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Probability of Pinching Failure in PWR SNF after Long-Term Storage

A probabilistic assessment was performed on pinching failure of PWR SNF rod cladding under accidental SNF cask transport conditions. a set of 3,000 rod pinching scenarios was analyzed, with different geometrical, material, and loading parameters, using a Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS). The investigated accidents include train derailments leading to cask collisions or cask drops. Pinching failure was related to cladding offset strain, defined as the plastic deformation interval in radial cladding direction normalized with respect to the outer cladding diameter. Finite element (FE) models were used to compute SNF rod deformations and the offset strain demand OSD in each of the assessed pinching scenarios. The numerical models account for the contribution of the degraded fuel pellets to rod pinching stiffness. The offset strain capacity OSC was computed using regression and interpolation models based on ring compression (RCT) test results, and account for hydride-related effects on cladding ductility. The results show a low probability of pinching failure. Hydride-related cladding embrittlement affects the structural integrity of PWR SNF rods after long-term dry storage of up to 300 years. Radial hydride patterns or large amounts of circumferentially oriented hydrides reduce the cladding ductile deformation capability when pinched at low material temperatures. The probability of hydride-related pinching failure of PWR cladding is estimated after long-term dry storage to address: How do PWR SNF rod conditions like hydrogen content, vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress σ{sub θ}, and cladding material temperature affect cladding ductility? Is hydride-related cladding embrittlement a material degradation mechanism that affects the structural integrity of PWR SNF rods under pinching loading? What are the controlling parameters for deformation demands in PWR SNF rods under pinching loading? Is the pinching load amplitude an important parameter that controls the probability of pinching failure? How do parameters like pellet-cladding gap or fuel pellet degradation affect the pinching loading capacity of PWR SNF rods? Statistical modelling of PWR SNF rod conditions in U.S. inventory: A pseudo rod database was generated based on EIA database. Analysis of train accident scenarios: a probability density function (pdf) of a pinching load distribution P{sub 9m} of a 9-m cask drop is linearly scaled to generate a more representative: distribution P{sub AS}. The new distribution considers train collision velocities, cask drops for on- and off-bridge accidents, and cask impact orientation. LHS generates 3,000 rod pinching scenarios based on nine independent geometrical, material, and loading parameters. Probabilistic FE Analysis: The LHS realizations are used to generate 3,000 FE models. The FE analysis is conducted for P{sub 9m}, and P{sub AS}. The workflow is automatized. The OSC is computed with regression and interpolation models, as a function of the hydrogen content C{sub H}, vacuum drying peak σ{sub θ}, and SNF temperature T{sub FR}: The regression data was obtained in RCTs on PWR cladding. The OSD is derived from the cladding deformations in the FE models. Cladding failure was identified via a comparison of OSC and OSD. A 300 and a 30 years-of-dry-storage duration is investigated: The dry-storage period affects the expected SNF temperature and consequently, the OSC and the OSD. The material temperature LHS population is adapted to account for a SNF temperature variation. The probability of hydride-related, ductile cladding failure during a severe transportation accident is not significantly affected by the pinching load amplitude: The probability is slightly reduced from a range of less than 0.0333% to 0.1667% for P{sub 9m}, to a range of less than 0.0333% to 0.1333% for P{sub AS}, depending on the vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress modelling assumptions. Further, the SNF dry-storage duration does not significantly affect the probability of ductile pinching failure. Based on available train accidents data, the pinching failure probability for a 5,000 km long transportation route ranges from less than 1.62 E-7 to a value of 6.47 E-7, depending on the vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress modelling assumptions. The pinching load amplitude is not a controlling parameter for the probability of ductile cladding pinching failure, and does not control the cladding deformations once pellet-cladding contact is established, The pellet-cladding gap width, however, plays a key role. Fuel pellet degradation only affects the deformation capacity, if the pellet stiffness is significantly reduced (more than 90%). Only highly embrittled cladding is likely to fail. The deformation demands on the cladding under pinching loading are small.

