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Twenty-Plus Years of Environmental Change and Ecological Recovery of East Fork Poplar Creek: Background and Trends in Water Quality

In May 1985, a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit was issued for the Department of Energy's Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 Complex) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA, allowing discharge of effluents to East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC). The effluents ranged from large volumes of chlorinated once-through cooling water and cooling tower blow-down to smaller discharges of treated and untreated process wastewaters, which contained a mixture of heavy metals, organics, and nutrients, especially nitrates. As a condition of the permit, a Biological Monitoring and Abatement Program (BMAP) was developed to meet two major objectives: demonstrate that the established effluent limitations were protecting the classified uses of EFPC, and document the ecological effects resulting from implementing a Water Pollution Control Program at the Y-12 Complex. The second objective is the primary focus of the other papers in this special series. This paper provides a history of pollution and the remedial actions that were implemented; describes the geographic setting of the study area; and characterizes the physicochemical attributes of the sampling sites, including changes in stream flow and temperature that occurred during implementation of the BMAP. Most of the actions taken under the Water Pollution Control Program were completed between 1986 and 1998, with as many as four years elapsing between some of the most significant actions. The Water Pollution Control Program included constructing nine new wastewater treatment facilities and implementation of several other pollution-reducing measures, such as a best management practices plan; area-source pollution control management; and various spill-prevention projects. Many of the major actions had readily discernable effects on the chemical and physical conditions of EFPC. As controls on effluents entering the stream were implemented, pollutant concentrations generally declined and, at least initially, the volume of water discharged from the Y-12 Complex declined. This reduction in discharge was of ecological concern and led to implementation of a flow management program for EFPC. Implementing flow management, in turn, led to substantial changes in chemical and physical conditions of the stream: stream discharge nearly doubled and stream temperatures decreased, becoming more similar to those in reference streams. While water quality clearly improved, meeting water quality standards alone does not guarantee protection of a waterbody's biological integrity. Results from studies on the ecological changes stemming from pollution-reduction actions, such as those presented in this series, also are needed to understand how best to restore or protect biological integrity and enhance ecological recovery in stream ecosystems. With a better knowledge of the ecological consequences of their decisions, environmental managers can better evaluate alternative actions and more accurately predict their effects.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Material Balance Area Design for the Transuranic Fuel Cycle Employing High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors

A major impetus has been to ensure safety in nuclear power plant systems from the beginning of its development to the current period of nuclear renaissance. As one of the next generation reactors with a high level of nuclear safety, high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) has attracted large attention because of the possibility to shut down the reactor safely and remove decay heat without the use of active cooling. A deep-burn concept of fuel utilization is proposed and studied for HTGRs to alleviate plutonium proliferation concern. The idea is to utilize the plutonium extracted by reprocessing the light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel and discharge it only at higher fuel burn-ups of up to 90 atom %. In addition HTGRs have been studied to utilize transuranic (TRU) fuel. A large amount of special nuclear material (SNM) will be used in the HTGR advanced fuel cycle. The inherent proliferation resistance and material attractiveness of the fresh fuel and discharged spent fuel have been discussed against the diversion from peaceful to military uses. On the other hand safeguards of SNM is also important to prevent nuclear proliferation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty between the state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Facility operators are responsible to design material balance area (MBA) and provide enough information on material balance of SNMs for the safeguards conclusion. The material unaccounted for (MUF) and measurement uncertainty in MUF (σ{sub MUF}) represent accuracy of material balance. The MBAs have to be designed and established to achieve enough confidence level on MUF and σ{sub MUF}. The MBA design is challenging for nuclear facilities managing large amount of bulk (instead of items) SNM because of potentially large MUF and σ{sub MUF}. A concept and guidance of MBA design for uranium fueled HTGRs has been discussed. In this study, a MBA design is presented for the transuranic fuel cycle employing HTGRs. The MUF and the σ{sub MUF} is calculated and evaluated using international target values (ITVs) provided by the IAEA. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Erosion Challenges at the L-Bar Disposal Site - 19561

The L-Bar, New Mexico, Disposal Site is located in the northeast corner of Cibola County, 10 miles north of Laguna, and was the former site of a uranium mill and underground mine. The mill operated from 1977 to 1981 where a total of 1.9 x 10{sup 6} tonnes (2.1 million tons) of ore was processed. Solid and liquid byproduct, or tailings, from the milling process were impounded behind a dam constructed of native weathered Mancos Shale, which is a predominant geologic formation in the area. The tailings were encapsulated in place, and the resulting 40.5-hectare (100-acre) engineered disposal cell was completed in 2000. The 299-hectare (738-acre) Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title II site was transferred to the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management under a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission general license in 2004. During reclamation activities, channels were designed and constructed into the surrounding weathered shale to protect the disposal cell from high-precipitation events. Due to the highly erodible soils and anticipated sediment deposition into the diversion channels, a sediment trap was also excavated. By excavating the channels and sediment trap, the local base elevation was altered, which exacerbated erosional forces. Recontouring surrounding drainage basins during the reclamation activities also promoted erosion by reducing natural rock armoring and vegetation that aids in soil stability. To compound the erosion issue, the L-Bar site is susceptible to short-duration, high-intensity, localized convective storms. Because the local geomorphology includes soils consisting of weathered shale, these precipitation events are not conducive to absorption into the soils, but rather to sheet flows that follow topography and concentrate in lower elevation areas where flow volumes and velocities increase. These factors result in the formation of deeply incised gullies and promote soil piping, which is an important geomorphic process in the widening of arroyos and the advancement of head-cutting, evident at the L-Bar site and surrounding areas. At the first annual inspection by DOE in 2005, it was noted that extensive erosion was occurring upgradient of the sediment trap. DOE determined that the design of the site's drainage system was the cause of extensive erosion. It is believed that by lowering the base elevation of the local drainage system through excavation of the sediment trap, the geomorphic response common to fluvial systems in a semiarid environment has increased the incision and remobilization of sediment downstream. Over time, these sediments would be deposited in the channels, which are designed to divert runoff away from the disposal cell, effectively limiting their capacities. The development of alluvial fans on one side of the channel directs flows to the opposite side of the channel, presenting the risk of cutting into the side slopes of the disposal cell. In addition, the upstream migrating gullies could intersect access roads and create hazards for adjacent stakeholders, including their grazing livestock. Current estimates conclude that potential offsite impacts could occur within the next 20 years, with gully migrations of up to 19 meters (63 feet) per year. In 2009, several erosion-control structures were constructed to reduce runoff velocities and ease the elevation differential created by the construction of the sediment trap and diversion channels. The first measurable storm events after construction occurred in August and September 2011, where one structure washed out and another structure was bypassed when runoff breached an earthen berm. DOE has conducted site assessments, continues to monitor erosion, and has applied lessons learned in the process of evaluating options to repair or modify the structures to stabilize the site and prevent potential short-term damage to adjacent properties as well as long-term damage to the disposal cell. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Heavy Water Components Test Reactor Decommissioning - Major Component Removal

