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First Industrial Tests of a Matrix Monitor Correction for the Differential Die-away Technique of Historical Waste Drums

The fissile mass in radioactive waste drums filled with compacted metallic residues (spent fuel hulls and nozzles) produced at AREVA NC La Hague reprocessing plant is measured by neutron interrogation with the Differential Die-away measurement Technique (DDT). In the next years, old hulls and nozzles mixed with Ion-Exchange Resins will be measured. The ion-exchange resins increase neutron moderation in the matrix, compared to the waste measured in the current process. In this context, the Nuclear Measurement Laboratory (LMN) of CEA Cadarache has studied a matrix effect correction method, based on a drum monitor, namely a 3He proportional counter located inside the measurement cavity. After feasibility studies performed with LMN's PROMETHEE 6 laboratory measurement cell and with MCNPX simulations, this paper presents first experimental tests performed on the industrial ACC (hulls and nozzles compaction facility) measurement system. A calculation vs. experiment benchmark has been carried out by performing dedicated calibration measurements with a representative drum and {sup 235}U samples. The comparison between calculation and experiment shows a satisfactory agreement for the drum monitor. The final objective of this work is to confirm the reliability of the modeling approach and the industrial feasibility of the method, which will be implemented on the industrial station for the measurement of historical wastes. (authors)

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Thermo-Hydraulic-Mechanical Modelling of the Full-Scale Emplacement (FE) Experiment at the Mont Terri Rock Laboratory - 16490

The Full-Scale Emplacement Experiment at the Mont Terri underground research laboratory is a heater test carried out in a gallery constructed in Opalinus Clay. The aim of the experiment is both to develop emplacement procedures for radioactive waste canisters and their surrounding backfill as well as understanding the thermo-hydro-mechanical effects of disposing of radioactive waste on the engineering materials and the host rock. Coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical models have been used to aid planning of the locations of sensors, to inform decisions on the schedule for turning on the heaters as well as to make predictions of the temperatures and water pressures in the bentonite and the Opalinus Clay. The FE Experiment was preceded by a number of other experiments at the Mont Terri laboratory at smaller scales, but with similar materials, which provided crucial input to the models and gave confidence in the general process understanding. Blind predictions were made prior to turning on the heaters, of the temperature and relative humidity in the bentonite surrounding the heaters. The comparison between the blind predictions and early data from the experiment show that knowledge gained from smaller scale experiments on similar materials has enabled good blind predictions to be made and gives confidence that temperature in the experiment is unlikely to rise to a level that could damage the sensors. It also demonstrates that the thermal properties of the disposal system are understood well enough to produce reliable estimates of temperature in the backfill. (authors)

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A New Consolidated Storage Facility for Used Nuclear Fuel in Andrews County, Texas - 16418

On February 6, 2015, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) announced its plan to file a license application with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct and operate a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF). Upon issuance of the license, WCS would be authorized to receive Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) and reactor related Greater Than Class C Low Level Radioactive Waste (referred hence forth as UNF) at the CISF in late 2020. WCS based its decision to license a CISF based on strong support from the State of Texas and the local community's willingness to host such a facility in Andrews County, Texas. WCS' decision to license a CISF in a supportive community is consistent with the consent-based licensing approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. WCS intends to use existing technology developed by AREVA and NAC International that have already been approved by the NRC to transport UNF from existing commercial nuclear reactors across the nation for interim storage at its 14,000 acre site in Andrew County, Texas. In the pre-application licensing meetings held with the NRC, WCS underscored that UNF would be removed first from the shutdown decommissioned reactor sites and transported to the CISF. Approximately eighty percent of the UNF currently residing at the shutdown decommissioned reactor sites can be safely placed into the storage systems developed by AREVA and NAC International that are currently licensed by the NRC. WCS plans to store up to 40,000 Metric Tons of Heavy Metal (MTHM) at the CISF that would be constructed in eight phases over the next 20 years. WCS intends to submit its license application for the CISF to the NRC by April 2016. The license application will request authorization to possess up to 5,000 MTHM of UNF for Phase One which can accommodate storing the fuel located at over ten shutdown decommissioned reactor sites. As discussed with the NRC, the license application will be developed following NRC regulatory guidance to comply with the technical requirements specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste. In addition, to filing the license application, WCS is also seeking legislative changes to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 requiring the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to take title of the UNF at the commercial nuclear reactor sites. Under such legislative changes, the DOE would also be responsible for the transport of UNF to the CISF. In addition to preparing the CISF License Application, WCS and its partners AREVA and NAC International are prepared to work with DOE to facilitate the development of the UNF transportation infrastructure in the timeframe needed to support CISF operations. The WCS site and technical approach give it several advantages which uniquely position it to become the first successful commercial CISF in the U.S. These advantages include: broad consent-based support at the local, state, and Congressional level; an operating waste disposal site with an existing transportation infrastructure; and the use of already licensed systems to address 80% of the UNF currently in dry storage at shutdown sites in the U.S. WCS firmly believes this initiative will provide an economically viable option for consolidated interim storage of UNF until a permanent geologic repository becomes available. (authors)

