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Effects of Residual Water on Storage Canister Internal Components

This report describes an evaluation of the spent nuclear fuel cladding and canister internal materials’ corrosion/oxidation due to (inadvertent) residual free water inside a dry storage canister post-dryout. Drying of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the impact of (inadvertent) residual water in a SNF canister is being addressed under the DOE-NE Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program to ensure the safe extended dry storage and transportation of commercial SNF. A long-standing understanding has been that the amount of residual water in a storage canister after vacuum drying is not expected to be much more than trace amounts of 0.43 gram mole. However, recent findings from the High Burnup Demonstration project, and an Integrated Research Project show that residual free water well above the amount of approximately 0.43 gm-moles that had been assumed for a 3 torr rebound pressure, may remain within an SNF canister following prototypic drying. In fact, an NRC-NMSS sponsored study considered residual water amount as high as 55 moles. Considering the recent findings and the NRC-sponsored work, this present work was conducted to study the effects of unspecified amount of residual water on oxidation and corrosion of canister internals, i.e., it was assumed that the residual water amount is not limiting. It was assumed that the spent nuclear fuel content in the canister is not exposed to the internal environment, i.e., the packaged canister does not contain any damaged (breached) fuel.

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Sister Rod Destructive Test Results (FY19)

This report documents work performed under the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition, Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). This work was performed to fulfill Level 2 Milestone M2SF-19ORO010201026 within work package SF-19OR01020102 and is an update to the work reported in M2SF-19OR010201028 and M3SF-19OR010201027. The document incorporates comments received with respect to the previous reports and incorporates additional test results. As a part of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 gigawatt days per metric ton uranium) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called the “sister rods,” are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin Zircaloy-4 (LT Zirc-4), ZIRLO ® , and M5 ® . The DEs are being conducted to obtain a baseline of the HBU rod’s condition prior to dry storage and are focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability. Both composite fuel and empty cladding will be tested to derive material properties. While the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, a primary goal for obtaining the post-irradiation examination data and the associated measured mechanical properties is to support SNF dry storage licensing and relicensing activities by (1) addressing identified knowledge gaps and (2) enhancing the technical basis for post-storage transportation, handling, and consolidation activities. This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase I DEs of 8 sister rods and outlines the DE tasks performed and the data collected to date, as guided by the sister rod test plans. The DEs are performed using a phased approach, and the Phase 1 DEs being performed at ORNL include: • full-length rod heat treatments (FHT) of 3 selected sister rods to examine the effects of temperatures reached during dry storage preparation, • rod internal pressure and void volume measurements of the 3 FHT rods and 3 corresponding baseline rods, as well as 2 additional rods selected for depressurization/gas transmission tests and fatigue lifetime tests, • fission gas sampling and analysis, • depressurization and gas transmission tests, • rough segmentation of the selected rods for mechanical tests and rod characterization, • fuel sampling and burnup analysis, • metallography, • cladding total hydrogen measurements, • mechanical testing, including fatigue lifetime (CIRFT), four-point bend, axial tension, microhardness, ring compression, and burst tests. Table S-1 provides a summary of the DE status. The mechanical testing will be performed using fueled segments and is expected to complement previous and current mechanical test results using defueled cladding segments.

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Fifty-Five Gallon Drum Standard Study

Fifty-five gallon drums are routinely used within the U.S. for the storage and eventual disposal of fissionable materials as Transuranic or low-level waste. To support these operations, criticality safety evaluations are required. A questionnaire was developed and sent to selected Endusers at Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak Ridge and the Savannah River Site to solicit current practices. This questionnaire was used to gather information on the kinds of fissionable materials packaged into drums, the models used in performing criticality safety evaluations in support of operations involving these drums, and the limits and controls established for the handling and storage of these drums. The completed questionnaires were reviewed and clarifications solicited through individual communications with each Enduser to obtain more complete and consistent responses. All five sites have similar drum operations involving thousands to tens of thousands of fissionable material waste drums. The primary sources for these drums are legacy (prior operations) and decontamination and decommissioning wastes at all sites except Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The results from this survey and our review are discussed in this paper.

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Composite Analysis Vadose Zone Transport of Selected Hanford Site Composite Analysis: Vadose Zone Transport of Selected Radionuclides Released from DOE O 435.1 Waste Sites

The main objectives of the composite analysis (CA) compliance case vadose zone (VZ) facet are to simulate transport of radionuclide releases from the surface to the water table, and to provide radionuclide transfer rates to groundwater for inclusion into the Plateau-to-River (P2R) saturated zone (SZ) model (CP-57037, Model Package Report: Plateau to River Groundwater Model, Version 8.3). The parallel exascale version of the Subsurface Transport Over Multiple Phases (eSTOMP) simulator is used to simulate flow and transport for the CA VZ models. The CA compliance case approach to address the scale and distribution of contaminant sources in the VZ facet is to subdivide the Hanford Site Central Plateau into 26 models that contain contaminant sources and liquid discharges likely to commingle during migration through the VZ to the water table.

