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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2005

Risk Management for Human Support Technology Development

NASA requires continuous risk management for all programs and projects. The risk management process identifies risks, analyzes their impact, prioritizes them, develops and carries out plans to mitigate or accept them, tracks risks and mitigation plans, and communicates and documents risk information. Project risk management is driven by the project goal and is performed by the entire team. Risk management begins early in the formulation phase with initial risk identification and development of a risk management plan and continues throughout the project life cycle. This paper describes the risk management approach that is suggested for use in NASA's Human Support Technology Development. The first step in risk management is to identify the detailed technical and programmatic risks specific to a project. Each individual risk should be described in detail. The identified risks are summarized in a complete risk list. Risk analysis provides estimates of the likelihood and the qualitative impact of a risk. The likelihood and impact of the risk are used to define its priority location in the risk matrix. The approaches for responding to risk are either to mitigate it by eliminating or reducing the effect or likelihood of a risk, to accept it with a documented rationale and contingency plan, or to research or monitor the risk, The Human Support Technology Development program includes many projects with independently achievable goals. Each project must do independent risk management, considering all its risks together and trading them against performance, budget, and schedule. Since the program can succeed even if some projects fail, the program risk has a complex dependence on the individual project risks.

jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRS2005

Analysis of Molecular Contamination on Genesis Collectors Through Spectroscopic Ellipsometry

Before the spacecraft returned to Earth in September, the Genesis mission had a preliminary assessment plan in place for the purpose of providing information on the condition and availability of collector materials to the science community as a basis for allocation requests. One important component of that plan was the evaluation of collector surfaces for molecular contamination. Sources of molecular contamination might be the on-orbit outgassing of spacecraft and science canister components, the condensation of thruster by-products during spacecraft maneuvers, or the condensation of volatile species associated with reentry. Although the non-nominal return of the Genesis spacecraft introduced particulate contamination to the collectors, such as dust and heatshield carbon-carbon, it is unlikely to have caused any molecular deposition. The contingency team's quick action in returning the damaged payload the UTTR cleanroom by 6 PM the evening of recovery help to ensure that exposure to weather conditions and the environment were kept to a minimum.

McNamara, K. M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

RTO Technical Publications: A Quarterly Listing

A quarterly listing of RTO technical publications is presented. The topics include: Handbook on the Analysis of Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations in Long Term Defence Planning; 2) Radar Polarimetry and Interferometry; 3) Combat Casualty Care in Ground-Based Tactical Situations: Trauma Technology and Emergency Medical Procedures; and 4) RTO Technical Publications: A Quarterly Listing

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NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Discovery Launch Readiness Press Conference

This press conference, attended by representatives from the national, Florida, and aerospace media, addresses launch, weather, and safety issues related to Space Shuttle Discovery prior to its launch on the STS-114 Return to Flight mission. The Master of Ceremonies is George Diller from NASA Public Affairs, and the panelists are: Space Shuttle Program Manager Bill Parsons, ISS Program Manager (JSC) Bill Gerstenmaier, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager Wayne Hale, Director of Shuttle Processing Mike Wetmore, ISS Program Manager (JAXA) Dr. Kuniaki Shiraki, and Launch Weather Officer (USAF) Mindy Chavez. Questions included the following topics: predicted weather conditions at launch, contingency rescue plans, countdown procedures, and risk management, as well as implications of the Return to Flight for the International Space Station (ISS).

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NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Discovery L-3 Countdown Status Briefing

Bruce Buckingham of NASA Public Affair hosted this briefing. Jeff Spaulding, NASA Test Director; Scott Higgenbotham, STS-114 Payload-Mission Manager; Cathy Winters, Shuttle Weather Officer were present. Jeff specifically noted that the mission represents NASA's first step towards fulfilling the President's visions of returning to the Moon and then on to Mars and beyond. Scott reports that the 28,000 pounds of ISS hardware that is in the payload bay of the Discovery is ready to go, and completed final close outs. Cathy mentioned that Hurricane Dennis is not a threat, however, main threat of inland thunderstorms would result to 30% weather prohibiting launch. Cathy further gave current weather forecast supported with charts: the Launch Forecast, Tanking Forecast, SRB (Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster) Forecast, CONUS and TAL Launch Sites Forecast and with 24 hours and 48 hours turn around plan. Final inspections, ice formation, ice inspection, effect of weather conditions to the external tank, delays and contingencies were some of the topics covered with the News Media.

