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At least 1,243 records · Page 69

Moon Base Life Support Design Depends on Launch Cost, Crew Size, and Mission Duration

Brief human space missions such as Apollo and the Space Shuttle used material storage for life support but a long mission such as a space station uses a recycling life support system. The upcoming Moon visits will probably be brief with few crew at first but in the future there may be a long-term or even permanent Moon base with a large crew. The initial life support system will probably use storage and resupply of materials from Earth, but it could be replaced later by recycling, especially if launch cost per kilogram is high. Moon base life support design is investigated considering requirements, performance, reliability, cost, and risk. The launch cost, crew size, and mission duration are variable parameters that affect the life support design choice. Greater launch cost, crew size, or mission duration all tend to make recycling more cost-effective than resupply.

Jones, Harry W.↗

Crew radiation dose from the plume of a high impulse gas-core nuclear rocket during a Mars mission.

Analytical calculations are performed to determine the radiation dose rate and total dose to the crew of a gas-core nuclear rocket from the fission fragments located throughout the plume volume. The radiation dose from the plume fission fragments to two crew locations of 100 and 200 meters from the nozzle exit are calculated. It is found that, in the case of the most probable fission fragment retention time of 100 seconds, the crew must be protected from the radiation dose. Five centimeters of lead shielding would reduce the radiation dose by two orders of magnitude thereby protecting the crew. The increase in vehicle weight would be insignificant (7150 kg to a vehicle gross weight of 0.94 million kg).

Masser, C. C.↗

A system performance throughput model applicable to advanced manned telescience systems

As automated space systems become more complex, autonomous, and opaque to the flight crew, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine whether the total system is performing as it should. Some of the complex and interrelated human performance measurement issues are addressed that are related to total system validation. An evaluative throughput model is presented which can be used to generate a human operator-related benchmark or figure of merit for a given system which involves humans at the input and output ends as well as other automated intelligent agents. The concept of sustained and accurate command/control data information transfer is introduced. The first two input parameters of the model involve nominal and off-nominal predicted events. The first of these calls for a detailed task analysis while the second is for a contingency event assessment. The last two required input parameters involving actual (measured) events, namely human performance and continuous semi-automated system performance. An expression combining these four parameters was found using digital simulations and identical, representative, random data to yield the smallest variance.

Haines, Richard F.↗

FUN3D Grid Refinement and Adaptation Studies for the Ares Launch Vehicle

This paper presents grid refinement and adaptation studies performed in conjunction with computational aeroelastic analyses of the Ares crew launch vehicle (CLV). The unstructured grids used in this analysis were created with GridTool and VGRID while the adaptation was performed using the Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) code FUN3D with a feature based adaptation software tool. GridTool was developed by ViGYAN, Inc. while the last three software suites were developed by NASA Langley Research Center. The feature based adaptation software used here operates by aligning control volumes with shock and Mach line structures and by refining/de-refining where necessary. It does not redistribute node points on the surface. This paper assesses the sensitivity of the complex flow field about a launch vehicle to grid refinement. It also assesses the potential of feature based grid adaptation to improve the accuracy of CFD analysis for a complex launch vehicle configuration. The feature based adaptation shows the potential to improve the resolution of shocks and shear layers. Further development of the capability to adapt the boundary layer and surface grids of a tetrahedral grid is required for significant improvements in modeling the flow field.

Bartels, Robert E.↗

Space Radiation Technologies for Human Missions beyond Low-Earth-Orbit

Ionizing radiation exposure is a pervasive occupational risk to astronauts and remains a major health risk associated with human exploration beyond low-Earth-orbit. Sustained lunar and Mars exploration crew will be at increased risk of radiogenic cancers and cardiovascular disease, as well as, the potential for in-mission performance decrements, immune system decrements, and late neurodegenerative conditions impacting crew health. Optimizing astronaut space radiation protection will incorporate both physical and biological radiological aspects and will implement protection strategies that span pre-mission, in-flight, and post mission timelines. Major facets of physical risk mitigation include accuracy in predicting the space radiation solar environment, monitoring environmental and human exposures, and minimizing exposure through vehicle shielding and design. Biological mitigation facets include understanding and predicting biological response to the space environment, developing advanced medical countermeasures, and identifying appropriate surveillance strategies to preserve long-term health. Coordinated investments in these major capability areas will support development of an integrated radiation protection solution to minimize astronaut risk for moon to Mars exploration missions.

