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Risk perception and social representation on radioactive waste: a case study with students of IPEN

Proper management of radioactive waste in teaching and research laboratories involves not only techniques and procedures for the treatment, storage and disposal of these materials but also the responsibility of all those who handle them. Responsibility begins with with methods that generate less waste and with the correct segregation of contaminated materials prior to disposal, In this context, the present study aimed to know, identify, understand and analyze the perception of risk and social representations about radioactive waste and its management by students and researchers of the Nuclear and Energy Research Institute. According to Renn (1992), two of the approaches to risk perception are cultural and sociological, which served as the basis to the present study. Within this analysis, the concept of risk is understood as a phenomenon and, therefore, the phenomena experienced by the individuals are related to their life histories, social relations, religious beliefs and academic formation, elements that interfere in the perception of risk. The method used to collect data was free evocation, with participants receiving the following instructions: 'Please write five words that pop up into your mind when you listen to the words radioactive waste and, sequentially, write a sentence using these words'. All participants received instructions of the voluntary character of the participation and of the confidentiality of the data. A total of 73 students and researchers were interviewed, including scientific initiation, masters degree, doctorate and postdoctoral researchers. 353 words were mentioned, of which 209 were different from each other. After analyzing the sentences, the words were inserted in 12 categories and later analyzed in the software INVOCADO, which provides a diagram with the possible structure of the social representations of the group studied. The analysis of the four-quadrants and their categories, as well as the mentioned words that compose them, are therefore consistent with the universe of the public analyzed. While it is not the totality of students dealing with radioactive materials, in general these individuals understand the importance of technology and that the adoption of safe practices ensures the successful development of research. Future developments: Analyze quantitatively and qualitatively the other questions of the questionnaire. Analyze the data and information obtained from the participant observation, which consisted of a follow-up of three students in their laboratory practices. Propose to the institute a manual of good practices that can be used by the students in their laboratory practices.

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Offsite source recovery project - ten years of sealed source recovery and disposal

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) has been recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources for ten years. In January 2009, GTRI announced that the project had recovered 20,000 sealed radioactive sources (this number has since increased to more than 23,000). This project grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover and disposition excess Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) sealed sources that were distributed in the 1960s and 1970s under the Atoms for Peace Program. Decades later, these sources began to exceed their special form certifications or fall out of regular use. As OSRP has collected and stored sealed sources, initially using 'No Path Forward' waste exemptions for storage within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, it has consistently worked to create disposal pathways for the material it has recovered. The project was initially restricted to recovering sealed sources that would meet the definition of Greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) low-level radioactive waste, assisting DOE in meeting its obligations under the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments (PL 99-240) to provide disposal for this type of waste. After being transferred from DOE-Environmental Management (EM) to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, OSRP's mission was expanded to include not only material that would be classified as GTCC when it became waste, but also any other materials that might constitute a 'national security consideration.' It was recognized at the time that the GTCC category was a waste designation having to do with environmental consequence, rather than the threat posed by deliberate or accidental misuse. The project faces barriers to recovery in many areas, but disposal continues to be one of the more difficult to overcome. This paper discusses OSRP's disposal efforts over its 10-year history. For sources meeting the DOE definition of 'transuranic,' OSRP has achieved many milestones, including defense determinations for various isotopes, a WIPP RCRA permit modification to accommodate headspace gas sampling requirements, and approval of a peer-reviewed non-assay radiological characterization methodology. For non-transuranic sources, which OSRP began to recover in 2004, OSRP has achieved NEP A coverage for storage and implemented consolidated storage at both DOE and commercial locations, as well as completing several specific disposal operations. The closure of the Barnwell low-level waste disposal site in 2008 has left 36 states with absolutely no commercial disposal pathway for most sealed sources, increasing the demands on OSRP. This and other current challenges and future work will also be discussed.

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Technical Basis for Extended Dry Storage of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report addresses previously identified technical knowledge and technology gaps and presents the key findings of the multiyear, EMTD-funded research efforts with the goal of evaluating whether ASNF can be safely stored dry for many decades and whether changes to existing ASNF management practices are appropriate. The findings formulate the technical basis for the extended dry storage of ASNF, leading to the main conclusion: All completed work to close the identified knowledge gaps on extended (>50 years) ASNF dry storage supports the conclusion that extended ASNF dry storage is both safe and viable.