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NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Discovery L-2 Countdown Status Briefing

George Diller of NASA Public Affairs hosted this briefing. Pete Nickolenko, NASA Test Director; Scott Higgenbotham, STS-114 Payload-Mission Manager; Cathy Winters, Shuttle Weather Officer were present. Pete reports his team has completed the avionics system check ups, servicing of the cryogenic tanks will take about seven hours that day, and will perform engine system checks and pad close outs come evening. Pete also summarized other standard close out activities: check ups of the Orbiter and ground communications network, rotary service, structure retraction, and external tank load (ETL). Pete reported that the mission will be 12 days with two weather contingency days, and end of mission landing scheduled at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at approximately 11:00 in the morning, Eastern time on July 25th. Scott briefly reported that all hardware is on board Discovery, closed out, and ready to fly. Cathy reported that hurricane Dennis moved to the North and looking forward to launch. She mentioned of a new hurricane looming and will be named Emily, spotted some crosswinds which will migrate to the west, there is 30% probability weather prohibiting launch. Cathy further gave current weather forecast supported with charts: the Launch Forecast, Tanking Forecast, SRB (Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster) Forecast, CONUS and TAL Launch Sites Forecast, and with 24 hours and 48 hours turn around plan. Launch constraints, weather, crosswinds, cloud cover, ground imagery system, launch countdown, launch crews, mission management simulations, launch team simulations were topics covered with the News Media.

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NASA NTRS2005

Flight Data Analysis of HyShot 2

The development of scramjet propulsion for alternative launch and payload delivery capabilities has comprised largely of ground experiments for the last 40 years. With the goal of validating the use of short duration ground test facilities, the University of Queensland, supported by a large international contingency, devised a ballistic re-entry vehicle experiment called HyShot to achieve supersonic combustion in flight above Mach 7.5. It consisted of a double wedge intake and two back-to-back constant area combustors; one supplied with hydrogen fuel at an equivalence ratio of 0.33 and the other un-fueled. Following a first launch failure on October 30th 2001, the University of Queensland conducted a successful second launch on July 30th, 2002. Post-flight data analysis of the second launch confirmed the presence of supersonic combustion during the approximately 3 second test window at altitudes between 35 and 29 km. Reasonable correlation between flight and some pre-flight shock tunnel tests was observed.

Hass, Neal E.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Candidate Materials Evaluated for a High-Temperature Stirling Convertor Heater Head

The Department of Energy and NASA have identified Stirling Radioisotope Generators (SRGs) as a candidate power system for use on long-duration, deep-space science missions and Mars rovers. One of the developments planned for an upgraded version of the current SRG design is to achieve higher efficiency by increasing the overall operating temperature of the system. Currently, the SRG operates with a heater head temperature of 650 C and is fabricated from the nickel-base superalloy 718. The current operating temperature is at the limit of alloy 718 s capability, and any planned increase in temperature will be contingent on identifying a more capable material from which to fabricate the heater head. To this end, personnel at the NASA Glenn Research Center are evaluating advanced materials for a high-temperature heater head to allow a higher convertor temperature ratio and, thus, increase the system efficiency. A generic list of properties that were used to screen the candidate materials follows: (1) creep, (2) fabricability, (3) helium gas containment, (4) long-term stability and compatibility, (5) ability to form a hermetical closeout seal, and (6) ductility and toughness.

Bowman, Randy R.↗
NASA NTRS2005

CORRELATED ERRORS IN EARTH POINTING MISSIONS

Two different Earth-pointing missions dealing with attitude control and dynamics changes illustrate concerns with correlated error sources and coupled effects that can occur. On the OrbView-2 (OV-2) spacecraft, the assumption of a nearly-inertially-fixed momentum axis was called into question when a residual dipole bias apparently changed magnitude. The possibility that alignment adjustments and/or sensor calibration errors may compensate for actual motions of the spacecraft is discussed, and uncertainties in the dynamics are considered. Particular consideration is given to basic orbit frequency and twice orbit frequency effects and their high correlation over the short science observation data span. On the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) spacecraft, the switch to a contingency Kalman filter control mode created changes in the pointing error patterns. Results from independent checks on the TRMM attitude using science instrument data are reported, and bias shifts and error correlations are discussed. Various orbit frequency effects are common with the flight geometry for Earth pointing instruments. In both dual-spin momentum stabilized spacecraft (like OV-2) and three axis stabilized spacecraft with gyros (like TRMM under Kalman filter control), changes in the initial attitude state propagate into orbit frequency variations in attitude and some sensor measurements. At the same time, orbit frequency measurement effects can arise from dynamics assumptions, environment variations, attitude sensor calibrations, or ephemeris errors. Also, constant environment torques for dual spin spacecraft have similar effects to gyro biases on three axis stabilized spacecraft, effectively shifting the one-revolution-per-orbit (1-RPO) body rotation axis. Highly correlated effects can create a risk for estimation errors particularly when a mission switches an operating mode or changes its normal flight environment. Some error effects will not be obvious from attitude sensor measurement residuals, so some independent checks using imaging sensors are essential and derived science instrument attitude measurements can prove quite valuable in assessing the attitude accuracy.

