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Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Crystalline versus Glassy Nature of Iron Phosphate Waste Forms Subjected to Different Slow Cooling Curves

This report provides experimental details and associated results on the elemental distributions (compositions), crystalline/amorphous phase distributions, and microstructures for iron phosphate reference materials (DPF5-336) made with different cooling curves and starting from different temperatures (i.e., 1050°C and 1200°C). The primary goal of this work was to evaluate the properties of the DPF5- 336 reference material after it was melted and cooled at different rates to simulate the cooling profile of different types of canisters. Crystal fractions across the SCC#2, SCC#3, and SCC#5 samples were all similar ranging in crystal content of 35.66–41.14 mass% with amorphous fractions being the balance (64.34–58.86 mass%, respectively). This shows that the heat treatment profile did not seems to greatly affect either the total crystal content or the phase distributions. The quenched sample was almost completely amorphous (99.55 mass%) with very small peaks identified as Li 3 Fe 2 (PO 4 ) 3 whereas the SCC-treated materials showed peaks for what appear to be ten separate phases present in various concentrations. Another goal of these experiments was to see how the phase distribution affected chemical durability of these waste forms, but that information is being collected at Argonne National Laboratory and will be published in a separate report

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Accelerating the Decommissioning of the Sellafield Pile Fuel Storage Pond Using Innovative Remote Tooling Developed with the Supply Chain - 16437

The Pile Fuel Storage Pond (PFSP) at Sellafield and adjoining de-canning building provided the storage, cooling and de-canning facility for used fuel and isotopes from the two Windscale reactors and later some Magnox fuel from the Calder Hall reactors. Operations ceased in the 1970's and the facilities are now undergoing a programme of accelerated decommissioning. The pond is a sub-divided outdoor storage pond containing skips of irradiated fuel and miscellaneous waste items and the building contains a series of sub-ponds, known as bays, connected underwater to the main pond. The radiation environment and access limitations necessitate the use of remote technology for the decommissioning programme. This paper describes the philosophy and approach and the technology and equipment adopted for the removal and export of key plant equipment and waste items from within the PFSP. In order to progress the project cost effectively and speedily, the Sellafield project team looked for partners in the supply chain with the required experience, expertise and facilities to supply and test 'commercial off-the-shelf' (COTS) or modified proprietary equipment. This COTS approach minimised the need for multiple, expensive and lengthy design and manufacturing tasks associated with bespoke equipment. Sellafield partnered with specialist remote handling contractor, James Fisher Nuclear, and the respective project teams worked closely together at every stage of the project from qualifying requirements, identifying potential solutions, through to development, testing, training and final deployment. Optioneering of potential solutions involved early 'proof of principle' trials in JFN rig hall facilities, utilising existing equipment and plant mock-ups, along with other equipment manufactured in-house. Together the project teams selected the best solution to take forward, adopting a practical and trials based approach, which allowed rapid and cost effective modification of the solution throughout the project with minimal impact on the programme. When the final solution was validated, plant operators then gained familiarity and training on the equipment so they could execute the work efficiently on plant and so minimise their dose uptake. The removal of a Large De-canner is described in detail. This was a significant obstruction to the emptying, modification and re-use of the bay and a key milestone in the clean-up of the PFSP. The de-canners are large and heavy pieces of equipment which weigh 6.5 t each and approximately 6.5 m long. Their removal was further complicated by limited equipment and man access, radiological contamination from de-canning fuel, challenging material properties, unknown equipment condition and complex lifting requirements. Sellafield Ltd and JFN project teams worked closely together to rapidly develop, trial and deploy a succession of adapted 'commercial off-the-shelf' (COTS) tools whilst addressing emerging challenges and completing the overall task on time and budget. The Sellafield and JFN project and design teams provided an underwater: wheel stop removal tool; towing trolley; grinder on a carbon fibre pole, chute cutting 600 mm circular saw and hydraulic 6 t winch. The suite of tools will be reused on the remaining de-canners in the PFSP and First Generation Magnox Fuel Storage Pond (FGMSP) giving cost and programme savings. Each of the tools can also be used, and some have already been, for other tasks in the bay retrievals such as the size reduction of support frames, large steel sections and chemical de-canner preparatory works. The 'learning from experience' acquired during the project was shared by the Sellafield project with other decommissioning projects across the site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

