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Operation of an Energy Recovery Linac with an Internal Target

Because an Energy Recovery Linac (ERL) decelerates and dumps the beam after at most a few passes, beam degradation in the interaction region that is orders of magnitude larger than in a storage ring is tolerable in such a device. As a consequence, some new types of Nuclear Physics experiments can be carried out. In 2016, an experiment (the DarkLight experiment) was installed in the Jefferson Lab FEL Driver ERL to test out this idea. The ERL had previously been used for FEL applications where high peak current and a large growth in energy spread was present. For the internal target, the machine setup required very small energy spread, and had to deal with large transverse emittance growth in the target. Additionally, the addition of a strong solenoid in the transport complicated the details of energy recovery. This presentation will describe how these new machine physics challenges were addressed.

Benson, S. V.↗

Combined modeling and experiments to predict corrosion and embrittlement in dual-phase stainless steels within the MARMOT framework

Extending service of Light Water Reactors (LWRs) to beyond 60 years will demand high integrity of materials and components in the reactors. The accurate evaluation and prediction of materials performance under anticipated operating conditions are of particular importance for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants over their extended lifetime. Stainless steels are extensively used as structural alloys in light water reactor (LWR) systems because of their excellent combination of mechanical properties and corrosion resistance. Austenitic stainless steel welds and cast austenitic stainless steels (CASS) contain significant amounts of ferrite ~5-30% and are ubiquitous in LWR piping (elbows, pump casings, valves) and internal structural components. During their lifetime, these components are subjected to thermal aging at the temperature range of 288-327°C for pressurized water reactors (PWR). A phase transformation within the ferrite phase of these materials leads to embrittlement and degradation in corrosion resistance, which undermines the materials selection criteria.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Experiences with new neutralization technologies for remediation after ISL mining of uranium in Straz Pod Ralskem

A big affection of the rock environment and groundwaters occurred during the chemical mining of uranium in the years 1966 to 1996 in the neighbourhood of the town Straz pod Ralskem in the Czech Republic. It is necessary to clean the residual technological solutions (RTS) from the underground. The pH of the solutions in some places is still less than 2 and the concentration of sulphates reaches up to 65 g/l. The remedial activities consist of pumping of the RTS from the ground and reprocessing of the RTS in the surface technologies. The implementation of the new neutralization technologies NDS ML and NDS 10 help us with increasing of the efficiency of the remedial process. The NDS ML technology ('Mother liquor reprocessing station') started its operation in 2009 and it processes the concentrated technological solution from the evaporation station after the alum crystallization (mother liquor) with the concentration of total dissolved solids up to 250 g/l. The principle is the neutralization of the acid solutions with the aid of the lime milk. The suspension is then filtrated in the filter press, the filter cake is deposited in the tailings pond and the filtrate is injected back into the underground rock environment. The NDS 10 technology ('Neutralization and Decontamination Station NDS 10') started its operation in 2012 and it works on the same technological principle as the NDS ML station. The difference is that the NDS 10 station can process higher volume (4.4 m{sup 3}/min) of the RTS with lower concentration of total dissolved solids 20 - 25 g/l. This poster describes the experiences of the state enterprise DIAMO with putting of these two neutralization technologies into operation and with using of the lime milk neutralization in such a large scale. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

As-Run Physics Analysis for the UCSB-1 Experiment in the Advanced Test Reactor

The University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB) -1 experiment was irradiated in the A-10 position of the ATR. The experiment was irradiated during cycles 145A, 145B, 146A, and 146B. Capsule 6A was removed from the test train following Cycle 145A and replaced with Capsule 6B. This report documents the as-run physics analysis in support of Post-Irradiation Examination (PIE) of the test. This report documents the as-run fluence and displacements per atom (DPA) for each capsule of the experiment based on as-run operating history of the ATR. Average as-run heating rates for each capsule are also presented in this report to support the thermal analysis.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Evaluation of Oak Ridge National Laboratory Health Physics Research Reactor Operation Data for Critical Benchmark Creation [Abstract]