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Development, Testing and Validation of a Waste Assay System for the Measurement and Characterisation of Active Spent Fuel Element Debris From UK Magnox Reactors - 12533

This paper describes the development, testing and validation of a waste measurement instrument for characterising active remote handled radioactive waste arising from the operation of Magnox reactors in the United Kingdom. Following operation in UK Magnox gas cooled reactors and a subsequent period of cooling, parts of the magnesium-aluminium alloy cladding were removed from spent fuel and the uranium fuel rods with the remaining cladding were removed to Sellafield for treatment. The resultant Magnox based spent fuel element debris (FED), which constitutes active intermediate level waste (ILW) has been stored in concrete vaults at the reactor sites. As part of the decommissioning of the FED vaults the FED must be removed, measured and characterised and placed in intermediate storage containers. The present system was developed for use at the Trawsfynydd nuclear power station (NPS), which is in the decommissioning phase, but the approach is potentially applicable to FED characterisation at all of the Magnox reactors. The measurement system consists of a heavily shielded and collimated high purity Germanium (HPGe) detector with electromechanical cooling and a high count-rate preamplifier and digital multichannel pulse height analyser. The HPGe based detector system is controlled by a software code, which stores the measurement result and allows a comprehensive analysis of the measured FED data. Fuel element debris is removed from the vault and placed on a tray to a uniform depth of typically 10 cm for measurement. The tray is positioned approximately 1.2 meters above the detector which views the FED through a tungsten collimator with an inverted pyramid shape. At other Magnox sites the positions may be reversed with the shielded and collimated HPGe detector located above the tray on which the FED is measured. A comprehensive Monte Carlo modelling and analysis of the measurement process has been performed in order to optimise the measurement geometry and eliminate interferences from radioactive sources and FED in the immediate vicinity of the measurement position. The detector system has been calibrated and high activity radioactive sources of Cs-137, Co-60 and Na-22 have been used to validate the measurement process. The data acquisition and analysis software code has been tested and validated in keeping with the software quality assurance requirements of both ISO:9001-2008 - TICK-IT in the UK and NQA-1. The measurement and analysis system has been comprehensively tested with high activity sources, is flexible and may be applicable to a wide range of remote handled radioactive waste measurement applications. It is due to be installed at Trawsfynydd NPS later this year. This paper describes the Waste Tray Assay System (WTAS) that has been developed for the measurement of Magnox FED waste. The WTAS has been tested with a range of radioactive sources and its operation has been simulated with benchmarked MCNP Monte Carlo calculations. The measurement software has been validated as has the operation of the system for a range of strong radioactive sources. A system based on the design is due for installation and operation in 2012. The system has application to the measurement of Magnox Fuel Element Debris (FED) waste at other Magnox reactor sites. The major design objective of the WTAS that has been achieved is the ability of the assay system to determine the content of Cs-137, and in turn to enable the fissile burden to be assessed using a radionuclide fingerprint, in the presence of higher and highly variable quantities of Co-60, typically from nimonic springs. The approach can be used in other Magnox FED waste configurations where the detector is located above the FED waste sorting tray and where the collimation is fixed below the detector and at a distance above the tray. In this case, which has also been investigated, there are different shielding problems and mechanical support issues. The extensive use of MCNP Monte Carlo modelling to simulate the geometry of the sorting cell and the distribution of radioactive sources has helped to ensure that all of the detector shielding requirements are addressed and suitable Cs-137 and Co-60 discrimination can be achieved. The WTAS in its present form or in other configurations has relevance to the measurement of other active ILW and highly active RH waste. Examples include high activity RH LLW and RH TRU (Transuranic) waste as defined in the United States arising from both commercial nuclear and Department of Energy (DOE) operations. The analysis is able to analyse a range of radionuclides beyong those expected in the Magnox FED cases. (authors)