THE SUITABILITY OF SODIUM PEROXIDE FUSION FOR PRODUCTION-SCALE PLUTONIUM PROCESSING OPERATIONS

Sodium peroxide (Na{sub 2}O{sub 2}) fusion is a method that offers significant benefits to the processing of high-fired plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) materials. Those benefits include reduction in dissolution cycle time, decrease in residual solids, and reduction of the potential for generation of a flammable gas mixture during dissolution. Implementation of Na{sub 2}O{sub 2} fusion may also increase the PuO{sub 2} throughput in the HB-Line dissolving lines. To fuse a material, Na{sub 2}O{sub 2} is mixed with the feed material in a crucible and heated to 600-700 C. For low-fired and high-fired PuO{sub 2}, Na{sub 2}O{sub 2} reacts with PuO{sub 2} to form a compound that readily dissolves in ambient-temperature nitric acid without the use of potassium fluoride. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) demonstrated the feasibility of Na{sub 2}O{sub 2} fusion and subsequent dissolution for the processing of high-fired PuO{sub 2} materials in HB-Line. Testing evaluated critical dissolution characteristics and defined preliminary process parameters. Based on experimental measurements, a dissolution cycle can be complete in less than one hour, compared to the current processing time of 6-10 hours for solution heating and dissolution. Final Pu concentrations of 30-35 g/L were produced without the formation of precipitates in the final solution.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Management of Spent and Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in the Czech Republic - 12124

The Czech Republic is a country with a well-developed peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation. Sealed Radioactive Sources (further also SRS) are broadly used in many areas in the Czech Republic, e.g. in research, industry, medicine, education, agriculture, etc. Legislation in the field of ionizing radiation source utilization has been fully harmonized with European Community legislation. SRS utilization demands a proper system which must ensure the safe use of SRS, including the management of disused (spent) and orphaned SRS. In the Czech Republic, a comprehensive system of SRS management has been established that is comparable with systems in other developed countries. The system covers both legal and institutional aspects. The Central Register of Ionizing Radiation Sources is an important part of the system. It is a tracking system that covers all activities related to SRS, from their production or import to the end of their use (recycling or disposal). Many spent SRS are recycled and can be used for other purposes after inspection, repacking or reprocessing. When the disused SRS are not intended for further use, they are managed as radioactive waste (RAW). The system of SRS management also ensures the suitable resolution of situations connected with improper SRS handling (in the case of orphaned sources, accidents, etc.). (author)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Closed Fuel Cycle Waste Treatment Strategy