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR) was a research reactor designed and built at ORNL in 1961. The critical assembly was using a highly enriched uranium and molybdenum alloy as the fuel, and it could be operated in steady-state or burst modes. The reactor was used for about 25 years to produce a lot of publications related to dosimetry, radiobiology and radiation detectors testing before its decommissioning in 1987. In recent years, the idea of using legacy operation data from the to create a valuable critical accident alarm system shielding benchmark arose. Such a benchmark has been submitted to the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiment Project (ICSBEP) Technical Review Group for a potential inclusion in the 2022 version of the handbook. Another way to use the valuable data from the operation of the HPRR is to evaluate the feasibility of the creation of a subcritical or prompt supercritical benchmark for inclusion in the ICSBEP or the International Reactor Physics Experiments Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) handbooks. To initiate a burst, the HPRR had to be operated in a slightly subcritical state for a few minutes. Then, the insertion of the burst control rod would greatly increase the reactivity of the system and start the burst. No critical configuration of the HPRR critical assembly could be located. The only information available concerns stable subcritical and prompt supercritical states, found in a burst experiments’ logbook. In the recovered logbook pages, information about 8 different bursts is available. The information includes the rods positions before and during a burst, the recorded subcritical reactor period and reactivity, and the burst fission yield derived from the temperature elevation sulfur pellet irradiation analysis. By using the HPRR logbook information and the as-built drawings of the critical assembly, a highly detailed model of the HPRR was created with SCALE 6.2.4/KENO-VI. Eight KENO-VI models were created to replicate the sub-critical assembly configurations described in the eight bursts from the recovered logbook pages. KENO-VI calculates k eff and it can be linked to a reactivity value in cents by using the delayed neutron fraction B eff , also calculated by KENO-VI. KENO-VI can also be used to model the prompt super-critical configurations of the HPRR and to assess the similarity with the burst measurements by comparing the calculated k eff and the measured fission yields between each burst. Unfortunately, high uncertainty exist and the obtained discrepancies between experiments and calculation results are high, compromising the creation of a valuable critical benchmark from HPRR operation data. The reasons of the discrepancies and potential ways to solve them are explored.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

National Ignition Facility. Facility and Infrastructure Systems Maintenance Plan

Ensuring the reliability of the NIF, including its support systems, laser systems, target diagnostic systems, and utilities, is essential to the availability of the NIF in its support of NNSA missions. NIF is a key capability in the DOE Stockpile Stewardship Program and supports high energy physics experiments for nuclear weapons, energy, and astrophysics applications. High system reliability provides opportunities for shots and scientific discoveries with opportunities to enhance and upgrade capabilities. This Maintenance Plan (MP) identifies the policies and procedures used to perform and support asset management of the NIF Facility and Infrastructure Systems (FInS), NIF Lasers & Alignment (LASE), NIF Target Experimental Operations (TOPS), NIF Target Area Science and Engineering (TASE), and NIF&PS Control Systems (NCS). The FInS systems include the facility, HVAC, contamination control, beampath, and Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) as well as utilities which create the beampath environments, such as vacuum, argon, or clean dry air. The LASE systems are Programmatic systems which include laser diagnostics, alignment, power conditioning, pulsed power, and input laser systems. The TOPS and TASE systems are also Programmatic systems which include target and diagnostic delivery systems and positioners, many different insertable and fixed target diagnostics, and cryogenic and target gas fill systems. Finally, the NCS systems include both software and hardware for industrial and shot operation control systems. Policies governing administrative and operational practices related to maintenance of FInS, LASE, TOPS, TASE, and NCS systems are described in this plan. In addition, the plan provides processes and procedures for managing, tracking, and documenting the work. This document, the NIF Operations Management Plan, NIF-5020544 (Ref. 1), and NIF Shot Operations Plan, NIF-5018506 (Ref. 2), together satisfy the requirements of the Conduct of Operations. Duties, responsibilities, and reporting requirements of the various positions associated with FInS, LASE, and TOPS maintenance are detailed in this plan. The FInS systems include both Real Property systems with asset management requirements specified in DOE Order 430.1C (Ref. 3) and Programmatic systems. In addition, for FInS, there is a list of the System Level Maintenance Plans (SLMPs) in NIF-1007419198 (Ref. 4) which provide the system descriptions and maintenance plan and schedule. In addition, the list includes the Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) and Experience Centered Maintenance (ECM) evaluations that have been performed for applicable FInS systems as well as reliability criticality per Section 3.5. The -AM version of the NIF Maintenance Plan focuses on the reliability program for FInS, LASE, TOPS, TASE, and NCS within the context of the overall NIF Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) program and incorporates changes since the -AL version from August 2011 and has been updated to be fully consistent with the updates to Ref. 1. It also includes asset management considerations, updates to the Work Order (WO) process within the NIF Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS) which is EAM infor® System Maintenance and Reliability Tracking (SMaRT) (Ref. 5), and updates to metrics and key performance indicators (KPIs).

