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Glass formulation and lab-scale testing of glasses designed for in-can Melter and in-container Vitrification of high-assay low-enriched uranium aqueous polishing Raffinate waste

Glasses were designed for processing a nuclear waste from aqueous polishing of high-assay low-enriched uranium using either In-Can Melter (ICM) or GeoMelt® In-Container Vitrification™ (ICV) technologies, which operate at temperatures of T p ≤ 1100 °C and T p ≤ 1450 °C, respectively. Due to the different operating conditions, the melt and glass properties were optimized differently for each technology. Each glass was designed to optimize for maximum waste loading while simultaneously satisfying processing (e.g., crystallization, viscosity, and conductivity) and product quality (e.g., durability, hazard characteristic, and crystal content) constraints. Here, the raffinate waste contains high nitric acid (4 M) and low total solids (9 g·L -1 ) concentrations. Feed preparation processes were tested to facilitate concentration and nitrate destruction/removal while controlling redox of the melter feed. A successful feed process including sugar addition and spray-drying was performed to generate an adequate melter feed for ICV processing.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Interfractional Prostate Shifts: Review of 1870 Computed Tomography (CT) Scans Obtained During Image-Guided Radiotherapy Using CT-on-Rails for the Treatment of Prostate Cancer

Purpose: To review 1870 CT scans of interfractional prostate shift obtained during image-guided radiotherapy. Methods and Materials: A total of 1870 pretreatment CT scans were acquired with CT-on-rails, and the corresponding shift data for 329 patients with prostate cancer were analyzed. Results: Of the 1870 scans reviewed, 44% required no setup adjustments in the anterior-posterior (AP) direction, 14% had shifts of 3-5 mm, 29% had shifts of 6-10 mm, and 13% had shifts of >10 mm. In the superior-inferior direction, 81% had no adjustments, 2% had shifts of 3-5 mm, 15% had shifts of 6-10 mm, and 2% had shifts of >10 mm. In the left-right direction, 65% had no adjustment, 13% had shifts of 3-5 mm, 17% had shifts of 6-10 mm, and 5% had shifts of >10 mm. Further analysis of the first 66 consecutive patients divided into three groups according to body mass index indicates that the shift in the AP direction for the overweight subgroup was statistically larger than those for the control and obese subgroups (p < 0.05). The interfractional shift in the lateral direction for the obese group (1 SD, 5.5 mm) was significantly larger than those for the overweight and control groups (4.1 and 2.9 mm, respectively) (p < 0.001). Conclusions: These data demonstrate that there is a significantly greater shift in the AP direction than in the lateral and superior-inferior directions for the entire patient group. Overweight and obese patient groups show a significant difference from the control group in terms of prostate shift.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Resolution of Technical Issues at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Pretreatment Facility - 17281

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Pretreatment (PT) Facility has a number of first-of-a-kind technical challenges that have required additional expert analysis and testing activities to resolve. In 2006, an External Flowsheet Review Team identified 28 technical vulnerabilities with the plant design or future operability. Over a period of three months starting in September 2012, a number of top scientists and engineers conducted a review of the major technical issues associated with the design and operability of the WTP. These experts also provided independent advice on some of the broader challenges associated with completing the Hanford tank waste mission - highlighting the linkage between the physical and chemical properties of the tank waste and the PT Facility technical issues. In 2012 and early 2013, DOE's Office of River Protection (ORP) directed the WTP contractor to suspend production work on the PT Facility until the outstanding technical issues could be resolved and the nuclear safety basis could be updated and brought into alignment with any updates to the facility design and/or process flowsheet. By late 2016, DOE and the WTP contractor resolved three of the eight outstanding technical issues: - (T1) Hydrogen Gas in Vessels; - (T2) Criticality in PT Facility Vessels; - (T3) Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels (HPAV). Resolving all three of these issues required a combination of engineering studies and updates to foundational PT Facility safety basis documents to ensure both the design features and safety control strategies were adequately developed and fully supportable. The five remaining unresolved technical issues are Pulse-Jet Mixing (PJM) of Vessels (T4), Erosion and Corrosion in WTP Vessels and Piping (T5), PT Facility Optimization (T6), Black Cell Vessel Structural Integrity (T7), and Facility Ventilation (T8). Specific plans for resolving each of the five remaining technical issues have been developed by the WTP contractor. This paper provides a synopsis of the status of PT Facility technical issue resolution, and how resolution of the issues will enable DOE to make an informed decision to establish a new performance baseline for the PT Facility at a future date. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demonstration of Integrated Hazard Analysis for Digital Reactor Trip Systems

Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) upgrades are a vital research area for nuclear industry. Despite their performance benefits, deployment of digital I&C in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been limited. Digital I&C systems exhibit complex failure modes including common cause failures (CCFs) which can be difficult to identify. This paper describes the development of a redundancy-guided application of the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the hazard analysis of digital I&C in advanced NPPs. The resulting Redundancy-guided System-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) is applied for the case study of a representative state-of-the-art digital reactor trip system. The analysis qualitatively and systematically identifies the most critical CCFs and other hazards of digital I&C systems. Ultimately, RESHA can help researchers make informed decisions for how, and to what degree, defensive measures such as redundancy, diversity, and defense-in-depth can be used to mitigate or eliminate the potential hazards of digital I&C systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The German product quality control of the compacted metallic nuclear waste - 15311

The treatment and safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel is a key challenge of nuclear energy utilization and has to be accomplished regardless the future nuclear of electricity production or phase-out policies. Until June 2005 approx. 6662 tons of spent fuel from German nuclear power plants was sent to the La Hague (France) and Sellafield (UK) plants for reprocessing. An equivalent amount of nuclear waste compounds has contractually to be returned to Germany, which is currently in progress. The returnable waste streams comprise mainly highly-active vitrified waste containing a major part of fission products and actinides, and intermediate-active super-compacted metallic waste containing reprocessed fuel element's structural materials and some technological waste from the reprocessing process itself. Shearing and dissolution of spent fuel leaves scraps of fuel metal cladding, the end-pieces and spacers which are contaminated, activated and irradiating from their life in a reactor core. In fact, this metallic intermediate level radioactive waste makes up a bit more than half of the total volume of the reprocessed waste. At La Hague the metallic waste is super-compacted. Several, typically eight, compacted discs are stacked in a stainless steel container, named CSD-C as for 'Colis Standard de Dechets Compactes'. 4104 containers of such CSD-Cs in 152 transport/storages casks have to be returned to Germany. Each one of them has to be checked and quality certified for its conformity with German national product specifications and acceptance criteria by independent national product quality control inspectors (PKS). The residue package documentation has to be complete and the characterization methods have to be comprehensive. Due to the heterogeneity of metallic waste the characterization and control of its properties is very complex. The nuclear characterization is performed by means of non-destructive measurements, where only a few key nuclides are measured directly. In fact, the proper calculation of the whole nuclear inventory relies on numerous supplementary simulations. The measurement and calculation methodology is scrutinized by PKS in detail and key points are benchmarked with our own simulations for the sake of an independent nuclear inventory declaration check. With respect to the vast amount of documentation and parameters, which have to be checked and verified, PKS had to optimize their checking procedures. For this purpose dedicated proof tools have been developed that shall be applied for selected indicative cross-checks of the relevant parameters. This contribution is dedicated to the procedure of quality control by PKS and examples of actually performed computational verifications of declared nuclear inventory. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NMIS with Imaging and Gamma Ray Spectrometry for Pu, HEU, HE and Other Materials

The Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) has been under development at ORNL and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 National Security Complex since 1984. In the mid-1990s, what is now the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) realized that it was a useful technology for future arms control treaty applications and supported further development of the system. In 2004, fast-neutron imaging was incorporated into the system. In 2007, the ONV decided to develop a fieldable version of the system, designated as FNMIS, for potential use in future treaties. The FNMIS is being developed to be compatible with the eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier. This report addresses how and what attributes could be determined by the FNMIS system with gamma-ray spectrometry. The NMIS is a time-dependent coincidence system that incorporates tomographic imaging (including mapping of the fission sites) and gamma-ray spectrometry. It utilizes a small, lightweight (30 lb), portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron (14.1 MeV) generator (4 x 10 7 neutrons/second) for active interrogation and can also perform passive interrogation. A high-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma-ray detector with multichannel analysis can be utilized in conjunction with the source for active interrogation or passively. The system uses proton recoil scintillators: 32 small 2.5 x 2.5 x 10.2-cm-thick plastic scintillators for imaging and at least two 2 x 2 arrays of 27 x 27 x 10-cm-thick plastic scintillators that detect induced fission radiation. The DT generator contains an alpha detector that time and directionally tags a fan beam of some of the neutrons emitted and subdivides it into pixels. A fast (1 GHz) time correlation processor measures the time-dependent coincidence among all detectors in the system. A computer-controlled scanner moves the small detectors and the source appropriately for scanning a target object for imaging. The system is based on detection of transmitted 14.1 MeV neutrons, fission neutrons, and gamma rays from spontaneous, inherent source fission of the target, fission neutrons and gamma rays induced by the external DT source, gamma rays from natural emissions of uranium and plutonium, and induced gamma-ray emission by the interaction of the 14.1 MeV neutrons from the DT source. The NMIS can and has been used with a time-tagged californium spontaneous fission source. It has also been used with pulsed interrogation sources such as LINACs, DT, and deuterium-deuterium (DD) sources. This system is uniquely suited for detection of shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and other special nuclear materials and detection of high explosives (HE) and chemical agents. The NMIS will be adapted to utilize a trusted processor that incorporates information barrier and authentication techniques using open software and then be useful in some international applications for materials whose characteristics may be classified. The proposed information barrier version of the NMIS system would consist of detectors and cables, the red (classified side) computer system, which processes the data, and the black (unclassified side) computer, which handles the computer interface. The system could use the 'IB wrapper' concept proposed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and the software integrity (digital signatures) system proposed by Sandia. Since it is based entirely on commercially available components, the entire system, including NMIS data acquisition boards, can be built with commercial off-the-shelf components. This system is being developed into a fieldable system (FNMIS) for potential arms control treaties by the ONV. The system will be modularly constructed with the RF shielded modules connected to the processor by appropriate control and signal cable in metal conduit. The FNMIS is presently being designed for eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier to protect classified information. The system hardware and software can be configured to obtain the following: plutonium presence, plutonium mass, Pu-240/239 ratio, plutonium geometry, plutonium metal vs non-metallic (absence of metal), time (age) since processing for plutonium (or last purification), uranium presence, uranium mass, uranium enrichment, uranium geometry, uranium metal vs non-metallic compound (absence of metal), beryllium presence and mass, tritium and deuterium gas bottle presence, HE, and chemical weapons. A matrix of the quantities determined, the method of determination, whether active (external neutron source) or passive, and the measurement equipment involved is given in the Tables 1-4. Some of these attributes can be obtained by multiple data analysis methods. The gamma-ray spectrometry methods for HEU, plutonium, and HE have been developed by other laboratories, are well known, and will be incorporated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integration of the Kromek D3S Detector and Spot Robot For Secondary Inspections

Inspecting vehicles and containers for the presence of nuclear material is a challenging task for border control and security. When performed manually by inspectors, this task also has an associated risk of exposing the inspectors to unknown radiation. With the advent of agile, easy-to-program, quadruped robots like the Boston Dynamics Spot, automation of secondary inspection can improve the efficiency of the inspection process and alleviates the radiation risks to inspectors. In this project, Brookhaven National Laboratory and the University of Massachussetts at Lowell explored how to automate a simple secondary inspection mission. The Spot robot comes with its own software development kit (SDK) that allows clients/users to write custom code in the Python programming language to control the robot. Spot also has a payload computer called Spot-CORE, which runs the Ubuntu Linux operating system and allows users to integrate external sensors, such as a radiation detector, with Spot. In this study, the Kromek D3S detector has been integrated with Spot via the Spot-CORE, allowing Spot to capture gamma spectra and neutron counts for a specified acquisition period. Two custom routines, search and confirmation, have been developed and executed in this specified order. The search routine directs Spot to go around the nearest obstacle, e.g., vehicle and container, in a preset distance and step to collect gamma and neutron gross counts with the D3S detector. The radiation data and the robot location corresponding to each step are stored and fed to the confirmation routine at the end of the search. The confirmation routine then navigates Spot to the locations of the highest gamma or neutron counts to perform a long, e.g., one minute, measurement, and gives the operators the signature gamma spectra and neutron counts at the hotspots. This paper presents a detailed description of this automated system along with results of the preliminary tests in identifying the location and signature of a 137Cs radiation source in a vehicle.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