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Developing Tomorrows Nuclear Professionals - Apprentice and Graduate Development at PFCS, Sellafield - 19013

The Pile Fuel Cladding Silo (PFCS) at Sellafield, originally built in 1949/50 to receive and store fuel cladding from reprocessing Windscale Pile fuel, has been used to store this material and other waste from the UK nuclear programme ever since. However, the Silo is unsuitable for indefinite storage of the waste; its age, condition and inventory, combined with significant uncertainty in all these factors, rank the facility among the most hazardous in Western Europe. In 2012, Sellafield Ltd began a highly collaborative relationship with its supply chain partners Bechtel Cavendish Nuclear Solutions (BCNS), to undertake a suite of projects to create a capability for retrieving waste. In doing so, the team has discovered a shared passion for graduate student and apprenticed trades development, which has led to the team goal of becoming the number one destination for training secondments within the associated businesses. This paper describes how the team has leveraged the unique challenge of the project, the extensive experience of the delivery team, and the capabilities of the contributing organisations to create a structure secondment experience aimed at maximizing learning and generating enthusiasm for nuclear clean-up. The scheme was developed and implemented, based on some very simple but consistent feedback from the trainee community on what differentiates a good and bad secondment. The paper includes three case studies from individuals who have participated in the programme and the analysis of overall feedback from all programme trainees. Universally, the scheme has been well received with a significant number of trainees coming back to the project to begin their professional careers. The simple differentiators between a good and bad secondment provide a good basis for those wishing to develop similar schemes. (authors)

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Crystalline Ceramic Waste Forms: Reference Formulation Report

The research conducted in this work package is aimed at taking advantage of the long term thermodynamic stability of crystalline ceramics to create more durable waste forms (as compared to high level waste glass) in order to reduce the reliance on engineered and natural barrier systems. Durable ceramic waste forms that incorporate a wide range of radionuclides have the potential to broaden the available disposal options and to lower the storage and disposal costs associated with advanced fuel cycles. Assemblages of several titanate phases have been successfully demonstrated to incorporate radioactive waste elements, and the multiphase nature of these materials allows them to accommodate variation in the waste composition. Recent work has shown that they can be successfully produced from a melting and crystallization process. The objective of this report is to explain the design of ceramic host systems culminating in a reference ceramic formulation for use in subsequent studies on process optimization and melt property data assessment in support of FY13 melter demonstration testing. The waste stream used as the basis for the development and testing is a combination of the projected Cs/Sr separated stream, the Trivalent Actinide - Lanthanide Separation by Phosphorous reagent Extraction from Aqueous Komplexes (TALSPEAK) waste stream consisting of lanthanide fission products, the transition metal fission product waste stream resulting from the transuranic extraction (TRUEX) process, and a high molybdenum concentration with relatively low noble metal concentrations. In addition to the combined CS/LN/TM High Mo waste stream, variants without Mo and without Mo and Zr were also evaluated. Based on the results of fabricating and characterizing several simulated ceramic waste forms, two reference ceramic waste form compositions are recommended in this report. The first composition targets the CS/LN/TM combined waste stream with and without Mo. The second composition targets with CS/LN/TM combined waste stream with Mo and Zr removed. Waste streams that contain Mo must be produced in reducing environments to avoid Cs-Mo oxide phase formation. Waste streams without Mo have the ability to be melt processed in air. A path forward for further optimizing the processing steps needed to form the targeted phase assemblages is outlined in this report. Processing modifications including melting in a reducing atmosphere, and controlled heat treatment schedules are anticipated to improve the targeted elemental partitioning.

