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Multiparty-controlled quantum secure direct communication

A theoretical scheme of a multiparty-controlled quantum secure direct communication is proposed. The supervisor prepares a communication network with Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs and auxiliary particles. After passing a security test of the communication network, a supervisor tells the users the network is secure and they can communicate. If the controllers allow the communicators to communicate, the controllers should perform measurements and inform the communicators of the outcomes. The communicators then begin to communicate after they perform a security test of the quantum channel and verify that it is secure. The recipient can decrypt the secret message in a classical message from the sender depending on the protocol. Any two users in the network can communicate through the above processes under the control of the supervisor and the controllers.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Data Summary Report for Soil and Slab Sampling at Former Building 175

Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are in the process of returning the area where Building 175 existed to beneficial use for future site development. The completed assessment will help LLNS and DOE to outline project scope and costs associated with the removal, characterization, and disposal of materials generated when the concrete slab for the former building and any associated remaining subsurface structures are demolished. Slab removal under the Transition & Disposition process requires full screening for potential site contamination to determine appropriate future land use. Borehole locations and depths were designed to correctly assess DOE’s future liability for characterizing residual vadose zone contamination. If a residual source area is identified at depth, DOE will need to evaluate the additional cost of future subsurface cleanup (with limited access) due to planned development. This is necessary to leave the location in a “ready-to-build” status. As a result, Phase II sampling requirements may in some cases extend beyond the construction zone required for slab removal to ensure the necessary due diligence. To avoid the potential spread of contamination and/or the creation of an environmental release by impacting the integrity of known contamination areas (e.g., pit within room 102 and the east to west boundary seam), these locations were not sampled for this project. During demolition of the slab, these locations and their underlying soils should be further evaluated. The assessment was conducted in accord with the May 2022 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Former Building 175 Assessment Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan / Quality Assurance Plan. Thirty-six, direct-push borings were advanced, along with collecting concrete (where present) and soil samples for laboratory analyses. Thirty-two of the borings were advanced to a depth of 25 feet below ground (bgs), and four borings were advanced to a depth of 55 feet bgs. The concrete slab for former Building 175 ranged from approximately 8 inches to over two feet in thickness. Soils encountered during the investigation consisted primarily of clayey silt, with interbeds of sandy gravel and silty sand to the total depth explored of 55 feet bgs. Field photoionization detector readings – checking for volatile organic compound (VOC) vapors in soils, ranged from zero (0) to a peak of 33 parts per million at 25 feet bgs in boring PC-B175- 028. The cause for the peak reading is unknown, however, no visually discolored or odorous soils were encountered during the assessment and all VOC results were below Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) soil screening levels (SSL). Groundwater was not encountered during the assessment and is expected to occur at roughly 65 feet bgs in the project area. No metals were detected at concentrations of concern in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. Low gross alpha and beta activity concentrations were detected in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The detected activity concentrations would appear to be from naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, i.e., potassium 40, present in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Tritium was not detected above the testing laboratory's Method Detection Limit (MDL) in any of the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 214, lead 212, lead 214, potassium 40, radium 226, radium 228, and thallium 208, were detected at low activity concentrations in the concrete core samples analyzed. Based on the detected activity concentrations, the isotopes would appear to be naturally occurring in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Acetone – a common laboratory contaminant, was detected in nine of the soil samples collected and analyzed. Concentrations of two other volatile organic compounds (benzene and tetrachloroethene) were detected in five of the soil samples analyzed. All concentrations were below SSLs. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel range organics were detected at 43.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as motor oil were detected at 7.20 mg/kg in the 15-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-001, and at 20.7 mg/kg in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. The SSL for diesel-range TPHs is 260 mg/kg. LLNL does not have an SSL for motor oil range TPHs. No indications of a release, e.g., visibly stained, or odorous soil, were present at the boring locations. No samples collected contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in concentrations above the laboratory reporting limit. Arsenic was detected above its SSL of 8.51 mg/kg in the 25-foot bgs routine sample collected from boring PC-B175-023. Nickel was detected above its SSL of 86.0 mg/kg in the 10-foot bgs routine sample from boing PC-B175-005, the 20-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-025, and the 25-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-034. The detected concentrations, however, were well below ten times (10x) their respective STLCs. Gross alpha and/or gross beta were detected above their respective SSL activity concentrations in three routine soil samples. Retesting (two per sample) of the samples showed that the initial reported activity concentrations were anomalous. Tritium was not detected in any of the routine or duplicate soil samples collected and analyzed during the investigation. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 212 and 214, lead 212 and 214, potassium 40, radium 224, 226 and 228, thallium 208, thorium 234 and uranium, were detected at low activity concentrations in the soil samples analyzed for radioactive constituents. The detected isotopes and their associated activity concentrations are typical of those naturally occurring in the marine-type sedimentary deposits underlying the Livermore Valley. No radiological controls are necessary for the soil evaluated.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Monoenergetic photon-induced fission cross-section ratio measurements for U 235 , U 238 , and Pu 239 from 9.0 to 17.0 MeV