This study is aimed at evaluating the existing waste management approaches for nuclear fuel cycle facilities in comparison to the objectives of implementing an advanced fuel cycle in the U.S. under current legal, regulatory, and logistical constructs. The study begins with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Integrated Waste Management Strategy (IWMS) as a general strategy and associated Waste Treatment Baseline Study (WTBS). The tenets of the IWMS are equally valid to the current waste management study. However, the flowsheet details have changed significantly from those considered under GNEP. In addition, significant additional waste management technology development has occurred since the GNEP waste management studies were performed. This study updates the information found in the WTBS, summarizes the results of more recent technology development efforts, and describes waste management approaches as they apply to both a nominal case study and near-term target reprocessing flowsheets. Many of the waste management technologies discussed also apply to other potential flowsheets that involve reprocessing. The report summarizes the waste arising from aqueous reprocessing of a typical light-water reactor (LWR) fuel to separate actinides for use in fabricating metal sodium fast reactor (SFR) fuel and from electrochemical reprocessing of the metal SFR fuel to separate actinides for recycle back into the SFR in the form of metal fuel. The primary streams considered and the recommended waste forms include: • Tritium separated from either a low volume gas stream or a high volume water stream. The recommended waste form is low-water cement in high integrity containers (HICs). • Iodine-129 separated from off-gas streams in aqueous processing. There are a range of potentially suitable waste forms. As a reference case, a glass composite material (GCM) formed by the encapsulation of the silver Mordenite (AgZ) getter material in a low-temperature glass is assumed. A number of alternatives with distinct advantages are also considered including a fused silica waste form with encapsulated nano-sized AgI crystals. • Carbon-14 separated from LWR fuel treatment off-gases and immobilized as a CaCO3 in a cement waste form. • Krypton-85 separated from LWR and SFR fuel treatment off-gases and stored as a compressed gas. • An aqueous reprocessing high-level waste (HLW) raffinate waste which is immobilized by the vitrification process in one of three forms: a single phase borosilicate glass, a borosilicate based glass ceramic, or a multi-phased crystalline synthetic rock (Synroc). • An undissolved solids (UDS) fraction from aqueous reprocessing of LWR fuel that is either included in the borosilicate HLW glass or is immobilized in the form of a metal alloy in the case of glass ceramics or Synroc. • Zirconium-based LWR fuel cladding hulls and stainless steel (SS) fuel assembly hardware that are washed and super-compacted for disposal or as an alternative with high promise the purification and reuse (or disposal as low-level waste, LLW) of Zr by reactive gas separations. • Electrochemical process salt HLW which is incorporated into a glass bonded Sodalite waste form known as the ceramic waste form (CWF). • Electrochemical process UDS and SS cladding hulls which are melted into an iron based alloy waste form. Mass and volume estimates for each of the recommended waste forms based on the source terms from the reference mass balances are reported. In addition to the above listed primary waste streams, a range of secondary process wastes are generated by aqueous reprocessing of LWR fuel, metal SFR fuel fabrication, and electrochemical reprocessing of SFR fuel. These secondary wastes have been summarized and volumes estimated by type and classification. The important waste management data gaps and research needs have been summarized for each primary waste stream and selected waste process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Extending Spent Fuel Storage until Transport for Reprocessing or Disposal

Spent fuel (SF) must be stored until an end point such as reprocessing or geologic disposal is imple-mented. Selection and implementation of an end point for SF depends upon future funding, legisla-tion, licensing and other factors that cannot be predicted with certainty. Past presumptions related to the availability of an end point have often been wrong and resulted in missed opportunities for properly informing spent fuel management policies and strategies. For example, dry cask storage systems were originally conceived to free up needed space in reactor spent fuel pools and also to provide SFS of up to 20 years until reprocessing and/or deep geological disposal became available. Hundreds of dry cask storage systems are now employed throughout the world and will be relied upon well beyond the originally envisioned design life. Given present and projected rates for the use of nuclear power coupled with projections for SF repro-cessing and disposal capacities, one concludes that SF storage will be prolonged, potentially for several decades. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently considered 300 years of storage to be appropriate for the characterization and prediction of ageing effects and ageing management issues associated with extending SF storage and subsequent transport. This paper encourages addressing the uncertainty associated with the duration of SF storage by de-sign – rather than by default. It suggests ways that this uncertainty may be considered in design, li-censing, policy, and strategy decisions and proposes a framework for safely extending spent fuel storage until SF can be transported for reprocessing or disposal – regardless of how long that may be. The paper however is not intended to either encourage or facilitate needlessly extending spent fuel storage durations. Its intent is to ensure a design and safety basis with sufficient margin to accommodate the full range of potential future scenarios. Although the focus is primarily on storage of SF from commercial operation, the principles described are equally applicable to SF from research and production reactors as well as high-level radioactive waste.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) Deep Burn Core and Fuel Analysis -- Complete Design Selection for the Pebble Bed Reactor