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L-Basin microbial monitoring program - evaluation of 20 years of monitoring

This report summarizes the results from over 20-years’ of activities for microbial monitoring of the bulk water, floc analysis, and test coupon surfaces for the Savannah River Site L Basin. The Microbial Monitoring Program provides important information for the characterization of overall water quality as it impacts the continued safe storage of spent nuclear fuel in L Basin. The potential impacts to fuel storage are: 1) microbial-influenced corrosion of the fuel; and 2) biofouling of the fuel storage systems.

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Validation of Non-Invasive Waste Assay System (Gamma Box Counter) Performance at AECL Whiteshell Laboratories - 13136

Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) in solid form, resulting from decommissioning and operations activities at AECL's Whiteshell Laboratories (WL), is packaged in B-25 and B-1000 standard waste containers and characterized before it is shipped to an on-site interim storage facility, pending AECL decisions on long term management of its LLW. Assay of the waste packages before shipment contributes to an inventory of the interim storage facility and provides data to support acceptance at a future repository. A key characterization step is a gamma spectrometric measurement carried out under standard conditions using an automated, multi-detector Waste Assay System (WAS), purchased from Antech Corporation. A combination of ORTEC gamma acquisition software and custom software is used in this system to incorporate multiple measurements from two collimated high-resolution detectors. The software corrects the intensities of the gamma spectral lines for geometry and attenuation, and generates a table of calculated activities or limits of detection for a user-defined list of radioisotopes that may potentially be present. Validation of WAS performance was a prerequisite to routine operation. Documentation of the validation process provides assurance of the quality of the results produced, which may be needed one or two decades after they were generated. Aspects of the validation included setting up a quality control routine, measurements of standard point sources in reproducible positions, study of the gamma background, optimization of user-selectable software parameters, investigation of the effect of non-uniform distribution of materials and radionuclides, and comparison of results with measurements made using other gamma detector systems designed to assay bulk materials. The following key components of the validation process have been established. A daily quality control routine has been instituted, to verify stability of the gamma detector operation and the background levels. A test box containing plywood (specific gravity 0.5) with holes for reproducible positioning of known point sources has been constructed and used in several configurations. Gamma spectra have been processed multiple times with user-adjustable parameters set to a variety of values to gain agreement on the most appropriate settings. A similar optimization process was followed with the custom software provided by the instrument manufacturer to reach agreement on the most stable settings for reliable results. Measurements made with the Canberra In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) instrument were compared with the WAS results as part of an estimate of instrument precision and accuracy. The validation report will conclude with recommendations for the configuration, appropriate use and limitations of the Waste Assay System. (authors)

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New approaches for MOX multi-recycling

Due to its low fissile content after irradiation, Pu from used MOX fuel is considered by some as not recyclable in LWR (Light Water Reactors). The point of this paper is hence to go back to those statements and provide a new analysis based on AREVA extended experience in the fields of fissile and fertile material management and optimized waste management. This is done using the current US fuel inventory as a case study. MOX Multi-recycling in LWRs is a closed cycle scenario where U and Pu management through reprocessing and recycling leads to a significant reduction of the used assemblies to be stored. The recycling of Pu in MOX fuel is moreover a way to maintain the self-protection of the Pu-bearing assemblies. With this scenario, Pu content is also reduced repetitively via a multi-recycling of MOX in LWRs. Simultaneously, {sup 238}Pu content decreases. All along this scenario, HLW (High-Level Radioactive Waste) vitrified canisters are produced and planned for deep geological disposal. Contrary to used fuel, HLW vitrified canisters do not contain proliferation materials. Moreover, the reprocessing of used fuel limits the space needed on current interim storage. With MOX multi-recycling in LWR, Pu isotopy needs to be managed carefully all along the scenario. The early introduction of a limited number of SFRs (Sodium Fast Reactors) can therefore be a real asset for the overall system. A few SFRs would be enough to improve the Pu isotopy from used LWR MOX fuel and provide a Pu-isotopy that could be mixed back with multi-recycled Pu from LWRs, hence increasing the Pu multi-recycling potential in LWRs.

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SOLUBILITY OF URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM IN ALKALINE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE HIGH LEVEL WASTE SOLUTIONS

Five actual Savannah River Site tank waste samples and three chemically-modified samples were tested to determine solubility limits for uranium and plutonium over a one year time period. Observed final uranium concentrations ranged from 7 mg U/L to 4.5 g U/L. Final plutonium concentrations ranged from 4 {micro}g Pu/L to 12 mg Pu/L. Actinide carbonate complexation is believed to result in the dramatic solubility increases observed for one sample over long time periods. Clarkeite, NaUO{sub 2}(O)OH {center_dot} H{sub 2}O, was found to be the dominant uranium solid phase in equilibrium with the waste supernate in most cases.