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Management of Ir-192 Disused Sealed Sources with Long-Lived Radioactive Contaminants

Iridium-192 sealed sources are the most widely used sealed source in industrial applications in Brazil. They are not recyclable and in the end of the useful life, they are discarded as radioactive waste. The recommended management strategy of this waste is decay in storage and disposal as exempt waste because the half-life is only 73.8 days. Presently, thousands of Ir- 192 sources are under storage waiting release. Surprisingly, sources that were under storage for more than ten years and for which no measurable contact dose rate was expected still present significant remaining radioactivity. The examination of the gamma spectra of these sources showed the presence of Co-60 and the gamma emission lines from the Ir-192m2 isomer, the metastable isotope with half-life of 241 years, which is also formed by the irradiation of natural iridium. The aim of the study reported in this paper is to characterize the Ir-192 disused sources under interim storage at the Radioactive Waste Management Department, considering the presence of minor contaminants in the irradiated iridium and the fraction of the total initial activity of the sources that is attributable to that metastable isotope. The radioactive inventories at the end of the irradiation and after the decay period were predicted using the Scale 6.0 code and the results were compared with activity measurements of the disused sources by gamma spectrometry. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Targeted Health Assessment for Wastes Contained at the Niagara Falls Storage Site to Guide Planning for Remedial Action Alternatives - 13428

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is evaluating potential remedial alternatives at the 191-acre Niagara Falls Storage Site (NFSS) in Lewiston, New York, under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). The Manhattan Engineer District (MED) and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) brought radioactive wastes to the site during the 1940's and 1950's, and the U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) consolidated these wastes into a 10-acre interim waste containment structure (IWCS) in the southwest portion of the site during the 1980's. The USACE is evaluating remedial alternatives for radioactive waste contained within the IWCS at the NFSS under the Feasibility Study phase of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) process. A preliminary evaluation of the IWCS has been conducted to assess potential airborne releases associated with uncovered wastes, particularly during waste excavation, as well as direct exposures to uncovered wastes. Key technical issues for this assessment include: (1) limitations in waste characterization data; (2) representative receptors and exposure routes; (3) estimates of contaminant emissions at an early stage of the evaluation process; (4) consideration of candidate meteorological data and air dispersion modeling approaches; and (5) estimates of health effects from potential exposures to both radionuclides and chemicals that account for recent updates of exposure and toxicity factors. Results of this preliminary health risk assessment indicate if the wastes were uncovered and someone stayed at the IWCS for a number of days to weeks, substantial doses and serious health effects could be incurred. Current controls prevent such exposures, and the controls that would be applied to protect onsite workers during remedial action at the IWCS would also effectively protect the public nearby. This evaluation provides framing context for the upcoming development and detailed evaluation of remedial alternatives for the IWCS. (authors)

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The Use of Positrons to Survey Alteration Layers on Synthetic Nuclear Waste Glasses

In order to safeguard society and the environment, understanding radioactive waste glass alteration mechanisms in interactions with solutions and near-field materials, such as Fe, is essential to nuclear waste repository performance assessments. Alteration products are formed at the surface of glasses after reaction with solution. In this study, glass altered in the presence of Fe0 in aqueous solution formed two alteration layers: one embedded with Fe closer to the surface and one without Fe found deeper in the sample. Both layers were found to be thinner than the alteration layer found in glass altered in aqueous solution only. For the first time, Doppler Broadening Positron Annihilation Spectroscopy (DB-PAS) is used to non-destructively characterize the pore structures of glass altered in the presence of Fe0. Advantages and disadvantages of DB-PAS compared to other techniques used to analyze pore structures for altered glass samples are discussed. Ultimately, DB-PAS has shown to be an excellent choice for pore structure characterization for glasses with multiple alteration layers. Monte Carlo modeling predicted positron trajectories through the layers, and helped explain DB-PAS data, which showed that the deeper alteration layer without Fe had a similar composition and pore structure to layers on glass altered in water only.