The Heavy Water Components Test Reactor (HWCTR) facility (Figure 1) was built in 1961, operated from 1962 to 1964, and is located in the northwest quadrant of the Savannah River Site (SRS) approximately three miles from the site boundary. The HWCTR facility is on high, well-drained ground, about 30 meters above the water table. The HWCTR was a pressurized heavy water test reactor used to develop candidate fuel designs for heavy water power reactors. It was not a defense-related facility like the materials production reactors at SRS. The reactor was moderated with heavy water and was rated at 50 megawatts thermal power. In December of 1964, operations were terminated and the facility was placed in a standby condition as a result of the decision by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to redirect research and development work on heavy water power reactors to reactors cooled with organic materials. For about one year, site personnel maintained the facility in a standby status, and then retired the reactor in place. In 1965, fuel assemblies were removed, systems that contained heavy water were drained, fluid piping systems were drained, deenergized and disconnected and the spent fuel basin was drained and dried. The doors of the reactor facility were shut and it wasn't until 10 years later that decommissioning plans were considered and ultimately postponed due to budget constraints. In the early 1990s, DOE began planning to decommission HWCTR again. Yet, in the face of new budget constraints, DOE deferred dismantlement and placed HWCTR in an extended surveillance and maintenance mode. The doors of the reactor facility were welded shut to protect workers and discourage intruders. The $1.6 billion allocation from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to SRS for site clean up at SRS has opened the doors to the HWCTR again - this time for final decommissioning. During the lifetime of HWCTR, 36 different fuel assemblies were tested in the facility. Ten of these experienced cladding failures as operational capabilities of the different designs were being established. In addition, numerous spills of heavy water occurred within the facility. Currently, radiation and radioactive contamination levels are low within HWCTR with most of the radioactivity contained within the reactor vessel. There are no known insults to the environment, however with the increasing deterioration of the facility, the possibility exists that contamination could spread outside the facility if it is not decommissioned. An interior panoramic view of the ground floor elevation taken in August 2009 is shown in Figure 2. The foreground shows the transfer coffin followed by the reactor vessel and control rod drive platform in the center. Behind the reactor vessel is the fuel pool. Above the ground level are the polar crane and the emergency deluge tank at the top of the dome. Note the considerable rust and degradation of the components and the interior of the containment building. Alternative studies have concluded that the most environmentally safe, cost effective option for final decommissioning is to remove the reactor vessel, steam generators, and all equipment above grade including the dome. Characterization studies along with transport models have concluded that the remaining below grade equipment that is left in place including the transfer coffin will not contribute any significant contamination to the environment in the future. The below grade space will be grouted in place. A concrete cover will be placed over the remaining footprint and the groundwater will be monitored for an indefinite period to ensure compliance with environmental regulations. The schedule for completion of decommissioning is late FY2011. This paper describes the concepts planned in order to remove the major components including the dome, the reactor vessel (RV), the two steam generators (SG), and relocating the transfer coffin (TC).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Validation of gamma-ray detection techniques for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under the revised policy, IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed to develop and validate concepts of nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP), where gamma-ray spectroscopy was selected as the process monitoring tool. The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was employed to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an NUCP. Nondestructive assay techniques using gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely way. This work investigated gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluated various gamma-ray detector sensitivities to uranyl nitrate. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the uranyl nitrate gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and high-purity germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10–90 g U/L of natural uranyl nitrate are presented. A range of gamma-ray lines is examined, including attenuation for transmission measurement of density and concentration. It was determined that transmission-corrected gamma-ray spectra provide a reliable way to monitor the 235 U concentration of uranyl nitrate solution in transfer pipes in NUCPs. Furthermore, existing predictive and analysis methods are adequate to design and realize practical designs. The 137 Cs transmission source employed in this work is viable but not optimal for 235 U densitometry determination. Validated simulations assessed the viability of 133 Ba and 57Co as alternative densitometry sources. All three gamma-ray detectors are viable for monitoring natural uranium feed; although high-purity germanium is easiest to interpret, it is, however, the least attractive as an installation instrument. Overall, for monitoring throughput in a facility such as UNCLE, emulating the uranium concentration and pump speeds of the Springfields conversion facility in the United Kingdom, an uncertainty of less than 0.17% is required in order to detect the diversion of 1 SQ of uranyl nitrate through changes in uranium concentration over an accountancy period of one year with a detection probability of 50%. As a result, calibrated gamma-ray detection systems are capable of determining the concentration of uranium content in NUCPs, it is only in combination with verifiable operator declarations and supporting data, such as flow rate and enrichment, that safeguards conclusions can be drawn.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Long-Term Stewardship Optimization for a Decommissioned Nuclear Reactor - 19579

The decommissioned Hallam Nuclear Power Facility (Hallam), located in Lancaster County, Nebraska, approximately 19 miles south of Lincoln, was developed as a prototype to investigate the technical and economic feasibility of a sodium-cooled, graphite-moderated nuclear reactor. As part of its Power Demonstration Program, the US Atomic Energy Commission (US AEC), a predecessor agency of the US Department of Energy (US DOE), operated the Hallam reactor from 1962 to 1964. The radiological surveillance of the Hallam site was established when the operating agreement between AEC and the Nebraska Public Power District was terminated. The US DOE Chicago Operations Office and the Nebraska Department of Health (NDH) agreed to install a shallow groundwater monitoring system as part of the environmental surveillance program. Surveillance at the site was scheduled to end in fiscal year 2005, with no further activities planned after that. At that time, the plan was to transition the site to the Nebraska Public Power District with future use of the facility to remain restricted. US DOE has title to and responsibility for the entombed radioactive materials. A surveillance and monitoring program was initiated in 1970 by NDH and was funded by US AEC. It included the analysis of samples from deep production wells (groundwater from the regional aquifer at depths greater than 55 meters [180 feet]) at the Sheldon Station. NDH was concerned in 1990 about the possibility of shallow groundwater coming in contact with the buried radiological materials along the buried walls of the reactor. Subsequently, DOE and NDH agreed to further characterize hydrologic conditions and establish a monitoring program in the shallow, perched groundwater zones. The current monitoring program focuses on the shallow, perched groundwater. Today, decades since facility decommissioning, site inspections and groundwater monitoring continue at this Cold War-era legacy site. The US DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) monitors groundwater as a best management practice in response to a request from the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). In 2006, LM recommended discontinuing groundwater monitoring because analytical results since 1970 demonstrated there had been no impact to shallow, perched groundwater and no current or anticipated unacceptable risk to human health and the environment. The State of Nebraska did not concur with the recommendation to stop monitoring but did agree to a reduction in sampling and analysis from once a year to once every 2 years--a schedule that began in 2008. An updated assessment of the groundwater monitoring effort was issued in 2016. The entire body of water-quality data continues to demonstrate that there have been no negative impacts to the shallow, perched groundwater from radioactive materials entombed at the site 46 years ago. LM, with concurrence from Nebraska DHHS, changed the sampling frequency, effective in 2018, as follows: once every 5 years from 2021 to 2041 and once every 10 years from 2041 to 2071. In summary, LM remains committed to its primary mission to protect human health and the environment at each of its 92 legacy sites. With results from groundwater sampling events demonstrating compliance for 48 years, the Hallam site was able to set an LM benchmark to optimize long-term stewardship and define an end-state strategy for other decommissioned reactor facilities across the DOE complex. Continued collaboration with local communities, stakeholder, and regulators often leads to outcomes of sound protectiveness without compromise to safety or compliance, as demonstrated by the optimization of the long-term stewardship at the Hallam site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

WE-G-213-00: History Symposium: Radiological Physics Pioneers: Roentgen and the AAPM Award Eponyms - William Coolidge, Edith Quimby, and Marvin Williams - Who Were They and What Did They Do?

