclear waste repository in shale. The TOUGH-FLAC simulator, a thermo-hydromechanically (THM) coupled numerical code, was used for the simulations. To achieve the objective, comparisons were performed between the results of anisotropic shale creep simulations and those of different simulation cases, namely, no creep (i.e., elastic), isotropic creep, and long-term creep shale cases. Results of the comparisons show that the elastic and isotropic creep shale cases respectively led to the overestimation and underestimation of stress and permeability in the repository, whereas the long-term creep shale case, which accumulated greater creep in later periods than in earlier periods, helped to keep large shear and tensile stresses from developing while maintaining compressive spherical stress, resulting in consistently low permeability levels. These results indicate that performance assessments with elastic and isotropic creep formation models will provide the upper and lower bound estimates of stress and permeability, while more reasonable estimates will be given by an anisotropic creep formation model, and that shale with long-term creep characteristics will be beneficial in many aspects of the safety and performance of nuclear waste repositories.
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Under its programme of self investment Internal Research and Development (IR&D), the UK's National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) is addressing the requirement for development in technology to enable hazard characterisation for nuclear decommissioning applications. Three such examples are described here: (1) RadBall developed by the NNL (patent pending) is a deployable baseball-sized radiation mapping device which can, from a single location, locate and quantify radiation hazards. RadBall offers a means to collect information regarding the magnitude and distribution of radiation in a given cell, glovebox or room to support the development of a safe, cost effective decontamination strategy. RadBall requires no electrical supplies and is relatively small, making it easy to be deployed and used to map radiation hazards in hard to reach areas. Recent work conducted in partnership with the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is presented. (2) HiRAD (patent pending) has been developed by the NNL in partnership with Tracerco Ltd (UK). HiRAD is a real-time, remotely deployed, radiation detection device designed to operate in elevated levels of radiation (i.e. thousands and tens of thousands of Gray) as seen in parts of the nuclear industry. Like the RadBall technology, the HiRAD system does not require any electrical components, the small dimensions and flexibility of the device allow it to be positioned in difficult to access areas (such as pipe work). HiRAD can be deployed as a single detector, a chain, or as an array giving the ability to monitor large process areas. Results during the development and deployment of the technology are presented. (3) Wireless Sensor Network is a NNL supported development project led by the University of Manchester (UK) in partnership with Oxford University (UK). The project is concerned with the development of wireless sensor network technology to enable the underwater deployment and communication of miniaturised probes allowing pond monitoring and mapping. The potential uses, within the nuclear sector alone, are both numerous and significant in terms of the proceeding effort to clean up the UK's nuclear waste legacy.
With the maturing of nuclear industry, there is an added burden on the Back End of fuel cycle. Radioactive facilities are in the need for refurbishment. This paper describes the steps adopted for managing such alpha contaminated unserviceable Glove Boxes. The first step consisted of in-situ encasement of individual Glove Boxes, encountering the challenges of low head room and space congestion in these laboratories with cognizance to regulatory requirement related to radiation safety. The second step was removal, transfer and placement of encased Glove Boxes in a dedicated facility under continuous surveillance. The glove boxes will remain stored in this facility until arrangements are completed for dismantling and volume reduction in another facility dedicated for this purpose. The final step is the development of an appropriate technique for dismantling/cutting of Glove Boxes in an alpha-tight facility constructed to prevent spread of airborne activity, collection of cut pieces, subsequent decontamination of these metallic wastes and disposal. The paper describes the design scheme for dismantling of the glove box. The description also includes hands on evaluation of tools and gadgets in pilot set-up with a view to incorporating the most credible choice in an upcoming active facility. (authors)