Steve Bilanow↗
NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Medical Care for Exploration

The goal of Autonomous Medical Care (AMC) is to ensure a healthy, well-performing crew which is a primary need for exploration. The end result of this effort will be the requirements and design for medical systems for the CEV, lunar operations, and Martian operations as well as a ground-based crew health optimization plan. Without such systems, we increase the risk of medical events occurring during a mission and we risk being unable to deal with contingencies of illness and injury, potentially threatening mission success. AMC has two major components: 1) pre-flight crew health optimization and 2) in-flight medical care. The goal of pre-flight crew health optimization is to reduce the risk of illness occurring during a mission by primary prevention and prophylactic measures. In-flight autonomous medical care is the capability to provide medical care during a mission with little or no real-time support from Earth. Crew medical officers or other crew members provide routine medical care as well as medical care to ill or injured crew members using resources available in their location. Ground support becomes telemedical consultation on-board systems/people collect relevant data for ground support to review. The AMC system provides capabilities to incorporate new procedures and training and advice as required. The on-board resources in an autonomous system should be as intelligent and integrated as is feasible, but autonomous does not mean that no human will be involved. The medical field is changing rapidly, and so a challenge is to determine which items to pursue now, which to leverage other efforts (e.g. military), and which to wait for commercial forces to mature. Given that what is used for the CEV or the Moon will likely be updated before going to Mars, a critical piece of the system design will be an architecture that provides for easy incorporation of new technologies into the system. Another challenge is to determine the level of care to provide for each mission type. The level of care refers to the amount and type of care one will render based on perceived need and ability. This is in contrast to the standard of care which is the benchmark by which that care is provided. There are certainly some devices and procedures that have unique microgravity or partial gravity requirements such that terrestrial methods will not work. For example, performing CPR on Mars cannot be done in exactly the same way as on Earth because the reduced gravity causes too large a reduction in the forces available for effective compression of the chest. Likewise, fluid behavior in microgravity may require a specialized water filtration and mixing system for the creation of intravenous fluids. This paper will outline the drivers for the design of the medical care systems, prioritization and planning techniques, key system components, and long term goals.

Johnson-Throop, Kathy A.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Microbial Air and Surface Monitoring Results from International Space Station Samples

Over the course of long-duration spaceflight, spacecraft develop a microbial ecology that directly interacts with the crew of the vehicle. While most microorganisms are harmless or beneficial to the inhabitants of the vehicle, the presence of medically significant organisms appearing in this semi-closed environment could adversely affect crew health and performance. The risk of exposure of the crew to medically significant organisms during a mission is estimated using information gathered during nominal and contingency environmental monitoring. Analysis of the air and surface microbiota in the habitable compartments of the International Space Station (ISS) over the last four years indicate a high presence of Staphylococcus species reflecting the human inhabitants of the vehicle. Generally, air and surface microbial concentrations are below system design specifications, suggesting a lower risk of contact infection or biodegradation. An evaluation of sample frequency indicates a decrease in the identification of new species, suggesting a lower potential for unknown microorganisms to be identified. However, the opportunistic pathogen, Staphylococcus aureus, has been identified in 3 of the last 5 air samples and 5 of the last 9 surface samples. In addition, 47% of the coagulase negative Staphylococcus species that were isolated from the crew, ISS, and its hardware were found to be methicillin resistance. In combination, these observations suggest the potential of methicillin resistant infectious agents over time.

Ott, C. Mark↗
NASA NTRS2006

Compressive Failure of Fiber Composites under Multi-Axial Loading

This paper examines the compressive strength of a fiber reinforced lamina under multi-axial stress states. An equilibrium analysis is carried out in which a kinked band of rotated fibers, described by two angles, is sandwiched between two regions in which the fibers are nominally straight. Proportional multi-axial stress states are examined. The analysis includes the possibility of bifurcation from the current equilibrium state. The compressive strength of the lamina is contingent upon either attaining a load maximum in the equilibrium response or satisfaction of a bifurcation condition, whichever occurs first. The results show that for uniaxial loading a non-zero kink band angle beta produces the minimum limit load. For multi-axial loading, different proportional loading paths show regimes of bifurcation dominated and limit load dominated behavior. The present results are able to capture the beneficial effect of transverse compression in raising the composite compressive strength as observed in experiments.

