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At least 1,135 records · Page 63

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

A Mathematical Framework for the Analysis of Cyber-Resilient Control Systems

The increasingly recognized vulnerability of industrial control systems to cyber-attacks has inspired a considerable amount of research into techniques for cyber-resilient control systems. The majority of this effort involves the application of well known information security (IT) techniques to control system networks. While these efforts are important to protect the control systems that operate critical infrastructure, they are never perfectly effective. Little research has focused on the design of closed-loop dynamics that are resilient to cyber-attack. The majority of control system protection measures are concerned with how to prevent unauthorized access and protect data integrity. We believe that the ability to analyze how an attacker can effect the closed loop dynamics of a control system configuration once they have access is just as important to the overall security of a control system. To begin to analyze this problem, consistent mathematical definitions of concepts within resilient control need to be established so that a mathematical analysis of the vulnerabilities and resiliencies of a particular control system design methodology and configuration can be made. In this paper, we propose rigorous definitions for state awareness, operational normalcy, and resiliency as they relate to control systems. We will also discuss some mathematical consequences that arise from the proposed definitions. The goal is to begin to develop a mathematical framework and testable conditions for resiliency that can be used to build a sound theoretical foundation for resilient control research.

Control Theory↗

Virtualizing Industrial Control Networks for Cyber Resilience Experiments

Industrial control systems (ICS) networks are undergoing constant shifts to accommodate new security measures. It is challenging to test varying network configurations and security tools with physical systems as they typically include large, expensive equipment. Not only this, but researchers often do not have access to this type of equipment for development of new security tools and techniques. As a solution to these issues, this work presents a set of tools for utilizing GNS3 and Docker as a virtual ICS network. Additionally, the virtual network can be attached to physical devices including network switches, hardware simulations, and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). Two case studies showcase a relatively complex automatically generated network and an attack on a simple ICS network with an example mitigation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

L-Band System Engineering - Concepts of Use, Systems Performance Requirements, and Architecture

This document is being provided as part of ITT s NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: New ATM Requirements-Future Communications, C-band and L-band Communications Standard Development. Task 7 was motivated by the five year technology assessment performed for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the joint FAA-EUROCONTROL cooperative research Action Plan (AP-17), also known as the Future Communications Study (FCS). It was based on direction provided by the FAA project-level agreement (PLA FY09_G1M.02-02v1) for "New ATM Requirements-Future Communications." Task 7 was separated into two distinct subtasks, each aligned with specific work elements and deliverable items. Subtask 7-1 addressed C-band airport surface data communications standards development, systems engineering, test bed development, and tests/demonstrations to establish operational capability for what is now referred to as the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS). Subtask 7-2, which is the subject of this report, focused on preliminary systems engineering and support of joint FAA/EUROCONTROL development and evaluation of a future L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) air/ground (A/G) communication system known as the L-band digital aeronautical communications system (L-DACS), which was defined during the FCS. The proposed L-DACS will be capable of providing ATM services in continental airspace in the 2020+ timeframe. Subtask 7-2 was performed in two phases. Phase I featured development of Concepts of Use, high level functional analyses, performance of initial L-band system safety and security risk assessments, and development of high level requirements and architectures. It also included the aforementioned support of joint L-DACS development and evaluation, including inputs to L-DACS design specifications. Phase II provided a refinement of the systems engineering activities performed during Phase I, along with continued joint FAA/EUROCONTROL L-DACS development and evaluation support.

Henriksen, Stephen↗

Security Policies for Mitigating the Risk of Load Altering Attacks on Smart Grid Systems

While demand response programs implement energy efficiency and power quality objectives, they bring potential security threats to the Smart Grid. The ability to influence load in a system enables attackers to cause system failures and impacts the quality and integrity of power delivered to customers. This paper presents a security mechanism to monitor and control load according to a set of security policies during normal system operation. The mechanism monitors, detects, and responds to load altering attacks. We examined the security requirements of Smart Grid stakeholders and constructed a set of load control policies enforced by the mechanism. We implemented a proof of concept prototype and tested it using the simulation environment. By enforcing the proposed policies in this prototype, the system is maintained in a safe state in the presence of load drop attacks.

Ryutov, Tatyana↗

Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) Principles Slide Presentation [Slides]

This document describes the concept and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), a methodology that integrates cyber threat awareness into all stages of the systems engineering life cycle. It delineates how CIE enhances the security posture of critical infrastructure systems, which are increasingly targeted by sophisticated cyber threats. The exposition proceeds to methodically walk through the twelve foundational principles of CIE, each serving as a strategic guidepost for embedding cybersecurity into the fabric of system design, development, operation, and maintenance. The principles highlight the importance of proactive and comprehensive security measures that span from risk assessment to continuous improvement, ensuring that systems are not only designed with security in mind but are also resilient in the face of evolving cyber threats.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Abramovo Counterterrorism Training Center

