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At least 1,099 records · Page 61

Transportation Secure Data Center: Real-world Data for Planning, Modeling, and Analysis (Fact Sheet)

The Transportation Secure Data Center (TSDC) at www.nrel.gov/tsdc provides free, web-based access to detailed transportation data from a variety of travel surveys conducted across the nation. While preserving the privacy of survey participants, this online repository makes vital transportation data broadly available to users from the comfort of their own desks via a secure online connection.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Reliable Video Analysis Helps Security Company Grow

Armed Response Team (ART) has grown to become the largest locally owned security company in New Mexico. With technical assistance from Sandia National Laboratories through the New Mexico Small Business Assistance (NMSBA) Program, ART got help so they could quickly bring workable video security solutions to market. By offering a reliable video analytic camera system, they’ve been able to reduce theft, add hundreds of clients, and increase their number of employees.

42 ENGINEERING↗

2nd Quarter Transportation Report FY2015: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RCRA Part A Permit Application for Waste Management Activities at the Nevada National Security Site Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU), Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU), and Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU)

This document is the first volume in a Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for continued operation of certain facilities on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), owned by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). This RCRA permit application pertains to the Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU), the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU), the Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU), and the Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU). This volume lists the relevant permits for each of these facilities and provides maps and drawings of many aspects of them. The companion volumes, which provide descriptive text and discussion and additional graphics, are jointly considered Part B of the permit application. Those volumes are identified by the following document numbers: DOE/NV/25946--2442, DOE/NV/25946--2448, DOE/NV/25946--2425, and DOE/NV/25946--2429.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NNSA Program Develops the Next Generation of Nuclear Security Experts

NNSA is fostering the next generation of nuclear security experts is through its successful NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP). NGFP offers its Fellows an exceptional career development opportunity through hands-on experience supporting NNSA mission areas across policy and technology disciplines. The one-year assignments give tomorrow’s leaders in global nuclear security and nonproliferation unparalleled exposure through assignments to Program Offices across NNSA.

human capital development↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Sandia National Laboratory Classified Macroencapsulated Mixed Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis evaluates whether the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) Classified Macroencapsulated Mixed Waste stream (ASLA000001007, Revision 4) is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The SNL Classified Macroencapsulated Mixed Waste stream consists of debris from classified nuclear weapons components (SNL 2015). The SNL Classified Macroencapsulated Mixed Waste stream required a special analysis due to tritium (3H) exceeding the NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Action Levels (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office [NNSA/NFO] 2015). The SNL Classified Macroencapsulated Mixed Waste stream had no significant effect on the maximum mean and 95th percentile results for the resident air pathway and all-pathways annual total effective dose (TED). The SNL Classified Macroencapsulated Mixed Waste stream increases the mean air pathway and all-pathways annual TED from approximately 100 to 200 years after closure. Addition of the SNL Classified Macroencapsulated Mixed Waste stream inventory shifts the maximum TED to approximately 100 years after closure and increases the TED for several alternative exposure scenarios. The maximum mean and the 95th percentile 222Rn flux density remain less than the performance objective throughout the compliance period. The SNL Classified Macroencapsulated Mixed Waste stream is suitable for disposal by SLB at the Area 5 RWMS. The waste stream is recommended for approval without conditions.

LNL↗

Transportation Secure Data Center: Real-World Data for Planning, Modeling, and Analysis

The Transportation Secure Data Center (TSDC) provides free, web-based access to detailed transportation data from a variety of travel surveys conducted across the nation. While preserving the privacy of survey participants, this online repository makes vital transportation data broadly available to users from the comfort of their own desks via a secure online connection. Maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in partnership with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the TSDC houses data from travel surveys and studies conducted using global positioning system (GPS) devices. It features millions of data points - second-by-second GPS readings, vehicle characteristics (if applicable), and demographics - for all modes of travel. NREL screens the initial data for quality control, translates each data set into a consistent format, and interprets the data for spatial analysis. NREL's processing routines add information on vehicle fuel economy and road grades and join data points to the road network.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗

Data-Driven Security Assessment of Power Grids Based on Machine Learning Approach: Preprint