Roentgen and the Birth of Modern Medical Physics – Perry Sprawls Wilhelm Roentgen is well known for his discovery of x-radiation. What is less known and appreciated is his intensive research following the discovery to determine the characteristics of the “new kind of radiation” and demonstrate its great value for medical purposes. In this presentation we will imagine ourselves in Roentgen’s mind and follow his thinking, including questions and doubts, as he designs and conducts a series of innovative experiments that provided the foundation for the rapid growth of medical physics. Learning Objectives: Become familiar with the personal characteristics and work of Prof. Roentgen that establishes him as an inspiring model for the medical physics profession. Observe the thought process and experiments that determined and demonstrated the comprehensive characteristics of x-radiation. The AAPM Award Eponyms: William D. Coolidge, Edith H. Quimby, and Marvin M.D. Williams - Who were they and what did they do? – Lawrence N. Rothenberg William David Coolidge (1873–1975) William Coolidge was born in Hudson, NY in 1873. He obtained his BS at the Massacusetts Institute of Technology in 1896. Coolidge then went to the University of Leipzig, Germany for graduate study with physicists Paul Drude and Gustave Wiedemann and received a Ph.D. in 1899. While in Germany he met Wilhelm Roentgen. Coolidge returned to the US to teach at MIT where he was associated with Arthur A. Noyes of the Chemistry Department, working on the electrical conductivity of aqueous solutions. Willis R. Whitney, under whom Coolidge had worked before going to Germany, became head of the newly formed General Electric Research Laboratory and he invited Coolidge to work with him. In 1905, Coolidge joined the staff of the GE laboratory and was associated with it for the remainder of his life. He developed ductile tungsten filaments to replace fragile carbon filaments as the material for electric light bulb filaments. Until that innovation light bulbs had a notoriously short life. He later incorporated the ductile tungsten as a filament material for a hot cathode, fully evacuated x-ray tube, first described in 1912, which allowed higher current and x-ray output, and greater reliability than had previously been possible. These “Coolidge x-ray tubes” were far superior to the cold cathode, partial pressure gas x-ray tubes that had been in use since Roentgen’s discovery of x-rays in 1895. The Coolidge tube with incremental developments is now the key component for x-ray production in all of our modern x-ray imaging devices, such as CT scanners, interventional radiology systems, and mammography units. Coolidge was also involved in the development of sectional x-ray tubes for research and treatment that were initially designed to reach 800 kV. Additional improvements led to 1 MV and 2 MV devices. In 1932 Coolidge became director of the General Electric Research Laboratory, and in 1940, was made Vice-President and Director of Research. In 1945 he retired and was named Director Emeritus of the laboratory. Coolidge held 83 patents and was recognized for these and many other achievements by election to the National Academy of Engineers, a place in the Engineering Hall of Fame and the National Inventor’s Hall of Fame. The AAPM’s highest honor, the Coolidge Award, was named after him. He accepted Honorary Membership in the AAPM and was the first recipient of the AAPM Coolidge Award, which was presented to him in a special ceremony in Schenectady, NY in 1972 when he was 100 years old. Edith Hinckley Quimby (1891–1982) Edith Quimby was born in Rockford, IL in 1891. She graduated from Whitman College in Walla Walla, WA with a B.S. in 1913, and then obtained a masters degree from the University of California at Berkeley. Later in her career, after many significant achievements, Quimby was awarded honorary doctorates by Whitman College and Rutgers University. Edith Quimby was hired by Giacchino Failla as a radiation physicist at Memorial Hospital for Cancer in New York City. Failla had studied with Madame Curie and obtained his doctoral degree in her laboratory. After many groundbreaking medical physics studies from 1919 until 1942, they both moved to Columbia University. Dr. Quimby developed a widely employed dosimetry system for single plane implants with radium and radon seeds, and a dosimetry methodology for internal radionuclides. She was author of more than 75 scientific publications, and of significant textbooks including the first comprehensive physics textbook for radiologists “Physical Foundations of Radiology”, which was co-authored with Otto Glasser, Lauriston Taylor and James Weatherwax in the first edition, with Russell Morgan added for the second edition and Paul Goodwin for the fourth edition. With Sergei Feitelberg, M.D. she published two editions of “Radioactive Isotopes in Medicine and Biology: Basic Physics and Instrumentation”. Quimby became a renowned examiner for the American Board of Radiology when the third ABR examination, given in 1936, added physics. She served as President of the American Radium Society, received the RSNA Gold Medal, and also numerous prestigious awards given to women in science. Edith Quimby was a Charter Member of AAPM. The AAPM Lifetime Achievement Award was renamed the Edith H. Quimby Lifetime Achievement Award in her honor in 2011. Marvin Martin Dixon Williams (1902–1981) Marvin Williams was born in Walla Walla, WA in 1902, and attended the same college as Edith Quimby, graduating from Whitman College in 1926. He was greatly influenced to go into medical physics by her accomplishments. During his early career, Williams worked with James Weatherwax in Philadelphia while he was working toward an M.S. from the University of Pennsylvania. In 1931 Williams was awarded a Ph.D. in Biophysics from the University of Minnesota, with the work actually performed at the Mayo Clinic Graduate School of the University. While completing his Ph.D. studies, Marvin met Dr. Paul Hodges who had returned from the Peiping Union Medical College in Peiping (now Beijing), China. Hodges suggested that a physicist be sent to Peiping to install x-ray therapy equipment and a radon plant. Williams accepted the position and, in 1931, he and his wife Orpha left for China. Before going to China, Williams had spent time with the physics group at Memorial Hospital to learn about the operation of a radon plant. In China, he constructed the radon plant, employing 0.25 g of radium, and also installed the x-ray therapy unit. Williams and his wife returned to the US in 1935, and he accepted a research position at the Mayo Clinic. In 1950, he became Professor of Biophysics at Mayo, where he taught physics and biophysics until his retirement in 1967. Williams was also very active in the American Board of Radiology where, from 1944 through 1977, he examined over 3000 radiologists and 250 physicists. Marvin Williams was a Charter member of AAPM, served as the fourth President of AAPM in 1963, and was the fourth recipient the AAPM Coolidge Award in 1975. The Marvin Williams Award was originally established as the highest award of the American College of Medical Physics. When various functions of the ACMP were absorbed into the AAPM in 2012, the Marvin M D Williams Professional Achievement Award became one of the AAPM’s highest honors. Learning Objectives: Become familiar with the persons in whose honor the three major AAPM Award are named Learn about the achievements and activities which influenced the AAPM to name these awards in their honor.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