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Basket Modification Concepts for Disposal Reactivity Control of Dual Purpose Canisters

This report documents work performed supporting the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology, under work breakdown structure element 1.08.01.03.05, “Direct Disposal of Dual Purpose Canisters.” In particular, this report fulfills milestone M3SF-21OR010305125, “DPC criticality analysis with fuel/basket modification,” within work package SF-21OR01030512, “DPC Reactivity and Criticality Modeling—ORNL.” This report uses three of the most reactive canisters that have been analyzed to-date using UNFST&DARDS to examine the performance of three potential reactivity suppression technologies under disposal conditions. Three already loaded canisters were analyzed using as-loaded contents including TSC-37 and MPC-32 pressurized water reactor (PWR) dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) and the MPC-89 DPCs. The reactivity suppression technologies considered were the B4C-filled disposal control rod assembly (DCRA) and the advanced neutron absorber (ANA)–based chevron insert for the PWR canisters and the ANA-based fuel channel replacement absorber for the MPC-89. For each combination of absorber concept and DPC, various insert patterns and absorber material concentrations were considered. The results of the analysis show that the DCRA concept has promise for providing reactivity hold-down for PWR DPCs, and the ANA fuel channel replacement absorber has promise for providing reactivity holddown in BWR DPCs. The ANA chevron basket insert showed mixed results, providing sufficient reactivity hold-down in the lower reactivity canister, but failing to do so in the higher reactivity canister considered herein.

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A comprehensive review on valorization of chestnut processing wastes into bio‐based composites and bioplastics

Abstract This review examines the characterization and utilization of chestnut processing wastes (35%) in the production of bioplastics and biocomposites. In this review, a Web of Science search without any publishing year restriction on the biochemical compositions of all the components of Castanea sativa . The obtaining of bioplastics and biocomposites based on C. sativa was reviewed. First, it highlights the biochemical composition and antioxidant properties of chestnut fruit, shell, burrs, leaves, flowers, and wood focusing on the most important compounds, such as phenolic acids, flavonoids, carbohydrates, Klason lignin, cellulose, and glucan, which can enhance the properties of these materials. Then the review covers using several chestnut extracts and fillers in bioplastics production through solvent casting technique. The mechanical, structural, bioactive properties, and moisture content were optimized through the composition and production. The color, UV absorption, antioxidant, and antimicrobial activity were also discussed. Biocomposites reinforced with chestnut burs, shells, or wood flour increased the intended properties. The enhancements in tensile strength, elastic modulus, and the effects of a pre‐treatment were evaluated. Additionally, it discusses material recovery, recycling, and reuse, particularly how it affects the biodegradability of composites incorporating chestnut waste residues. Highlights Chestnut fruit, shells, and burrs are rich in starch, lignin, and cellulose. The waste of chestnut processing can be used in bioplastics and biocomposites. Chestnut‐based films and biocomposites exhibit promising mechanical properties. The antimicrobial activity, making films, and composites proper for food packaging. New techniques boost performance, offering alternatives to conventional plastics.

Silva, Simão B. [REQUIMTE/LAQV, ISEP, Polytechnic ↗

Modeling of SRS Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel in Standard DOE Sealed Canisters

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), approximately 7 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel is currently in wet storage at L-basin. A significant portion of this fuel is slated to be dried and sealed in DOE standard canisters for long-term storage. This report will focus on a few fuel types, which should bound all other fuel stored at SRS. These consist of the reference fuel assembly, the MURR fuel and the HFIR fuel. These bound a hypothetical maximum scenario for MTR box fuel, a maximum for decay heat in an assembly, and a maximum for the aluminum surface area, respectively. The geometry for the packages were created from DOE specifications for storage of each of the fuels. As long as the minimum time from reactor discharge to sealed storage is 3 years, then the highest temperatures which occur within the sealed canisters do not exceed 100° C for all scenarios considered here. In the geometry considered, while the HFIR fuel has a large surface area, the packaging configuration leaves large void areas, such that the aluminum surface to free volume ratio is about 30% less than an ATR or MURR packaging configuration.

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Permanent Criticality Termination Processes in Disposed DPCs

This report aims at answering what, how, and when spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or dual-purpose canister (DPC) characteristics could be impacted by disposal events and processes, including decay, corrosion, dissolution, and criticality, such that the potential for criticality initiation or continuation in disposed DPCs becomes permanently significantly diminished. This report uses the term "permanent termination of criticality to denote the significant diminishment of criticality potential, not absolute prevention. The occurrence of disposal processes and events is a direct function of disposal time. For fundamental processes (e.g., decay), time is absolute; however, for other processes (e.g., corrosion), time is relative because it is driven by a combination of DPC characteristics (e.g., fuel conditions, basket composition), geologic parameters (e.g., infiltration rate), engineered barrier design, and other processes and events that impact in-package chemistry.