URANIUM ACCUMULATIONS IN CASTING OPERATIONS

In December 2017, unexpected accumulations of uranium were discovered in several locations throughout the casting process area at the Y-12 National Security Complex that subsequently placed casting operations on hold. The Y-12 uranium casting process takes place in enclosures and hoods, many of which are open to a large floor surface area that has limited visibility and access. At the time of discovery, there were no Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) analyses or limits for material accumulations in the casting processing areas. Due to changes in the operation of the casting process and invalid assumptions in the criticality safety evaluation, significant material accumulations were occurring inside the enclosures. The material accumulations were identified as a result of an extent of condition review from another process, and an occurrence report was filed. The NCS organization worked with Production and Operations personnel to identify additional areas of uranium accumulation in the casting area, which resulted in several iterations of cleaning and material collection. Following material recovery, a causal analysis was performed that identified several contributing factors that allowed the accumulations to go unnoticed. In order to resume operations, the criticality safety evaluation was revised to analyze and control uranium accumulations in the casting area. Additionally, improvements in nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) controls were required. Casting operations have since resumed with frequently required material collections, which have limited the amount of uranium material accumulation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

URANIUM ACCUMULATIONS IN CASTING OPERATIONS

In December 2017, unexpected accumulations of uranium were discovered in several locations throughout the casting process area at the Y-12 National Security Complex that subsequently placed casting operations on hold. The Y-12 uranium casting process takes place in enclosures and hoods, many of which are open to a large floor surface area that has limited visibility and access. At the time of discovery, there were no Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) analyses or limits for material accumulations in the casting processing areas. Due to changes in the operation of the casting process and invalid assumptions in the criticality safety evaluation, significant material accumulations were occurring inside the enclosures. The material accumulations were identified as a result of an extent of condition review from another process, and an occurrence report was filed. The NCS organization worked with Production and Operations personnel to identify additional areas of uranium accumulation in the casting area, which resulted in several iterations of cleaning and material collection. Following material recovery, a causal analysis was performed that identified several contributing factors that allowed the accumulations to go unnoticed. In order to resume operations, the criticality safety evaluation was revised to analyze and control uranium accumulations in the casting area. Additionally, improvements in nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) controls were required. Casting operations have since resumed with frequently required material collections, which have limited the amount of uranium material accumulation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

A Redundancy-Guided Approach for the Hazard Analysis of Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Advanced Nuclear Power Plants

We report digital instrumentation and control (I&C) upgrades are a vital research area for the nuclear industry. Despite their performance benefits, deployment of digital I&C in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been limited. Digital I&C systems exhibit complex failure modes including common cause failures (CCFs), which can be difficult to identify. This paper describes the development of a redundancy-guided application of the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis and fault tree analysis for the hazard analysis of digital I&C in advanced NPPs. The resulting Redundancy-Guided Systems-Theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) is applied for the case study of a representative state-of-the-art digital reactor trip system. The analysis qualitatively and systematically identifies the most critical CCFs and other hazards of digital I&C systems. Ultimately, the RESHA can help researchers make informed decisions for how, and to what degree, defensive measures such as redundancy, diversity, and defense in depth can be used to mitigate or eliminate the potential hazards of digital I&C systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Crystal defects and related stress in Y{sub 2}O{sub 3} thin films: Origin, modeling, and consequence on the stability of the C-type structure

We study the impact that the crystal defects have on the C-type structure of rare earth sesquioxide thin films grown by ion-beam sputtering, through the example of Y{sub 2}O{sub 3}. By monitoring the energy of the argon beam used in the sputter deposition process (between 600 and 1200 eV), we show that it is possible to control the microstructure (defects concentration, stress state and phase) in the oxide layer. Two main types of defects, ascribed to the 'atomic peening effect', are evidenced by high-resolution transmission electron microscopy, Rutherford backscattering spectroscopy, and nuclear reaction analysis experiments: anti-Frenkel pairs, leading to a disorder on the oxygen-vacancy network, and oxygen-vacancy dislocations loops, to accommodate the strong nonstoichiometry. From a macroscopic measurement of the residual stresses in the as-deposited and the annealed layers, through x-ray diffraction and the sin{sup 2}{Psi} method, we have modeled the related stress state using an enhanced triaxial stress model. In the as-grown films, we evidence the coexistence of a biaxial and a hydrostatic stress, due to inclusions of atomic size defects. Quantitative information of the concentration and the nature of each type of defect (size effect) have also been determined, in good agreement with experiments. Interestingly, in the most energetic growth conditions corresponding to the highest degree of disorder on the oxygen-vacancy network and to the highest stress field in the film, we demonstrate that it is possible to stabilize an unexpected and metastable non equilibrium fluorite-like phase (X-type).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Xyce parallel electronic simulator design.