Data-driven security assessment provides key indicators on power system stability using simulations on scheduling models, as opposed to dynamic simulations that are more time-consuming. This paper investigates data-driven security assessment of power grids based on machine learning. Multivariate random forest regression is used as the machine learning algorithm due to its high robustness to the input data. Three stability issues are analyzed using the proposed machine learning tool, including transient stability, frequency stability and small signal stability. The estimation values from machine learning tool are compared with those from dynamic simulations. Results show that the proposed machine learning tool can effectively predict the stability margins for the three stability metrics.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Applied Risk Analysis for Guiding Homeland Security Policy

Risk analysis methods may be qualitative, semi-quantitative, or quantitative; adopt probabilistic and statistical theories; and implement concepts from core disciplines including operations research, reliability engineering, systems engineering, and applied mathematics. These methods continue to develop and evolve and have successfully been applied to address various homeland security mission challenges in recent years. The objective of this book is to: 1) highlight the role of risk analysis for informing homeland security policy decisions, and 2) describe case studies from academia, government, and industry that apply risk analysis methods for addressing challenges within each of the DHS missions.

national security, risk assessment, risk managemen↗

Energy Security and Resilience (ESR) Initiative

Central to achieving reduced carbon emissions and sustained economic recovery from the COVID pandemic is a national energy system based on low-carbon technologies and resistant to disruption from severe weather events and human attacks. NREL’s Energy Security and Resilience (ESR) Initiative applies NREL’s expertise in the design and operation of clean, highly distributed energy systems to the most pressing security and resilience challenges.

cybersecurity↗

Remediation of Mercury-Contaminated Storm Sewer Sediments from the West End Mercury Area at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee - 12061

The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN has faced an ongoing challenge from mercury entrapped in soils beneath and adjacent to buildings, storm sewers, and process pipelines. Previous actions to reduce the quantity and/or mobilization of mercury-contaminated media have included plugging of building floor drains, cleaning of sediment and sludge from sumps, manholes, drain lines, and storm sewers, lining/relining of storm sewers and replacement of a portion of the storm sewer trunk line, re-routing and removal of process piping, and installation of the Central Mercury Treatment System to capture and treat contaminated sump water. Despite the success of these actions, mercury flux in the storm sewer out-falls that discharge to Upper East Fork Poplar Creek (UEFPC) continues to pose a threat to long-term water quality. A video camera survey of the storm sewer network revealed several sections of storm sewer that had large cracks, separations, swells, and accumulations of sediment/sludge and debris. The selected remedy was to clean and line the sections of storm sewer pipe that were determined to be primary contributors to the mercury flux in the storm sewer out-falls. The project, referred to as the West End Mercury Area (WEMA) Storm Sewer Remediation Project, included cleaning sediment and debris from over 2,460 meters of storm sewer pipe followed by the installation of nearly 366 meters of cure-in-place pipe (CIPP) liner. One of the greatest challenges to the success of this project was the high cost of disposal associated with the mercury-contaminated sludge and wastewater generated from the storm sewer cleaning process. A contractor designed and operated an on-site wastewater pre-treatment system that successfully reduced mercury levels in 191 cubic meters of sludge to levels that allowed it to be disposed at Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) disposal cell as a non-hazardous, low-level waste. The system was also effective at pre-treating over 1,514,000 liters of wastewater to levels that met the waste acceptance criteria for the on-site West End [wastewater] Treatment Facility (WETF). This paper describes the storm sewer cleaning and lining process and the methods used to process the mercury-contaminated sludge and wastewater, as well as several 'lessons learned' that would be relevant to any future projects involving storm sewer cleaning and debris remediation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Successful Characterization Strategies for the Active High Risk Y-12 National Security Complex 9201-5 (Alpha-5) Facility, Oak Ridge, TN - 12164

