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This report provides data on asbestiform waste received at Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site under permits SW 532 and NEV HW0101.
Enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) can enrich the Nation’s energy portfolio by increasing the amount of renewable baseload power available to the electrical grid. Microseismic activity, due to fluid resource injection and production, provides critical insight into the processes that occur within EGS subsurface fracture networks. To more precisely characterize these fracture networks, we leverage recent advances in deep neural network (DNN) image analysis techniques. Using seismic spectrogram data collected during a meso scale EGS field experiment as image inputs, we developed a new approach to correlate microseismic events. Our results indicate that our chosen DNN is able to estimate the correlation value between highly correlated events (i.e., cross-correlation coefficients greater than approximately 0.7), but has difficulty estimating correlation values between poorly correlated events. In physical systems however, the highly correlated microseismic events are the events of interest. Therefore, this data-driven method has shown potential for improving domestic Energy and Resource Security, advancing the current methods available to image subsurface EGS thermal reservoirs to enhance the availability of clean and reliable energy to the national electric grid.
Based in Richland, Washington, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is one of ten U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science (SC) national laboratories. PNNL is DOE’s premier chemistry, earth sciences, and data analytics laboratory, delivering vital mission impacts in energy resiliency and national security. PNNL has 19 core capabilities, each a powerful combination of world-class staff, state-of-the- art equipment, and mission-ready facilities. These capabilities represent a collective set of skills and a body of world-leading scientific and engineering work that provides exceptional value and mission delivery to DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other federal agencies and industry through strategic partnership projects on a not-to-interfere basis. Currently operated by Battelle Memorial Institute, PNNL occupies more than 2.3 million gross square feet (GSF) of buildings and employs approximately 4,700 staff members. PNNL has implemented a rolling 10-year campus strategy, initiated in fiscal year 2013, designed to deliver the foundation for the multidisciplinary science and engineering expertise, equipment, instrumentation, facilities, and infrastructure required to continue providing exceptional value and mission delivery. This strategy is incorporated into PNNL’s annual Laboratory Plan, which serves as DOE-SC’s equivalent of the Five- Year Site Plan required by DOE Order 430.1C Chg. 1, Real Property Asset Management. The PNNL Sequim Campus is located in Clallam County, just outside of Sequim, Washington. PNNL Sequim builds upon a rich history of research related to marine and coastal resources, environmental chemistry, water resources modeling, ecotoxicology, biotechnology, and national security. Facilities at the PNNL Sequim Campus were designed to take advantage of two unique locational assets: the pristine coastal ocean water in Sequim Bay and the region’s exceptionally clean air. Research facilities on the waterfront are supplied with up to 200 gallons per minute (gpm) of seawater and/or groundwater that enables research on aquatic systems ranging from fully seawater to fresh water, with an onsite water treatment system that removes all biological and hazardous chemical residues prior to discharge. Multiple large seawater tanks outside the waterfront laboratories, along with a boat ramp, pier, and floating dock, enable lab-to-field research. The uplands facility takes advantage of the amazing air quality and is built and operated to enable ultratrace chemical/radiological analytical chemistry. This combination of capabilities is not available at any other marine laboratory in the nation.
Based in Richland, Washington, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is one of 10 United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science (SC) national laboratories. PNNL is DOE’s premier chemistry, earth sciences and data analytics Laboratory, delivering vital mission impacts in energy resiliency and national security. PNNL has 19 core capabilities, each a powerful combination of world-class staff, state-of-the-art equipment, and mission ready facilities. These capabilities represent a collective set of skills and a body of world-leading scientific and engineering work that provides exceptional value and mission delivery to DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the missions of other federal agencies and industry through strategic partnership projects. Operated by Battelle Memorial Institute (Battelle), PNNL has more than: 2.3 million gross square feet and 4,400 staff members. PNNL is implementing a rolling 10-year campus strategy (initiated in FY 2013) designed to deliver the foundation for the multidisciplinary science and engineering expertise, equipment, instrumentation, facilities, and infrastructure required to continue providing exceptional value and mission delivery. PNNL’s annual ten-year plan is published with SC’s Ten-Year Plans for the Science National Laboratories. The most recent publication is available at: https://science.energy.gov/lp/laboratory-planning-process/. This edition of the PNNL Richland Campus Master Plan (CMP) is an update to the 2012 CMP.