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Crystalline Ceramic Waste Forms: Report Detailing Data Collection In Support Of Potential FY13 Pilot Scale Melter Test

The research conducted in this work package is aimed at taking advantage of the long term thermodynamic stability of crystalline ceramics to create more durable waste forms (as compared to high level waste glass) in order to reduce the reliance on engineered and natural barrier systems. Durable ceramic waste forms that incorporate a wide range of radionuclides have the potential to broaden the available disposal options and to lower the storage and disposal costs associated with advanced fuel cycles. Assemblages of several titanate phases have been successfully demonstrated to incorporate radioactive waste elements, and the multiphase nature of these materials allows them to accommodate variation in the waste composition. Recent work has shown that they can be successfully produced from a melting and crystallization process. The objective of this report is to summarize the data collection in support of future melter demonstration testing for crystalline ceramic waste forms. The waste stream used as the basis for the development and testing is a combination of the projected Cs/Sr separated stream, the Trivalent Actinide - Lanthanide Separation by Phosphorous reagent Extraction from Aqueous Komplexes (TALSPEAK) waste stream consisting of lanthanide fission products, the transition metal fission product waste stream resulting from the transuranic extraction (TRUEX) process, and a high molybdenum concentration with relatively low noble metal concentrations. The principal difficulties encountered during processing of the “reference ceramic” waste form by a melt and crystallization process were the incomplete incorporation of Cs into the hollandite phase and the presence of secondary Cs-Mo non-durable phases. In the single phase hollandite system, these issues were addressed in this study by refining the compositions to include Cr as a transition metal element and the use of Ti/TiO 2 buffer to maintain reducing conditions. Initial viscosity studies of ceramic waste forms indicated that the pour spout must be maintained above 1400°C to avoid flow blockages due to crystallization. In-situ electron irradiations simulate radiolysis effects indicated hollandite undergoes a crystalline to amorphous transition after a radiation dose of 10 13 Gy which corresponds to approximately 1000 years at anticipated doses (2 10 10 -2 10 11 Gy). Dual-beam ion irradiations employing light ion beam (such as 5 MeV alpha) and heavy ion beam (such as 100 keV Kr) studies indicate that reference ceramic waste forms are radiation tolerant to the α-particles and β-particles, but are susceptible to a crystalline to amorphous transition under recoil nuclei effects. A path forward for refining the processing steps needed to form the targeted phase assemblages is outlined in this report. Processing modifications including melting in a reducing atmosphere with the use of Ti/TiO 2 buffers, and the addition of Cr to the transition metal additives to facilitate Cs-incorporation in the hollandite phase. In addition to melt processing, alternative fabrication routes are being considered including Spark Plasma Sintering (SPS) and Hot Isostatic Pressing (HIP).

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Crystalline Ceramic Waste Forms: Comparison Of Reference Process For Ceramic Waste Form Fabrication

The research conducted in this work package is aimed at taking advantage of the long term thermodynamic stability of crystalline ceramics to create more durable waste forms (as compared to high level waste glass) in order to reduce the reliance on engineered and natural barrier systems. Durable ceramic waste forms that incorporate a wide range of radionuclides have the potential to broaden the available disposal options and to lower the storage and disposal costs associated with advanced fuel cycles. Assemblages of several titanate phases have been successfully demonstrated to incorporate radioactive waste elements, and the multiphase nature of these materials allows them to accommodate variation in the waste composition. Recent work has shown that they can be produced from a melting and crystallization process. The objective of this report is to explore the phase formation and microstructural differences between lab scale melt processing in varying gas environments with alternative densification processes such as Hot Pressing (HP) and Spark Plasma Sintering (SPS). The waste stream used as the basis for the development and testing is a simulant derived from a combination of the projected Cs/Sr separated stream, the Trivalent Actinide - Lanthanide Separation by Phosphorous reagent Extraction from Aqueous Komplexes (TALSPEAK) waste stream consisting of lanthanide fission products, the transition metal fission product waste stream resulting from the transuranic extraction (TRUEX) process, and a high molybdenum concentration with relatively low noble metal concentrations. Melt processing as well as solid state sintering routes SPS and HP demonstrated the formation of the targeted phases; however differences in microstructure and elemental partitioning were observed. In SPS and HP samples, hollandite, pervoskite/pyrochlore, zirconolite, metallic alloy and TiO 2 and Al 2 O 3 were observed distributed in a network of fine grains with small residual pores. The titanate phases that incorporate M +3 rare earth elements were observed to be distinct phases (ex. Nd 2 Ti 2 O 7 with less degree of substitution as compared to the more homogeneous melt processed samples where a high degree of substitution and variation of composition within grains was observed. Liquid phase sintering was enhanced in reducing gas environments and resulted in large (10-200 microns) irregular shaped grains along with large voids associated with the melt process; SPS and HP samples exhibited finer grain size with smaller voids. Metallic alloys were observed in the bulk of the sample for SPS and HP samples, but were found at the bottom of the crucible in melt processed trials. These results indicate that for a first melter trial, the targeted phases can be formed in air by utilizing Ti/TiO 2 additives which aid phase formation and improve the electrical conductivity. Ultimately, a melter run in reducing gas environments would be beneficial to study differences in phase formation and elemental partitioning.