WE-G-213-01: Roentgen and the Birth of Modern Medical Physics

Roentgen and the Birth of Modern Medical Physics – Perry Sprawls Wilhelm Roentgen is well known for his discovery of x-radiation. What is less known and appreciated is his intensive research following the discovery to determine the characteristics of the “new kind of radiation” and demonstrate its great value for medical purposes. In this presentation we will imagine ourselves in Roentgen’s mind and follow his thinking, including questions and doubts, as he designs and conducts a series of innovative experiments that provided the foundation for the rapid growth of medical physics. Learning Objectives: Become familiar with the personal characteristics and work of Prof. Roentgen that establishes him as an inspiring model for the medical physics profession. Observe the thought process and experiments that determined and demonstrated the comprehensive characteristics of x-radiation. The AAPM Award Eponyms: William D. Coolidge, Edith H. Quimby, and Marvin M.D. Williams - Who were they and what did they do? – Lawrence N. Rothenberg William David Coolidge (1873–1975) William Coolidge was born in Hudson, NY in 1873. He obtained his BS at the Massacusetts Institute of Technology in 1896. Coolidge then went to the University of Leipzig, Germany for graduate study with physicists Paul Drude and Gustave Wiedemann and received a Ph.D. in 1899. While in Germany he met Wilhelm Roentgen. Coolidge returned to the US to teach at MIT where he was associated with Arthur A. Noyes of the Chemistry Department, working on the electrical conductivity of aqueous solutions. Willis R. Whitney, under whom Coolidge had worked before going to Germany, became head of the newly formed General Electric Research Laboratory and he invited Coolidge to work with him. In 1905, Coolidge joined the staff of the GE laboratory and was associated with it for the remainder of his life. He developed ductile tungsten filaments to replace fragile carbon filaments as the material for electric light bulb filaments. Until that innovation light bulbs had a notoriously short life. He later incorporated the ductile tungsten as a filament material for a hot cathode, fully evacuated x-ray tube, first described in 1912, which allowed higher current and x-ray output, and greater reliability than had previously been possible. These “Coolidge x-ray tubes” were far superior to the cold cathode, partial pressure gas x-ray tubes that had been in use since Roentgen’s discovery of x-rays in 1895. The Coolidge tube with incremental developments is now the key component for x-ray production in all of our modern x-ray imaging devices, such as CT scanners, interventional radiology systems, and mammography units. Coolidge was also involved in the development of sectional x-ray tubes for research and treatment that were initially designed to reach 800 kV. Additional improvements led to 1 MV and 2 MV devices. In 1932 Coolidge became director of the General Electric Research Laboratory, and in 1940, was made Vice-President and Director of Research. In 1945 he retired and was named Director Emeritus of the laboratory. Coolidge held 83 patents and was recognized for these and many other achievements by election to the National Academy of Engineers, a place in the Engineering Hall of Fame and the National Inventor’s Hall of Fame. The AAPM’s highest honor, the Coolidge Award, was named after him. He accepted Honorary Membership in the AAPM and was the first recipient of the AAPM Coolidge Award, which was presented to him in a special ceremony in Schenectady, NY in 1972 when he was 100 years old. Edith Hinckley Quimby (1891–1982) Edith Quimby was born in Rockford, IL in 1891. She graduated from Whitman College in Walla Walla, WA with a B.S. in 1913, and then obtained a masters degree from the University of California at Berkeley. Later in her career, after many significant achievements, Quimby was awarded honorary doctorates by Whitman College and Rutgers University. Edith Quimby was hired by Giacchino Failla as a radiation physicist at Memorial Hospital for Cancer in New York City. Failla had studied with Madame Curie and obtained his doctoral degree in her laboratory. After many groundbreaking medical physics studies from 1919 until 1942, they both moved to Columbia University. Dr. Quimby developed a widely employed dosimetry system for single plane implants with radium and radon seeds, and a dosimetry methodology for internal radionuclides. She was author of more than 75 scientific publications, and of significant textbooks including the first comprehensive physics textbook for radiologists “Physical Foundations of Radiology”, which was co-authored with Otto Glasser, Lauriston Taylor and James Weatherwax in the first edition, with Russell Morgan added for the second edition and Paul Goodwin for the fourth edition. With Sergei Feitelberg, M.D. she published two editions of “Radioactive Isotopes in Medicine and Biology: Basic Physics and Instrumentation”. Quimby became a renowned examiner for the American Board of Radiology when the third ABR examination, given in 1936, added physics. She served as President of the American Radium Society, received the RSNA Gold Medal, and also numerous prestigious awards given to women in science. Edith Quimby was a Charter Member of AAPM. The AAPM Lifetime Achievement Award was renamed the Edith H. Quimby Lifetime Achievement Award in her honor in 2011. Marvin Martin Dixon Williams (1902–1981) Marvin Williams was born in Walla Walla, WA in 1902, and attended the same college as Edith Quimby, graduating from Whitman College in 1926. He was greatly influenced to go into medical physics by her accomplishments. During his early career, Williams worked with James Weatherwax in Philadelphia while he was working toward an M.S. from the University of Pennsylvania. In 1931 Williams was awarded a Ph.D. in Biophysics from the University of Minnesota, with the work actually performed at the Mayo Clinic Graduate School of the University. While completing his Ph.D. studies, Marvin met Dr. Paul Hodges who had returned from the Peiping Union Medical College in Peiping (now Beijing), China. Hodges suggested that a physicist be sent to Peiping to install x-ray therapy equipment and a radon plant. Williams accepted the position and, in 1931, he and his wife Orpha left for China. Before going to China, Williams had spent time with the physics group at Memorial Hospital to learn about the operation of a radon plant. In China, he constructed the radon plant, employing 0.25 g of radium, and also installed the x-ray therapy unit. Williams and his wife returned to the US in 1935, and he accepted a research position at the Mayo Clinic. In 1950, he became Professor of Biophysics at Mayo, where he taught physics and biophysics until his retirement in 1967. Williams was also very active in the American Board of Radiology where, from 1944 through 1977, he examined over 3000 radiologists and 250 physicists. Marvin Williams was a Charter member of AAPM, served as the fourth President of AAPM in 1963, and was the fourth recipient the AAPM Coolidge Award in 1975. The Marvin Williams Award was originally established as the highest award of the American College of Medical Physics. When various functions of the ACMP were absorbed into the AAPM in 2012, the Marvin M D Williams Professional Achievement Award became one of the AAPM’s highest honors. Learning Objectives: Become familiar with the persons in whose honor the three major AAPM Award are named Learn about the achievements and activities which influenced the AAPM to name these awards in their honor.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

WE-G-213-02: The AAPM Award Eponyms: William D. Coolidge, Edith H. Quimby, and Marvin M.D. Williams - Who Were They and What Did They Do?

Roentgen and the Birth of Modern Medical Physics – Perry Sprawls Wilhelm Roentgen is well known for his discovery of x-radiation. What is less known and appreciated is his intensive research following the discovery to determine the characteristics of the “new kind of radiation” and demonstrate its great value for medical purposes. In this presentation we will imagine ourselves in Roentgen’s mind and follow his thinking, including questions and doubts, as he designs and conducts a series of innovative experiments that provided the foundation for the rapid growth of medical physics. Learning Objectives: Become familiar with the personal characteristics and work of Prof. Roentgen that establishes him as an inspiring model for the medical physics profession. Observe the thought process and experiments that determined and demonstrated the comprehensive characteristics of x-radiation. The AAPM Award Eponyms: William D. Coolidge, Edith H. Quimby, and Marvin M.D. Williams - Who were they and what did they do? – Lawrence N. Rothenberg William David Coolidge (1873–1975) William Coolidge was born in Hudson, NY in 1873. He obtained his BS at the Massacusetts Institute of Technology in 1896. Coolidge then went to the University of Leipzig, Germany for graduate study with physicists Paul Drude and Gustave Wiedemann and received a Ph.D. in 1899. While in Germany he met Wilhelm Roentgen. Coolidge returned to the US to teach at MIT where he was associated with Arthur A. Noyes of the Chemistry Department, working on the electrical conductivity of aqueous solutions. Willis R. Whitney, under whom Coolidge had worked before going to Germany, became head of the newly formed General Electric Research Laboratory and he invited Coolidge to work with him. In 1905, Coolidge joined the staff of the GE laboratory and was associated with it for the remainder of his life. He developed ductile tungsten filaments to replace fragile carbon filaments as the material for electric light bulb filaments. Until that innovation light bulbs had a notoriously short life. He later incorporated the ductile tungsten as a filament material for a hot cathode, fully evacuated x-ray tube, first described in 1912, which allowed higher current and x-ray output, and greater reliability than had previously been possible. These “Coolidge x-ray tubes” were far superior to the cold cathode, partial pressure gas x-ray tubes that had been in use since Roentgen’s discovery of x-rays in 1895. The Coolidge tube with incremental developments is now the key component for x-ray production in all of our modern x-ray imaging devices, such as CT scanners, interventional radiology systems, and mammography units. Coolidge was also involved in the development of sectional x-ray tubes for research and treatment that were initially designed to reach 800 kV. Additional improvements led to 1 MV and 2 MV devices. In 1932 Coolidge became director of the General Electric Research Laboratory, and in 1940, was made Vice-President and Director of Research. In 1945 he retired and was named Director Emeritus of the laboratory. Coolidge held 83 patents and was recognized for these and many other achievements by election to the National Academy of Engineers, a place in the Engineering Hall of Fame and the National Inventor’s Hall of Fame. The AAPM’s highest honor, the Coolidge Award, was named after him. He accepted Honorary Membership in the AAPM and was the first recipient of the AAPM Coolidge Award, which was presented to him in a special ceremony in Schenectady, NY in 1972 when he was 100 years old. Edith Hinckley Quimby (1891–1982) Edith Quimby was born in Rockford, IL in 1891. She graduated from Whitman College in Walla Walla, WA with a B.S. in 1913, and then obtained a masters degree from the University of California at Berkeley. Later in her career, after many significant achievements, Quimby was awarded honorary doctorates by Whitman College and Rutgers University. Edith Quimby was hired by Giacchino Failla as a radiation physicist at Memorial Hospital for Cancer in New York City. Failla had studied with Madame Curie and obtained his doctoral degree in her laboratory. After many groundbreaking medical physics studies from 1919 until 1942, they both moved to Columbia University. Dr. Quimby developed a widely employed dosimetry system for single plane implants with radium and radon seeds, and a dosimetry methodology for internal radionuclides. She was author of more than 75 scientific publications, and of significant textbooks including the first comprehensive physics textbook for radiologists “Physical Foundations of Radiology”, which was co-authored with Otto Glasser, Lauriston Taylor and James Weatherwax in the first edition, with Russell Morgan added for the second edition and Paul Goodwin for the fourth edition. With Sergei Feitelberg, M.D. she published two editions of “Radioactive Isotopes in Medicine and Biology: Basic Physics and Instrumentation”. Quimby became a renowned examiner for the American Board of Radiology when the third ABR examination, given in 1936, added physics. She served as President of the American Radium Society, received the RSNA Gold Medal, and also numerous prestigious awards given to women in science. Edith Quimby was a Charter Member of AAPM. The AAPM Lifetime Achievement Award was renamed the Edith H. Quimby Lifetime Achievement Award in her honor in 2011. Marvin Martin Dixon Williams (1902–1981) Marvin Williams was born in Walla Walla, WA in 1902, and attended the same college as Edith Quimby, graduating from Whitman College in 1926. He was greatly influenced to go into medical physics by her accomplishments. During his early career, Williams worked with James Weatherwax in Philadelphia while he was working toward an M.S. from the University of Pennsylvania. In 1931 Williams was awarded a Ph.D. in Biophysics from the University of Minnesota, with the work actually performed at the Mayo Clinic Graduate School of the University. While completing his Ph.D. studies, Marvin met Dr. Paul Hodges who had returned from the Peiping Union Medical College in Peiping (now Beijing), China. Hodges suggested that a physicist be sent to Peiping to install x-ray therapy equipment and a radon plant. Williams accepted the position and, in 1931, he and his wife Orpha left for China. Before going to China, Williams had spent time with the physics group at Memorial Hospital to learn about the operation of a radon plant. In China, he constructed the radon plant, employing 0.25 g of radium, and also installed the x-ray therapy unit. Williams and his wife returned to the US in 1935, and he accepted a research position at the Mayo Clinic. In 1950, he became Professor of Biophysics at Mayo, where he taught physics and biophysics until his retirement in 1967. Williams was also very active in the American Board of Radiology where, from 1944 through 1977, he examined over 3000 radiologists and 250 physicists. Marvin Williams was a Charter member of AAPM, served as the fourth President of AAPM in 1963, and was the fourth recipient the AAPM Coolidge Award in 1975. The Marvin Williams Award was originally established as the highest award of the American College of Medical Physics. When various functions of the ACMP were absorbed into the AAPM in 2012, the Marvin M D Williams Professional Achievement Award became one of the AAPM’s highest honors. Learning Objectives: Become familiar with the persons in whose honor the three major AAPM Award are named Learn about the achievements and activities which influenced the AAPM to name these awards in their honor.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Overview of actinide chemistry in the WIPP

