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At least 1,135 records · Page 63

Modeling Electric Vehicle Benefits Connected to Smart Grids

Connecting electric storage technologies to smartgrids will have substantial implications in building energy systems. Local storage will enable demand response. Mobile storage devices in electric vehicles (EVs) are in direct competition with conventional stationary sources at the building. EVs will change the financial as well as environmental attractiveness of on-site generation (e.g. PV, or fuel cells). In order to examine the impact of EVs on building energy costs and CO2 emissions in 2020, a distributed-energy-resources adoption problem is formulated as a mixed-integer linear program with minimization of annual building energy costs or CO2 emissions. The mixed-integer linear program is applied to a set of 139 different commercial buildings in California and example results as well as the aggregated economic and environmental benefits are reported. The research shows that considering second life of EV batteries might be very beneficial for commercial buildings.

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Evaluation of Neutron Absorber Panels from Zion Spent Fuel Pool

In spent fuel pools (SFPs), fixed neutron absorber materials are used to increase storage capacity while maintaining criticality safety margins. BORAL{sup R} is a commonly used neutron absorber material for both wet (SFPs) and dry storage (casks). The specific questions surrounding fixed neutron absorber materials include the following: 1. What are the conditions of the neutron absorber panels in SFPs? Is there any gross degradation that could cause potential concern for criticality safety of the pools? 2. Is the coupon monitoring approach adequate for monitoring the conditions of the panels as part of an aging management program? 3. For plants that do not have coupons, do current in situ measurement approaches provide accurate results? Could such in situ approaches be used as an alternative monitoring approach? In order to shed light on these technical questions using actual plant data, EPRI initiated the Zion comparative analysis project at the decommissioning Zion Nuclear Power Plant in late 2014. An overview of the Zion plant, SFP, and project was described in a previous publication. (authors)

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Summary of Consolidated Interim Storage Advantages and Disadvantages from an Integrated Systems Perspective from Prior Reports and Studies

The question of whether centralized storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. Centralized storage facilities were included as a potential component of the U.S. spent fuel management system in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), but these facilities were not identified as being essential. When the NWPA was passed, it was expected that a permanent repository would be available around the turn of the century to meet the commitments that were made to start accepting waste by that time. For a number of reasons, a permanent repository was not available at that stage. This report summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of including an ISF as part of an integrated waste management system that have been identified in numerous analyses of the impacts of a consolidated interim storage facility (ISF), previously discussed as monitored retrievable storage, the form of ISF authorized in the NWPA) by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and independent groups. Storing SNF before disposal is a functional requirement for an integrated waste management system. As described below, the studies reviewed in this report have identified a range of benefits that could be obtained by adding a consolidated ISF to the waste management system, including (1) earlier acceptance of fuel by the federal government, (2) reduction in the number of unintended long-term storage sites, (3) added system flexibility and opportunity for better integration, and (4) near-term development and demonstration of institutional and technical infrastructures for large-scale management of SNF. At the same time, these studies have identified potential drawbacks to deployment of an ISF, including (1) potential adverse impacts on development of a repository, (2) additional transportation of SNF, and (3) a large upfront economic investment to establish the consolidated storage capability. In general, the studies that have considered the positive and negative impacts of consolidated storage most comprehensively have concluded that in light of these considerations, the benefits of including an ISF as part of an integrated waste management system can outweigh any real or perceived disadvantages.

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A Practical Solution to Used Nuclear Fuel Treatment to Enable Sustained Nuclear Energy and Recovery of Vital Materials

A systems analysis, based on previous in-depth studies, was made to develop an advanced used fuel recycling approach in which over 90% of the fuel components and cladding material are recovered and reused. This can minimize the waste requiring disposition to a geologic repository while enabling sustained nuclear energy and recovery of vital materials. The analysis assumed that: (1) continuing delays will occur in locating a site and licensing a geologic repository in the United States; (2) continued storage of used fuel at reactor sites or central storage locations is not a permanent solution; and (3) public perception is that the unresolved used fuel disposal problem is a deterrent to the continuation and expansion of the use of nuclear energy. The practical solution recommended is to move forward with a parallel approach to (1) deployment of industrialized recycling of used fuels which is a multi-decade process, and (2) focused R&D to recover the re-usable components and minimize residual waste. This approach would use concepts for proliferation resistant recycle facilities, processing oldest fuels first, and incorporating more-complete recycling of used fuel components. In addition to uranium and transuranic actinide recycle, the R&D would be focused on recovery and re-use of valuable components such as noble metals, lighter lanthanide elements, xenon gas, and zirconium from cladding. While the eventual need for a geologic repository will remain, the methods recommended can delay the need, minimize the capacity required, and significantly reduce the hazard of the wastes disposed. With no decision, the path forward for nuclear waste (used fuels) disposal remains uncertain, with many diverse technologies being considered. However, a decision to take advantage of proliferation resistant facility design, processing aged fuels, and incorporation of the concepts of nearcomplete recycling will provide the focus and path forward to a practical solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal.

