DOE OSTI2012
In nuclear material processing facilities, it is often necessary to balance the competing demands of accuracy and throughput. While passive neutron multiplicity counting is the preferred method for relatively fast assays of plutonium, the presence of low-Z impurities (fluorine, beryllium, etc.) rapidly erodes the assay precision of passive neutron counting techniques, frequently resulting in unacceptably large total measurement uncertainties. Conversely, while calorimeters are immune to these impurity effects, the long count times required for high accuracy can be a hindrance to efficiency. The higher uncertainties in passive neutron measurements of impure material are driven by the resulting large (>>2) {alpha}-values, defined as the ({alpha},n):spontaneous fission neutron emission ratio. To counter impurity impacts for high-{alpha} materials, a known-{alpha} approach may be adopted. In this method, {alpha} is determined for a single item using a combination of gamma-ray and calorimetric measurements. Because calorimetry is based on heat output, rather than a statistical distribution of emitted neutrons, an {alpha}-value determined in this way is far more accurate than one determined from passive neutron counts. This fixed {alpha} value can be used in conventional multiplicity analysis for any plutonium-bearing item having the same chemical composition and isotopic distribution as the original. With the results of single calorimeter/passive neutron/gamma-ray measurement, these subsequent items can then be assayed with high precision and accuracy in a relatively short time, despite the presence of impurities. A calorimeter-based known-{alpha} multiplicity analysis technique is especially useful when requiring rapid, high accuracy, high precision measurements of multiple plutonium bearing items having a common source. The technique has therefore found numerous applications at the Savannah River Site. In each case, a plutonium (or mixed U/Pu) bearing item is divided into multiple containers. A single item from that batch is then selected for both neutron and calorimetric measurements; all remaining items undergo a neutron measurement only. Using the technique mentioned above, the 'true' {alpha} value determined from the first (calorimeter and passive neutron measured) item is used in multiplicity analysis for all other items in the batch. The justification for using this {alpha} value in subsequent calculations is the assumption that the chemical composition and isotopic distribution of all batch items are the same, giving a constant ({alpha},n):spontaneous fission ratio. This analysis method has been successfully applied to the KIS Facility, significantly improving measurement uncertainties and reducing processing times for numerous items. Comprehensive plans were later developed to extend the use of this method to other applications, including the K-Area Shuffler and the H-Area Pu-Blending Project. While only the feasibility study for the Shuffler has been completed, implementation of the method in the H-Area Pu-Blending Project is currently in progress and has been successfully applied to multiple items. This report serves to document the details of this method in order to serve as a reference for future applications. Also contained herein are specific examples of the application of known-{alpha} multiplicity analysis.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