This document is the Xyce Circuit Simulator developer guide. Xyce has been designed from the 'ground up' to be a SPICE-compatible, distributed memory parallel circuit simulator. While it is in many respects a research code, Xyce is intended to be a production simulator. As such, having software quality engineering (SQE) procedures in place to insure a high level of code quality and robustness are essential. Version control, issue tracking customer support, C++ style guildlines and the Xyce release process are all described. The Xyce Parallel Electronic Simulator has been under development at Sandia since 1999. Historically, Xyce has mostly been funded by ASC, the original focus of Xyce development has primarily been related to circuits for nuclear weapons. However, this has not been the only focus and it is expected that the project will diversify. Like many ASC projects, Xyce is a group development effort, which involves a number of researchers, engineers, scientists, mathmaticians and computer scientists. In addition to diversity of background, it is to be expected on long term projects for there to be a certain amount of staff turnover, as people move on to different projects. As a result, it is very important that the project maintain high software quality standards. The point of this document is to formally document a number of the software quality practices followed by the Xyce team in one place. Also, it is hoped that this document will be a good source of information for new developers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Introductory Review of the Maritime Nuclear Regulatory Landscape

The successful deployment of nuclear technology for maritime applications, including the ability to provide energy to land-based projects at ports, has the potential to assist the International Maritime Organization’s pursuit of 2050 targets while simultaneously bringing low-cost nuclear power closer to where it is needed. The benefits of low-cost nuclear power include, but are not limited to, effective resource extraction and processing, more efficient and productive industrial applications through electrification, and increased energy abundance. In addition, the maritime sector presents unique opportunities for nuclear. For example, by leveraging the maritime sector’s experience with modular shipyard manufacturing, the nuclear industry can achieve significant cost and schedule reductions, increased productivity, and improved quality control.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Life Extension of a Nuclear Facility: Export Control Implications

This paper discusses life extension upgrades to an operational nuclear research facility and identifies export control implications. The Department of Energy (DOE) is engaged in a multi-year program of deactivating and decommissioning (D&D) the majority of the Hanford Site 300 Area facilities. In 2006, the DOE decided to retain the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL), which was on the D&D list. As part of the facility life-extension to ensure continued mission capability, the DOE decided to consolidate replacement hot cell capability into the RPL. Physical limitations within the facility dictated that new hot cell design and construction would be modularized—a process that allows for ease of fabrication and introduction into existing space. A review of the fabrication and installation techniques has identified potential export control issues.

Kerschner, Harrison F.↗

Breakthrough: X-ray Laser Captures Atoms and Molecules in Action

The Linac Coherent Light Source at SLAC is the world's most powerful X-ray laser. Just two years after turning on in 2009, breakthrough science is emerging from the LCLS at a rapid pace. A recent experiment used the X-rays to create and probe a 2-million-degree piece of matter in a controlled way for the first time-a significant leap toward understanding the extreme conditions found in the hearts of stars and giant planets, and a finding which could further guide research into nuclear fusion, the mechanism that powers the sun. Upcoming experiments will investigate the fundamental, atomic-scale processes behind such phenomena as superconductivity and magnetism, as well as peering into the molecular workings of photosynthesis in plants.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Model Study and Site Experience of Radiation Physics Analysis for Research Reactor Decommissioning - 18586