Basu, Shiladitya↗
NASA NTRS2005

Expanding the Frontiers of Knowledge

So space is supremely hostile, but we know this. But when we ask what is the cost of human space missions, we need to consider as many contingencies as possible. This is important because we want to do more than send people on one-way trips, we want to be able to bring astronauts back. So if exploration is what really matters and not just pride of nation, then perhaps we should genetically engineer a version of ourselves that can survive the hostile environments of space. We've got cloning. We're inside the genome. Let s just do it. Well in fact, we ve done that already. Yes, we have emissaries of ourselves that survive the hazards of space; they re called robots. You don t have to feed them or bring them back, and they don t complain if you lose them in space. So my concern is if costs turn out to be what they have historically been and the time to execute programs lasts as long as it historically has, then I am not convinced that economic cycles and political cycles will allow such programs to survive if they do not satisfy one of these three criteria. The record of history tells us this, unless somehow you want to believe that we are different today than 6,000 years of our predecessors.

deGrasse Tyson, Neil↗
NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 4

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it will be necessary to prepare for the receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but specific detailed protocols for the handling and testing of returned samples must still be developed. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and to develop the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened a series of workshops in 2000-2001. The overall objective of the Workshop Series was to produce a Draft Protocol by which returned martian sample materials can be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This report also provides a record of the proceedings of Workshop 4, the final Workshop of the Series, which was held in Arlington, Virginia, June 5-7, 2001. During Workshop 4, the sub-groups were provided with a draft of the protocol compiled in May 2001 from the work done at prior Workshops in the Series. Then eight sub-groups were formed to discuss the following assigned topics: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing Environmental and Health/Monitoring and Safety Issues Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft Protocol Draft Protocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts This report provides the first complete presentation of the Draft Protocol for Mars Sample Handling to meet planetary protection needs. This Draft Protocol, which was compiled from deliberations and recommendations from earlier Workshops in the Series, represents a consensus that emerged from the discussions of all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the five Workshops of the Series. These discussions converged on a conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific analytical requirements. Discussions also identified important issues requiring attention, as well as research and development needed for protocol implementation.

Race Margaret S.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Managing the Implementation of Mission Operations Automation

Reducing the cost of mission operations has necessitated a high level of automation both on spacecraft and ground systems. While automation on spacecraft is implemented during the design phase, ground system automation tends to be implemented during the prime mission operations phase. Experience has shown that this tendency for late automation development can be hindered by several factors: additional hardware and software resources may need to be procured; software must be developed and tested on a non-interference basis with primary operations with limited manpower; and established procedures may not be suited for automation requiring substantial rework. In this paper we will review the experience of successfully automating mission operations for seven on-orbit missions: the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory (CGRO), the Rossi X-Ray Timing Explorer (RXTE), the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE), the Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE), Interplanetary Physics Laboratory (WIND), Polar Plasma Laboratory (POLAR), and the Imager for Magnetopause-to-Aurora Global Exploration (IMAGE). We will provide lessons learned in areas such as: spacecraft recorder management, procedure development, lights out commanding from the ground system vs. stored command loads, spacecraft contingency response time, and ground station interfaces. Implementing automation strategies during the mission concept and spacecraft integration and test phase as the most efficient method will be discussed.

Sodano, R.↗
NASA NTRS2006

MSL EDL Entry Guidance using the Entry Terminal Point Controller

The Mars Science Laboratory will be the first Mars mission to attempt a guided entry with the objective of safely delivering the entry vehicle to a survivable parachute deploy state within 10 km of the pre-designated landing site. The Entry Terminal Point Controller guidance algorithm is derived from the final phase Apollo Command Module guidance and, like Apollo, modulates the bank angle to control range based on deviations in range, altitude rate, and drag acceleration from a reference trajectory. For application to Mars landers which must make use of the tenuous Martian atmosphere, it is critical to balance the lift of the vehicle to minimize the range while still ensuring a safe deploy altitude. An overview of the process to generate optimized guidance settings is presented, discussing improvements made over the last four years. Performance tradeoffs between ellipse size and deploy altitude will be presented, along with imposed constraints of entry acceleration and heating. Performance sensitivities to the bank reversal deadbands, heading alignment, attitude initialization error, and atmospheric delivery errors are presented. Guidance settings for contingency operations, such as those appropriate for severe dust storm scenarios, are evaluated.

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