Doppler Broadening Positron Annihilation Spectrosc↗

Boron nitride: Novel ceramic reductant for low‐activity waste vitrification

Abstract During vitrification of radioactive wastes, excessive foaming reduces processing rates within melters by hindering heat transfer from the molten glass pool to the reacting melter feed. Formulations of low‐activity waste (LAW) melter feeds, for vitrification at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at the Hanford Site, conventionally include the addition of sucrose to mitigate excessive foaming by hastening the denitration process. However, incomplete combustion of sucrose produces organics such as acetonitrile (C 2 H 3 N) that may exceed bounding limits of downstream effluent treatment facilities. Using boron nitride (BN) as an alternate reductant to sucrose, in a representative LAW melter feed reduced C 2 H 3 N production by 90% by preventing the low‐temperature sucrose–nitrate reactions. Furthermore, foaming was suppressed due to the higher decomposition temperature of BN than H 3 BO 3 meaning a delayed reaction of a large fraction of boron with the transient glass‐forming melt until above the foam onset temperature, thus reducing the quantity and viscosity of the connected melt and trapping less gas in the foam layer.

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Remote Dismantling and Packaging of the RPV and Thermal Shield at the Obrigheim NPP - 16073

The Obrigheim Nuclear Power Plant (KWO) is located in the Federal State of Baden- Wuerttemberg in Germany and was operated by the EnKK-KWO. The Nuclear Power Plant - a light water pressurized water reactor with 357 MW of electrical power - was operated from 1968 to 2005. In June 2009 the Energiewerke Nord GmbH (EWN) was charged with the dismantling planning and dismantling of the reactor. According to the German nuclear and radiation protection law, several licenses will be required for the realisation of this task. This also applies to the disposal of the waste produced by dismantling, which must finally be stored in the German final repository for low and medium-radioactive waste (underground repository 'Konrad'). In spring 2010 EWN completed all application documents for the dismantling of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the RPV internals and EnKK-KWO delivered them to the responsible Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Since then it has been worked intensively on the design, construction and manufacturing of the facilities for dismantling. With a separate notification of amendment, it was applied for the license to install and commission the facilities for the dismantling of the RPV and the RPV internals at the Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg in October 2010. This notification of amendment was confirmed in summer 2012. In September 2011 the work process and test plan and the technical information about the campaign for the removal of the radioactive waste resulting from the RPV with internals, peripheral components and secondary waste with the aim of final disposal in the Federal Repository 'Konrad' was submitted to the Federal Office for Radiation Protection. The evaluation and assessment of the work process and test plan was concluded in August 2013, when it was audited by TUV Nord EnSys without any further measures and indications. On September 10 the work process and test plan was released by the Federal Office for radiation protection. The dismantling of the RPV internals upper core and lower core structure started in September 2013 in the wet cutting area in room 01.106/306 and were finished in October 2014. In the presentation 'Dismantling of the Obrigheim NPP Reactor and Waste Management' held on the WM Symposia in Phoenix, 2014, an overview about the remote cutting and packaging of the upper and lower core structure was given. In today's presentation the subsequent dismantling activities will be outlined and evaluated. The presentation will start with the short description of the basic frame conditions for the nuclear licensing procedure, important procedural principles, and necessary plant-specific conditions. After the remote cutting and packing of the reactor internals of the upper and lower core structure was completed, the wet cutting area 'reactor room 01.106/306' was cleaned and the reactor room rebuilt into a cutting area for peripheral components. After the peripheral components were dismantled, all preconditions were set to lift the RPV from its mounting position and to arrange it in the upper reactor room 01.306. After these activities were completed, the lifting of the RPV was prepared and the cutting area 'Dismantling of the RPV insulation in the reactor room 01.106/306' was set up. To carry out this task, a strand jack unit with connection block was installed on the bridge of the reactor building crane. The opening created by the dismantling of the pool plate was closed with a flap door. The manipulators used for the wet cutting of the RPV internals were also used for the remote dismantling of the RPV insulation and mounted in the cutting area. The remote facilities were handled from a control centre and/or control stand. The air-technical housing which has already been used for the remote dismantling of the RPV internals was designed for the dismantling of the RPV insulation and was extended for this dismantling scope with appropriate ventilation systems. A special feature is the fixation of the RPV insulation at the RPV corpus. The RPV insulation consists of insulation wool, wire mesh and metal-sheet insulation. This 'Sandwich Construction' is detached with a steel corset at the RPV corpus and partly tightened. The insulation of the RPV bottom dome is tightened at the supporting frame. Due to the activation of the material in the core area and the resulting high ambient dose rate the RPV insulation can only be dismantled remotely. Additionally, as asbestos fibers are expected to be found in the insulation the dismantling has to be performed according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances. The demolition, restoration or maintenance works have to be performed remotely according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances when the RPV is located in the cutting area. But in case of dismantling of a power reactor no such experience can be found. Beginning with the explanation of the technical, radiological and substantial boundary conditions this presentation will not only impart knowledge about the dismantling of the RPV insulation but also about the remote controlled packaging of the metal sheet insulation and the manual conditioning of the RPV insulation. Subsequently, reports on the remotely controlled cutting and packaging of the RDB are given. Here is particularly interesting that cutting methods have been used and how the activity determination of the segments was carried out. On the basis of the evaluation of the realisation the subsequent dismantling activities will be lined out. In parallel to the dismantling tasks, the waste package documentation for the final repository was issued, checked and confirmed for the containers loaded with parts of the RDB internals. The most important stages are exemplified in this presentation. (authors)