This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) describes the steps to reconstruct x-ray projection images from Nuctech LS1516BS data captured at facilities operating in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Explosives Threat Assessment Program (ETA). This document also provides the steps for evaluating and approving the quality of the reconstructed images.
The U.S. electricity system is amid a rapidly occurring and widespread energy transition. Regional, Tribal, state, and customer demand for new energy resources, combined with favorable policies, is driving a rapid rise of interconnection requests. Interconnection processes will need to evolve to handle this larger number of requests today and into the future, as policy and economic drivers continue to motivate significant resource development. This roadmap identifies and organizes nearer- and longer-term solutions to enable transmission interconnection processes to meet this expected demand, and it is intended for a diverse audience of stakeholders participating within transmission interconnection processes. The roadmap is a result of the Interconnection Innovation e-Xchange (i2X) program launched by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in June 2022 to convene stakeholders and address interconnection challenges. The roadmap is organized into four primary goal areas, each important to the overall i2X mission to enable a simpler, faster, and fairer interconnection of clean energy resources while enhancing the reliability, resiliency, and security of our electric grid. The first goal aims to improve interconnection data transparency, to aid interconnection customers’ ability to screen and site potential projects, better enable third-party modeling, facilitate more process automation, enhance competition while ensuring equitable outcomes, and enable benchmarking, tracking, and auditing of interconnection processes and reforms. The second goal covers solutions to improve queue management practices, affected system studies, fair processes, and workforce development. The third goal incorporates solutions that aim to improve cost allocation, reduce costs to electricity consumers, enhance the coordination between transmission planning and the interconnection process, and optimize the rightsizing of transmission investment through improvements in interconnection studies. The fourth and final goal aims to reduce the performance issues not identified during interconnection studies by updating technical requirements within interconnection studies, models, and tools while also improving industry interconnection standards.
The convergence of Information Technologies and Operational Technology systems in industrial networks presents many challenges related to availability, integrity, and confidentiality. In this paper, we evaluate the various cybersecurity risks in industrial control systems and how they may affect these areas of concern, with a particular focus on energy-sector Operational Technology systems. There are multiple threats and countermeasures that Operational Technology and Information Technology systems share. Since Information Technology cybersecurity is a relatively mature field, this paper emphasizes on threats with particular applicability to Operational Technology and their respective countermeasures. We identify regulations, standards, frameworks and typical system architectures associated with this domain. We review relevant challenges, threats, and countermeasures, as well as critical differences in priorities between Information and Operational Technology cybersecurity efforts and implications. These results are then examined against the recommended National Institute of Standards and Technology framework for gap analysis to provide a complete approach to energy sector cybersecurity. We provide analysis of countermeasure implementation to align with the continuous functions recommended for a sound cybersecurity framework.
This exploratory longitudinal program evaluation examined GPA trajectories among 14 STEM scholars participating in the Scholarly Partnership in Nuclear Security (SPINS) mentoring program at an HBCU. Using de-identified administrative data (37 scholar-semester observations), the study compared baseline and latest term GPAs anchored to each scholar’s first funded semester. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to assess within-student change. Mean GPA increased modestly from 3.46 (SD = 0.30) at baseline to 3.61 (SD = 0.33) at the latest observed semester, with 12 of 14 scholars (85.7%) showing net improvement (median change = +0.12). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicated a statistically significant positive shift (W = 18, p = 0.030). However, scholars entered the program with a high baseline GPA, and ceiling effects were evident for several participants. Grounded in Social Cognitive Career Theory, findings suggest that multi-semester participation in SPINS is associated with GPA stability and modest improvement in an already high-performing cohort. Results should be interpreted cautiously given the small sample size and single-group design. The study highlights the value of sustained, culturally responsive mentoring at an HBCU while underscoring the need for larger evaluations with comparison cohorts and broader psychosocial outcomes. An evidence-informed mentoring framework is proposed to strengthen multi-semester support.