Background: High-accuracy data are needed to advance microscopic descriptions of the nuclear fission process, to improve the predictive precision of phenomenological models, and for applications in nuclear energy and homeland security. Purpose: In this work, the main goal is to provide high-accuracy cross-section data for photofission of 235 U, 238 U, and 239 Pu in the energy range from the fission threshold to the high-energy tail of the giant dipole resonance. These new data should contribute significantly to the reduction of the systematic uncertainty in evaluated photofission cross-section databases. Method: Cross-section ratios for photofission of the “big three” actinide nuclei were measured using a quasimonoenergetic photon beam and dual-fission chambers. The measurements were performed at the HIγS facility using a photon beam produced from Compton backscattering of free-electron laser light. The dual-fission chamber enabled simultaneous counting of fission events from two targets. This method allows for cross-section ratio measurements with very small systematic errors. The largest source of systematic error in the determination of the cross-section ratios is the uncertainty in the ratio of the target thicknesses. Results: We report photon-induced fission cross-section ratios for σ[ 235 U(γ,f) / 238 U(γ,f)] , σ[235U(γ,f) / 239 Pu(γ,f)] , and σ[ 238 U(γ,f) / 239 Pu(γ,f)] at photon energies from 9.0–17.0 MeV. More than 20 data points were measured for each ratio, and the systematic uncertainties are less than 2%. Conclusion: The present photofission cross-section ratio data sets are compared to ratios computed from previous measurements, to the corresponding neutron-induced fission cross-section ratios, and to ratios computed from evaluated databases. Finally, the data obtained in this work for σ[ 235 U(γ,f) / 238 U(γ,f)] are consistent with the existing data, while for σ[ 235 U(γ,f) / 239 Pu(γ,f)] and σ[ 238 U(γ,f) / 239 Pu(γ,f)] the present data are systematically lower.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Livermore Lab's giant laser system will bring star power to Earth