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Progress Update on the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Pulse- Jet Mixed Vessel Testing Program - 16286

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is designed to use cylindrical-shaped pulse-jet mixers in the black cell vessels to mix the radioactive waste during process operations. Pulse-jet mixers operate like large turkey basters, using air pressure to suck radioactive waste up into the mixer and eject it back into the vessel at high velocity. Using pulse-jet mixers for keeping waste in process vessels adequately mixed is one of the design features that ensures that there are no mechanical parts inside the black cells that would require maintenance. The WTP Project is conducting a testing program to ensure the pulse-jet mixed vessels can address three design and nuclear safety concerns: 1) pulse jet mixer controls, 2) hydrogen gas generation, and 3) the potential for inadvertent criticality in the vessels. The currently planned pulse-jet mixed vessel testing program is divided into three major test campaigns. The first campaign consists of testing to demonstrate pulse-jet mixed vessel control system design and operating concepts. The second test campaign consisted of informational testing of select prototypic PJM vessel features in a reduced scale facility. This testing informed decision making on selection of different mixing system configurations. This test campaign was completed in March 2015. The third test campaign is planned to test the complete functionality of a pulse-jet mixed vessel at full-scale using a prototype standardized high-solids vessel design. (authors)

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Global Survey of Selected Deep Underground Facilities; Examples of Geotechnical and Engineering Capabilities, Achievements, Challenges(Mines, Shafts, Tunnels, Boreholes, Sites and Underground Facilities for Nuclear Waste and Physics R&D):A Guide

This report presents tables, references, notes, and a synthesis of some notable geotechnical and engineering information that were applied in the creation of five interactive layer maps [http://gis.inl.gov/globalsites/ will redirect to 2018 update, http://gis.inl.gov/GlobalSurvey/] for selected: 1) deep mines and shafts; 2) existing, considered or planned radioactive waste management deep underground studies or disposal facilities 3) deep large diameter boreholes, 4) physics underground laboratories and facilities, and 5) deep open pit mines from around the world. These data are intended to facilitate user access to basic information and references regarding “deep underground” facilities, history, activities, and plans. In general, the interactive maps and database provide each facility’s approximate site location, geology, and engineered features (e.g.: access, geometry, depth, diameter, year of operations, groundwater, lithology, host unit name and age, basin; operator, management organization, geographic data, nearby cultural features, other). Although the survey is not all encompassing, it is a comprehensive review of many of the significant existing and historical underground facilities discussed in the literature addressing radioactive waste management and deep mined geologic disposal safety systems. The interactive map suite allows for a better appreciation of site area geographic and cultural settings. The global survey is intended to be used as a communication tool to support and inform: 1) interested parties and decision makers; 2) radioactive waste disposal and siting option evaluations, and 3) safety case development applicable to any mined geologic disposal facility as a demonstration (examples) of historical and current engineering and geotechnical capabilities available for use in deep underground facility siting, planning, construction, operations and monitoring.