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 1, January-March 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 International Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety: NUCSAFE 88 by A. P. Malinauskas and J. G. Pruett; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 18 Chernobyl Today: State of Research by A. Yu. Gagarinskii; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 23 Problems Associated with Routine In-Plant Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Systems at U.S. Light-Water Reactors by Barry G. Wahlig, David M. Walker, Mahmoud R. Ghavi, and John M. Palms; DESIGN FEATURES: 34 Twentieth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning Conference by R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First, 46 Design Options for the Core Support Structure for Liquid-Metal-Cooled Reactor Plants by J. P. Burelbach, W. J. Kann, J. G. Saiveau, and R. W. Seidensticker; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 53 The Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident by L. V. Konstantinov and A. J. González; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 70 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 80 Fuel Performance Annual Report for 1986 by W. J. Bailey, 103 Safety Considerations Related to 12-Hour Shift Schedules by S. Gould, 105 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 108 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 130 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 140 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 145 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 153 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 69 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 79 International Seminar on Fission Product Transport Processes in Reactor Accidents, 129 Harvard School of Public Health Offers Short Courses, 152 MIT Offers Summer Short Courses on Reactor Safety and Nodal Analysis, 152 Seminar on Use of PCs in Probabilistic Safety Analysis, 157 The Authors, 160 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 29.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 1, January-March 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 International Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety: NUCSAFE 88 by A. P. Malinauskas and J. G. Pruett; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 18 Chernobyl Today: State of Research by A. Yu. Gagarinskii; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 23 Problems Associated with Routine In-Plant Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Systems at U.S. Light-Water Reactors by Barry G. Wahlig, David M. Walker, Mahmoud R. Ghavi, and John M. Palms; DESIGN FEATURES: 34 Twentieth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning Conference by R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First, 46 Design Options for the Core Support Structure for Liquid-Metal-Cooled Reactor Plants by J. P. Burelbach, W. J. Kann, J. G. Saiveau, and R. W. Seidensticker; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 53 The Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident by L. V. Konstantinov and A. J. González; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 70 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 80 Fuel Performance Annual Report for 1986 by W. J. Bailey, 103 Safety Considerations Related to 12-Hour Shift Schedules by S. Gould, 105 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 108 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 130 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 140 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 145 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 153 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 69 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 79 International Seminar on Fission Product Transport Processes in Reactor Accidents, 129 Harvard School of Public Health Offers Short Courses, 152 MIT Offers Summer Short Courses on Reactor Safety and Nodal Analysis, 152 Seminar on Use of PCs in Probabilistic Safety Analysis, 157 The Authors, 160 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 29.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Second Opinion is Worth the Cost - 12479