Building 9201-5 (Alpha 5) was completed in May 1944 and served as a production facility for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 Weapons Plant. During the Manhattan Project, it functioned as a uranium enrichment facility. The facility was renovated and altered over the years, converting the calutrons to support other missions. Alpha 5 consists of 4 floors and a basement measuring approximately 600,000 square feet. The facility contains various pieces of equipment remaining from legacy operations. A significant amount (approximately 200,000 kgs) of mercury (Hg) has been spilled in the facility over the operational history of the building. To further complicate matters, beryllium (Be) contamination in 9201-5 is found throughout approximately sixty percent of the facility. Concentrations varying from very low (< 0.2 micrograms (μg)/100 cm{sup 2}) to areas where concentrations are relatively high, approximately 600 μg/100 cm{sup 2}, in regulated beryllium areas. The primary site related contaminants (SRCs) for the waste in this facility are enriched uranium, depleted uranium, beryllium and mercury. This facility represents the highest environmental risk for DOE-ORO EM and NNSA at Y-12 and must be quickly addressed to minimize impacts to future Y-12 missions, as well as human health and the environment. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), approximately 700,000 cubic feet of legacy material was removed in 2010 and 2011. In addition, characterization of the 9201-5 facility was scheduled in the winter and spring of 2011. This activity was initiated in January 2011 and was completed in July 2011. Heavy schedule pressure was further complicated by the fact that this building has active utility, security and process systems. Given these complex variables, a unique, out of the box characterization strategy was forged in an effort to bound radiological and chemical contaminants, as well as providing the appropriate level of quality to ensure that this data could be used to develop waste profiles when deactivation, decontamination and demolition (D and D) activities are authorized at a future date. The characterization strategy involved a hybrid model of statistically-based and biased sampling events. To achieve the desired results, traditional intrusive sampling and laboratory analysis, as well as a number of field-based characterization methodologies (e.g., X-ray Fluorescence [XRF], Lumex and Non-Destructive Assay [NDA]) were utilized. Results were captured and synthesized into meaningful, usable conclusions in a facility characterization report that will more accurately aid D and D cost estimates for future remedial actions. This massive characterization campaign involved over 1,200 separate sample locations using 4 separate characterization methods and was successfully completed to meet a performance-based milestone within 8 months of initiation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nevada National Security Site Industrial Sites Project Closeout - 12498

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is responsible for environmental restoration (ER) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This includes remediation at Industrial Sites where past nuclear testing activities and activities that supported nuclear testing may have or are known to have resulted in the release of contaminants into the environment. Industrial Sites at the NNSS have included nuclear facilities that supported the nuclear rocket/missile development programs, gas stations, landfills, spill sites, ordnance sites, and numerous other waste disposal and release sites. The NNSS Industrial Sites activities neared completion at the end of fiscal year 2011 while other activities required under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) and part of the same NNSS ER Project are forecasted to extend to 2027 or beyond. With the majority of Industrial Sites corrective action units (CAUs) completed (more than 250 CAUs and over 1,800 corrective action sites), it was determined that an activity closeout process should be implemented to ensure that the work completed over the past 15 years is well documented in a comprehensive and concise summary. While the process used to close each individual CAU is described in approved documents, no single document describes in summary fashion the work completed to close the many individual Industrial Sites. The activity closeout process will be used to develop an Industrial Sites closeout document that describes these years of work. This document will summarize the number of Industrial Sites closed under the FFACO and provide general descriptions of projects, contaminants removed, and sites closed in place with corresponding Use Restrictions. Other pertinent information related to Industrial Sites work such as the project history, closure decisions, historical declarations, remediation strategies, and final CAU status will be included in the closeout document, along with a table listing each CAU and corresponding corrective action sites within each CAU. Using this process of conducting the activity closeout and developing a closeout document may prove useful for other ER projects within the DOE complex in describing how a long period of ER can be summarized in a single document. The NNSS Industrial Sites activities were completed over the span of 15 years and involved the investigation, cleanup or Use Restriction, and closure of more than 260 CAUs and over 1,800 sites. These activities will conclude in FY 2012 (with the exception of one CAU). In order to capture the work completed over this length of time and document decisions made during the activities, a closeout effort was initiated. The closeout will review the work conducted during the Industrial Sites activities and produce a single document that summarizes Industrial Sites activities. This closeout is being conducted at an interim stage in the overall NNSA/NSO ER Project since the Soils and UGTA activities will continue for a number of years, but the completion of the Industrial Sites project warrants conducting a closeout now while personnel are available and information is still current. The process followed by NNSA/NSO in conducing project closeout for the Industrial Sites portion of the ER program may prove useful within the DOE complex in demonstrating how a large ER project can be summarized. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The evolution of the Nevada National Security site waste acceptance criteria - 15312

The Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (DOE/NV--325) is an evolution of requirements spanning almost three decades of waste acceptance at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The original waste acceptance criteria (WAC) document was written in 1978 (document NVO-185) and underwent multiple revisions as time passed and disposal experience was gained. This document came into being when the NNSS first started receiving significant quantities of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) from offsite U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) generators, such as the Mound and Rocky Flats Plants. The original WAC was far less prescriptive and rigorous than the current criteria since many of the current DOE order directives, Federal/State laws, and regulations did not exist. The current WAC reflects the results of numerous revisions in order to address the nuances of the varied waste streams and package configurations accepted for disposal at the NNSS. This includes waste streams that exhibit challenges not previously faced or covered by the WAC and therefore, from time to time, require new information and or changes to be made to the WAC. These wastes now represent a growing percentage of the remaining waste at cleanup sites across the DOE Complex. These waste streams present challenges, such as the technical basis for ensuring safe transportation to and disposal at the NNSS. The current WAC (Rev. 10 dated June 2013), is Available online at: http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/Environmental/DOENV{sub 3}25.pdf). Other challenges for the NNSS include incorporating new and emerging technologies and addressing stakeholder concerns. Addressing these challenges sometimes results in changes to the NNSS WAC. Drivers for revising the NNSS WAC over the years have included operating experience improvements, the need to specify waste origin/ownership, and identifying preferred transportation routing. This paper will discuss various aspects of the NNSS WAC, and how it has evolved based upon DOE orders and requirements, acceptance of offsite mixed wastes, acceptance of non-radioactive classified wastes, stakeholder concerns and agreements, and the changing face of the remaining legacy waste at DOE sites across the United States. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Environmental Remediation Using EPA's Model Evaluation Guidance to Move to Closure - 15588

The National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) has adapted the Environmental Protection Agency's guidance on environmental model evaluation as a framework for evaluating corrective action investigation models. Model evaluation is an important confidence building activity, which is needed to support closure of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Corrective Action Units (CAUs) associated with underground nuclear testing. Through this process, site-investigation models of groundwater flow and contaminant transport are reviewed and compared to new site-specific data to determine if the results can be used to support regulatory decisions required for closure and to achieve NNSA/NFO site management objectives. The regulatory decisions include identifying and establishing CAU regulatory boundaries; identifying institutional controls, including use-restriction boundaries; and developing a long-term closure monitoring program. A successful case study from Frenchman Flat, Nevada is used to illustrate the model evaluation process. Groundwater flow and transport from two of the 10 underground nuclear tests in Frenchman Flat had the largest potential for contaminating groundwater, and were selected for evaluation. Wells were drilled, logged, hydraulically tested, sampled, and analyzed for radionuclides and the data was evaluated with respect to previous site conceptualization and numerical model results. The approach and results of this process as applied to the PIN STRIPE test and how it helped build confidence to close the Frenchman Flat CAU is described in this case study. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk informed cyber security for nuclear power plants - 342

Nuclear power plants are increasingly adding digital components for plant operation, safety, and security. These digital components fill a gap with legacy equipment where replacement components no longer exist. They also benefit operation of the plant by increasing efficiency in power generation, monitoring of equipment and plant parameters, as well as aiding operator control. However, the addition of digital components and systems also adds cyber risks with previously unanalyzed failure modes and attack vectors are introduced with these new systems. These risks are difficult to identify, analyze, and mitigate due to the increasingly complex nature of the digital components and the integration of these components with additional plant processes and communication networks. The research presented in this paper develops a new method that addresses the cyber risk to inform appropriate levels of protection. EPRI and Sandia are working under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement to develop an effective method of evaluating the cyber risk in production nuclear power facilities. The Cyber Hazards Analysis Risk Methodology (CHARM) focuses on ensuring adequate controls are in place for appropriate cyber protection of the plant from radiological release or generation risk. Existing plant hazards analyses (e.g., PRA, FTA) do not account for software deficiencies or adversarial intent. This method leverages existing plant analyses and MIT's Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to create cyber informed fault trees. These new fault trees will provide the basis for comprehensive cyber risk analysis and help ensure potential gaps in cyber security controls are identified and corrected. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