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Consolidated Interim Storage Advantages and Disadvantages from Prior Reports and Studies

The question of whether centralized storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. Since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) [1] was enacted, the need for interim storage facilities (ISFs) as part of the federal waste management system has been analyzed and documented in numerous reports and studies. This presentation summarizes the advantages and disadvantages, as described in those reports, of incorporating an ISF into the waste management system.

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A Structural Integrity Evaluation of the Tank Farm Waste Transfer System

Radioactive supernate, salt, and/or sludge wastes (i.e., high level wastes) are confined in 45 underground storage tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The waste is transported between tanks within and between the F and H area tank farms and other facilities on site via underground and a limited number of aboveground transfer lines. The Department of Energy - Savannah River Operations Office (DOE-SR) performed a comprehensive assessment of the structural integrity program for the Tank Farm waste transfer system at the SRS. This document addresses the following issues raised during the DOE assessment

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Preparation of Waste Fingerprints for the Miscellaneous Beta Gamma Waste Feeds to the Box Encapsulation Plant at Sellafield - 16080

There are a number of legacy pond and silo storage facilities on Sellafield Site that contain a broad range of ILW arising from the early Windscale Pile and Magnox Fuel Reprocessing Programmes. The waste comprises of solid Miscellaneous Beta Gamma Waste (MBGW) from operations (including filters, containerised waste, thermocouple wire, support struts, pumps, soft wastes) and associated sludges that have arisen from the corrosion of the fuel, Magnox Swarf cladding and the MBGW. It is intended to retrieve and package this waste to meet the requirements of interim storage and final disposal in the Box Encapsulation Plant (BEP) at Sellafield. As part of this process each package must be assigned a realistic and justifiable radionuclide and material inventory. These inventories can either be assigned by radiometric measurements including the associated errors or developed by fundamental data underpinning these assessments and a 'chain of custody' approach of knowing where the waste has been and how it has evolved. The subject of this paper is concerned with the development of the waste fingerprints for these legacy waste streams. As the wastes have arisen over a ∼70 year period there have been an assortment of different working practices and developments in equipment design that have led to significant variations in the waste condition and its composition. During storage the waste items have become mixed, corroded and sludge deposits have arisen. Because of this, and that early consignment records are either incomplete or missing, the task of assigning material and radionuclide fingerprints has been very challenging. In addition, to comply with regulatory requirements the inventory assignment has to be sufficiently robust to meet the processing envelope of the encapsulation process i.e. to allow controls to be made on the amounts of reactive materials (e.g. aluminium, Magnox and uranium) that can be processed within each product and allow identification of excluded items from being consigned from the donor plants. Also, as the waste comprises actinides, fission and activation products it was noted that whilst the UK standard inventory code FISPIN10 predicts the actinides and fission products well, there was a significant discrepancy in the prediction of activation products when compared with those predicted by the specialised fusion code FISPACT. It should be noted that the use of FISPACT to predict actinides and fission products is not recommended. To address these issues, - position statements were produced for each of the waste streams that would be consigned to BEP; - gaps within the data were assessed and where possible inactive trial work was identified to address it; - material and radionuclide fingerprint justification documents were developed from the position statements based upon available data, the experimental work and justified assumptions; - where FISPIN runs were required, these were run with a modified activation data library based on the European Activation File 2010 (EAF2010) to model the activation products. This paper summarises the BEP process, discusses examples of how the material and radionuclide waste stream fingerprints have been justified by revisiting the sample data, original consignment records, engineering drawings and recent remotely operated vehicle (ROV) pond surveys and making reasoned assumptions based on operational practices and non-active experimental work. Incorporation of the EAF2010 library within the FISPIN code has offered significant benefits to BEP and indeed other plants processing mixed fission and activated wastes as it allows comparable predictions of activation products compared with that made by FISPACT and for the plant to maintain one data processing stream rather than two if it had to utilise both modelling codes. This work will underpin the inventory submission in support of the Interim Letter of Compliance (ILoC) to Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM). The process of examining the original records, plant operation schedules and engineering drawings has enabled removal of some of the pessimisms that have been made in previous assessments. (authors)