The Deep-Burn (DB) concept focuses on the destruction of transuranic nuclides from used light water reactor fuel. These transuranic nuclides are incorporated into TRISO coated fuel particles and used in gas-cooled reactors with the aim of a fractional fuel burnup of 60 to 70% in fissions per initial metal atom (FIMA). This high performance is expected through the use of multiple recirculation passes of the fuel in pebble form without any physical or chemical changes between passes. In particular, the concept does not call for reprocessing of the fuel between passes. In principle, the DB pebble bed concept employs the same reactor designs as the presently envisioned low-enriched uranium core designs, such as the 400 MWth Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR-400). Although it has been shown in the previous Fiscal Year (2009) that a PuO2 fueled pebble bed reactor concept is viable, achieving a high fuel burnup, while remaining within safety-imposed prescribed operational limits for fuel temperature, power peaking and temperature reactivity feedback coefficients for the entire temperature range, is challenging. The presence of the isotopes 239-Pu, 240-Pu and 241-Pu that have resonances in the thermal energy range significantly modifies the neutron thermal energy spectrum as compared to a ”standard,” UO2-fueled core. Therefore, the DB pebble bed core exhibits a relatively hard neutron energy spectrum. However, regions within the pebble bed that are near the graphite reflectors experience a locally softer spectrum. This can lead to power and temperature peaking in these regions. Furthermore, a shift of the thermal energy spectrum with increasing temperature can lead to increased absorption in the resonances of the fissile Pu isotopes. This can lead to a positive temperature reactivity coefficient for the graphite moderator under certain operating conditions. The effort of this task in FY 2010 has focused on the optimization of the core to maximize the pebble discharge burnup level, while retaining its inherent safety characteristics. Using generic pebble bed reactor cores, this task will perform physics calculations to evaluate the capabilities of the pebble bed reactor to perform utilization and destruction of LWR used-fuel transuranics. The task will use established benchmarked models, and will introduce modeling advancements appropriate to the nature of the fuel considered (high TRU content and high burn-up).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Spent fuel nondestructive assay integrated characterization from active neutron, passive neutron, and passive gamma

Spent nuclear fuel comprises a wide range of irradiated isotopic material compositions, and characterization through nondestructive measurements is beneficial in verifying declared parameters before the fuel is placed in storage, final disposal, and/or reprocessed. This paper discusses results from three nondestructive assay instruments, including passive gamma, passive neutron, and active neutron methods, that measured fifty spent fuel assemblies at the Clab interim storage facility in Sweden. Here, integrated analysis of the measurements from the three different instruments allowed parametric assessments of cooling time, burnup, neutron multiplication, fissile mass, initial enrichment, and decay heat of each individual fuel assembly. Passive gamma measurements were found to be the most beneficial in predicting cooling time, passive neutron for determining burnup, active neutron in estimating initial enrichment, and both passive and total neutron for multiplication correlations. Fissile mass was best estimated using any combination of any two of the instruments such that corrections for isotopic changes in the fuel could be accounted for with the first set of measurements and multiplication of the assembly in the second. In conclusion, the nondestructive assay technologies demonstrated through this effort enhance the characterization of spent nuclear fuel assemblies.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

The integration of process monitoring for safeguards.

The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Infrared emission in Seyfert 2 galaxies - Reprocessed radiation from a dusty torus?

New and existing data for a sample of nine Seyfert 2 galaxies with known 'ionization cones' are combined in order to test whether collimation results from shadowing of radiation from a small isotropic nuclear source by a thick dusty torus. The number of ionizing photons emitted by the compact nucleus is calculated from the emission-line ratios measured for gas within the cones. On the assumption that this compact nuclear source radiates isotropically, the optical-UV power incident on the torus, which is expected to be reradiated in the IR, is determined. It is found that the observed IRAS luminosities are consistent with the torus model in eight of the nine objects with sufficient data to perform the calculation. It is concluded that the data are generally consistent with collimation and reradiation by a dusty torus.