The University of Alberta Safe Low Power Kritical Experiment (SLOWPOKE II) nuclear reactor facility (UASF) was commissioned on April 22, 1977. It was designed, built and installed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and was the fourth SLOWPOKE II research reactor installed at a Canadian university at that time. The reactor was used as a source of neutrons for radionuclide production and elemental analysis via neutron activation analysis, to provide a service to industry, government and to support research and teaching at the University of Alberta. It was licensed to operate at 20 kW, less than the heat produced by a small residential furnace, and work with the reactor was typically performed at one-tenth full power. After nearly four decades of service, the reactor reached the end of its useful life in August 2017 when defueling and the project to decommission the reactor began. Decommissioning of the UASF is a process to dismantle the facility by progressively removing the reactor core and other radioactive components as well as managing the balance of contaminated materials around the reactor in a safe manner. The objective of the project is to release the site from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's (CNSC) regulatory control and return the site to a 'greenfield' status. This paper will discuss the radiation physics analysis that was undertaken to support the decommissioning of the University of Alberta SLOWPOKE II Facility Reactor which took place from July - October 2017. It will address the radiation physics model study, development of the radiation protection (RP) plan, site experience and how the lessons learned from this project can be utilized for best practice on other similar projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Improvements to the operational efficiency of the Portsmouth 'Blue Box' Assay system - 15162

The 'Blue Box' in Building 326 at Portsmouth comprises a dual cargo container lined with high density polyethylene with 5% (elemental) boron that acts as a neutron shield. This construction provides a low environmental neutron background to support the capability to attain low values of minimal detectable activity (MDA). A Non-destructive Assay (NDA) measurement platform known as the Fluor B and W Portsmouth Slab Counter (FBPSC) is housed inside the Blue Box. This comprises four neutron slab detectors supported with an electronic system supplying power and associated signal processing. The system is operated by a laptop computer which has data acquisition and analysis capabilities. Each slab contains five {sup 3}He proportional counters embedded in polyethylene. The system is designed to measure the mass of U-235 in coolers from the Portsmouth site using passive neutron counting. The system was calibrated by taking measurements with {sup 252}Cf sources attached to various positions on the outside surfaces of a surrogate cooler. In addition, Monte-Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations were performed to extend the baseline calibration for coolers of various sizes used in the gaseous-diffusion process. The basic principle of operation is to measure the total neutron emission from the item and determine the mass of {sup 235}U using the system efficiency (determined from MCNP calculations combined with the calibration measurements) combined with known isotopic information ({sup 235}U enrichment and U-235/U-234 ratio), assumed chemical composition, and gross cooler mass. The FBPSC analysis program calculates the mass of U-235 within the cooler being assayed, together with the associated Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU). A background correction is performed that accounts for the measured environmental background with a cosmic-ray spallation correction (based on the cooler's gross weight). The software suite developed for the system also includes the capability to track and trend measurement control data in order to quickly identify conditions where the system has drifted outside of its quality control envelope. The MDA of the system has been determined to be less the 15 g of U-235 for count times that are typically less than 5 minutes (depending on the uranium isotopics). This is primarily the result of the low neutron background rate inside the Blue Box (approximately 3 times lower than at nearby locations outside the box). Additionally, various software features have been designed to yield optimum counting performance for the system including count time adjustment and interval filtering to reject statistical outliers that are usually associated with cosmic spallation events. The operation of the system has proven to be very efficient, with the short measurement time providing a high throughput rate of coolers through the Blue Box NDA system. Significant operational benefits and improved data traceability have been yielded compared to the previous measurement process, which involved operators taking measurement with counter/scalers and manually entering data into spreadsheets. As of August 2014, this system successfully measured all coolers required to support completion of a contractually-required Performance Milestone. There are approximately 1900 coolers available for measurement. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fission Meter Information Barrier Attribute Measurement System: FY2018 Office of Nuclear Verification FNI/UKC Task 2 Documentation Package

The ORTEC Fission Meter is a neutron multiplicity detector developed by Oak Ridge, TN based Advanced Measurement Technology (AMETEK), ORTEC Division. Data analysis techniques developed for neutron multiplicity detectors allows determination of mass and multiplication of unknown objects of special nuclear material (SNM). This can be done based on the physics of fission neutrons with little or no a priori information about the object. The articulating panel design and “5-Mode Counter” neutron multiplicity data-acquisition hardware were licensed to ORTEC by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 2005 based on a 2004 prototype. The “5-Mode Counter” development started in 2000 in order to produce a compact neutron multiplicity file containing the full neutron count timing distribution. Development of this hardware along with the prototype detector design continued through 2004. Photographs of the Fission Meter are shown in Figure 1. In 2011, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory developed a software-based information barrier (IB) for the Fission Meter to control transmission of some for potential use in treaty applications. This IB was extended over the next several years to include improvements to the algorithms, more automated processing, and list mode data acquisition and processing. This report provides design and operational documentation for the Fission Meter and the Information Barrier additions.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