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Analysis of Radioactive 65 Zn Contamination using 3D Position Sensitive CdZnTe Detectors

SRNL NMG Goal: In collaboration with ORNL, the aim is to identify and explore innovative technology opportunities that accelerate disposition, reduce life cycle costs, minimize worker radiation exposure, and improve worker safety and minimize program risks. • This process will include 3 glovebox systems that require personnel to dilute and package the plutonium for safe storage at WIPP. • For holdup monitoring and verification, gamma ray spectroscopy and imaging are the methods employed to achieve real time analysis of the plutonium waste. 2

Nwadeyi, Valerie E.↗

Discovery and Vetting of Exoplanets. I. Benchmarking K2 Vetting Tools

We have adapted the algorithmic tools developed during the Kepler mission to vet the quality of transit-like signals for use on the K2 mission data. Using the four sets of publicly available light curves at MAST, we produced a uniformly vetted catalog of 772 transiting planet candidates from K2 as listed at the NASA Exoplanet Archive in the K2 Table of Candidates. Our analysis marks 676 of these as planet candidates and 96 as false positives. All confirmed planets pass our vetting tests. Sixty of our false positives are new identifications, effectively doubling the overall number of astrophysical signals mimicking planetary transits in K2 data. Most of the targets listed as false positives in our catalog show either prominent secondary eclipses, transit depths suggesting a stellar companion instead of a planet, or significant photocenter shifts during transit. We packaged our tools into the open-source, automated vetting pipeline Discovery and Vetting of Exoplanets (DAVE), designed to streamline follow-up efforts by reducing the time and resources wasted observing targets that are likely false positives. DAVE will also be a valuable tool for analyzing planet candidates from NASA's TESS mission, where several guest-investigator programs will provide independent light-curve sets—and likely many more from the community. We are currently testing DAVE on recently released TESS planet candidates and will present our results in a follow-up paper.

Kostov, Veselin B.↗

Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. “Road-ready dry storage” is a management concept where SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later removal. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE SNF for road-ready dry storage. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the demonstration will package a select amount of DOE-managed SNF into DOE Standard Canisters. The closure process for the DOE Standard Canisters will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussion on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly, this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOE Standard Canisters are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds. Both are performed by remotely operated and semi-autonomous welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld connects the vent plug to the vent port with an identical butt joint to the circumferential pipe weld. After the second weld is performed on the vent port, these welds are helium leak tested using an inside-out technique. In addition to the commercially available vacuum and leak detector systems, the DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes fabrication and performance testing associated with the inside-out technique. INL staff designed and tested systems to accomplish these tasks. Hardware fabrication occurred at INL facilities. Forthcoming work includes design optimization, integration to existing systems, and implementation to packaging demonstration operations.

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GDSA Repository Systems Analysis Progress Report

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in fiscal year (FY) 2019 associated with FY19 Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

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GDSA Repository Systems Analysis Investigations in FY2021

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

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GDSA Repository Systems Analysis Investigations in FY2022

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

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Transuranic Waste Facility: Evaluation of Material-at-Risk Limits

The purpose of this analysis was to provide an evaluation and justification of the differences in the safety-basis parameters of Area G and the proposed TRU Waste Facility (TWF) in response to a request from the Los Alamos Field Office. Many of the differences in safety parameters stem from physical attributes such as facility location, size, and updated safety-basis requirements, etc. However, the primary safety-basis parameter that LANL and the Los Alamos Field Office can control for the proposed TWF is the required MAR limit. Based on the following analysis, LANL has proposed to reduce the overall facility MAR from 30,000 PE Ci to 21,400 PE Ci, and the waste storage buildings from 4,550 PE Ci to 3,200 PE Ci. The recommendation balances program requirements, operational considerations, facility construction cost, and container costs. To implement the reduced MAR strategy above, the Los Alamos Field Office and LANL will need to work with WIPP to ensure two characterization/shipment campaigns are scheduled each year. The analysis in this document included a review of historical trends and potential future scenarios in activity for enduring waste containers to define the expected normal operating range. The first part of the MAR analysis resulted in a newly defined range of activity of 10.5-18.0 PE Ci per DE2= expected for the design life of the new TWF. However, for accident scenario analysis, containers will use the WIPP WAC limits because there are no other individual container controls. Specifically, accident scenarios involving less than the building MAR will use the 80-PE Ci WIPP-WAC limit for drums. The accident analyses are intended to bound the potential impacts, and are not intended to be based on normal operational ranges. The Field Office also requested that LANL evaluate a potential reduction of the waste storage building MAR Limit by a factor of two to three. LANL used the newly defined MAR range of 10.5-18.0 PE Ci/DE to define upper and lower MAR boundary requirements using three containerization scenarios. The result of the analysis showed that the most probable scenario of future operations that balances costs, drum packaging efficiency, and shipment efficiency will routinely require the use of one-third to two-thirds of the MAR limit for each building. This result, paired with scenarios that could potentially provide short-term MAR increases, demonstrates that the MAR cannot be reduced by a factor as large as two to three, but can be reduced from 4,550 PE Ci to 3,200 PE Ci for waste storage buildings (a reduction of 30%). The TWF PDSA submittal contained combustibility values for enduring waste that appeared relatively large compared to Area G. The analysis provided the basis for the initial combustibility values established in the PDSA. Although the recent data provided combustibility values that were much lower than the PDSA assumptions (27% versus 80% in PDSA), the analysis shows that there is variability in combustible loading over time. For safety-basis accident scenarios, the material composition distribution for waste containers will be included in the MAR requirement by assuming all waste is combustible instead of applying a control for combustible loading. For operations and programs, it is better to assume 100% combustibles and maintain flexibility for waste generator containerization rather than to maintain a requirement for administrative controls of combustible loading. Controlling MAR through administrative controls is difficult for both the generator and waste management operations.