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From Dealing with Legacy Waste to Avoiding It - 17432

When dealing with radioactive waste management and its regulation, there are various national approaches. At the same time there is a growing tendency towards consideration of fundamental principles and standards thus forming the underlying basics in detailing the customized regulatory framework for specific applications. Dealing with legacy waste poses some particular problems as at the time of its production current safety principles were sometimes not well established. Considering today's standards this frequently requires remedial actions. Usually, this involves considerable effort and cost as well as radiation exposure for the involved personnel. Resolving legacy waste related problems not only benefits from an established regulatory framework but allows conclusions on how deal with legacy waste problems in general. The most important lessons learned from such operations might be how to prevent the production of legacy waste in the first place, thus avoiding further problems. By reflecting on practical applications from a number of countries the presentation is set to carve out the crucial recommendations from internationally recognized standards that give a substantial dividend in terms of not only time and budget but most of all safety and radiation exposure when properly implemented. The scope of the examples given ranges from dealing with legacy waste to avoiding it and includes recommendations towards essential features of best practice as seen from the perspective of an independent expert organization. (authors)

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Double-Shell tank Integrity program - 15533

Waste at Hanford is stored in 149 single-shell tanks and 28 double-shell tanks (DSTs). Concerns related to aging radioactive waste storage facilities throughout the US DOE complex led to Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) developing guidelines for structural integrity programs for tank systems (BNL-52527, Guidelines for Development of Structural Integrity Programs for DOE High-Level Waste Storage Tanks). The committee of experts who developed these guidelines is commonly known as the Tank Structural Integrity Panel (TSIP). The US DOE has subsequently adopted these guidelines, and requires site operators to have a program consistent with them (DOE M 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual). The Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) manages the tanks for the US DOE Office of River Protection (ORP) under the Tank Operations Contract (TOC). The US DOE-ORP contractual agreement with the TOC (11-NSD-010) includes a requirement to 'maintain the tank structural integrity program as described in RPP-7574, Double-Shell tank Integrity Project Plan'. The DST integrity is maintained with a variety of activities such as ultrasonic and visual inspections, chemistry controls, corrosion monitoring and structural analyses methods. The recent loss of tank 241-AY-102 has led to the formation of the High-Level Waste Integrity Assessment Panel to evaluate the DST integrity project (DSTIP) and to recommend improvements to the DSTIP. This panel continues the DOE practice of seeking expert advice to guide the formulation and continuous assessment of tank integrity activities. The panel has concluded its work and WRPS has developed a series of tasks to implement their recommendations. (authors)

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Radionuclide inventory of vitrified waste after spent nuclear fuel reprocessing at La Hague

The primary aim of the present work was to determine the inventories of the radionuclides and stable elements in vitrified high-level waste produced at La Hague and delivered to Germany, which are of importance for long-term safety assessment of final repositories for radioactive wastes. For a subset of these radionuclides and stable elements, the inventories were determined - either by direct measurements or by involving established correlations - and reported by AREVA. This allowed verification of the validity of application of a model approach utilizing the data of burnup and activation calculations and auxiliary information on the reprocessing and vitrification process operated at La Hague. Having proved that such a model approach can be applied for prediction of inventories of actinides, fission and activation products in vitrified waste, the present work estimated the minimum, average and maximum inventories of the radionuclides, which are of importance for long-term safety assessment of final repositories for radioactive waste but were not reported by AREVA for delivered CSD-V canisters. The average and maximum inventories in individual CSD-V canisters predicted in the present approach were compared to the inventories predicted by Nagra for canisters with vitrified waste delivered from La Hague to Switzerland [1]. This comparison revealed a number of differences between these inventories despite the fact that the canisters delivered to Switzerland were produced in essentially the same way and from the common reprocessing waste stock as CSD-V canisters delivered to Germany. Therefore, a further work is required in order to identify the reason for the discrepancy in the present estimation versus the Nagra estimation [1]. Such a work should also address the recommendation by the international peer review of the Safety Report of the Project Opalinus Clay to obtain estimates of the inventories of long-lived mobile radionuclides (such as {sup 14}C, {sup 36}Cl, {sup 79}Se, and {sup 129}I), which contribute most to the dose estimates in the radiological safety assessments, if possible, in agreement with other countries with similar waste streams in order for a coordinated set of data to be generated [2]. Since vitrified waste from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at La Hague was delivered to several countries - Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Switzerland - an international effort can be recommended. (authors)

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OPERATIONS REVIEW OF THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE INTEGRATED SALT DISPOSITION PROCESS - 11327