Much remains to be done in terms of addressing the legacies from the early development of nuclear energy, including the dismantling of redundant research and fuel cycle facilities, research reactors, and power plants, and the remediation of sites affected by past uranium mining and processing operations. Long-term solutions still need to be found for management of the resulting waste, including development of disposal facilities that meet public acceptance and safety requirements. Some countries are moving forward with dealing with these legacies, and accordingly have built up appropriate technical resources and expertise, but many national programmes still face very significant challenges. Many are the factors that constrain progress in addressing past legacies. It is recognized the importance of early implementation of decommissioning and environmental remediation (D and ER) programmes in order to safeguard people and the environment from the undesirable effects of ionizing radiation and other hazards associated with these sites. There is also an urgent need to better understand the global status of these activities and to establish mechanisms to analyze and report the barriers impeding the implementation of D and ER programmes, with the aim of outlining actions that may improve the current situation. The IAEA has thus launched the CIDER Project (Constraints to Implementing Decommissioning and Environmental Remediation) with the broad aim of contributing to improve current levels of performance on D and ER programmes through promoting greater cooperation amongst its Member States and relevant international organizations. This paper provides early results from the first phase of the project. During this phase, a survey on the global situation of D and ER was undertaken in order to better understand why these programmes proceed faster in some countries than in others; to identify major constraining factors that affect the implementation of D and ER programmes and how these impediments might be overcome. The paper aims to address policy-level issues, regulatory aspects, technological aspects, and stakeholder involvement in the decision-making process. In the next phase of the project it is intended that specific actions and/or innovative approaches will be proposed at international, regional, or national levels with the goal of facilitating progress in programme implementation. (authors)
It is an accident of history that the current model of the fuel cycle is a separate set of facilities connected by transportation. The question is whether collocation and integration of reprocessing and fuel fabrication with the repository significantly reduce the costs of a closed fuel cycle while improving system performance in terms of safety and long-term repository performance. This paper examines the question in terms of higher-level functional requirements of reprocessing systems and geological repositories.
In the United States, approximately 2,500 casks are loaded with commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that has transitioned from wet storage (spent fuel pools) to dry storage. The number of loaded dry storage casks is increasing by approximately 200 each year. Over time, cask designs have evolved to enhance safety and to accommodate more fuel and higher heat loads. Also, higher burnup fuel is being transitioned into dry storage. The SNF is being stored in dry casks for longer times than specified in the original certification period. Several degradation mechanisms related to fuel assemblies and canisters are affected by temperature. For the cladding, temperature-dependent phenomena include creep and annealing, hydride reorientation and embrittlement, and the ductile-to-brittle transition. Temperature can also influence phenomena that affect the long-term integrity of the storage system, including deliquescence, corrosion, and stress-corrosion cracking. Therefore, accurate determination of the temperatures of various components is needed to evaluate potential safety-related issues during transportation after extended storage and to ensure SNF retrievability. The Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF ST&DARDS) is being developed for the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy to streamline analyses for the waste management system [1]. Lastly, the thermal analysis capability within UNF-ST&DARDS and example results are discussed herein.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, and again after the March 11, 2011, accident at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi station from the Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami, concern was expressed regarding security of current spent fuel storage practices in the United States. An approach recurrently proposed to reduce the potential for fire and the release of radionuclides in an accident or sabotage scenario is to reduce the loading of the reactor fuel pools, which are frequently maintained near their full capacity at many reactor sites in the U.S. We assess the impact on the waste management system of different scenarios for accelerating the schedule of used nuclear fuel (UNF) transfer from reactor pools to dry storage casks. We consider scenarios where the spent fuel pools are drawn down to 50% or 25% of full capacity over 5- or 10-year schedules. The scenarios include status quo, where UNF continues to remain in dry storage at the reactor sites, as well as scenarios with UNF transfer to interim storage and eventually to a mined geologic repository. The primary purpose is to evaluate how the different scenarios for accelerating the transfer of UNF to at-reactor dry storage would affect the performance of the entire UNF management system. Areas that were considered include an estimate of the additional system costs that could be incurred and where the existing infrastructure at the reactor sites would come under stress from the transfer demands. This study considered only the fuel-handling logistics and rough-order-of-magnitude cost at reactor sites, interim storage facility, and operations to package UNF into disposal canisters. The effects of minimum fuel age that could be transferred and the accelerated transfer starting date are also examined, but found to have relatively little effect. Impacts on safety and worker dose are not evaluated quantitatively, although effects can be inferred from increases in handling operations, etc. from the scenarios considered. (authors)