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Hanford double-shell tank extent-of-condition construction review - 15498

During routine visual inspections of Hanford double-shell waste tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102), anomalies were identified on the annulus floor which resulted in further evaluations. Following a formal leak assessment in October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) determined that the primary tank of AY-102 was leaking. A formal leak assessment, documented in RPP-ASMT-53793, Tank 241-AY-102 Leak Assessment Report, identified first-of-a-kind construction difficulties and trial-and-error repairs as major contributing factors to tank failure. To determine if improvements in double-shell tank (DST) construction occurred after construction of tank AY-102, a detailed review and evaluation of historical construction records was performed for Hanford's remaining twenty-seven DSTs. Review involved research of 241 boxes of historical project documentation to better understand the condition of the Hanford DST farms, noting similarities in construction difficulties/issues to tank AY-102. Information gathered provides valuable insight regarding construction difficulties, future tank operations decisions, and guidance of the current tank inspection program. Should new waste storage tanks be constructed in the future, these reviews also provide valuable lessons-learned.(authors)

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Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 134: Aboveground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 134 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as “Aboveground Storage Tanks” and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3, 15, and 29 of the Nevada Test Site: · CAS 03-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank · CAS 03-01-04, Tank · CAS 15-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank · CAS 29-01-01, Hydrocarbon Stain

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A Preliminary Probabilistic Performance Assessment Model for Radiological and Chemical Contamination at the West Valley Site, New York - 19295

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351-ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States at the WNYNSC. NFS built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg (640 metric tons) of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations halted in 1972 and never restarted, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. The reprocessing wastes include high-level waste (HLW), so U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was compelled to complete certain waste management activities under the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Act of 1980, including decommissioning of WVDP facilities. As collaborating agencies, NYSERDA and the DOE are tasked with making decisions about decommissioning and risk reduction for the West Valley Site. Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) was contracted to develop a probabilistic performance assessment (PPA) model to assist the agencies in their decision making process for decommissioning the WVDP and WNYNSC. One important tool that is needed in order to inform the decision-making process is a science-based model of the contamination at the West Valley Site and its potential implications for human health and the environment. The West Valley PPA Model (the Model), developed using the GoldSim modeling software, is a tool intended to provide support for decision making with uncertainty, in a manner that is transparent, defensible, and robust. The PPA Model includes contaminant transport and health effects components, and is organized around geographically-organized contaminated facilities. These include the waste disposal areas licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of New York, a waste tank farm for storage of HLW resulting from reprocessing operations, and several areas contaminated with radioactive and chemical constituents. The Model evaluates contaminant transport from these sources to points of exposure across the site and into receiving surface waters and sediments. Hypothetical people and wildlife are exposed to contamination at these locations, and the effects of these exposures are evaluated. Contaminant transport processes to be evaluated in the Model include groundwater and surface water transport, contaminant translocation by plants and animals, diffusion in subsurface air and water, and erosion of the Site. The evaluation of exposures to people in this preliminary model is limited to a resident farmer scenario, and ecological assessment is performed at the level of a screening analysis. The results of these preliminary evaluations inform future model developments. Model results are subjected to sensitivity analysis in order to determine those pathways and parameters that are most significant in influencing the results. This information allows analysts and decision makers to focus on those aspects of Site behavior and processes that contribute most to overall uncertainty. With this information, the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) can inform defensible decisions regarding remediation of the Site. (authors)