The year 2009 celebrates 10 years of safe operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the only nuclear waste repository designated to dispose defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste in the United States. Many elements contributed to the success of this one-of-the-kind facility. One of the most important of these is the chemistry of the actinides under WIPP repository conditions. A reliable understanding of the potential release of actinides from the site to the accessible environment is important to the WIPP performance assessment (PA). The environmental chemistry of the major actinides disposed at the WIPP continues to be investigated as part of the ongoing recertification efforts of the WIPP project. This presentation provides an overview of the actinide chemistry for the WIPP repository conditions. The WIPP is a salt-based repository; therefore, the inflow of brine into the repository is minimized, due to the natural tendency of excavated salt to re-seal. Reducing anoxic conditions are expected in WIPP because of microbial activity and metal corrosion processes that consume the oxygen initially present. Should brine be introduced through an intrusion scenario, these same processes will re-establish reducing conditions. In the case of an intrusion scenario involving brine, the solubilization of actinides in brine is considered as a potential source of release to the accessible environment. The following key factors establish the concentrations of dissolved actinides under subsurface conditions: (1) Redox chemistry - The solubility of reduced actinides (III and IV oxidation states) is known to be significantly lower than the oxidized forms (V and/or VI oxidation states). In this context, the reducing conditions in the WIPP and the strong coupling of the chemistry for reduced metals and microbiological processes with actinides are important. (2) Complexation - For the anoxic, reducing and mildly basic brine systems in the WIPP, the most important inorganic complexants are expected to be carbonate/bicarbonate and hydroxide. There are also organic complexants in TRU waste with the potential to strongly influence actinide solubility. (3) Intrinsic and pseudo-actinide colloid formation - Many actinide species in their expected oxidation states tend to form colloids or strongly associate with non actinide colloids present (e.g., microbial, humic and organic). In this context, the relative importance of actinides, based on the TRU waste inventory, with respect to the potential release of actinides from the WIPP, is greater for plutonium and americium, and to less extent for uranium and thorium. The most important oxidation states for WIPP-relevant conditions are III and IV. We will present an update of the literature on WIPP-specific data, and a summary of the ongoing research related to actinide chemistry in the WIPP performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Actinide Chemistry and Repository Science (ACRSP) team located in Carlsbad, NM [Reed 2007, Lucchini 2007, and Reed 2006].

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Initial Site-Specific Studies for Removing SNF from Six Shutdown Sites - 18042

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is exploring options for developing a large-scale transportation system for the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste to future storage or disposal facilities. This complex, large-scale transportation system will involve coordinated, integrated activities. Interfaces with various transportation and non-transportation activities must be defined, and systems must be developed to ensure successful integration when the system becomes operational. To provide an understanding of the tasks and interfaces required for the complete de-inventory of particular sites where SNF is stored, DOE solicited bids from integrating contractors to develop initial site-specific de-inventory reports. The reports were developed for several nuclear power plant sites selected to represent a range of geographic locations, existing on-site SNF storage systems, and expected transportation modal options. Each report is presented in a self-contained narrative describing a potential campaign for removing all SNF and greater-than-class-C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) from each specified site. Each study narrative includes site information; an analysis of the near-site transportation infrastructure; a concept of operations for the de-inventory; an estimated budget and schedule for the duration of operations; and a safety and security plan with site-specific considerations, emergency response considerations, and recommendations for the next steps DOE could take to de-inventory the site. The reports provide cost estimates for analytical purposes only; they do not attempt to specify the party or parties responsible for the costs. These reports present a first look at how an integrating contractor might recommend removing SNF from particular sites. They are written from the perspective of the contractor and do not represent DOE's plans. At this writing, six sites have been studied: - Connecticut Yankee, - Big Rock Point, - Humboldt Bay, - Maine Yankee, - Trojan, - Kewaunee. DOE may develop de-inventory reports for all reactor sites, with an initial focus on shutdown reactor sites. The order in which sites have been selected for study should not be considered an indicator of the order used by DOE to remove SNF from the sites. Since the SNF's destination is not important for the purpose of this work, DOE tasked the contractor with planning transportation of the SNF from the site to a generic railroad location in the approximate geographical center of the United States. These reports represent an initial study of the specific sites. Per the terms of the contract, the contractor was not permitted to engage in dialogue with power plant site personnel; near-site railroad personnel; or any local, state, or regional stakeholders about the studies. DOE provided site-specific data. The contractor was tasked to rely on past corporate experience, data available from DOE, and publicly available data when making site-specific recommendations for removing all SNF from each site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Innovative Process for Comprehensive Treatment of Liquid Radioactive Waste - 12551

