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DOE OSTI2016

High Fidelity BWR Fuel Simulations

This report describes the Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL) work conducted for completion of the Thermal Hydraulics Methods (THM) Level 3 milestone THM.CFD.P13.03: High Fidelity BWR Fuel Simulation. High fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) was conducted to investigate the applicability and robustness performance of BWR closures. As a preliminary study, a CFD model with simplified Ferrule spacer grid geometry of NUPEC BWR Full-size Fine-mesh Bundle Test (BFBT) benchmark has been implemented. Performance of multiphase segregated solver with baseline boiling closures has been evaluated. Although the mean values of void fraction and exit quality of CFD result for BFBT case 4101-61 agreed with experimental data, the local void distribution was not predicted accurately. The mesh quality was one of the critical factors to obtain converged result. The stability and robustness of the simulation was mainly affected by the mesh quality, combination of BWR closure models. In addition, the CFD modeling of fully-detailed spacer grid geometry with mixing vane is necessary for improving the accuracy of CFD simulation.

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DOE OSTI2017

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. Revision 0

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan provides the rationale and supporting information for the selection and implementation of corrective actions at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413, Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR). CAU 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range and includes one corrective action site, TA-23-02CS. CAU 413 consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of data quality objectives decisions, the releases at CAU 413 were divided into seven study groups: 1 Undisturbed Areas 2 Disturbed Areas 3 Sedimentation Areas 4 Former Staging Area 5 Buried Debris 6 Potential Source Material 7 Soil Mounds Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities, as set forth in the CAU 413 Corrective Action Investigation Plan, were performed from June 2015 through May 2016. Radionuclides detected in samples collected during the CAI were used to estimate total effective dose using the Construction Worker exposure scenario. Corrective action was required for areas where total effective dose exceeded, or was assumed to exceed, the radiological final action level (FAL) of 25 millirem per year. The results of the CAI and the assumptions made in the data quality objectives resulted in the following conclusions: The FAL is exceeded in surface soil in SG1, Undisturbed Areas; The FAL is assumed to be exceeded in SG5, Buried Debris, where contaminated debris and soil were buried after the CSII test; The FAL is not exceeded at SG2, SG3, SG4, SG6, or SG7. Because the FAL is exceeded at CAU 413, corrective action is required and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) must be evaluated. For CAU 413, three CAAs were evaluated: no further action, clean closure, and closure in place. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at CAU 413, and the detailed and comparative analysis of CAAs, clean closure was selected as the preferred CAA for CAU 413 by the U.S. Air Force, Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, and U.S. Department of Energy at the CAA meeting held on August 24, 2016.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2017

Monitoring Potential Transport of Radioactive Contaminants in Shallow Ephemeral Channels: FY2015 and FY2016

The Desert Research Institute (DRI) is conducting a field assessment of the potential for contaminated soil to be transported from the Smoky Contamination Area (CA) as a result of storm runoff. This activity supports Nevada Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) efforts to complete regulatory closure of the Soils Corrective Action Unit (CAU) contamination areas. The work is intended to confirm the likely mechanism of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause movement of contaminated soils, as well as determine the particle size fraction that is most closely associated with transported radionuclide-contaminated soils. These data will facilitate the appropriate closure design and post-closure monitoring program.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2019

Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy Standard Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation (DOE-STD-5002-2017) requires preparation of an Annual Summary Report comparing low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities operations with the Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) and its supporting technical documents including the performance assessment (PA) and the composite analysis (CA). The fiscal year (FY) 2018 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) was prepared by reviewing planned and discovered changes, waste receipts, monitoring results, research and development (R&D) results, and the status of DAS conditions and issues to assess the validity of the DASs, PAs, and CAs. The Area 3 RWMS was placed in stand-by in 2006 and remained inactive in FY 2018. Resumption of waste disposal operations is planned for FY 2019. No proposed actions, new information, or discoveries affecting the Area 3 RWMS were identified in FY 2018. No significant changes have occurred since preparation of the most recent special analysis, which indicates a continuing reasonable expectation of meeting the PA performance objectives and measures, and the CA dose constraint in DOE O 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” No changes were made to documents supporting the Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) including the PA, CA, DAS, waste acceptance criteria (WAC), closure plan, monitoring plan, or maintenance plan. Monitoring results for the most recent year with available data, calendar year (CY) 2017, indicate no changes to long-term trends and no results inconsistent with expected performance. R&D results for the Area 3 RWMS Drainage Lysimeter Facility continue to be consistent with the conceptual site model (CSM). All Area 3 RWMS DAS conditions and secondary issues were closed in 2002. The Area 5 RWMS continued disposal operations within the Northern Expansion Area in FY 2018. Eighty-six changes involving proposed actions, new information, or discoveries affecting the Area 5 RWMS PA and CA were screened during FY 2018 in the Unreviewed disposal question (UDQ) process. Twenty-two changes required UDQ evaluations and two changes resulted in unreviewed composite analysis question evaluations. None of the proposed actions, new information, or discoveries had significant impacts on the PAs or CAs. All of the planned changes were implemented. No special analyses were performed, and no changes were made to documents supporting the RWMB including the PA, CA, DAS, WAC, closure plan, monitoring plan, or maintenance plan. Planning continued and construction commenced on development of the Western Expansion Area within the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. All Area 5 RWMS DAS conditions and secondary issues were closed in 2002. The cumulative effects of changes occurring since preparation of the Area 5 RWMS PA and CA were assessed with the current baseline PA/CA model. Model results indicate that there is a reasonable expectation that the PA performance objectives and measures, and the CA dose constraint in DOE O 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” can be met. No PA or CA mean result exceeds 50% of its performance objective. Monitoring results and R&D results continue to be consistent with the CSM. Monitoring results for CY 2017 indicate no changes to long-term trends and no results inconsistent with expected performance. R&D results for the Area 5 RWMS Weighing Lysimeter Facility continue to be consistent with the CSM. The FY 2018 review of Area 3 RWMS and Area 5 RWMS disposal operations supports the following conclusions: The Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PA and associated CA assumptions and conclusions remain valid based on consideration of all changes identified or planned; The reasonable expectation that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs will meet the performance objectives identified in DOE O 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management”, remains valid; and The DAS, based on interpretation of the data collected, monitoring results, and other information, continues to be adequate.

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DOE OSTI2019

Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site (Rev.3)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, requires that performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities be maintained by the responsible field office. This plan describes the activities performed to maintain the PA and the CA for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The plan is based on DOE Order 435.1 Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2007), DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual (DOE 2011), and DOE Standard DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation (DOE 2017). The facility’s Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) specifies conditions for the continuing operation of a LLW facility. The DAS is issued based on a review of the facility's PA, CA, the maintenance plan, preliminary closure plan, and preliminary monitoring plan. The DAS specifies the limits and conditions on construction, design, operations, and closure of the low-level waste facility based on these reviews. The Maintenance Plan uses an Unreviewed Disposal Question (UDQ)/Unreviewed Composite Analysis Question (UCAQ) change control process to identify, evaluate, and control planned or discovered changes affecting the PA, CA, DAS, or other documents composing the Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB). The UDQ/UCAQ process uses the PA and CA GoldSim models to calculate updated results, assess the significance of changes, and to assess the need to revise the PA, CA, or DAS. In addition to the change control process, the Maintenance Plan requires an annual review of all changes and an annual assessment of the need to revise RWMB documents, plans, and programs. The cumulative effect of all changes is assessed annually by preparing a revised PA and CA baseline model that is used to update PA and CA results. The updated results are used to assess compliance with the PA performance objectives and the CA dose constraint, and to assess the need to revise the PAs, CAs, and other documents, plans, and programs supporting the RWMB. An Annual Summary Report documenting the results and conclusions of the annual review is prepared and submitted to DOE.

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DOE OSTI2019

Inventory Data Package for the Hanford Site Composite Analysis

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DOE OSTI2019

Inventory Data Package for the Hanford Site Composite Analysis

The disposed inventory estimate is perhaps the most important component of the composite analysis (CA), as it directly affects the future radiological impacts following site closure. The goal is to estimate radionuclide inventory from site inception to closure. Because of the inclusive nature of a CA, all relevant contaminants are identified and initially considered. Then, subsets of contaminants appropriate for quantitative analysis are selected. Reducing the number of radionuclides for inclusion in the quantitative analysis helps focus budget and resources on simulating only those radionuclides that are likely to contribute to the total dose to the receptor above a threshold value. Inventory is reported within the geographical boundary of the Hanford Site 200 Areas and includes contributing sources on the Central Plateau. The inventory covers the radiological inventories of historical discharges and residuals that have the potential to release after closure. The reported inventory is focused on the source terms needed for transport modeling and the evaluation of risk associated with the ground water pathway. Risk from the air pathway was considered. Inventories of sites with approved performance assessments (PAs) will be integrated using their release curves directly with vadose zone transport modeling.