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is removing liquid radioactive waste from its Tank Farm. To treat waste streams that are low in Cs-137, Sr-90, and actinides, SRS developed the Actinide Removal Process and implemented the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Unit (MCU). The Actinide Removal Process contacts salt solution with monosodium titanate to sorb strontium and select actinides. After monosodium titanate contact, the resulting slurry is filtered to remove the monosodium titanate (and sorbed strontium and actinides) and entrained sludge. The filtrate is transferred to the MCU for further treatment to remove cesium. The solid particulates removed by the filter are concentrated to {approx} 5 wt %, washed to reduce the sodium concentration, and transferred to the Defense Waste Processing Facility for vitrification. The CSSX process extracts the cesium from the radioactive waste using a customized solvent to produce a Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS), and strips and concentrates the cesium from the solvent with dilute nitric acid. The DSS is incorporated in grout while the strip acid solution is transferred to the Defense Waste Processing Facility for vitrification. The facilities began radiological processing in April 2008 and started processing of the third campaign ('MarcoBatch 3') of waste in June 2010. Campaigns to date have processed {approx}1.2 million gallons of dissolved saltcake. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) personnel performed tests using actual radioactive samples for each waste batch prior to processing. Testing included monosodium titanate sorption of strontium and actinides followed by CSSX batch contact tests to verify expected cesium mass transfer. This paper describes the tests conducted and compares results from facility operations. The results include strontium, plutonium, and cesium removal, cesium concentration, and organic entrainment and recovery data. Additionally, the poster describes lessons learned during operation of the facility.

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Regulating Operational Safety at a Future Geological Disposal Facility in the UK - 18038

The United Kingdom (UK) has generated commercial nuclear energy for over 60 years; generating a significant and varied inventory of higher activity radioactive waste (HAW). In accordance with international practice, UK Government policy for long-term management of HAW is disposal in a geological disposal facility (GDF). The nuclear materials comprising HAW include high level waste, intermediate level waste and some low level waste, not suitable for disposal to the Low Level Waste Repository. In addition, other nuclear materials may be reclassified as waste in the future and will require to be managed as HAW for disposal to a GDF; these include spent fuel, uranium and plutonium. The operator of a GDF will be required to obtain a nuclear site licence from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), as the nuclear safety and security regulator, in order to construct and operate the facility. In the period prior to submission of a licence application, ONR is working to develop its regulatory expectations and provide advice on its regulatory role with regards to a future GDF. ONR has developed regulatory guidance on operational safety, benchmarked against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards and the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) Safety Reference Levels for Disposal. This guidance draws upon ONR's current expectations for nuclear sites; including operational reactors, fuel manufacture and reprocessing facilities, and reactors undergoing decommissioning; and incorporates relevant good practice drawn from international programmes for geological disposal and related industries (eg mining). In addition to the technical assessment guidance, ONR has developed guidance on the licensing process specific to a GDF; providing clarity for example on when a licence will be required. A review of the standard licence conditions applied to all nuclear sites concluded no significant amendment would be required for application to a GDF. Through its voluntary agreement with Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), the developer and future operator of a GDF in the UK, ONR exerts regulatory influence on the design and organisational development of the future licensee. As part of this scrutiny, ONR has assessed RWM's generic Disposal System Safety Case. Subjecting the generic design and safety case to regulatory review provides opportunity for early engagement to ensure the appropriate standards will be achieved. ONR will only grant the necessary regulatory permissions if RWM adequately demonstrates the GDF will be constructed, operated and closed safely. Future challenges faced by ONR with respect to a GDF include building and maintaining regulatory competence and confidence, and engaging effectively with the public as the UK begins its search for a suitable site to provide appropriate assurance that a GDF will be operated safely and securely. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of Thermolytic Hydrogen Generation Rate Models at High-Temperature/High-Hydroxide Regimes