This paper presents the results of research activities aimed at creation of a principally new LRW distilling treatment method. The new process is based on the instantaneous evaporation method widely used in distillation units. The main difference of the proposed process is that the vapor condensation is conducted without using heat exchangers in practically ideal mode by way of direct contacting in a vapor-liquid system. This process is conducted in a specially designed ejector unit in supersonic mode. Further recuperation of excess heat of vaporization is carried out in a standard heat exchanger. Such an arrangement of the process, together with use of the barometric height principle, allows to carry out LRW evaporation under low temperatures, which enables to use excess heat from NPS for heating initial LRW. Thermal calculations and model experiments have revealed that, in this case, the expenditure of energy for LRW treatment by distilling will not exceed 3 kilowatt-hour/m{sup 3}, which is comparable with the reverse-osmosis desalination method. Besides, the proposed devices are 4 to 5 times less metal-intensive than standard evaporation units. These devices are also characterized by versatility. Experiments have revealed that the new method can be used for evaporation of practically any types of LRW, including those containing a considerable amount of oil products. Owing to arrangement of the evaporation process at low temperatures, the new devices are not sensitive to 'scale formation'. This is why, they can be used for concentrating brines of up to 500-600 g/l. New types of such evaporating devices can be required both for LRW treatment processes at nuclear-power plants under design and for treating 'non-standard' LRW with complex physicochemical and radionuclide composition resulting from the disaster at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.) As a result of accidents at nuclear energy objects, as it has recently happened at NPP 'Fukushima-1', personnel faces the necessity to take emergency measures and to use marine water for cooling of reactor zone in contravention of the technological regulations. In these cases significant amount of liquid radioactive wastes of complex physicochemical composition is being generated, the purification of which by traditional methods is close to impossible. According to the practice of elimination of the accident after-effects at NPP 'Fukushima' there are still no technical means for the efficient purification of liquid radioactive wastes of complex composition like marine water from radionuclides. Therefore development of state-of-the-art highly efficient facilities capable of fast and safe purification of big amounts of liquid radioactive wastes of complex physicochemical composition from radionuclides turns to be utterly topical problem. Cesium radionuclides, being extremely dangerous for the environment, present over 90% of total radioactivity contained in liquid radioactive wastes left as a result of accidents at nuclear power objects. For the purpose of radiation accidents aftereffects liquidation VNIIHT proposes to create a plant for LRW reprocessing, consisting of 4 major technological modules: Module of LRW pretreatment to remove mechanical and organic impurities including oil products; Module of sorption purification of LWR by means of selective inorganic sorbents; Module of reverse osmotic purification and desalination; Module of deep evaporation of LRW concentrates. The first free modules are based on completed technological and designing concepts implemented by VNIIHT in the framework of LLRW Project in the period of 2000-2001 in Russia for comprehensive treatment of LWR of atomic fleet. These industrial plants proved to be highly efficient and secure during their long operation life. Module of deep evaporation is a new technological development. It will ensure conduction of evaporation and purification of LRW of different physicochemical composition, including those containing hardness salts, resulted in generation of LRW concentrate 300-600 g/l. The method is based on utilization of supersonic ejector for intensification of thermal physic processes and performance of evaporation in brine recycling mode. All proposed technological solutions are totally based on patented Russian developments. Proposed work will allow to construct modular plants, which will be totally prepared for efficient purification of any types of liquid radioactive wastes from radionuclides in case of force majeure. According to proposed scheme concentration level of cesium radionuclides in safe-for-storage form will make up not less than 5000. With respect to purification from cesium radionuclides of liquid radioactive wastes stored at NPP 'Fukushima' about 10 t of inorganic sorbents, loaded in 160 protective filter-containers, will be required for solving this problem. The amount of secondary wastes will be reduced approximately in 5 times in comparison with traditional schemes, applied in purification of secondary LRW of Fukushima-1 by Areva (France) and Kurion (USA) companies. All units of modular plants will be constructed and manufactured as totally automated, providing their twenty-four-hour safe operation. Modular design will ensure efficiency and let optimize the costs of secondary LRW treatment. In order to ensure off-line operation in emergency conditions the plant should be equipped with auxiliary modules: energy and ventilation ones. Under normal conditions these modules can be stored in 'mothballed' condition at special warehouses under the authority of federal bodies. It will be reasonable to choose required transport facilities, the most suitable for transportation of modules to target destination beforehand, using vessel classification list.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program 2014 Report

The Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program (EMAC), funded through the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO, formerly Nevada Site Office), monitors the ecosystem of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and ensures compliance with laws and regulations pertaining to NNSS biota. This report summarizes the program’s activities conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), during calendar year 2014. Program activities included (a) biological surveys at proposed activity sites, (b) desert tortoise compliance, (c) ecosystem monitoring, (d) sensitive plant species monitoring, (e) sensitive and protected/regulated animal monitoring, and (f) habitat restoration monitoring. During 2014, all applicable laws, regulations, and permit requirements were met, enabling EMAC to achieve its intended goals and objectives. Sensitive and protected/regulated species of the NNSS include 42 plants, 1 mollusk, 2 reptiles, 236 birds, and 27 mammals. These species are protected, regulated, or considered sensitive according to state or federal regulations and natural resource agencies and organizations. The desert tortoise (Gopherus agassizii) and the western yellow-billed cuckoo (Coccyzus americanus) are the only species on the NNSS protected under the Endangered Species Act, both listed as threatened. However, only one record of the cuckoo has ever been documented on the NNSS, and there is no good habitat for this species on the NNSS. It is considered a rare migrant. Biological surveys for the presence of sensitive and protected/regulated species and important biological resources on which they depend were conducted for 18 projects. A total of 199.18 hectares (ha) was surveyed for these projects. Sensitive and protected/regulated species and important biological resources found during these surveys included a predator burrow, one sidewinder rattlesnake (Crotalus cerastes), two mating speckled rattlesnakes (Crotalus mitchellii), and several species of cacti. NSTec provided to project managers a written summary report of all survey findings and mitigation recommendations, where applicable. Of the 18 projects on the NNSS, 15 occurred within the range of the threatened desert tortoise. Approximately 2.19 ha of desert tortoise habitat were disturbed. No desert tortoises were accidentally injured or killed by project activities, and no tortoises were killed by vehicles. On 13 occasions, tortoises were moved off the road and out of harm’s way. Six tortoises were found and transmitters attached as part of an approved study to assess impacts of vehicles on tortoises on the NNSS. NSTec biologists continued to monitor 37 juvenile desert tortoises as part of a collaborative effort to study survival and temperament of translocated animals. From 1978 until 2013, there has been an average of 11.2 wildland fires per year on the NNSS with an average of about 83.7 ha burned per fire. There were no wildland fires documented on the NNSS during 2014. Results from the wildland fuel surveys showed a very low risk of wildland fire due to reduced fuel loads caused by limited natural precipitation. Limited reptile trapping and reptile roadkill surveys were conducted to better define species distribution on the NNSS. Sixteen reptiles were trapped representing five species. Combined with data from 2013, 183 road kills were detected, representing 11 snake and 8 lizard species. Selected natural water sources were monitored to assess trends in physical and biological parameters, and one new water source was found. Wildlife use at five water troughs and four radiologically contaminated sumps was documented using motion-activated cameras. As part of the statewide effort to disseminate information throughout the botanical community, NSTec prepared a shape file with site-specific data for all 17 sensitive plants on the NNSS and provided it to the Nevada Natural Heritage Program for inclusion in their statewide database. No field surveys were conducted this year for sensitive plants on the NNSS due to poor growing conditions. Surveys of sensitive and protected/regulated animals during 2014 focused on winter raptors, bats, wild horses (Equus caballus), mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus), desert bighorn sheep (Ovis Canadensis nelsoni), and mountain lions (Puma concolor). Two permanent, long-term winter raptor survey routes were established and sampled in January and February. A total of 27 raptors representing 4 species were observed. The wild horse population increased from 30 to 41, with several yearlings recruiting into the population, possibly due to the death of a mountain lion known to prey on horse foals. Mule deer abundance and density measured with standardized deer surveys was similar to 2013 and appears to be stable. Desert bighorn sheep, including rams, ewes, and lambs, were detected using motion-activated cameras at four water sources. There are plans to conduct helicopter surveys to census the population during September 2015 and then capture and radio-collar up to 20 sheep during November 2015. Over 150 sheep scat samples have been collected for genetic analysis to try to determine how sheep on the NNSS are related to surrounding sheep populations. Information is presented about bird mortalities, Migratory Bird Treaty Act compliance, and a summary of nuisance animals and their control on the NNSS. A total of 93 mountain lion images (i.e., photographs or video clips) were taken during 220,379 camera hours at 16 of 32 sites sampled and another 11,946 images of at least 29 species other than mountain lions were taken as well. A mountain lion telemetry study continued in 2014. NNSS7 was tracked from January 1 to November 15 using a global positioning system satellite transmitter. He consumed 21 mule deer, 17 desert bighorn sheep, 1 juvenile bobcat, and 3 coyotes. Mule deer were primarily taken in the summer and fall. No new mountain lions were captured. A minimum of four adult lions (two males, two females), a subadult male, and three kittens were known to inhabit the NNSS during 2014. Two previously revegetated sites on the NNSS and one on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) were monitored in 2014. The cover cap on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit, revegetated in 2000, and the 92-Acre Site at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex, revegetated in 2011, were the restoration sites monitored on the NNSS. The Corrective Action Unit 407 Rollercoaster RADSAFE site, revegetated in 2000, was the restoration site monitored on the TTR. Plant cover and density were recorded at all sites except U-3ax/bl (qualitative monitoring), and reclamation success standards were evaluated, where applicable.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 544: Cellars, Mud Pits, and Oil Spills, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 544, Cellars, Mud Pits, and Oil Spills, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 544 comprises the following 20 corrective action sites (CASs) located in Areas 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 19, and 20 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS): • 02-37-08, Cellar & Mud Pit • 02-37-09, Cellar & Mud Pit • 07-09-01, Mud Pit • 09-09-46, U-9itsx20 PS #1A Mud Pit • 10-09-01, Mud Pit • 12-09-03, Mud Pit • 19-09-01, Mud Pits (2) • 19-09-03, Mud Pit • 19-09-04, Mud Pit • 19-25-01, Oil Spill • 19-99-06, Waste Spill • 20-09-01, Mud Pits (2) • 20-09-02, Mud Pit • 20-09-03, Mud Pit • 20-09-04, Mud Pits (2) • 20-09-06, Mud Pit • 20-09-07, Mud Pit • 20-09-10, Mud Pit • 20-25-04, Oil Spills • 20-25-05, Oil Spills This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing each CAS. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 544 using the SAFER process. Using the approach approved for previous mud pit investigations (CAUs 530–535), 14 mud pits have been identified that • are either a single mud pit or a system of mud pits, • are not located in a radiologically posted area, and • have no evident biasing factors based on visual inspections. These 14 mud pits are recommended for no further action (NFA), and further field investigations will not be conducted. For the sites that do not meet the previously approved closure criteria, additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible recommendation for closure of the remaining CASs in CAU 544. This will be presented in a closure report (CR) that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 27, 2010, by representatives of NDEP and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for each CAS in CAU 544. The DQO process developed for this CAU identified the following expected closure options: (1) investigation and confirmation that no contamination exists above the final action levels (FALs) leading to an NFA declaration, (2) characterization of the nature and extent of contamination leading to closure in place with use restrictions, (3) clean closure by remediation and verification, (4) closure in place with use restrictions with no investigation if CASs are in crater areas that have been determined to be unsafe to enter, or (5) NFA if the mud pit CAS meets the criteria established during the CAUs 530–535 SAFER investigation. The following summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 544: • Perform visual inspection of all CASs. • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, construction of temporary site exclusion zones). • Removal of easily managed, nonhazardous, and nonradioactive debris, including vegetation (e.g., tumbleweeds), at various CASs that interfere with sampling, if required to inspect soil surface or collect soil sample. • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., mud pits, cellars, stained soil) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • If no COCs are present at a CAS, establish NFA as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. • If a COC is present at a CAS, either - Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or - Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions. • Confirm the preferred closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Calcium Phosphate Constraints in HLW Glasses: Phosphate Liquidus Model

About 50 million gallons of high-level mixed waste is currently stored in underground tanks at the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site in the State of Washington. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will provide DOE’s Office of River Protection (ORP) with a means of treating this waste by vitrification for subsequent disposal. The tank waste will be separated into low- and high-activity waste fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed in an engineered facility on the Hanford site while the IHLW product is designed for acceptance into a national geological disposal facility for high-level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements before they can be accepted for disposal. Glass property-composition models will be used to control the vitrification process at the WTP to ensure that the glass meets product quality and processability requirements. The quality and the validity ranges of the property-composition models and the supporting database will greatly influence waste treatment operations, including the waste loading that is achievable in the glass for each waste composition. The current baseline models for operation of the WTP were developed under the Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI) WTP contract. These models were based on LAW and HLW glass property data over a range of compositions that was guided primarily by the WTP contract and the set of tanks specified therein. The HLW testing was directed towards waste streams from the then-planned early feed tanks for the WTP (i.e., AZ-101, AZ-102, C-106/AY-102, and C-104/AY-101). These wastes are high in iron (AZ-101, AZ-102, and C-106/AY-102) or thorium (C-104/AY-101). While the baseline models may be adequate for commissioning of the facility and processing of the specified tanks, refinements and extensions or augmentations of these models will be required to process the balance of the tank waste inventory. The overall mission of the WTP will require the immobilization of tank waste compositions that are variously dominated by mixtures of aluminum, chromium, bismuth, iron, phosphorous, zirconium, and sulfur compounds as waste-loading-limiting components. Further, the WTP contract includes minimum waste loading requirements that are generally rather modest while loadings significantly higher than those in the current baseline are likely achievable. In order to achieve these higher waste loadings and to expand the applicable composition regions, new models will be needed to support the optimized operation of the WTP. Since the development of the baseline WTP models, ORP directed a program of work at the Vitreous State Laboratory (VSL) to examine various approaches for optimization of the performance of the WTP, including increasing the waste loadings in the LAW and HLW glass products. That work involved HLW rich in Al, Al+Na, Cr, Bi, S, Zr, Sr, P and Fe, in contrast to old baseline models that were based mostly on HLW tanks that were high in Fe, with one other that was also high in Th. Glass property data collected under the ORP program were compiled and combined with data collected to develop the WTP models. The combined databases have been used to update pre-existing HLW composition models or to develop new models for properties such as Product Consistency Test (PCT) responses, spinel crystallization (one-percent crystal fraction temperature, T 1% ), melt viscosity, melt electrical conductivity, nepheline formation upon slow cooling (i.e., Canister Centerline Cooling [CCC]), and Toxicity Characteristic Leach Procedure (TCLP) Cd response. While spinel is typically the most commonly occurring phase in HLW glasses, other phases can be limiting depending on the waste and glass composition. For example, various phosphate phases can become important as the phosphorus content increases. Lithium phosphate crystallization can impact PCT releases of HLW glasses, while calcium phosphate phases forming in the cold-cap can deleteriously impact feed processing in the melter. At present, however, no models exist that relate glass composition and crystallization of phosphate phases in general and calcium phosphate in particular. The present work was therefore directed towards the initial development of such models. Future work may be directed at studying amorphous phase separation in high phosphate HLW glasses. Within the River Protection Project, feed compositions are projected using the Hanford Tank Waste Operations Simulator (HTWOS), a dynamic computer model that tracks the waste through storage, retrieval, feed staging, and treatment processes. A review of the HTWOS data shows that WTP will process 4106 batches of HLW glass for the overall mission (System Plan Rev. 6, ORP-11242), each with its own waste feed and glass composition. Some of the projected HTWOS feed batches are expected to have relatively high concentrations of phosphorous compared to typical HLW streams. In the 4106 batches of HLW for the overall WTP mission P 2 O 5 varies from 0.59 wt% to 13.00 wt%, with 95 batches containing at least 10 wt% P 2 O 5 . Occurrences of phosphate crystals have commonly been noted in glasses with high bismuth and phosphorus contents. In addition, recently collected data from a set of statistically designed HLW matrix glasses prepared and characterized to support enhancement of the HLW glass property-composition models identified apatite in a number of glass samples. However, the current HLW model for crystallization (one-percent crystal fraction temperature) is applicable only to spinel crystallization in glasses. Previous projections of waste loadings and glass volume (such as those in System Plan Rev. 6, ORP-11242) have used preliminary constraints for calcium phosphate crystallization that are based on the limited available data. Additional data and improved constraints or, preferably, models that relate glass composition to crystallization of phosphate-containing phases, are therefore needed to support HLW vitrification at the WTP. The present study focuses on the development of such a model based on data from previously characterized glasses and a set of newly fabricated glasses.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Criticality Safety Controls and the Safety Basis at PFP