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DOE OSTI2016

Cost estimation inputs for spent nuclear fuel geologic disposal concepts (Revision 1)

A set of 16 geologic disposal concepts is described in sufficient detail for rough-order-of-magnitude repository cost estimates, for disposal of spent nuclear reactor fuel in generic crystalline, argillaceous, and salt host geologic media. The description includes total length, diameter, and volume for all underground shafts, ramps, drifts and large-diameter borings. Basic types of ground support are specified. Total repository capacity is assumed to be approximately 140,000 MT of spent fuel, but concepts are described in terms of modular panels each containing 10,000 MT. Waste packaging is described, and the materials and outer dimensions for disposal overpacks are given. The manner of emplacement is specified, with any additional fixturing, lining, buffer materials, and backfill needed. Thermal limits for waste package emplacement or repository closure are given, as appropriate for enclosed and open emplacement modes, respectively. The 16 disposal concepts are based on disposal concept studies performed for the Used Fuel Disposition R&D program between 2011 and 2014, and the accompanying engineering analyses. Revision 1 results from review and checking of repository spacings, drift length estimates, repository plan area estimates, closure power limits, and estimates of fuel age at closure.

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DOE OSTI2020

Monitoring Potential Transport of Radioactive Contaminants in Shallow Ephemeral Channels: FY2019

Desert Research Institute (DRI) conducted a field assessment of the potential for contaminated soil to be transported from the Smoky Site Contamination Area (CA) because of storm runoff. This activity supported U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) efforts to establish post-closure monitoring plans for the Smoky Site Soils Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 550. The work was intended to confirm the likely mechanism of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause the movement of contaminated soils, as well as determine the particle size fraction most closely associated with transported radionuclide-contaminated soils. These data will facilitate the design of the appropriate post-closure monitoring program. In 2011, DRI installed a meteorological monitoring station on the west side of the Smoky Site CA and a hydrologic (runoff) monitoring station within the CA, near the east side. The meteorological station collected air temperature, wind speed, wind direction, relative humidity, precipitation, solar radiation, barometric pressure, soil temperature, and soil water content data. The maximum, minimum, and average or total values (as appropriate) for each of these parameters were recorded for each 10-minute interval. The maximum, minimum, and average water depth in the flume installed at the hydrologic station were also recorded for each 10-minute interval. This report presents the data collected from these stations during fiscal year (FY) 2019. During the FY2019 reporting period, the warmest months were June, July, and August and the coldest were December and February. The highest monthly solar radiation (i.e., sunshine) values were recorded in June, July, and August, whereas December through February had the lowest solar radiation values. Monthly mean wind speeds were highest in the spring (April) and early summer (June). Winds were predominantly from the north, except in February, July, August, and September when winds were mostly from the west. The monthly average relative humidity ranged from 17 percent to approximately 60 percent. Humidity was lowest in the summer and highest in the winter. Monthly total precipitation ranged from 0.0 during August and September to 2.22 inches (in) (56.39 millimeters [mm]) in February. Total precipitation for FY2019 was 7.83 in (198.88 mm). During the reporting period, a single, nonzero, flow event was recorded at the flume. This occurred over two days between March 6 and 7, 2019, in response to 1.16 in (29.46 mm) of precipitation falling within 9.3 hours on March 6, 2019. This event produced a peak water depth of 0.39 in (0.99 centimeters [cm]) in the flume, and runoff was measured for approximately 23.5 hours. However, the maximum recorded flow depth was less than the limit for flow discharge and velocity that can be calculated for the six-inch (15 cm) throat of a Parshall flume. The runoff event produced insufficient flow velocities through the natural channel to cause local erosion and transport of bedload materials. No bedload samples were collected for radiological analysis. Observing meteorological and environmental conditions that lead to storm runoff will help identify the parameters and threshold conditions that should be incorporated into post-closure monitoring plans for this and similar Soils CAU sites. Routine monitoring of meteorological and hydrologic parameters at the Smoky Site CA has been discontinued at the request of EM NV, effective at the conclusion of FY2019. Environmental data acquisition was completed and the meteorological and runoff monitoring stations were removed from the Smoky Site on October 15, 2019.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Features Events and Processes Relevant to DPC Disposal Criticality Analysis