This paper, 'A Second Opinion is Worth the Cost', shows how a second opinion for a Department of Energy (DOE) Project helped prepare and pass a DOE Order 413.3A 'Program and Project Management for the acquisition of Capital Assets' Office of Engineering and Construction Management (OECM) required External Independent Review (EIR) in support of the approved baseline for Critical Decision (CD) 2. The DOE project personnel were informed that the project's Total Project Cost (TPC) was going to increase from $815 million to $1.1 billion due to unforeseen problems and unexplained reasons. The DOE Project Team determined that a second opinion was needed to review and validate the TPC. Project Time and Cost, Inc. (PT and C) was requested to evaluate the cost estimate, schedule, basis of estimate (BOE), and risk management plan of the Project and to give an independent assessment of the TPC that was presented to DOE. This paper will demonstrate how breaking down a project to the work breakdown structure (WBS) level allows a project to be analyzed for potential cost increases and/or decreases, thus providing a more accurate TPC. The review Team's cost analyses of Projects identified eight primary drivers resulting in cost increases. They included: - Overstatement of the effort required to develop drawings and specifications. - Cost allocation to 'Miscellaneous' without sufficient detail or documentation. - Cost for duplicated efforts. - Vendor estimates or quotations without sufficient detail. - The practice of using the highest price quoted then adding an additional 10% mark-up. - Application of Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) highest level quality requirements when not required. - Allocation of operational costs to the Project Costs instead of to the Operating Expenses (OPEX). OPEX costs come from a different funding source. - DOE had not approved the activities. By using a Team approach with professionals from cost, civil, mechanical, electrical, structural and nuclear disciplines and by performing a Line by Line, WBS element by WBS element review of the Projects' CD-2 baseline package helped the DOE Project Team experience success. The second opinion that PT and C provide by conducting a Pre-EIR review of the Project baseline package and the cost review of the TPC helped the DOE Team pass the CD-2 EIR and reduced the TPC. The Line-by-Line review of the DOE Project identified opportunities to reduce the TPC from $1.1 billion to $740.8 million, thus realizing a saving of approximately $359.2 million, or roughly 32% of the original TPC. This significant cost savings underscores the cost in obtaining the second opinion. This same Line by Line review can be applied to any DOE project in the Energy Management or Weapons complex. In the case of this DOE Project a second opinion was worth the cost. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Challenges of Repository Operation in an Existing Mine - 19339

A generally accepted principle related to long term management of radioactive waste/ spent fuel is the isolation in a geological repository. In Germany, the disposal operation of low-level waste (LLW) and intermediate-level waste (ILW) started in the Asse II mine in 1967 and in the former German Democratic Republic in the Morsleben repository in 1971. After the German reunification, the responsibility for the existing sites changed several times until the Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung (BGE) became new license holder for both sites in 2017. The BGE is responsible to carry out the operative tasks of searching for a high-level waste (HLW) repository, the planning and construction of the Konrad repository for the emplacement of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW), the operation of the Asse II mine including the retrieval of the emplaced waste, and the preparation for the closure of the Morsleben repository. Nevertheless, the challenges of repository operation in an existing mine have not changed in all these years, as the regulatory framework is mainly written for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and is difficult to adapt for a repository mine. In particular, conditions in a mine are substantially different from 'clean' above-ground nuclear installations. Dust due to mining activities, relatively high temperatures, and a corrosive atmosphere in a salt mine might be present. Therefore, the usability of the repository for several decades during the different operational phases, i.e. planning, construction, emplacement, and closure, can only be ensured by continuous maintenance. Furthermore, the atomic law is applicable for above-ground facilities and the mining law for mines of every description. The difficulty of geological repositories is to ensure that both laws are going to be applied above and below ground with no regulatory framework tailored especially for such sites. A special case is the Asse II mine where the mining law was applied from the very beginning, before the atomic law needed to be established later on and now requires the retrieval of the radioactive waste before decommissioning. In this presentation, similarities and differences in the legal framework of the repositories in the responsibility of BGE and some operational experiences throughout the years are described. This applies to the radiation protection regime, the excavation ratio, the host rock stability and the backfilling concepts of the mining areas. Further challenges arise from the demonstration of long term safety according to the state-of-the-art of science and technology for either existing repositories/ mines or those under construction or planned. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Experience by BAM in the Transport Package Safety Assessment of German Waste Containers - 18469