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SLUDGE BATCH 7 PREPARATION TANK 4 AND 12 CHARACTERIZATION

Samples of PUREX sludge from Tank 4 and HM sludge from Tank 12 were characterized in preparation for Sludge Batch 7 (SB7) formulation in Tank 51. SRNL analyses on Tank 4 and Tank 12 were requested in separate Technical Assistance Requests (TAR). The Tank 4 samples were pulled on January 19, 2010 following slurry operations by F-Tank Farm. The Tank 12 samples were pulled on February 9, 2010 following slurry operations by H-Tank Farm. At the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), two 200 mL dip samples of Tank 4 and two 200 mL dip samples of Tank 12 were received in the SRNL Shielded Cells. Each tank's samples were composited into clean 500 mL polyethylene storage bottles and weighed. The composited Tank 4 sample was 428.27 g and the composited Tank 12 sample was 502.15 g. As expected there are distinct compositional differences between Tank 4 and Tank 12 sludges. The Tank 12 slurry is much higher in Al, Hg, Mn, and Th, and much lower in Fe, Ni, S, and U than the Tank 4 slurry. The Tank 4 sludge definitely makes the more significant contribution of S to any sludge batch blend. This S, like that observed during SB6 washing, is best monitored by looking at the total S measured by digesting the sample and analyzing by inductively coupled plasma - atomic emission spectroscopy (ICPAES). Alternatively, one can measure the soluble S by ICP-AES and adjust the value upward by approximately 15% to have a pretty good estimate of the total S in the slurry. Soluble sulfate measurements by ion chromatography (IC) will be biased considerably lower than the actual total S, the difference being due to the non-sulfate soluble S and the undissolved S. Tank 12 sludge is enriched in U-235, and hence samples transferred into SRNL from the Tank Farm will need to be placed on the reportable special nuclear material inventory and tracked for total U per SRNL procedure requirements.

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The Disposal Systems Evaluation Framework for DOE-NE

The Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) Campaign within DOE-NE is evaluating storage and disposal options for a range of waste forms and a range of geologic environments. For each waste form and geologic environment combination, there are multiple options for repository conceptual design. The Disposal Systems Evaluation Framework (DSEF) is being developed to formalize the development and documentation of options for each waste form and environment combination. The DSEF is being implemented in two parts. One part is an Excel workbook with multiple sheets. This workbook is designed to be user friendly, such that anyone within the UFD Campaign can use it as a guide to develop and document repository conceptual designs that respect thermal, geometric, and other constraints. The other part is an Access relational database file that will be centrally maintained to document the ensemble of conceptual designs developed with individual implementations of the Excel workbook. The DSEF Excel workbook includes sheets for waste form, environment, geometric constraints, engineered barrier system (EBS) design, thermal, performance assessment (PA), materials, cost, and fuel cycle system impacts. Each of these sheets guides the user through the process of developing internally consistent design options, and documenting the thought process. The sheets interact with each other to transfer information and identify inconsistencies to the user. In some cases, the sheets are stand-alone, and in other cases (such as PA), the sheets refer the user to another tool, with the user being responsible to transfer summary results into the DSEF sheet. Finally, the DSEF includes three top-level sheets: inputs & results, interface parameters, and knowledge management (references). These sheets enable users and reviewers to see the overall picture on only a few summary sheets, while developing the design option systematically using the detailed sheets. The DSEF Access relational database file collects the key inputs, results, and interface parameters from each Excel workbook implementation. The power of a relational database is available to sort and organize groups of designs, and to answer queries about what evaluations have been done in the UFD Campaign.