In the 50 years since the laser was first demonstrated in Malibu, California, on May 16, 1960, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has been a world leader in laser technology and the home for many of the world's most advanced laser systems. That tradition continues today at LLNL's National Ignition Facility (NIF), the world's most energetic laser system. NIF's completion in March 2009 not only marked the dawn of a new era of scientific research - it could also prove to be the next big step in the quest for a sustainable, carbon-free energy source for the world. NIF consists of 192 laser beams that will focus up to 1.8 million joules of energy on a bb-sized target filled with isotopes of hydrogen - forcing the hydrogen nuclei to collide and fuse in a controlled thermonuclear reaction similar to what happens in the sun and the stars. More energy will be produced by this 'ignition' reaction than the amount of laser energy required to start it. This is the long-sought goal of 'energy gain' that has eluded fusion researchers for more than half a century. Success will be a scientific breakthrough - the first demonstration of fusion ignition in a laboratory setting, duplicating on Earth the processes that power the stars. This impending success could not be achieved without the valuable partnerships forged with other national and international laboratories, private industry and universities. One of the most crucial has been between LLNL and the community in which it resides. Over 155 businesses in the local Tri-Valley area have contributed to the NIF, from industrial technology and engineering firms to tool manufacturing, electrical, storage and supply companies. More than $2.3B has been spent locally between contracts with nearby merchants and employee salaries. The Tri-Valley community has enabled the Laboratory to complete a complex and far-reaching project that will have national and global impact in the future. The first experiments were conducted on NIF last summer and fall, successfully delivering a world-record level of ultraviolet laser energy - more than 1.2 million joules - to a target. The experiments also demonstrated the target drive and target capsule conditions required to achieve fusion ignition. When ignition experiments begin later this year, NIF's lasers will create temperatures and pressures in the hydrogen target that exist only in the cores of stars and giant planets and inside thermonuclear weapons. As a key component of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Stockpile Stewardship Program, NIF will offer the means for sustaining a safe, secure and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. NIF is uniquely capable of providing the experimental data needed to develop and validate computer models that will enable scientists to assess the continuing viability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. Along with this vital national security mission, success at NIF also offers the possibility of groundbreaking scientific discoveries in a wide variety of disciplines ranging from hydrodynamics to astrophysics. As a unique facility in the world that can create the conditions that exist in supernovas and in the cores of giant planets, NIF will help unlock the secrets of the cosmos and inspire the next generation of scientists. It is NIF's third mission, energy security that has been generating the most excitement in the news media and the international scientific community. The reasons are obvious: global energy demand, driven by population growth and the aspirations of the developing world, already is straining the planet's existing energy resources. Global need for electricity is expected to double from its current level of about two trillion watts (TW) to four TW by 2030 and could reach eight to ten TW by the end of the century. As many as 10,000 new billion-watt power plants will have to be built to keep up with this demand. Meeting this pressing need will require a sustainable carbon-free energy technology that can supply base load electricity to the world. Successful ignition experiments at NIF can be a springboard for a revolutionary, long-term solution to our energy security - laser inertial fusion energy, or LIFE. An advanced energy concept now under development at LLNL, LIFE will build on the physics and technology developed for NIF to help meet future worldwide energy needs in a safe, sustainable manner without carbon dioxide emissions. LIFE power plants would be inherently safe, use the limitless supply of hydrogen fuel found in the world's oceans, and be capable of supplying base load electricity to the world. By harnessing the universe's quintessential power source, fusion energy, the United States can continue its leadership in game-changing technologies that drive economic competitiveness. Successful demonstration of ignition and energy gain at NIF will be a transforming event that will solidify fusion's potential as an important energy source.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2014

This Nevada Nuclear Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts.This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2014 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NFO is responsible for the oversight of these ER projects, and the Sandia Field Office of NNSA (NNSA/SFO) has oversight of all other TTR and NTTR activities. NNSA/SFO produces the TTR annual environmental report, which is available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.Major Site Programs and Facilities NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. The six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for weapons experimentation and nuclear test readiness. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site (known as the T-1 Site), Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

CS651 Computer Systems Security Foundations 3d Imagination Cyber Security Management Plan

3d Imagination is a new company that bases its business on selling and improving 3d open source related hardware. The devices that they sell include 3d imagers, 3d printers, pick and place machines and laser etchers. They have a fast company intranet for ease in sharing, storing and printing large, complex 3d designs. They have an employee set that requires a variety of operating systems including Windows, Mac and a variety of Linux both for running business services as well as design and test machines. There are a wide variety of private networks for testing transfer rates to and from the 3d devices, without interference with other network tra c. They do video conferencing conferencing with customers and other designers. One of their machines is based on the project found at delta.firepick.org(Krassenstein, 2014; Biggs, 2014), which in future, will perform most of those functions. Their devices all include embedded systems, that may have full blown operating systems. Most of their systems are designed to have swappable parts, so when a new technology is born, it can be quickly adopted by people with 3d Imagination hardware. This company is producing a fair number of systems and components, however to get the funding they need to mass produce quality parts, so they are preparing for an IPO to raise the funds they need. They would like to have a cyber-security audit performed so they can give their investors con dence that they are protecting their data, customers information and printers in a proactive manner.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Data Enhanced Hierarchical Control to Improve Distribution Voltage with Extremely High PV Penetration: Preprint