Transport and storage containers for low and mid-level radioactive waste are getting more and more of relevance due to the nuclear phase out decision in 2011. For higher activities Type B(U) approved waste containers will be needed for the shut down and dismantling phases of NPPs. It is expected that large quantities are required in the near future. German waste containers are generally approved for transport and interim storage and are also intended for the final disposal in the Konrad repository. BAM is involved in the authority licensing of transport package designs in Germany. In this context, BAM is responsible for the assessment of safe containment, mechanical, thermal and quality management issues. BAM also operates test facilities and performs drop as well as thermal tests during package licensing procedures. This paper summarizes our experience in the transport package design assessment of Type B(U) waste containers. A general overview of the approval process, the requirements and approaches BAM applies are described. Some examples are used to illustrate different aspects and technical issues we are addressing during the package assessment. In the first part of the paper the specific design aspects of German waste containers are described. Here, a general overview is given e.g. about closure systems, impact limiter designs, and the handling concepts. Furthermore, the wide range of radioactive content and their physical behavior including the impact on the packages assessment are described. The second part is focused on questions about the licensing and assessment process of German waste containers from the BAM authority point of view. The general approaches for the strategy of demonstration are outlined on the basis of the test conditions according to IAEA Regulations SSR-6. Furthermore, particular issues of the mechanical and thermal assessment with respect to the specific test conditions are discussed. For accident conditions of transport, aspects to be mentioned are e.g. the assessment of the lid bolts, the axial gap applied between content and lid, and the thermal behavior of the wood filled impact limiter after the fire test. However, issues of the assessment for routine and normal conditions of transport are addressed in this paper, too. The intention of this paper is introduce recent approval procedure experience in Germany, describing technical evaluation issues and so reduce rounds of questions during applications. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

High Burnup Transient Fission Gas Release Testing and Post-Test Examinations

The contribution of transient fission gas release (tFGR) to the burst behavior of high burnup fuel during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) for commercial light water reactors is a complex phenomenon that is not fully understood. During the temperature ramp associated with a LOCA, there is significant additional transient fission gas release in excess of the steady state fission gas release from normal operation. An addition to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Severe Accident Test Station (SATS) was created to explore the different conditions that impact transient fission gas release. Four tests on commercially irradiated zirconium clad uranium dioxide nuclear fuel were performed to support transient fission gas release study. These experiments and their post-test analyses are discussed. The first test on high burnup fuel revealed a LOCA relevant transient fission gas release of 5.3% for an unpressurised segment. Subsequent tests have measured transient fission gas release at different conditions that span from 4.8% to 14.4 % transient fission gas release.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Preconceptual Design of Irradiated Fuel Salt Management System

The National Reactor Innovation Center was established by the U.S. Department of Energy to accelerate the demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear reactors. To meet this mission, the National Reactor Innovation Center has developed the Laboratory for Operations and Testing in the U.S. (LOTUS) to support the first fast-spectrum molten salt reactor demonstration. The goal of this research is to understand the system requirements that may be applied to a molten salt reactor experiment in the LOTUS test bed and to perform systems analyses and preconceptual development of a storage container for the management of the irradiated molten salt fuel. This study proposes a set of irradiated fuel salt management processes for the molten salt reactor, from defueling to storage or disposal. For that, the historic Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory has served as a crucial source of data for a mock application. This paper proposes a potential geometry for storing irradiated fuel salt based on MSRE data and the Monte Carlo N-Particle radiation transport code. The geometry was analyzed for criticality safety under abnormal situations, such as water ingress and interaction between containers. Based on the determined configuration of the storage system, the decay heat produced from the irradiated fuel salts was calculated to provide a reasonable time scale of the dormancy period. Using the same geometry assumed above, the neutron and gamma dose rates from the irradiated fuel salt at the end of the dormancy period were estimated, which will be useful for understanding the handling and radiation protection requirements for handling the irradiated fuel salt. Lastly, a reactor in the LOTUS test bed could use chloride-based fuel as opposed to the fluoride-based fuel used in MSRE. Thus, a literature study provided data to understand the similarities and differences between the characteristics of fluoride- and chloride-based salts in terms of salt chemistry, material characteristics, postirradiation behavior, neutronics, thermal hydraulics, and heat removal. This study, together with the proposed irradiated fuel salt management processes, preliminary criticality calculations, decay heat, and dose rate estimates, provides a strong basis for future investigation into the management of irradiated fuel salts generated during molten salt reactor technology demonstrations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Modeling the Resilience of Nuclear Power Plant for Unexpected Reactor Trip