The U.S. government has been assisting the Russian Federation (RF) Ministry of Defense (MOD) for many years with nuclear weapons transportation security (NWTS) through the provision of specialized guard escort railcars and cargo railcars with integrated physical security and communication systems, armored transport vehicles, and armored escort vehicles. As a natural continuation of the NWTS program, a partnership has been formed to construct a training center that will provide counterterrorism training to personnel in all branches of the RF MOD. The Abramovo Counterterrorism Training Center (ACTC) is a multinational, multiagency project with funding from Canada, RF and the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy. ACTC will be a facility where MOD personnel can conduct basic through advanced training in various security measures to protect Category IA material against the threat of terrorist attack. The training will enhance defense-in-depth principles by integrating MOD guard force personnel into the overall physical protection systems and improving their overall response time and neutralization capabilities. The ACTC project includes infrastructure improvements, renovation of existing buildings, construction of new buildings, construction of new training facilities, and provision of training and other equipment. Classroom training will be conducted in a renovated training building. Basic and intermediate training will be conducted on three different security training areas where various obstacles and static training devices will be constructed. The central element of ACTC, where advanced training will be held, is the 'autodrome,' a 3 km road along which various terrorist events can be staged to challenge MOD personnel in realistic and dynamic nuclear weapons transportation scenarios. This paper will address the ACTC project elements and the vision for training development and integrating this training into actual nuclear weapons transportation operations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A physical zero-knowledge object-comparison system for nuclear warhead verification

Zero-knowledge proofs are mathematical cryptographic methods to demonstrate the validity of a claim while providing no further information beyond the claim itself. The possibility of using such proofs to process classified and other sensitive physical data has attracted attention, especially in the field of nuclear arms control. Here we demonstrate a non-electronic fast neutron differential radiography technique using superheated emulsion detectors that can confirm that two objects are identical without revealing their geometry or composition. Such a technique could form the basis of a verification system that could confirm the authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. More broadly, by demonstrating a physical zero-knowledge proof that can compare physical properties of objects, this experiment opens the door to developing other such secure proof-systems for other applications.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

How to implement security controls for an information security program at CBRN facilities

This document was prepared by PNNL within the framework of Project 19 of the European Union Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative entitled, ''Development of procedures and guidelines to create and improve secure information management systems and data exchange mechanisms for CBRN materials under regulatory control.'' It provides management and workers at CBRN facilities, parent organization managers responsible for those facilities, and regulatory agencies (governmental and nongovernmental) with guidance on the best practices for protecting information security. The security mitigation approaches presented in this document were chosen because they present generally accepted guidance in an easy-to-understand manner, making it easier for facility personnel to grasp key concepts and envision how security controls could be implemented by the facility. This guidance is presented from a risk management perspective.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Technology transfer: Transportation

The successful application of aerospace technology to problems related to highways and rail and rapid transit systems is described with emphasis on the use of corrosion resistant paints, fire retardant materials, and law enforcement. Possible areas for the use of spinoff from NASA technology by the California State Department of Corrections are identified. These include drug detection, security and warning systems, and the transportation and storage of food. A communication system for emergency services is also described.

Anyos, T.↗

Rapid Monitoring and Defense Approach for Resilience Improvement of Grid Cyber Security

Cyber-physical systems and electric utilities significantly depend on the reliability and efficiency of information and operational technology. However, false data injection attacks based on synchrophasor measurement data pose a serious threat to the safe and reliable operation of modern power systems. Here, to mitigate this problem, a rapid monitoring and defense approach is proposed to defend against cyber attacks. Initially, the Time and Frequency based Convolutional neural Network (TFCN) is proposed to detect different types of attacks. Within the TFCN, the advances are that both time and frequency domain information can be fused without extra spectrum analysis methods, and can save detection time to speed the calculation efficiency using the developed time-frequency block. Next, a comprehensive defense strategy is developed for multiple cyber attacks to ensure the stability and resilience of the power system according to the feedback detection results. The advances of this strategy are that different control strategies can be automatically selected to recover the stability to the greatest extent according to the detected attacks. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the high-speed frequency measurements collected from the wide-area monitoring system are used. The results demonstrate that the cyber attack detection performance can reach 95.57% accuracy, outperforming both traditional and some advanced neural networks. Importantly, the defense strategy is conducted and verified in a modified IEEE 39 bus system as well, which illustrates profound performance in faster stability restoration.

Comprehensive defense strategy↗

Nevada National Security Site - E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System: Fourth Quarter 2019

This report includes the results of monthly inspections and monitoring for October, November, and December 2019. Monthly inspections and monitoring were conducted on October 15, November 26, and December 18, 2019. Inspections include a visual assessment of the berms, ponding, water levels relative to the overflow pipes, tunneling or burrowing into the berms, soil conditions on and around the berms, erosion or sloughing of the slopes of the berms, seeps at the toe of the berms, deep-rooting botanicals on the berms, and fencing. Monthly monitoring includes measurements of the instantaneous flow rate, hydrogen ion activity (pH), and specific conductance of the E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System (ETDS) discharge. Annual sample results of the effluent water from the ETDS are also included in this report. The effluent sample was collected on September 11, 2019, and analyzed for the parameters listed in Table 1-B of Permit NEV 96021. In addition, Permit NEV 96021 requires the collection and analysis of representative groundwater samples from Well ER 12-1 every 24 months. This summary report provides the information pertaining to the sampling and analysis of groundwater samples collected on April 10, 2019.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System Quarterly Monitoring Report, Water Pollution Control Permit NEV 96021 (First Quarter Calendar Year 2020)

This report includes the results of monthly inspections and monitoring for January, February, and March 2020. Monthly inspections and monitoring were conducted on January 15, February 12, and March 17, 2020. Inspections include a visual assessment of the berms, ponding, water levels relative to the overflow pipes, tunneling or burrowing into the berms, soil conditions on and around the berms, erosion or sloughing of the slopes of the berms, seeps at the toe of the berms, deep-rooting botanicals on the berms, and fencing. Monthly monitoring includes measurements of the instantaneous flow rate, hydrogen ion activity (pH), and specific conductance of the E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System discharge.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