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RCRA Part A Permit Application for Waste Management Activities at the Nevada Test Site, Part B Permit Application Hazardous Waste Storage Unit, Nevada Test Site, and Part B Permit Application - Explosives Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU)

The Area 5 Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU) was established to support testing, research, and remediation activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), a large-quantity generator of hazardous waste. The HWSU, located adjacent to the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS), is a prefabricated, rigid steel-framed, roofed shelter used to store hazardous nonradioactive waste generated on the NTS. No offsite generated wastes are managed at the HWSU. Waste managed at the HWSU includes the following categories: Flammables/Combustibles; Acid Corrosives; Alkali Corrosives; Oxidizers/Reactives; Toxics/Poisons; and Other Regulated Materials (ORMs). A list of the regulated waste codes accepted for storage at the HWSU is provided in Section B.2. Hazardous wastes stored at the HWSU are stored in U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) compliant containers, compatible with the stored waste. Waste transfer (between containers) is not allowed at the HWSU and containers remain closed at all times. Containers are stored on secondary containment pallets and the unit is inspected monthly. Table 1 provides the metric conversion factors used in this application. Table 2 provides a list of existing permits. Table 3 lists operational Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units at the NTS and their respective regulatory status.

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SRS Tank Structural Integrity Program

The mission of the Structural Integrity Program is to ensure continued safe management and operation of the waste tanks for whatever period of time these tanks are required. Matthew Maryak provides an overview of the Structural Integrity Program to open Session 5 (Waste Storage and Tank Inspection) of the 2010 EM Waste Processing Technical Exchange.

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RCRA Part B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU)

This volume of the permit application by the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) focuses on the Area 5 Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU). The HWSU was established to support testing, research, and remediation activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), a large-quantity generator of hazardous waste. The HWSU, located adjacent to the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), is a prefabricated, rigid steel-framed, roofed shelter used to store hazardous nonradioactive waste generated on the NNSS. No offsite-generated wastes are managed at the HWSU. Waste managed at the HWSU includes the following: Flammables/Combustibles, Acid Corrosives, Alkali Corrosives, Oxidizers/Reactives, Toxics/Poisons, and Other Regulated Materials (ORMs). A list of regulated waste codes accepted for storage at the HWSU is provided in this volume. Hazardous wastes are stored at the HWSU in containers that are compliant with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations and compatible with the stored waste. Waste packages (e.g., drums) without inner closed containers of waste remain closed except during inspection or sampling. Transfer of uncontainerized waste between waste packages at the HWSU is prohibited. Closed inner containers may be transferred or consolidated into larger waste packages, and small closed containers may be placed into larger containers. Containers are stored on secondary containment pallets, and the unit is inspected monthly. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

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Modeling the Drying of a Mock Used Fuel Assembly with COBRA-SFS Cycle-4 - 18597

The processing and storage of nuclear fuel is an ever increasingly pressing issue. Around 70,000 tons of used fuel are currently in either dry or wet storage on site at nuclear power plants or at specified spent fuel storage facilities. Additionally, about 2,000 tons are added to that sum each year. To promote retrievability, limit degradation in the canister, and reduce potential for hydrogen generation, spent fuel that is initially in wet storage must be dried before moving to dry cask storage. Therefore, this research seeks to use a mock used fuel storage cask to replicate the conditions in the industry during the drying process of fuel being moved from storage pools. To simulate this, a mock storage cask has been constructed to closely resemble those used in industry such that any areas that tend to retain water are replicated effectively. It is able to hold one mock used fuel assembly. The assembly used is an AREVA 10A 10 x 10 assembly with 78 rods filled with depleted uranium, 12 heater rods to simulate decay heat, a 3 x 3 BWR water channel, and one interchangeable rod position for tests such as a simulated failed fuel rod, BWR water rod, and PWR guide tube tests. The industry standard procedure is used in drying the assembly which involves stepping the system pressure down and holding for certain periods until reaching 3 torr and holding for 30 minutes. This is believed to sufficiently dry the assembly. The goal is to record data throughout these tests that can provide the industry with a greater understanding of how well the process works. This data will also be used to develop and validate a computer model of the drying process. Mechanistic models are currently under development. Reduced order models are being investigated for incorporation into current related engineering codes such as COBRA-SFS. COBRA-SFS is a member of the COBRA family of codes which is mainly used in the evaluation of thermal hydraulic systems containing spent nuclear fuel. However, it does not currently have the capability to account for processes such as evaporation encountered during drying operations. Therefore, those physical models are to be added to the source code. At present a model of the experiment has been created using the COBRA-SFS Cycle-4 code. A number of steady state models along with transient models have been developed and presented. Each of these yield valuable results for comparison with the experiments conducted. In addition to comparison with experimental results, the data collected from COBRA-SFS is compared with that which has been generated from other computer models which utilize computational fluid dynamics. (authors)

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Annual Waste Minimization Summary Report, Calendar Year 2010, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Identification No. NV3890090001

This report summarizes the waste minimization efforts undertaken by National Security TechnoIogies, LLC, for the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), during calendar year 2010. The NNSA/NSO Pollution Prevention Program establishes a process to reduce the volume and toxicity of waste generated by NNSA/NSO activities and ensures that proposed methods of treatment, storage, and/or disposal of waste minimize potential threats to human health and the environment.