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Review: Waste-Pretreatment Technologies for Remediation of Legacy Defense Nuclear Wastes

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for retrieving, immobilizing, and disposing of radioactive waste that has been generated during the production of nuclear weapons in the United States. The vast bulk of this waste material is stored in underground tanks at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Hanford Site in Washington State. The general strategy for treating the radioactive tank waste consists of first separating the waste into high-level and low-activity fractions. This initial partitioning of the waste is referred to as pretreatment. Following pretreatment, the high-level fraction will be immobilized in a glass form suitable for disposal in a geologic repository. The low-activity waste will be immobilized in a waste form suitable for disposal at the respective site. This paper provides a review of recent developments in the application of pretreatment technologies to the processing of the Hanford and Savannah River radioactive tank wastes. Included in the review are discussions of 1) solid/liquid separations methods, 2) cesium separation technologies, and 3) other separations critical to the success of the DOE tank waste remediation effort. Also included is a brief discussion of the different requirements and circumstances at the two DOE sites that have in some cases led to different choices in pretreatment technologies.

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DEMONSTRATION OF MIXING AND TRANSFERRING SETTLING COHESIVE SLURRY SIMULANTS IN THE AY-102 TANK

In support of Hanford's waste certification and delivery of tank waste to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was tasked by the Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) to evaluate the effectiveness of mixing and transferring tank waste in a Double Shell Tank (DST) to the WTP Receipt Tank. The work discussed in this report (Phase III) address the impacts cohesive simulants have on mixing and batch transfer performance. The objective of the demonstrations performed in Phase III was to determine the impact that cohesive particle interactions in the simulants have on tank mixing using 1/22{sup nd} scale mixing system and batch transfer of seed particles. This testing is intended to provide supporting evidence to the assumption that Hanford Small Scale Mixing Demonstration (SSMD) testing in water is conservative. The batch transfers were made by pumping the simulants from the Mixing Demonstration Tank (MDT) to six Receipt Tanks (RTs), and the consistency in the amount of seed particles in each batch was compared. Tests were conducted with non-Newtonian cohesive simulants with Bingham yield stress ranging from 0.3 Pa to 7 Pa. Kaolin clay and 100 {mu}m stainless steel seed particles were used for all the non-Newtonian simulants. To specifically determine the role of the yield stress on mixing and batch transfer, tests were conducted with a Newtonian mixture of glycerol and water with at viscosity of 6.2 cP that was selected to match the Bingham consistency (high shear rate viscosity) of the higher yield stress kaolin slurries. The water/glycerol mixtures used the same 100 {mu}m stainless steel seed particles. For the transfer demonstrations in Phase III, the mixer jet pumps were operated either at 10.0 gpm (28 ft/s nozzle velocity, U{sub o}D=0.63 ft{sup 2}/s) or 8.0 gpm (22.4 ft/s nozzle velocity, U{sub o}D=0.504 ft{sup 2}/s). All batch transfers from the MDT to the RTs were made at 0.58 gpm (MDT suction velocity 3.95 ft/s). The demonstrations that used simulants that ranged from 1.6 Pa to 7 Pa yield stress had the most successful batch transfer of solids to the RTs in terms of the total quantity of seed particles transferred. Testing suggest that when mixing water/seed particles and transferring, water provides the least desired batch transfer of solids based on the total quantity transferred. For the water tests, large dead zones of solids formed in the MDT and fewer solids get transferred to the RTs. For simulants with a yield stress of 0.3 Pa and below, the batch transfer behavior in terms of total transfer of seed particles was slightly higher than water test results. The testing did show somewhat more batch-to-batch variation in the transfer of seed particles with the slurries in comparison to water. A comparison of batch transfers with the kaolin slurries that had Bingham consistencies (viscosities) that wernearly the same as the Newtonian glycerol/water mixtures showed that the kaolin slurries with Bingham yield stresses of 1.6 and 7 Pa gave better batch transfer of seed particles based on the total quantities transferred. Overall, the batch transfer testing results show that testing with water is conservative, since using a simulant with a yield stress and/or elevated viscosity always resulted in a better total transfer of solids.

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ARIES Oxide Production Program: Monthly Report - May 2014

A summary of the accomplishments, milestones, financial summary, project performance and issues facing the ARIES Oxide Production Program for the end of May 2014 is presented in this Executive Summary.