The use of ERTS imagery for water resources planning in the lower Mekong Basin relates to three major issues: (1) it complements data from areas, which have been inaccessible in the past because of security; this concerns mainly forest cover of the watersheds, and geological features, (2) it refines ground surveys; this concerns mainly land forms, and soils of existing and planned irrigation perimeters, and (3) it provides new information, which would be almost or entirely impossible to detect with ground surveys or conventional photography; this concerns the mechanism of flooding and drainage of the delta; siltation of the Great Lake and mapping of acidity, possibly also of salinity, in the lower delta; sedimentation and fisheries in the Mekong Delta estuarine areas.
This paper describes concepts for secure naming and addressing directed at Store, Carry and Forward (SCF) distributed applications, where disconnection and intermittent connectivity between forwarding systems is the norm. The paper provides a brief overview of store, carry and forward distributed applications followed by an in depth discussion of how to securely: create a namespace; allocate names within the namespace; query for names known within a local processing system or connected subnetwork; validate ownership of a given name; authenticate data from a given name; and, encrypt data to a given name. Critical issues such as revocation of names, mobility and the ability to use various namespaces to secure operations or for Quality-of-Service are also presented. Although the concepts presented for naming and addressing have been developed for SCF, they are directly applicable to fully connected systems.
The launch of the Cassini/Huygens mission on October 15, 1997, began a seven year journey across the solar system that culminated in the entry of the spacecraft into Saturnian orbit on June 30, 2004. Cassini/Huygens Spacecraft Navigation is the result of a complex interplay between several teams within the Cassini Project, performed on the Ground Data System. The work of Spacecraft Navigation involves rigorous requirements for accuracy and completeness carried out often under uncompromising critical time pressures. To support the Navigation function, a fault-tolerant, high-reliability/high-availability computational environment was necessary to support data processing. Configuration Management (CM) was integrated with fault tolerant design and security engineering, according to the cornerstone principles of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. Integrated with this approach are security benchmarks and validation to meet strict confidence levels. In addition, similar approaches to CM were applied in consideration of the staffing and training of the system administration team supporting this effort. As a result, the current configuration of this computational environment incorporates a secure, modular system, that provides for almost no downtime during tour operations.
These maps are an analysis of the Thomas Fire that occurred in California during December 2017. Using a variety of NASA Earth science data from five National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) sources (including four Earth Observing System Data and Information System Distributed Active Archive Centers and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System), as well as ancillary data from Ventura County, Santa Barbara County, and the Department of Homeland Security, this analysis sought to identify forest fire risk zones, create a fire occurrence density map, examine the vegetation and subsequent burn scar, capture the affected parcels, and capture the affected vegetation.
Presentation describes research to extract quantitative information about an imaging system from calibration imagery using radiographic data from the Cygnus Dual Beam Radiography Facility at the Nevada National Security Site.
As the grid of today is evolving into a highly distributed and autonomous cyber-physical system with higher penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and autonomous controls that are dependent on the cyber infrastructure, there are novel and increasing challenges to cyber-resilient operation of the grid. While the traditional mechanisms take a "bolt on" approach to cybersecurity and resiliency, this talk presents two novel technologies developed at NREL that "bake in" security and resilience into the design and control of the grid. An Adaptive Resilience Metrics framework is a novel mechanism for system owners and operators to understand the impact of cyber and physical system design and topology on the resilient operation, while also helping determine optimal policies in response to adverse cyber events. Along with that a zero-knowledge proof-based technique helps incorporate security into the controls layer by focusing on computational integrity rather than data integrity. By leveraging design and control properties unique to Operational Technology systems these technologies will not only help enhance cyber-resilience for the grid of today, but a highly distributed and autonomous grid of tomorrow.
The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.
Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 413 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. CAU 413 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-02CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 413 are the result of the atmospheric deposition of contamination from the 1963 CSII test. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 413 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 17, 2015, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 413. The CAI will include radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, collection and analyses of soil samples, and assessment of investigation results. The collection of soil samples will be accomplished using both probabilistic and judgmental sampling approaches. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of DQO decisions, the releases at CAU 413 have been divided into seven study groups.
Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 414 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 414 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate III (CSIII) storage–transportation test conducted on June 9, 1963. CAU 414 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-03CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 414 are the result of the atmospheric dispersal of contamination from the 1963 CSIII test. The CSIII test was a nonnuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 8 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily uranium and plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 414 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 7, 2016, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective action alternatives for CAU 414.
The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.