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SECONDARY WASTE/ETF (EFFLUENT TREATMENT FACILITY) PRELIMINARY PRE-CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING STUDY

This pre-conceptual engineering study is intended to assist in supporting the critical decision (CD) 0 milestone by providing a basis for the justification of mission need (JMN) for the handling and disposal of liquid effluents. The ETF baseline strategy, to accommodate (WTP) requirements, calls for a solidification treatment unit (STU) to be added to the ETF to provide the needed additional processing capability. This STU is to process the ETF evaporator concentrate into a cement-based waste form. The cementitious waste will be cast into blocks for curing, storage, and disposal. Tis pre-conceptual engineering study explores this baseline strategy, in addition to other potential alternatives, for meeting the ETF future mission needs. Within each reviewed case study, a technical and facility description is outlined, along with a preliminary cost analysis and the associated risks and benefits.

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SRNL LDRD Program Report 2012

Progress is reported on 20 different projects in a wide variety of areas ranging from nuclear chemistry and radiation detection to energy storage and renewable energy.

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Estimation of SNF amount from various scenarios of power consumption prediction in South Korea - 15394

The Korean government is reviewing the methodology for every condition such as treatment, storage, disposal for the management of spent fuel. In order to establish the control policy of spent fuel, it is necessary to predict how much spent fuel is produced as the time changes. In this thesis the spent fuel production amount was predicted with the basis of the forecast number of the nuclear power plant. Until 2024 the construction plan was applied and until 2035 the number was predicted considering the ratio of nuclear power production. From 2035 to 2100, long term assessment was done assuming the energy consumption in different cases to calculate the necessary power production and then the amount was applied to the of the current power plant production rate to calculate the power production amount by nuclear power plant and the number of necessary nuclear power plants. As the estimated number of the operated power plants of each year and period is correlated with the nuclear power production amount, the main factors of the assessment were spent fuel production amount, the number of operated nuclear power plant, power consumption amount, power production amount, and the proportion of the nuclear power plant to assess. In long-term view the spent fuel production amount differed highly depending on the different conditions so it's thought to be necessary to establish policies after predicting the spent fuel production amount by every case for the management plan of spent fuel. (authors)

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FY2017 ILAW Glass SPFT Testing for Disposal at IDF: Glass IDF21-EC14

About 50 million gallons of high-level mixed waste is currently stored in underground tanks at The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site in the State of Washington. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will provide DOE’s Office of River Protection (ORP) with a means of treating this waste by vitrification for subsequent disposal. The tank waste will be separated into low- and high-activity waste fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed in an engineered facility – the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) – on the Hanford site, while the IHLW product is designed for deep geological disposal in a national facility for high level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements with respect to protection of the environment before they can be accepted for disposal. The objective of the work described in this report is to perform testing, data collection, and analyses for the ILAW glass product for subsequent use in the performance assessment (PA) of the IDF to assess potential environmental risks associated with long-term storage.