The Department of Energy is evaluating the technical feasibility of disposal of spent nuclear fuel in dual-purpose canisters in various geologies. As part of ongoing research and development, the effect of potential post-closure criticality events on repository performance is being studied. Many different features, events, and processes (FEPs) could affect the potential for criticality or the extent of a criticality event. Additionally, a criticality event could affect other FEPs. This report uses existing lists of FEPs as a starting point to evaluate the FEPs that could affect or be affected by an in- package criticality event. The evaluation indicates that most of the FEPs associated with the waste form, the waste, or the EBS have some effect on post-closure criticality and/or are affected by the consequences of post-closure criticality. In addition, FEPs not previously considered are identified for further development.

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DOE OSTI2020

Summary Report for the NEPA Impact Analysis. Revision 1

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste. Containment of TRU waste at the WIPP facility is derived from standards set forth in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191. The DOE assesses compliance with the containment standards according to the Certification Criteria in Title 40 CFR Part 194 by means of Performance Assessment (PA) calculations performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). WIPP PA calculations estimate the probability of radionuclide releases from the repository to the accessible environment for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after facility closure. The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has initiated a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) action for a proposal to excavate and use additional transuranic (TRU) waste disposal panels at the WIPP facility. This report documents an analysis undertaken as part of an effort to evaluate the potential environmental consequences of the proposed action. Although not explicitly required for a NEPA analysis, evaluations of a dose indicator to hypothetical members of the public after final facility closure are presented in this report. The analysis is carried out in two stages: first, Performance Assessment (PA) calculations quantify the potential releases to the accessible environment over a 10,000-year post-closure period. Second, dose was evaluated for three hypothetical exposure pathways using the conservative radionuclide concentrations assumed to be released to the accessible environment.

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DOE OSTI2020

PORFLOW modeling of Vadose zone flow and transport for the E-area intermediate level vault

In support of the E-Area Performance Assessment, a two-dimensional model of water flow and radionuclide transport through the E-Area Intermediate Level Vault (ILV) and local vadose zone has been developed using the PORFLOWTM software. The purpose of the model is to calculate flux to the water table for radionuclides eluted from the ILV during its operational life, the period of institutional control, and times following site closure. Results of model calculations will be used by a three-dimensional PORFLOW model of transport through the aquifer to determine radionuclide concentrations at a hypothetical 100 meter well and at the site boundary where contaminated groundwater could be assessed by members of the public following site closure. While newly developed, the model structure closely follows that used in the 2008 PA while incorporating a refined computational mesh, updated material properties for the vadose zone soil and vault concrete, revised infiltration rates, and new solid-liquid distribution coefficients. The model also addresses degradation of concrete hydraulic properties by blending soil and concrete water retention curves over a 500 year period. That is, the hydraulic properties of ILV concrete start out as fresh concrete at the time of site closure and degrade to soil properties over a 500 year time period. This approach has not been used previously in E-Area PA’s. The model has been used to calculate water flow through the ILV vadose zone and, on a trial basis, transport of a limited number of radionuclides from the waste region inside the ILV to the water table. Figure ES-1 provides a view of the model and an example of water flow after the concrete has substantially degraded. Figure dimensions are in centimeters. The red area in the left hand side figure is the waste disposal region within the ILV. Colored bands in the figures indicate different soil and concrete regions. Figure ES-2 shows a calculation of flux to the water table (mol/yr) for U-234 and its one-year half-life decay chain (U-234 → Th-230 → Ra-226 → Pb-210). Pb-210 flux is too small to show on the same scale used for Th-230 and Ra-226 in Figure ES-2. The model has also been used to make a preliminary evaluation of the release of tritium from TPBAR disposal containers that will be place in the ILV. A separately calculated tritium release rate as a function of time was used as a source in the PORFLOW model. The TPBAR disposal schedule and tritium release rate differ from the values used in the 2008 PA. Results from these initial trial runs are compared to calculations made for the 2008 PA ILV analysis. In brief, a new PORFLOW model of flow and transport through the ILV vadose zone has been developed and tested. The model is ready to be used for PA calculations.