Storchi-Bergmann, Thaisa↗

RADIOACTIVE WASTE STREAMS FROM VARIOUS POTENTIAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE OPTIONS

Five fuel cycle options, about which little is known compared to more commonly known options, have been studied in the past year for the United States Department of Energy. These fuel cycle options, and their features relative to uranium-fueled light water reactor (LWR)-based fuel cycles, include: • Advanced once-through reactor concepts (Advanced Once-Through, or AOT) – intended for high uranium utilization and long reactor operating life, use depleted uranium in some cases, and avoid or minimize used fuel reprocessing • Fission-fusion hybrid (FFH) reactor concepts – potential variations are intended for high uranium or thorium utilization, produce fissile material for use in power generating reactors, or transmute transuranic (TRU) and some radioactive fission product (FP) isotopes • High temperature gas reactor (HTGR) concepts - intended for high uranium utilization, high reactor thermal efficiencies; they have unique fuel designs • Molten salt reactor (MSR) concepts – can breed fissile U-233 from Th fuel and avoid or minimize U fuel enrichment, use on-line reprocessing of the used fuel, produce lesser amounts of long-lived, highly radiotoxic TRU elements, and avoid fuel assembly fabrication • Thorium/U-233 fueled LWR (Th/U-233) concepts – can breed fissile U-233 from Th fuel and avoid or minimize U fuel enrichment, and produce lesser amounts of long-lived, highly radiotoxic TRU elements. These fuel cycle options could result in widely different types and amounts of used or spent fuels, spent reactor core materials, and waste streams from used fuel reprocessing, such as: • Highly radioactive, high-burnup used metal, oxide, or inert matrix U and/or Th fuels, clad in Zr, steel, or composite non-metal cladding or coatings • Spent radioactive-contaminated graphite, SiC, carbon-carbon-composite, metal, and Be reactor core materials • Li-Be-F salts containing U, TRU, Th, and fission products • Ranges of separated or un-separated activation products, fission products, and actinides. Waste forms now used or studied for used LWR fuels can be used for some of these waste streams – but some waste forms may need to be developed for unique waste streams.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Requirements and Conceptual Design of Off-gas Systems for the Reprocessing of Metallic Fuels

An assessment has been conducted to determine how key regulations regarding volatile radionuclide emissions to the atmosphere may apply to the off-gas streams associated with electrochemical reprocessing. The scope of this assessment was based upon a generic electrochemical reprocessing scheme with a throughput rate of 200 MTIHM/y applied to metallic fuel discharged from a sodium fast reactor (SFR), but the findings are able to be translated to other advanced nuclear scenarios as merited. Air dispersion modeling was performed using the EPA CAP-88 model and evaluated the uncontrolled decontamination factors (DFs) that would be required to achieve regulatory compliance with the dose-based limits set forth by EPA regulation 40 CFR 190.10(a). These DFs were compared to those required by fuel cycle–based limits set forth by EPA regulation 40 CFR 190.10(b). Two theoretical sites with disparate climatological conditions were selected for air dispersion modeling (Idaho and Tennessee). The radionuclides modeled included 3 H, 85 Kr, 129 I, and selected alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes (referred to here as 239 Pu-TRU <1y ). It was found that the fuel cycle-based limits in 40 CFR 190.10(b) are most restrictive for 85 Kr and 239 Pu-TRU <1y , with DFs of 3 and 6.1E+09, respectively. The dose-based limit as derived from 40 CFR 190.10(a) could require mitigation of tritium in some scenarios, with an estimated DF of about 3 for the reference scenarios. The fuel cycle-based limit for 129 I resulted in a DF of about 240 for the reference scenario. The need for iodine mitigation based on dose to the public depended upon the physical form of iodine as either particulate or vapor-phase species. Emission of iodine from the facility as a vapor necessitated DFs of about 2 but emission as a particulate would require DFs >6,000 to meet thyroid dose-based limits. Effects of physical form on needed iodine mitigation are significant, but the understanding of speciation of iodine both during electrochemical reprocessing and after release to the atmosphere is limited. The electrochemical processing unit operations were evaluated to identify potential release points for the volatile radionuclides and to assess the potential for retention of the radionuclides within the process (thus decreasing the need for mitigation). Mitigation strategies for 3 H, 85 Kr, 129 I, and 239 Pu-TRU <1y were identified. In all cases, there are reasonably achievable pathways to regulatory compliance, although in some cases additional R&D is merited to verify the chemical speciation of these isotopes and to develop and demonstrate potential treatment technologies for this application. Whether or not additional off-gas controls (beyond common operations such as HEPA filtration and oxygen and moisture control) are needed for any of these regulated or volatile radionuclides depends on the (a) type of facility (NRC-regulated or DOE), (b) used fuel process rate, (c) used fuel burnup and composition, (d) speciation and retention of volatile radionuclides in the process and in the cell gas cleanup system, (e) site-specific parameters such as location, meteorology, stack height, and site boundaries, and (f) levels of conservatism and safety factors used in assessing compliance to air emissions regulations. Performance of this assessment revealed several areas where information is lacking or additional research is required in order to better determine if or what kinds of off-gas control might be needed. First, and most significantly, the understanding of the chemical speciation and physical form and partitioning of iodine during electrochemical processing operations is lacking and prevents the ability to accurately assess the potential iodine mitigation requirements. Future research in this area should be multifaceted and include thermodynamic modeling of iodine speciation in different process steps, experiments to quantify the kinetics of vapor-phase and melt-phase transitions, bench-scale experiments to determine the potential chemical and physical form of iodine emissions from the electrorefining process, and verification of iodine behavior with experiments utilizing operational facilities. Similarly, an improved understanding of iodine behavior in the environment after release from the facility stack will be required to refine dose estimations, as particulate and vapor-phase emissions result in significantly different doses to the MEI.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dissolution of Used Nuclear Fuel using a TBP/n-paraffin Solvent