Dynamic, scalable and interoperable control paradigm is required to enable efficient, secure, reliable and resilient distribution grid operations with widespread grid integration of renewable energy resources. This paper presents our recent research work on developing a novel, holistic, data enhanced hierarchical control architecture that addresses the formidable challenges faced by emerging distribution grids with increasing penetrations of distributed energy resources. The proposed architecture integrates centralized monitoring and control together with distributed grid edge control, and thus effectively deals with multi-spatiotemporal dynamics existing in the grid. Simulation results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed control architecture.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Radiation portal monitor data file format for comprehensive background radiation monitoring

Radiation portal monitors (RPMs) are widely used at border security checkpoints to detect the presence of radioactive materials in people, vehicles, and cargo. Typically, RPM detection systems consist of two pillars equipped with gamma and neutron detectors. To improve detection efficiency, RPMs employ techniques such as a limited energy window, dynamic alarm thresholds, and lead shielding. However, without continuous monitoring of background radiation, signal interpretation can be compromised, because environmental factors and mechanical failures can cause fluctuations. Here, we introduce a daily file format that logs gamma background and neutron background radiation levels continuously over a 24 h period; this format is different from traditional formats that record data only when the RPM is active or occupied. The approach enables RPM operators and analysts to (1) identify and diagnose malfunctioning components, (2) adjust system settings to account for dynamic environmental factors, and (3) use the recorded data to characterize outer space phenomena. Continuous background reporting is essential for identifying issues such as faulty connections, voltage divider failures, and errors in background updates. Continuous background reporting also enables the detection of external influences, including nearby X-ray scanners, temperature fluctuations, rainfall, cosmic radiation, and lunar phase changes. These data files are designed to be easily evaluated and parsed using common tools, and a quick review by an expert is often sufficient for problem diagnosis. We anticipate that continuous background radiation monitoring and these new strategies will significantly improve the accuracy and reliability of RPM systems, reducing the rate of false alarms and enhancing overall system performance.

Background radiation monitoring↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit 374 is located in Areas 18 and 20 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 374 comprises the five corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 18-22-05, Drum • 18-22-06, Drums (20) • 18-22-08, Drum • 18-23-01, Danny Boy Contamination Area • 20-45-03, U-20u Crater (Schooner) These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on October 20, 2009, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 374.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) on Opportunistic Networks_ A Feasibility Study Utilizing Fiber Optic Infrastructure at NEON Sites for DAS

This study demonstrates the feasibility of using Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) on the opportunistic optical fiber infrastructure presented by NEON (National Ecological Observatory Network) sites. The test took place at the NEON Terrestrial Site designated D10 CPER. Unlit portions of the local fiber network were successfully spliced together and optimized for length and a Silixa iDAS sensor was installed. The resulting array (composed of 12 spliced fiber runs) totaled 875m in length. Over a period of 2 weeks, we gathered a high spatial and temporal resolution data set to characterize discernable signals and understand background noise. The data set was reviewed to extract wave signatures of identifiable origin, both anthropogenic and otherwise. Continent wide distribution of these sites makes them an interesting candidate for DAS and identifying measurable signal sources informs future DAS application on opportunistic fiber networks. These observations validate the utility of both the NEON and similarly small fiber networks (<1km) for geoscience, environmental, and security DAS applications and indicate possibilities for further inquiry in methods for DAS data collection and analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 544: Cellars, Mud Pits, and Oil Spills, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 544, Cellars, Mud Pits, and Oil Spills, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 544 comprises the following 20 corrective action sites (CASs) located in Areas 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 19, and 20 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS): • 02-37-08, Cellar & Mud Pit • 02-37-09, Cellar & Mud Pit • 07-09-01, Mud Pit • 09-09-46, U-9itsx20 PS #1A Mud Pit • 10-09-01, Mud Pit • 12-09-03, Mud Pit • 19-09-01, Mud Pits (2) • 19-09-03, Mud Pit • 19-09-04, Mud Pit • 19-25-01, Oil Spill • 19-99-06, Waste Spill • 20-09-01, Mud Pits (2) • 20-09-02, Mud Pit • 20-09-03, Mud Pit • 20-09-04, Mud Pits (2) • 20-09-06, Mud Pit • 20-09-07, Mud Pit • 20-09-10, Mud Pit • 20-25-04, Oil Spills • 20-25-05, Oil Spills This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing each CAS. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 544 using the SAFER process. Using the approach approved for previous mud pit investigations (CAUs 530–535), 14 mud pits have been identified that • are either a single mud pit or a system of mud pits, • are not located in a radiologically posted area, and • have no evident biasing factors based on visual inspections. These 14 mud pits are recommended for no further action (NFA), and further field investigations will not be conducted. For the sites that do not meet the previously approved closure criteria, additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible recommendation for closure of the remaining CASs in CAU 544. This will be presented in a closure report (CR) that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 27, 2010, by representatives of NDEP and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for each CAS in CAU 544. The DQO process developed for this CAU identified the following expected closure options: (1) investigation and confirmation that no contamination exists above the final action levels (FALs) leading to an NFA declaration, (2) characterization of the nature and extent of contamination leading to closure in place with use restrictions, (3) clean closure by remediation and verification, (4) closure in place with use restrictions with no investigation if CASs are in crater areas that have been determined to be unsafe to enter, or (5) NFA if the mud pit CAS meets the criteria established during the CAUs 530–535 SAFER investigation. The following summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 544: • Perform visual inspection of all CASs. • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, construction of temporary site exclusion zones). • Removal of easily managed, nonhazardous, and nonradioactive debris, including vegetation (e.g., tumbleweeds), at various CASs that interfere with sampling, if required to inspect soil surface or collect soil sample. • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., mud pits, cellars, stained soil) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • If no COCs are present at a CAS, establish NFA as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. • If a COC is present at a CAS, either - Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or - Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions. • Confirm the preferred closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011