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Supplemental Environmental Baseline Survey for Proposed Land Use Permit Modification for Expansion of the Dynamic Explosive Test Site (DETS) 9940 Main Complex Parking Lot

The “subject property” is comprised of a parcel of land within the Kirtland Military Reservation, Bernalillo County, New Mexico, as shown on the map in Appendix B of this document. The land requirement for the parking lot addition to the 9940 Main Complex is approximately 2.7 acres. The scope of this Supplemental Environmental Baseline Survey (SEBS) is for the parking lot addition land transfer only. For details on the original 9940 Main Complex see Environmental Baseline Survey, Land Use Permit Request for the 9940 Complex PERM/0-KI-00-0001, August 21, 2003, and for details on the 9940 Complex Expansion see Environmental Baseline Survey, Proposed Land Use Permit Expansion for 9940 DETS Complex, June 24, 2009. The 2.7-acre parcel of land for the new parking lot, which is the subject of this EBS (also referred to as the “subject property”), is adjacent to the southwest boundary of the original 12.3- acre 9940 Main Complex. No testing is known to have taken place on the subject property site. The only activity known to have taken place was the burial of overhead utility lines in 2014. Adjacent to the subject property, the 9940 Main Complex was originally a 12.3-acre site used by the Department of Energy (DOE) under a land use permit from the United States Air Force (USAF). Historical use of the site, dating from 1964, included arming, fusing, and firing of explosives and testing of explosives systems components. In the late 1970s and early 1980s experiments at the 9940 Main Complex shifted toward reactor safety issues. From 1983 to 1988, fuel coolant interaction (FCI) experiments were conducted, as were experiments with conventional high explosives (HE). Today, the land is used for training of the Nuclear Emergency Response community and for research on energetic materials. In 2009, the original complex was expanded to include four additional 20-acre areas: 9940 Training South, 9940 Training East, T-Range 6, and Training West Landing Zone. The proposed use of the subject property is for the purpose of adding a parking lot to serve the increase in customer vehicles that is occurring as the 9940 Main Complex is more heavily utilized, and as the 2009 Expansion areas come online as operational training facilities. The subject property would be used only for parking, not for testing or training activities. The parking lot would have a gravel surface. Current and future work at the 9940 Main Complex involves arming, fuzing, and firing of explosives and the testing of explosive systems components in both terrestrial and aquatic settings. It also involves specialized training activities for a variety of first responder customers, both DOE and non-DOE agencies. The approach was to perform a document search, supplemented by a visual site inspection, to identify potential environmental contamination associated with the property. Factors evaluated included hazardous substances; petroleum products and derivatives; environmental restoration sites; areas of concern; storage tanks; oil/water separators; grease traps; wash racks; waste tanks; pesticides; military munitions/ordnance; medical or bio-hazardous waste; radioactive waste; solid/municipal waste; indoor air quality; groundwater; wastewater treatment, collection, and disposal/discharge; drinking water quality; utilities; asbestos; polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); radon; lead-based paint; cultural resources; floodplains; and natural/biological resources. Each of these factors is evaluated separately in Section 5, Findings for Subject Property. The property categorization for this subject property would be considered Category 1- “An area or real property where no storage, release, or disposal of hazardous substances or petroleum products or their derivatives has occurred into the environment or structures or disposed on the subject property (including no migration of these substances from adjacent properties).” There appears to be sufficient information to categorize the subject property and it appears that no further effort needs to be made to obtain additional information. There are no findings of an adverse nature on the subject property itself or from adjacent properties. It is recommended that the proposed transfer of the subject property from the USAF to DOE proceed.