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Prediction of Peak Hydrogen Concentrations for Deep Sludge Retrieval in Tanks AN-101 and AN-106 from Historical Data of Spontaneous Gas Release Events

Radioactive and chemical wastes from nuclear fuel processing are stored in large underground storage tanks at the Hanford Site. The Tank Operations Contractor is continuing a program of moving solid wastes from single-shell tanks (SSTs) to double-shell tanks (DSTs) and preparing for waste feed delivery (WFD). A new mechanism for a large spontaneous gas release event (GRE) in deep sludge sediments has been postulated. The creation of this potential new GRE hazard, deep sludge gas release events (DSGREs), is the retrieval of sludge waste into a single DST that results in a sediment depth greater than operating experience has demonstrated is safe. The Tank Operations Contractor program of moving solid wastes from SSTs to DSTs and preparing for WFD is being negatively impacted by this sediment depth limit.

Deep sludge retrieval↗

Gas composition observed by destructive examination of 3013 containers

The Department of Energy’s Integrated Surveillance and Monitoring Program implements requirements to measure gas pressure and gas composition during destructive examination of 3013 containers as required by DOE’s 3013 Standard. Gas pressures and gas compositions measured by the Program during destructive examination of 3013 containers from 2007 to 2017 are reported here. The maximum gas pressure within the population of containers that have undergone destructive examination was 299 kPa (43.4 psia) and this container had 0.52 wt% moisture which is higher than the Standard allows. The majority of containers have essentially no gas pressurization. Hydrogen was quantifiable above the measurement uncertainty in less than half (47 out of 114) of the containers that have undergone destructive examination. The amount of hydrogen that is generated within the sealed 3013 containers is always less than the amount predicted by the 3013 Standard’s pressure equation with the maximum observed hydrogen fraction (observed moles of hydrogen/predicted moles of hydrogen) of 0.18. It is recommended that for the purposes of calculating a maximum hydrogen pressure using the 3013 equation, a correction to the amount of hydrogen produced from decomposition of the water be incorporated. The pressure (or moles) of H 2 should be reduced by multiplying by a hydrogen fraction as described in the text. Helium and nitrogen are the other major constituents. Oxygen which is initially present in nearly all of the containers undergoing destructive examination was consumed to low values in all cases. The highest observed oxygen concentration was 1.7%, and in this case the H 2 concentration was essentially zero. Other minor gases observed in some cases included CO 2 with maximum content of 3.5%, CO with maximum content of 0.8%, N 2 O with maximum content of 1.4%, and CH 4 with maximum content of 0.4%.

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Criticality Safety Calculations for General Handling of B-25 Box

This project’s purpose is to determine the neutron multiplication factor (keff ) for the general handling of the B-25 Box in normal and credible abnormal conditions. This project is part of the container improvement effort at Y-12.

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FY25 Task 5: Small-Scale Mixing

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site has 177 underground storage tanks that contain a complex and diverse mix of chemical and radioactive wastes from past nuclear fuel reprocessing and waste management operations. The strategy of the DOE Hanford Field Office is to retrieve this waste, ~20 vol% of which is in the form of insoluble undissolved solids (UDS) or sludge, and treat it via immobilization at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The diverse properties and characteristics of Hanford tank waste lead to major challenges related to its transport from the underground tanks to the WTP. These challenges, however, can be addressed by investigating the behavior of tank waste samples and simulant materials and evaluating their behavior against the capabilities of mixing and transport system designs that may be incorporated to retrieve and treat the waste.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 1, January-March 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 A Decision Support System for Maintenance Management of a Boiling-Water Reactor Power Plant, J. H. Shen, A. Ray, and S. Levine; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 12 On Prediction of the Ignition Potential of Uranium Metal and Hydride, M. Epstein, W. Luangdilok, M. G. Plys, and H. K. Fauske; 26 An Overview of the Primary Parameters and Methods for Determining Condensation Heat Transfer to Containment Structures, J. Green and K. Almenas; DESIGN FEATURES: 49 Modem Tornado Design of Nuclear and Other Potentially Hazardous Facilities, J. D. Stevenson and Y. Zaho; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 73 1994 Accident Sequence Precursor Program Results, R. J. Belles, J. W. Cletcher, D. A. Coplnger, B. W. Dolan, J. W. Minarick, and P. D. O'Reilly; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 93 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AlChE) Spring 1997 National Meeting; 94 European Safety and Reliability Association International Conference on Safety and Reliability ESREL ’97; 95 Criticality Safety Challenges in the Next Decade; 96 21st International Symposium on the Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management; 84 The Authors; 88 Letter to the Editor; 90 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 36.