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Problems with packaged sources in foreign countries

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP), which is administered by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), removes excess, unwanted, abandoned, or orphan radioactive sealed sources that pose a potential threat to national security, public health, and safety. In total, GTRI/OSRP has been able to recover more than 25,000 excess and unwanted sealed sources from over 825 sites. In addition to transuranic sources, the GTRI/OSRP mission now includes recovery of beta/gamma emitting sources, which are of concern to both the U.S. government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This paper provides a synopsis of cooperative efforts in foreign countries to remove excess and unwanted sealed sources by discussing three topical areas: (1) The Regional Partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency; (2) Challenges in repatriating sealed sources; and (3) Options for repatriating sealed sources.

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System Model Calculations for the Active Trenches of the Low-Level Burial Grounds, Hanford Site, Washington

Two lined trenches (Trench 31 and 34) located within the 200 West Low-Level Burial Ground (LLBG) area of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hanford Site are designated for permanent disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW). In accordance with DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, radioactive waste shall be managed and disposed in a manner that is protective of worker, public health and safety, and the environment. DOE O 435.1 requires a site-specific radiological performance assessment (PA) that includes calculations of potential releases and subsequent doses to members of the public for a period of 1,000 years after closure of a low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility. The purpose of this environmental calculation file (ECF) is to document the various dose calculations performed to support DOE’s LLBG PA. The dose assessments are performed to evaluate the potential exposure of an all-pathway representative person to radionuclide contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) that may be released from the LLBG Trenches 31 and 34 to the point of calculation (POC) located at the outer edge of a 100 m buffer zone surrounding the trench boundary. This ECF uses inputs from other ECFs and their associated model package reports (MPRs) supporting the LLBG PA. The five major objectives of this ECF are to present the results of the following: (1) Deterministic dose assessments for both groundwater and atmospheric exposure scenarios; (2) Radon-222 (Rn-222) flux emanating at the surface from the disposed wastes; (3) Uncertainty analyses of the groundwater pathway annual dose due to uncertainty in input parameters; (4) Sensitivity analyses of the input parameters that could potentially impact the fate and transport of the contaminants and doses; (5) Doses arising from inadvertent intruder exposure scenarios.

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Lessons Learned from the Remote Reactor Vessel Internals Segmentation at Barsebaeck 2 - 18231

Westinghouse is performing a decommissioning project at Barsebaeck in Sweden that was awarded in June 2015. Barsebaeck is an ABB-designed boiling water reactor (BWR) plant (2 units of 615 MW) located 30 kilometers from Malmoe. The first reactor, Barsebaeck 1, was permanently shut down on Nov. 30, 1999, and the second one, Barsebaeck 2, ceased operation on May 31, 2005. The scope of work covers the underwater segmentation and packaging of the Reactor Vessel internals at Barsebaeck 1 and 2, including the up-front engineering studies and equipment manufacturing and qualification. The Barsebaeck Unit 2 was selected for starting the site work in August 2016. Cutting was performed with different types of Westinghouse designed cutting equipment (hydraulic shears, band saw, disc saw). All segmentation tools are remotely controlled due to the high radiation levels and ALARA and personal safety is the number one priority during the site work. The cutting equipment proved to be reliable and flexible which is very valuable for the execution of such a challenging project. The Barsebaeck Unit 2 cutting activities have been finished end of October 2018 and its lessons learned will be taken into consideration for the Unit 1 activities. (authors)

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