With the implementation of DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and DOE-STD-3007-2007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities', a new requirement was imposed that all criticality safety controls be evaluated for inclusion in the facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and that the evaluation process be documented in the site Criticality Safety Program Description Document (CSPDD). At the Hanford site in Washington State the CSPDD, HNF-31695, 'General Description of the FH Criticality Safety Program', requires each facility develop a linking document called a Criticality Control Review (CCR) to document performance of these evaluations. Chapter 5, Appendix 5B of HNF-7098, Criticality Safety Program, provided an example of a format for a CCR that could be used in lieu of each facility developing its own CCR. Since the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is presently undergoing Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D), new procedures are being developed for cleanout of equipment and systems that have not been operated in years. Existing Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) are revised, or new ones written, to develop the controls required to support D&D activities. Other Hanford facilities, including PFP, had difficulty using the basic CCR out of HNF-7098 when first implemented. Interpretation of the new guidelines indicated that many of the controls needed to be elevated to TSR level controls. Criterion 2 of the standard, requiring that the consequence of a criticality be examined for establishing the classification of a control, was not addressed. Upon in-depth review by PFP Criticality Safety staff, it was not clear that the programmatic interpretation of criterion 8C could be applied at PFP. Therefore, the PFP Criticality Safety staff decided to write their own CCR. The PFP CCR provides additional guidance for the evaluation team to use by clarifying the evaluation criteria in DOE-STD-3007-2007. In reviewing documents used in classifying controls for Nuclear Safety, it was noted that DOE-HDBK-1188, 'Glossary of Environment, Health, and Safety Terms', defines an Administrative Control (AC) in terms that are different than typically used in Criticality Safety. As part of this CCR, a new term, Criticality Administrative Control (CAC) was defined to clarify the difference between an AC used for criticality safety and an AC used for nuclear safety. In Nuclear Safety terms, an AC is a provision relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility. A CAC was defined as an administrative control derived in a criticality safety analysis that is implemented to ensure double contingency. According to criterion 2 of Section IV, 'Linkage to the Documented Safety Analysis', of DOESTD-3007-2007, the consequence of a criticality should be examined for the purposes of classifying the significance of a control or component. HNF-PRO-700, 'Safety Basis Development', provides control selection criteria based on consequence and risk that may be used in the development of a Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) to establish the classification of a component as a design feature, as safety class or safety significant, i.e., an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), or as equipment important to safety; or merely provides defense-in-depth. Similar logic is applied to the CACs. Criterion 8C of DOE-STD-3007-2007, as written, added to the confusion of using the basic CCR from HNF-7098. The PFP CCR attempts to clarify this criterion by revising it to say 'Programmatic commitments or general references to control philosophy (e.g., mass control or spacing control or concentration control as an overall control strategy for the process without specific quantification of individual limits) is included in the PFP DSA'. Table 1 shows the PFP methodology for evaluating CACs. This evaluation process has been in use since February of 2008 and has proven to be simple and effective. Each control identified in the applicable new/revised CSE is evaluated via the table. The results of this evaluation are documented in tables attached to the CCR as an appendix, for each CSE, to the base document.

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Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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Simulation Model of Mobile Detection Systems

In this paper, we consider a mobile source that we attempt to detect with man-portable, vehicle-mounted or boat-mounted radiation detectors. The source is assumed to transit an area populated with these mobile detectors, and the objective is to detect the source before it reaches a perimeter. We describe a simulation model developed to estimate the probability that one of the mobile detectors will come in to close proximity of the moving source and detect it. We illustrate with a maritime simulation example. Our simulation takes place in a 10 km by 5 km rectangular bay patrolled by boats equipped with 2-inch x 4-inch x 16-inch NaI detectors. Boats to be inspected enter the bay and randomly proceed to one of seven harbors on the shore. A source-bearing boat enters the mouth of the bay and proceeds to a pier on the opposite side. We wish to determine the probability that the source is detected and its range from target when detected. Patrol boats select the nearest in-bound boat for inspection and initiate an intercept course. Once within an operational range for the detection system, a detection algorithm is started. If the patrol boat confirms the source is not present, it selects the next nearest boat for inspection. Each run of the simulation ends either when a patrol successfully detects a source or when the source reaches its target. Several statistical detection algorithms have been implemented in the simulation model. First, a simple k-sigma algorithm, which alarms with the counts in a time window exceeds the mean background plus k times the standard deviation of background, is available to the user. The time window used is optimized with respect to the signal-to-background ratio for that range and relative speed. Second, a sequential probability ratio test [Wald 1947] is available, and configured in this simulation with a target false positive probability of 0.001 and false negative probability of 0.1. This test is utilized when the mobile detector maintains a constant range to the vessel being inspected. Finally, a variation of the sequential probability ratio test that is more appropriate when source and detector are not at constant range is available [Nelson 2005]. Each patrol boat in the fleet can be assigned a particular zone of the bay, or all boats can be assigned to monitor the entire bay. Boats assigned to a zone will only intercept and inspect other boats when they enter their zone. In our example simulation, each of two patrol boats operate in a 5 km by 5 km zone. Other parameters for this example include: (1) Detection range - 15 m range maintained between patrol boat and inspected boat; (2) Inbound boat arrival rate - Poisson process with mean arrival rate of 30 boats per hour; (3) Speed of boats to be inspected - Random between 4.5 and 9 knots; (4) Patrol boat speed - 10 knots; (5) Number of detectors per patrol boat - 4-2-inch x 4-inch x 16-inch NaI detectors; (6) Background radiation - 40 counts/sec per detector; and (7) Detector response due to radiation source at 1 meter - 1,589 counts/sec per detector. Simulation results indicate that two patrol boats are able to detect the source 81% of the time without zones and 90% of the time with zones. The average distances between the source and target at the end of the simulation is 5,866 km and 5,712 km for non-zoned and zoned patrols, respectively. Of those that did not reach the target, the average distance to the target is 7,305 km and 6,441 km respectively. Note that a design trade-off exists. While zoned patrols provide a higher probability of detection, the nonzoned patrols tend to detect the source farther from its target. Figure 1 displays the location of the source at the end of 1,000 simulations for the 5 x 10 km bay simulation. The simulation model and analysis described here can be used to determine the number of mobile detectors one would need to deploy in order to have a have reasonable chance of detecting a source in transit. By fixing the source speed to zero, the same model could be used to estimate how long it would take to detect a stationary source. For example, the model could predict how long it would take plant staff performing assigned duties carrying dosimeters to discover a contaminated spot in the facility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