This report describes the results of testing performed to extend the applicable ranges of temperature and hydroxide concentration for use within the Glycolate and Global Total Organic Carbon (TOC) Hydrogen Generation Rate (HGR) expressions. Seven experimental conditions (six simulants of the 242-25H Evaporator system chosen as a D-optimal set of experiments and a single test conducted at an elevated boiling point of 170 °C) were investigated in the presence of sodium glycolate and Xiameter TM AFE-1010. Glycolate was employed to study the extension of the Glycolate Thermolytic HGR expression while Xiameter TM AFE-1010 was employed to study the extension of the Global TOC Thermolytic HGR expression. The following conclusions were derived from this testing: The Glycolate Thermolytic HGR expression may be confidently used to predict thermolytic HGRs from glycolate at temperatures as high as 170 °C and hydroxide concentrations as high as 23 M.; The hydroxide and temperature-dependence predicted by the Global TOC Thermolytic HGR expression has been confirmed at temperatures as high as 170 °C and hydroxide concentrations as high as 23 M, suggesting that the Global TOC Thermolytic HGR expression may be used at these ranges.; Methane was observed from tests with Xiameter TM AFE-1010 at production rates higher than those observed for hydrogen. These rates were observed at temperatures higher than 100 °C.; Preliminary models suggest that increasing hydroxide/temperature causes an increase in Methane Generation Rate (MGR) from Xiameter TM AFE-1010. The following recommendations are based on this testing: The existing equations for thermolytic HGR from glycolate and non-glycolate organics should be used at Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) storage and evaporation conditions, including temperatures and hydroxide concentrations exhibited in the 242-25H Evaporator.; Further investigation should be made into the influence of methylsilanes on CSTF flammability. This investigation should include: determination of the types of methylsilanes historically added to the CSTF, determination of methane formation rates from each type of methylsilane, and determination of the extent of degradation of methylsilanes in CSTF waste.; Characterization techniques should be developed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to assist in the speciation of methylsilane-containing waste in the CSTF.; Additional testing with radioactive waste should be performed to determine the MGRs possible in radioactive waste and better inform model predictions made from testing with simulants.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Microstructural Characteristics of U-Zr Ingot Slug and Atomized Powder for SFR metal Fuel

Rod-type fuel slugs and spherical powder of U- 10wt.%Zr alloy was also fabricated and characterized in microstructure by injection casting, gravity casting and centrifugal atomization process. U grains became finer from ∼30μm in conventionally ingot rod to ∼2μm in atomized powder. Laminar structure became so fine from ∼0.2μm in conventionally cast ingot rod to 0.05∼0.1μm in atomized powder. Metallic fuels such as U-Zr and U-Pu-Zr alloys have been considered as a nuclear fuel for a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR), related to the closed fuel cycle for managing minor actinides and reducing a high radioactivity levels since the 1980's. Metallic fuel slugs of U-Pu-Zr alloys for SFR have conventionally been fabricated by an injection casting method. U-Pu-Zr alloy melts are injected and cast into quartz tube molds during injection casting. Metallic fuel slugs are collected by fracturing quartz tubes from the molds. Demolded quartz tubes are treated with radioactive wastes. Recently, management of minor actinides (MA) became an important issue because direct disposal of the long-lived MA can be a long-term burden for a tentative repository up to several hundreds of thousand years. The metallic fuel for SFR should be remotely fabricated under a radiation shielded environment such as a hot cell, because it contains highly radioactive MA such as Np, Am and Cm. The addition of MA in the fuel composition introduces new challenges in the manufacturing of a metallic fuel slug. Am has a high vapor pressure under a vacuum atmosphere at above a melting temperature of U-Zr or U-Pu-Zr. Used graphite crucibles and quartz molds cannot be recycled easily because of difficult decontamination of radioactive residues on their surfaces. It is necessary to minimize the vaporization of Am and volume of radioactive wastes. Atomized metallic fuel does not need these quartz molds during fabrication, as uranium alloys are prepared as a particle form. It is possible to reduce the formation of radioactive wastes by applying the fabrication process of a particulate metallic fuel. Metallic fuel having a fine microstructure, which originates from a rapid solidification effect during atomization process, results in a higher FG release rate during irradiation. In the case of applying a new forming method such as vibrocompaction in Zr sheath, the sheath can act as a reliable FCCI (fuel/cladding chemical interaction) barrier and a re-constraint for external elongation. In addition, atomized fuel powder, dispersed in a Na liquid metal having a high thermal conductivity, may have a lower temperature distribution during irradiation. In order to develop an efficient fabrication process of metallic fuel for SFR, U-Zr ingot rods were fabricated in a lab-scale with various casting methods. Rod-type U-Zr fuel slugs were fabricated by gravity casting and injection casting. Spherical powder of U-Zr alloy was also fabricated by centrifugal atomization. And then, the microstructural characteristics were investigated by using electron microscopes and energy-dispersive electron X-ray spectroscopy. Atomized U-10Zr powder generally showed spherical morphology of below 200 μm in particle size. U grains became finer from ∼30 μm in conventionally ingot rod to ∼2 μm in atomized powder. Laminar structure became so fine from ∼0.2 μm in conventionally cast ingot rod to 0.05∼0.1 μm in atomized powder. Atomized particulate metallic fuel for SFR has a fine microstructure, resulting in a higher fission gas release rate during irradiation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