Resilience can be defined as the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust to its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions. Resilience engineering is a relatively new paradigm for safety management that focuses on how to cope with complexity under pressure or disturbance to achieve success. A resilient system combines inherent human abilities with engineered safety features and organizational features in a controlled and flexible manner both in expected and in unexpected situations. The concept of resilience has been suggested to complement conventional safety analyses. Conventional safety analysis methods such as PSA have several limitations: 1) they primarily focus on technical dimension, 2) the analysis are linear and sequential, 3) they are dominated by static models, 4) they do not take a systemic view into account, and 5) they focus primarily on why accidents happen and not how success is achieved. The concept of resilience provides a more integrated view for the safety analysis in safety-critical systems, e.g., nuclear power plants. The concept of resilience in the organization of NPPs has been highlighted since the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. An IAEA report addresses that a resilient organization is one that quickly realizes deviation from normal operations and has the ability to make even the toughest and least popular decisions and to manage the margins in which it can maneuver. While traditional strategy to safety in NPPs is to identify what could go or has gone wrong, the concept of resilience is focused on what the organization does well and what it does to maintain its successful operation and to capitalize on those processes in the event of an unexpected situation. This study attempts to model the resilience of NPP dynamically, based on the operating experiences in Korean NPPs. First, this study revised the characterization of NPP. Then, a survey on the literature was conducted to identify the influences between the elements in the model of resilience in NPPs. These works provide a qualitative model for the resilience in NPPs. Then, this study reviewed 168 licensee events reports submitted to the Korean regulatory body since 2004 and quantified the relation between the attributes in the model by performing a Pearson correlation analysis. Finally, a few simulations using the System Dynamics were conducted to discuss which factors are most influencing the resilience. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Establishing Maximal Core Excess Reactivity Envelope for TREAT Test Vehicle Insertion

The Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility is an air-cooled reactor composed of graphite-urania fuel encapsulated in zirconium alloy canisters and surrounded by ~2 ft (~61 cm) of nuclear grade graphite. The primary role of TREAT is to provide in-pile nuclear-heated safety research via transient testing [1]. The following work represents further analyses building upon previously reported work to support larger volume test vehicles within TREAT [2]. The Broad Use Specimen Transient Experiment Rig (BUSTER) provides ample versatility for numerous transient test concepts. However, future testing and experiment needs will require testing environments of different in-core footprints. The versatility of TREAT allows for the development of variegated core layouts with key limitations emplaced as operational safety temperature restrictions and available core reactivity. The focus of this current effort is to gauge core arrangements for TREAT core loadings to support centralized experimental testing of varying dimensional capacity. The total core excess reactivity (ER) was computed for different arrangements to establish comparison tables that enable ready assessment of core ER available for future experiment concepts. Test vehicle worths would then be necessary to establish available ER to support transient testing requirements and to perform reactor performance and safety calculations [3,4].

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Improved computational neutronics methods and validation protocols for the advanced test reactor

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is in the process of updating the various reactor physics modeling and simulation tools used to support operation and safety assurance of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). Key accomplishments so far have encompassed both computational as well as experimental work. A new suite of stochastic and deterministic transport theory based reactor physics codes and their supporting nuclear data libraries (HELIOS, KENO6/SCALE, NEWT/SCALE, ATTILA, and an extended implementation of MCNP5) has been installed at the INL. Corresponding models of the ATR and ATRC are now operational with all five codes, demonstrating the basic feasibility of the new code packages for their intended purposes. On the experimental side of the project, new hardware was fabricated, measurement protocols were finalized, and the first four of six planned physics code validation experiments based on neutron activation spectrometry have been conducted at the ATRC facility. Data analysis for the first three experiments, focused on characterization of the neutron spectrum in one of the ATR flux traps, has been completed. The six experiments will ultimately form the basis for flexible and repeatable ATR physics code validation protocols that are consistent with applicable national standards. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