This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.' Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2011 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory-Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2012

This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) (formerly designated as the Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO]). The new field office designation occurred in March 2013. Published reports cited in this 2012 report, therefore, may bear the name or authorship of NNSA/NSO. This and previous years’ reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NFO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2012 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NFO is responsible for the oversight of these ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR and NTTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Applying RFID technology in nuclear materials management.

The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) of US Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM), Office of Safety Management and Operations (EM-60), has developed a radio frequency identification (RFID) system for the management of nuclear materials. Argonne National Laboratory, a PCP supporting laboratory, and Savi Technology, a Lockheed Martin Company, are collaborating in the development of the RFID system, a process that involves hardware modification (form factor, seal sensor and batteries), software development and irradiation experiments. Savannah River National Laboratory and Argonne will soon field test the active RFID system on Model 9975 drums, which are used for storage and transportation of fissile and radioactive materials. Potential benefits of the RFID system are enhanced safety and security, reduced need for manned surveillance, real time access of status and history data, and overall cost effectiveness.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Preparations for Additional Protocol Implementation

The United States Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force (EIF) January 6, 2009. In anticipation of the EIF, the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) began the initial DOE AP data call on November 3, 2008. This paper describes the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's (ORNL's) preparation, organization, and development efforts to successfully implement the AP and complete the AP data call. ORNL had 35 days to identify declarable activities and finalize the declaration line items (DLIs) for submission to NA-243. To be able to respond within the required time frame, many preparation activities at ORNL were necessary, such as determining the AP coordinator (APC) and team roles; conducting site awareness training; creating the ORNL Standards-Based Management System (SBMS) procedure Reporting of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities; training personnel; and defining site implementation software tools. Identifying, updating, compiling, reviewing, and submitting the DLIs to NA-243 were all critical activities for successfully implementing the AP and completing the AP data call at ORNL.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Valuing Energy Security: Customer Damage Function Methodology and Case Studies at DoD Installations

This report describes a methodology to value non-energy savings that can be attributed to energy security projects. The methodology is based on: (1) completing a site survey to collect data on two hypothetical outage scenarios lasting for different durations to compute a customer damage function (CDF), which represents interruption costs as a function of the outage duration; (2) characterizing the reliability of the commercial power supply at the site; and (3) estimating the value of electrical energy security (VEES), which is a metric that characterizes on an annual basis the cost of utility outages. The avoided cost of commercial power outages can be used as ancillary non-energy savings to increase the return on investment of energy security projects.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