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REMOTE AREA RADIATION MONITORING (RARM) ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS

The Remote Area Radiation Monitoring (RARM) system will be used to provide real-time radiation monitoring information to the operations personnel during tank retrieval and transfer operations. The primary focus of the system is to detect potential anomalous (waste leaks) or transient radiological conditions. This system will provide mobile, real-time radiological monitoring, data logging, and status at pre-selected strategic points along the waste transfer route during tank retrieval operations. The system will provide early detection and response capabilities for the Retrieval and Closure Operations organization and Radiological Control personnel.

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CONTINUOSLY STIRRED TANK REACTOR PARAMETERS THAT AFFECT SLUDGE BATCH 6 SIMULANT PROPERTIES

The High Level Radioactive Waste (HLW) Sludge in Savannah River Site (SRS) waste tanks was produced over a period of over 60 years by neutralizing the acidic waste produced in the F and H Separations Canyons with sodium hydroxide. The HLW slurries have been stored at free hydroxide concentrations above 1 M to minimize the corrosion of the carbon steel waste tanks. Sodium nitrite is periodically added as a corrosion inhibitor. The resulting waste has been subjected to supernate evaporation to minimize the volume of the stored waste. In addition, some of the waste tanks experienced high temperatures so some of the waste has been at elevated temperatures. Because the waste is radioactive, the waste is transforming through the decay of shorter lived radioactive species and the radiation damage that the decay releases. The goal of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) simulant development program is to develop a method to produce a sludge simulant that matches both the chemical and physical characteristics of the HLW without the time, temperature profile, chemical or radiation exposure of that of the real waste. Several different approaches have been taken historically toward preparing simulated waste slurries. All of the approaches used in the past dozen years involve some precipitation of the species using similar chemistry to that which formed the radioactive waste solids in the tank farm. All of the approaches add certain chemical species as commercially available insoluble solid compounds. The number of species introduced in this manner, however, has varied widely. All of the simulant preparation approaches make the simulated aqueous phase by adding the appropriate ratios of various sodium salts. The simulant preparation sequence generally starts with an acidic pH and ends up with a caustic pH (typically in the 10-12 range). The current method for making sludge simulant involves the use of a temperature controlled continuously stirred tank reactor (CSTR). Precipitated MnO{sub 2} is combined with metal nitrates and fed into the CSTR. The metals are precipitated by a caustic NaOH stream. The rates at which these streams are added allows for pH adjustment of the mixture. A graphical representation of this process is given in Figure 1. In using the CSTR method for developing simulant, there are various parameters that can be adjusted in order to effectuate a physical change in the resulting simulant: pH, temperature, mixing speed, and flow rate. How will changing these parameters affect the physical properties of the sludge simulant? The ability to determine which parameter affects a particular property could allow one to develop a simulant that would better match the physical characteristics of HLW sludge.

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ON-LINE MONITORING FOR CONTROL AND SAFEGUARDING OF RADIOCHEMICAL STREAMS AT SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT

Advanced techniques that enhance safeguarding of spent fuel reprocessing plants are urgently needed. Our approach is based on the prerequisite that real-time monitoring of solvent extraction flowsheets at a spent fuel reprocessing plant provides the unique capability to quickly detect unwanted manipulations with fissile isotopes present in the radiochemical streams during reprocessing activities. The methods used to monitor these processes must be robust and capable of withstanding harsh radiation and chemical environments. A new on-line monitoring system satisfying these requirements and featuring Raman spectroscopy combined with a Coriolis and conductivity probes recently has been developed by our research team for tank waste retrieval. It provides immediate chemical data and flow parameters of high-level radioactive waste streams with high brine content generated during retrieval activities from nuclear waste storage tanks at the Hanford Site. The nature of the radiochemical streams at the spent fuel reprocessing plant calls for additional spectroscopic information that can be gained by using Vis-NIR capabilities augmenting Raman spectroscopy. A fiber optic Raman probe allows monitoring of high concentration species encountered in both aqueous and organic phases within the UREX suite of flowsheets, including metal oxide ions, such as uranyl, components of the organic solvent, inorganic oxo-anions, and water. Actinides and lanthanides are monitored remotely by Vis-NIR spectroscopy in aqueous and organic phases. In this report, we present our results on spectroscopic measurements of simulant flowsheet solutions and commercial fuels designed to demonstrate the applicability of Raman and Vis-NIR spectroscopic analysis for actual dissolver feed solutions.

Bryan, Samuel A↗