The complete recycle of used nuclear fuel (UNF) is desirable to recover the energy value from the remaining U and the higher actinides produced during fuel irradiation; however, the construction of a large-scale reprocessing facility is prohibitively expensive. A simplified flowsheet with a reduced equipment footprint is needed to improve the economic viability. To address this issue, we evaluated a hybrid process which combines the dissolution of UNF pretreated (oxidized) for tritium removal in a tributyl phosphate (TBP) solvent with the solvent extraction cycles required for recovery of the actinide and lanthanide elements. To demonstrate the feasibility of the hybrid process, we prepared actinide solid solutions containing selected fission product elements as surrogates for pretreated, irradiated light water reactor fuel. The distribution of the actinide and fission product elements was measured between the solvent and residual solids to determine dissolution efficiencies. Dissolution of the solid solutions in the TBP solvent was effective for the recovery of both the actinide and lanthanide elements. An increase in the TBP concentration and temperature improved the dissolution efficiencies for these elements. Two-stage dissolutions were successfully used to recover nearly all the actinides and most of the lanthanides from the solid solutions. Our data indicate that most of the fission products generated during fuel irradiation except for the lanthanides and Tc (based on data for Re) would remain in the undissolved solids. The Am/Cm, lanthanides, and other fission product are easily scrubbed from the solvent by contact with nitric acid generating a pure U/Np/Pu stream.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Coupling a Transient Solvent Extraction Module with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model

A past difficulty in safeguards design for reprocessing plants is that no code existed for analysis and evaluation of the design. A number of codes have been developed in the past, but many are dated, and no single code is able to cover all aspects of materials accountancy, process monitoring, and diversion scenario analysis. The purpose of this work was to integrate a transient solvent extraction simulation module developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the SSPM Separations and Safeguards Performance Model, developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The SSPM was designed for materials accountancy and process monitoring analyses, but previous versions of the code have included limited detail on the chemical processes, including chemical separations. The transient solvent extraction model is based on the ORNL SEPHIS code approach to consider solute build up in a bank of contactors in the PUREX process. Combined, these capabilities yield a much more robust transient separations and safeguards model for evaluating safeguards system design. This coupling and the initial results are presented. In addition, some observations toward further enhancement of separations and safeguards modeling based on this effort are provided, including: items to be addressed in integrating legacy codes, additional improvements needed for a fully functional solvent extraction module, and recommendations for future integration of other chemical process modules.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