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DOE OSTI2021

Corrosion of Steel During Long-Term Exposure to Evolving Cementitious Environments

SRS is proceeding with closure of the H-Area Tank Farm (HTF) and F-Area Tank Farm (FTF). Closure consists of removing the bulk waste, heel removal, and filling the tank with tailored grout formulations. The long-term performance of the concrete and steel materials of construction and the closure grout is an important consideration for Performance Assessment (PA) of closed tanks in FTF and HTF. Over PA timeframes of hundreds, thousands, to tens of thousands of years, the chemical and physical properties of the concrete and steel materials will slowly degrade due to environmental exposure and material aging. In the interim these materials will provide a barrier to the leaching of radionuclides into the soil. Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is updating relevant portions of these analysis inputs to support an imminent revision to the HTF PA and a future update to the FTF PA. This analysis provides an update to the previous PA inputs for steel corrosion. The Central Scenario for the PA analysis includes three postulated modeling cases: 1) Realistic Case, 2) Compliance Case, and 3) Pessimistic Case. This analysis also included a Fast Flow Path Case. This latter case considered the circumstance where the initial condition of the concrete was a completely degraded state and that grout shrinkage exposed the steel to the soil environment immediately. In effect, the steel was unprotected by the concrete and grout. The cases have various degrees of conservatism considered. Chemical, physical and tank configuration parameters were investigated to understand their effects on the predicted time to release of the contaminants. The assessment reviewed the initial tank and steel configuration, service life degradation of the steel, and potential corrosion mechanisms associated with degradation of the concrete materials.

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DOE OSTI2023

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Chapter 1

This report documents the revised Performance Assessment (PA) analysis for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) at the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS). A PA analysis is required for DOE-operated facilities that dispose of low-level radioactive waste. PA analyses simulate (1) the release of radionuclides from the disposal site after facility closure, (2) transport of those contaminants through the environment, and (3) exposure/impacts to potential receptors. The purpose of the PA analysis is to demonstrate that the facility is operated in a manner that ensures long-term environmental protection after facility closure, thereby providing for the protection of public health and safety in limiting doses to a hypothetical member of the public (MOP) or an inadvertent human intruder (IHI). DOE Manual (M) 435.1-1, Chg. 3, Radioactive Waste Management (U.S. DOE, 2021b) establishes quantitative post-closure environmental impact limits and requires a facility-specific PA analysis to demonstrate compliance with these limits for DOE low-level waste (LLW) disposed of after September 26, 1988. These limits are defined in terms of human health (e.g., dose limits) with respect to radioactive constituents in the waste.

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DOE OSTI2017

2016 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The site was the location of an underground nuclear test in 1968, which resulted in residual contamination at and near the detonation depth of approximately 3200 feet (ft) below ground surface (bgs) that requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (State of Nevada et al. 1996) (as amended) (FFACO) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (LMS/CNT/S12760) (DOE 2016a) (Closure Report) describes LM’s plan for the long-term postclosure monitoring of radioisotope concentrations and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2016a).

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DOE OSTI2019

2018 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018a), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018a).

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DOE OSTI2023

2020 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended 1996 Nevada Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (State of Nevada et al. 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

UNF-ST&DARDS Enhancements for RCCA Data in As-loaded Dual Purpose Cask Models

This report summarizes the work performed to enable detailed modeling of rod cluster control assembly (RCCAs) in dual purpose canisters (DPCs) in as-loaded configurations using the Used Nuclear Fuel – Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS). The goal of this project was to evaluate the reactivity impact that RCCAs have on k eff of DPCs with pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel to potentially use the additional margin in future post-closure criticality safety analysis. This preliminary evaluation determined the number of DPCs that currently require compensatory actions prior to emplacement in a repository because of their high reactivity under post-closure criticality scenarios, which could be made acceptable by including the as-loaded RCCAs as specified in the Unified Database (UDB). This report briefly describes the modeling methods currently used within UNF-ST&DARDS and the modifications made to automate inclusion of the as-loaded RCCAs in the DPCs for post-closure criticality calculations for the loss of neutron absorber (NA) scenarios, or NA models. For the Zion site, the loss of basket scenarios, or degraded basket (DB) models, are also included. Discussion is also provided regarding the UDB data compared to available site-specific loading map data for the sites, which are specifically evaluated herein. This report compares the modifications to a similar evaluation for the Zion by site conducted by Walker as an initial validation. After the partial validation, all existing PWR sites with applicable NA models within the UDB were evaluated.

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