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Criticality safety administration in legacy waste management - 14613

Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) is Canada's largest nuclear science and technology laboratory, with a long history in developing and progressing in the field of nuclear science. In the early years of nuclear science and technology development, there were practices used for nuclear material storage and management that have led to recent challenges in meeting current regulatory (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission) safety requirements. There are over 900 storage locations where significant amounts of experimental fuel and operations fuel are stored, with varying degrees of administrative rigor being applied over the last 60+ years. To determine the safety of the stored materials, it was impracticable to examine every location to determine the status of fissile material composition. A risk graded approach was developed to first administratively determine the locations that were at risk, followed by comparison to upper subcritical limits. This narrowed the area of concern from >900 locations to approximately >70 locations. Locations of concern were then modeled with more accurate geometry, reflection and moderation conditions to further narrow down the selection area. This further narrowed the locations of concern to 32. Reducing overall risk, this small selection of locations have been selected for non-destructive imaging/examination and further analysis to confirm geometry to ensure criticality safety in all the storage locations. (authors)

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SRNL CRP progress report [Development of Melt Processed Ceramics for Nuclear Waste Immobilization]

A multi-phase ceramic waste form is being developed at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for treatment of secondary waste streams generated by reprocessing commercial spent nuclear. The envisioned waste stream contains a mixture of transition, alkali, alkaline earth, and lanthanide metals. Ceramic waste forms are tailored (engineered) to incorporate waste components as part of their crystal structure based on knowledge from naturally found minerals containing radioactive and non-radioactive species similar to the radionuclides of concern in wastes from fuel reprocessing. The ability to tailor ceramics to mimic naturally occurring crystals substantiates the long term stability of such crystals (ceramics) over geologic timescales of interest for nuclear waste immobilization [1]. A durable multiphase ceramic waste form tailored to incorporate all the waste components has the potential to broaden the available disposal options and thus minimize the storage and disposal costs associated with aqueous reprocessing.

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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE STABILITY OF VESSEL-SPANNING BUBBLES IN CYLINDRICAL & ANNULAR & OBROUND & AND CONICAL CONTAINERS

This report provides a summary of experiments that were performed by Fauske & Associates on the stability of vessel-spanning bubbles. The report by Fauske & Associates, An Experimental Study of the Stability of Vessel-Spanning Bubbles in Cylindrical, Annular, Obround and Conical Containers, is included in Appendix A. Results from the experiments confirm that the gravity yield parameter, Y{sub G}, correctly includes container size and can be applied to full-scale containers to predict the possibility of the formation of a stable vessel spanning bubble. The results also indicate that a vessel spanning bubble will likely form inside the STSC for KE, KW, and Settler sludges if the shear strengths of these sludges exceed 1820, 2080, and 2120 Pa, respectively. A passive mechanism installed in the STSC is effective at disrupting a rising sludge plug and preventing the sludge from plugging the vent filter or being forced out of the container. The Sludge Treatment Project for Engineered Container and Settler Sludge (EC/ST) Disposition Subproject is being conducted in two phases. Phase 1 of the EC/ST Disposition Subproject will retrieve the radioactive sludge currently stored in the K West (KW) Basin into Sludge Transport and Storage Containers (STSCs) and transport the STSCs to T-Plant for interim storage. Phase 2 of the EC/ST Disposition Subproject will retrieve the sludge from interim storage, treat and package sludge for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The STSC is a cylindrical container; similar to previously used large diameter containers. A STSC (Figure 1) with a diameter of 58 inches will be used to transport KE and KW originating sludge (located in Engineered Containers 210, 220, 240, 250, and 260) to T-Plant. A STSC with an annulus (Figure 2) will be used to transport Settler Tank sludge, located in Engineered Container 230. An obround small canister design was previously considered to retrieve sludge from the basin. The obround design was selected in Small Canister Design Selection, PRC-STP-00052. However, the small canister was not selected for transporting the sludge. The STSC was selected for sludge loading and transport to T-Plant as discussed in Decision Report for Direct Hydraulic Loading of Sludge into Sludge Transport and Storage Containers, PRC-STP-00112. The STSC will be directly loaded with sludge as described in the Preliminary STP Container and Settler Sludge Process System Description and Material Balance, HNF-41051.