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Radiometric characterization process for locating radioactivity hold-up and measuring non-uniformly distributed sources - 15342

A novel approach to facility radiometric characterization for non-uniformly distributed radiation sources has been developed by ANTECH and is currently being employed at the Argonne National Laboratory. It is being applied to the measurement of a wide range of objects and the interiors and contents of laboratories and buildings. The integrated non destructive assay measurement process involves the use of a scanning spectroscopic gamma ray camera as well as high purity Germanium detectors with different collimators and hence differing detector fields of view to measure and quantify non-uniformly distributed sources of radioactivity in laboratory equipment, glove boxes, storage tanks, pipework and general laboratory objects and process components. The purpose of the radiometric characterization is to quantify radiation sources and radioactive contamination levels in facilities containing nuclear material and to ensure compliance with facility characterization requirements and for decontamination and decommissioning planning and execution. The integrated measurement process also involves automated data capture and processing software and a database with which both measurement instrument operators and subject matter expert analysts can interact. An appropriate measuring instrument (gamma camera, scintillation detector, high purity Germanium detector system, neutron detector or alpha-beta counter) records the measurement data and the measurement site is recorded in a photograph. All of the data relevant to the measurement (or set of measurements for a particular object) are recorded in the database including measured gamma ray spectra, equipment description and relevant calibration, measurement site photograph and measurement descriptive data. Once data analysis protocols are established for specific geometries and measurement situations they can be applied to the measured data in a partially automated manner, reducing analysis and transcription errors. In addition to measurements and data analysis the process also utilises radiometric modelling computer codes including MicroShield and Monte Carlo Neutrons Photons in order to perform model calculations where appropriate. In a typical measurement, the ANTECH RadSearch spectroscopic gamma camera is utilized to find areas of concentrated activity so that these areas can be measured and calculated separately from areas with diffuse contamination. The use of the gamma camera in scanning mode helps to ensure that the assay does not overestimate the detected radiation source, which is a frequent consequence of using standard far field geometry and attenuation analysis codes that assume uniformity of both density and radioactive source distribution. Once the hot spots are identified, high purity Germanium detector measurements are made using various collimators with wide or narrow fields of view as required. These measurements are then processed through a semi-automatic calculation process assuming an appropriate source configuration as identified by RadSearch. These source configurations include point sources, line sources or surface sources. The Generalized Geometry Hold-up algorithms are employed to determine an estimate of the activity of the various sources that are identified in a measurement. The ANTECH integrated measurement process provides an automated calculation procedure where the analyst can select the source type, geometry and appropriate input data, and then the software calculates the activity by radionuclide for all sources identified in the measurement. The measurement and analysis process is controlled under the ANTECH ISO9001: 2008 Quality Assurance System and managed by a site specific Quality Assurance Plan. Both Argonne National Laboratory and Department of Energy technical reviewers have vetted the Integrated Measurement and Analysis Process. The application of the measurement and analysis process is described and measurement examples are provided. (authors)

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The Off-Site Source Recovery Program Capabilities in Recovering Transuranic Sealed Sources - 17599

Over the past 16 years, the mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) has been recovering disused radioactive sealed sources in the interest of national security, public health and safety. This program, which is sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Material Security's Office of Radiological Security, is managed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory and has recovered sources worldwide. To date, OSRP has recovered more than 38,000 sources from over 1,300 locations worldwide. Since its inception, OSRP has grown from recovering only sealed sources containing one transuranic (TRU) isotope, Pu-239, in the early days of the program, to recovering sealed sources containing several other TRU and non-TRU isotopes. Primarily, OSRP's mission includes Pu-238, Pu-239, Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Sr-90, Cs-137, Co-60, Ir-192 and Ra-226 sources that are US-origin, defense related and not commercially disposable. Over the lifetime of this program the types of recoveries performed have expanded from a single site to multi-site round-up recoveries. An additional approach, referred to as self-ship recoveries, is also used in cases where only a few sources may be present at a licensee's site. In these situations, the licensee ships their source(s) to an OSRP staging facility for ultimate consolidation and disposal. OSRP recovers sources from many types of licensees, with the majority of sources being removed from industry, universities and hospitals. These include sealed sources used in industrial radiological devices like moisture-density gauges and thickness gauges, medical devices such as blood irradiators and radiotherapy devices and sealed sources from nuclear power plants, among others. The recovery and management of sealed sources is a complex process covering multidisciplinary areas, including source construction, characteristics of the radioactive material, source packaging and transportation per DOT regulations, safe and secure storage, and final disposition per waste acceptance criteria of repository sites. (authors)

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