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TRU Outdoor Operations

This detailed operating procedure (DOP) documents the process for handling, staging, and distributing (i.e., packing/unpacking) transuranic (TRU) waste in compliance with P409, LANL Waste Management, TA55-RD-539, TA-55 FOD Waste Management Requirements, and P409-1, LANL Waste Acceptance Criteria., at designated outdoor storage and operations locations at LANL TA-55.

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Major Achievements of the Springfields Decommissioning Program - 16512

Since the 1940's, Springfields has manufactured fuel products for the UK's nuclear power stations and for international customers. The early operations were in support of the atomic weapons program, closely followed by fuel manufacture for electricity generation via the Magnox power stations commencing in the late 1950's. In 2005, responsibility for the assets and liabilities of Springfields was transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A new company, Springfields Fuels Limited, was created to run the site, which was managed and operated by Westinghouse Electric UK Ltd on the NDA's behalf. On April 1, 2010, Westinghouse entered into an agreement with the NDA for a long-term lease of the Springfields site, which transferred responsibility for the commercial fuel manufacturing business and Springfields Fuels Limited to Westinghouse. Today, the main Springfields activities include: - Oxide fuels for Advanced Gas-cooled and Light Water Reactors, as well as intermediate fuel products, such as powders, granules and pellets, - Manufacture of Uranium Hexafluoride (now in Care and Maintenance), - Processing and recovery of Uranium residues, - Decommissioning and demolition of redundant plants and buildings. Some 120 plant buildings and support facilities have been successfully decommissioned and demolished in the period 1996 to date. These range from 1940's buildings, subsequently converted for nuclear fuel manufacture, together with some of the formerly sealed chemical agent manufacture and storage facilities. Decommissioning of the now redundant Magnox manufacturing facilities is ongoing at Springfields without compromising the other site operations. Westinghouse is managing all activities related to the whole lifecycle, planning, design, safety case, radiation protection, Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), service diversions, characterization, decommissioning all phases through to ground remediation, waste disposal and agreed end states. Decommissioning of process plants starts with the removal of the majority of radiological activity or hazard contained within the plant. This is known as Post Operational Clean Out. Once this is complete, the plant may be dismantled. Work is scoped and defined within packages (at plant or cell level) to aid control and commercial monitoring as the decommissioning is progressed. This package approach also enables clean or lightly contaminated items to be removed separately to aid potential re-cycling and minimize decontamination and waste disposal costs. Westinghouse is further optimising work package delivery by planning parallel POCO and Decommissioning work phases within plant at a cell level to systematically remove redundant plant and reduce hazard earlier, whilst optimising use of both internal and external resources to reduce total project cost. Waste and Residues from all phases are disposed of via authorized disposal routes and in accordance with our environmental authorizations. On completion of decommissioning and removal of plant and equipment the building is re-assessed radiologically, categorized and appropriate remediation work progressed to render it safe for conventional demolition. The major elements of the success achieved to date can be attributed to the following elements: - Overall programme management with extensive experience of planning, cost, and risk management. Integration of the programme within a major commercial site without compromising safety or operations. - Complete site EHS management working within a complex regulatory framework including the Nuclear Site Licenses, Environmental Authorisations and Security requirements. - Avoiding safety complacency by use of rigorous and systematic process to emphasise safety over competing goals. Including structured use of Human Performance and Corrective Action and Learning processes. - Unique safety experiences attained through complex hazard reduction across a broad range of uranium manufacturing and chemical hazard/agent facilities. - Project leadership and excellence utilizing a core site team to deploy repeatable processes and safe practices to deliver complex scope within budget and schedule. - Optimised use of internal and external resources, with extensive use of Operating Experience to drive continuous improvement and problem resolution. - Management of Contractors from initial selection, pre-qualification, tender assessment and Performance using varied contract forms across delivery phases. - Use of Westinghouse expertise for safety case, waste management, uranium recovery, health physics and design. - Implementation of a work package to ensure gated discreet manageable packages. Underpinned by package specific method statements, with appropriate hold points to maintain management and control of the works. - Continuous local safety focus via safety planning, induction, plant specific training, proactive risk assessment, and a defined approach to decoupling operating plant safety cases enabling focussed and usable documentation. This paper will provide an overview of the latest decommissioning activities achieved on the Springfields site and will focus on best practices that allowed Westinghouse to maintain the program on time and on budget. (authors)

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Final Scientific/Technical Report, Multi-Sensor Inspection and Robotic Systems for Dry Storage Casks

Once removed from service, fuel rod assemblies are cooled in a pool and then placed in dry storage until they can be transported to a repository for disposal. The extended duration that used nuclear fuel spends in dry storage makes it prudent to be able to nondestructively inspect the dry storage casks. The degradation mechanisms of most concern are chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel canister that confines the spent fuel and distributed cracking of the concrete in the overpack structure. Multi-sensor inspection and robotic systems were researched, developed, built, and tested. One system operates completely outside the cask to inspect the concrete. The other system, known as the PRINSE system, for Proactive Robotic Inspection of Nuclear Storage Enclosures, enters the cask through an outlet vent and navigates around the outer surface of the stainless steel canister. The PRINSE system delivers sensors for: (i) real-time characterization of the canister surface in order to assess whether chlorides are present, (ii) detecting the presence of cracks using shear-horizontal ultrasonic guided waves, (iii) measuring the temperature of the canister surface, and (iv) a gamma radiation counter. The four sensing modalities are applicable to any cask containing a stainless steel canister, however the robotic delivery system is designed specifically for Holtec’s HI-STORM family of casks. Horizontal axis casks have exposed concrete surfaces. A fully contactless air-coupled scanning ultrasonic test platform and a frequency-wavenumber domain data analysis method are used for these concrete structures. Analysis, numerical simulation and experimental results demonstrate that distributed cracks in concrete can be detected and cracked regions localized within a scanned region of concrete. Vertical axis casks (like the HI-STORM family) have steel-clad concrete overpacks. In a separate effort, a semi-coupled test platform and a guided wave attenuation-based data analysis method are used for disbond detection. Analysis, numerical simulation and experimental results show that the bonding conditions of steel-concrete interfaces can be quantitatively characterized using the guided wave signal analysis scheme. The PRINSE system is designed for vertical axis dry storage casks, specifically the HI-STORM family. The double pulse laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) system takes advantage of an optical fiber to deliver intense light to the canister surface that enables surface composition characterization in-situ in real time. Chlorine concentrations as low as 10 mg/m2 were detected on stainless steel. Additionally, a simpler laser setup was created to detect sodium as a surrogate for chlorine, and sodium was detectable when the chlorine concentration was as low as 0.5 mg/m2. The electromagnetic acoustic transducers (EMATs) enable detection of stress corrosion cracks. The EMATs generate shear-horizontal waves that propagate around the canister and are reflected by cracks enabling 100% of the canister weld lines to be inspected. The EMAT-based crack detection system was tested at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory on a canister containing blind defects and was shown to detect the crack sizes it was designed to detect. The PRINSE system is a novel marsupial robot. The command center and winch outside the cask control the delivery arm and train of cars that traverse the outside of the canister from the cask ventilation system. The sensors are housed in the cargo bays of three cars that comprise the train, which is lowered to the bottom of the canister by the winch. Encoders on the winch enable the sensors to be delivered to a prescribed location, e.g., for re-inspection of a problem area. The PRINSE system does not mar the canister surface, can be extracted manually in the case of a power failure, and is designed for an elevated temperature and gamma radiation environment, although not all components of the prototype are made from the final materials. The PRINSE system was tested on a full canister that was placed inside a HI-STORM cask at the Holtec Manufacturing Division. It was also demonstrated on a full-height mockup at Penn State to a live audience.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