Lisa C Simonsen↗

NASA Human Health and Performance Strategy

In May 2007, what was then the Space Life Sciences Directorate, issued the 2007 Space Life Sciences Strategy for Human Space Exploration. In January 2012, leadership and key directorate personnel were once again brought together to assess the current and expected future environment against its 2007 Strategy and the Agency and Johnson Space Center goals and strategies. The result was a refined vision and mission, and revised goals, objectives, and strategies. One of the first changes implemented was to rename the directorate from Space Life Sciences to Human Health and Performance to better reflect our vision and mission. The most significant change in the directorate from 2007 to the present is the integration of the Human Research Program and Crew Health and Safety activities. Subsequently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate underwent a reorganization to achieve enhanced integration of research and development with operations to better support human spaceflight and International Space Station utilization. These changes also enable a more effective and efficient approach to human system risk mitigation. Since 2007, we have also made significant advances in external collaboration and implementation of new business models within the directorate and the Agency, and through two newly established virtual centers, the NASA Human Health and Performance Center and the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation. Our 2012 Strategy builds upon these successes to address the Agency s increased emphasis on societal relevance and being a leader in research and development and innovative business and communications practices. The 2012 Human Health and Performance Vision is to lead the world in human health and performance innovations for life in space and on Earth. Our mission is to enable optimization of human health and performance throughout all phases of spaceflight. All HHPD functions are ultimately aimed at achieving this mission. Our activities enable mission success, optimizing human health and productivity in space before, during, and after the actual spaceflight experience of our crews, and include support for ground-based functions. Many of our spaceflight innovations also provide solutions for terrestrial challenges, thereby enhancing life on Earth. Our strategic goals are aimed at leading human exploration and ISS utilization, leading human health and performance internationally, excelling in management and advancement of innovations in health and human system integration, and expanding relevance to life on Earth and creating enduring support and enthusiasm for space exploration.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗

NASA Human Health and Performance Strategy

In May 2007, what was then the Space Life Sciences Directorate, issued the 2007 Space Life Sciences Strategy for Human Space Exploration. In January 2012, leadership and key directorate personnel were once again brought together to assess the current and expected future environment against its 2007 Strategy and the Agency and Johnson Space Center goals and strategies. The result was a refined vision and mission, and revised goals, objectives, and strategies. One of the first changes implemented was to rename the directorate from Space Life Sciences to Human Health and Performance to better reflect our vision and mission. The most significant change in the directorate from 2007 to the present is the integration of the Human Research Program and Crew Health and Safety activities. Subsequently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate underwent a reorganization to achieve enhanced integration of research and development with operations to better support human spaceflight and International Space Station utilization. These changes also enable a more effective and efficient approach to human system risk mitigation. Since 2007, we have also made significant advances in external collaboration and implementation of new business models within the directorate and the Agency, and through two newly established virtual centers, the NASA Human Health and Performance Center and the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation. Our 2012 Strategy builds upon these successes to address the Agency's increased emphasis on societal relevance and being a leader in research and development and innovative business and communications practices. The 2012 Human Health and Performance Vision is to lead the world in human health and performance innovations for life in space and on Earth. Our mission is to enable optimization of human health and performance throughout all phases of spaceflight. All HH&P functions are ultimately aimed at achieving this mission. Our activities enable mission success, optimizing human health and productivity in space before, during, and after the actual spaceflight experience of our crews, and include support for ground-­‐ based functions. Many of our spaceflight innovations also provide solutions for terrestrial challenges, thereby enhancing life on Earth. Our strategic goals are aimed at leading human exploration and ISS utilization, leading human health and performance internationally, excelling in management and advancement of innovations in health and human system integration, and expanding relevance to life on Earth and creating enduring support and enthusiasm for space exploration.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗

STS-96 FD Highlights and Crew Activities Report: Flight Day 05

On this fifth day of the STS-96 Discovery mission, the flight crew, Commander Kent V. Rominger, Pilot Rick D. Husband, and Mission Specialists Ellen Ochoa, Tamara E. Jernigan, Daniel T. Barry, Julie Payette, and Valery Ivanovich Tokarev are seen performing logistics transfer activities within the Discovery/International Space Station orbiting complex. The crew transfers supplies, equipment, and water. Payette and Tokarev perform maintenance activities on the storage batteries in the Zarya module. Barry and Tokarev install acoustic insulation around some of the fans inside Zarya. Jernigan and Husband install shelving in 2 soft stowage racks. Husband and Barry troubleshoot and perform maintenance activities on the Early Communications System. At the end of the workday, Rominger, Jernigan, and Barry discussed the progress of the mission with NBC's "Today," CBS "This Morning," and CNN.

Source record↗

From Diagnosis to Action: An Automated Failure Advisor for Human Deep Space Missions

The major goal of current space system development at NASA is to enable human travel to deep space locations such as Mars and asteroids. At that distance, round trip communication with ground operators may take close to an hour, thus it becomes unfeasible to seek ground operator advice for problems that require immediate attention, either for crew safety or for activities that need to be performed at specific times for the attainment of scientific results. To achieve this goal, major reliance will need to be placed on automation systems capable of aiding the crew in detecting and diagnosing failures, assessing consequences of these failures, and providing guidance in repair activities that may be required. We report here on the most current step in the continuing development of such a system, and that is the addition of a Failure Response Advisor. In simple terms, we have a system in place the Advanced Caution and Warning System (ACAWS) to tell us what happened (failure diagnosis) and what happened because that happened (failure effects). The Failure Response Advisor will tell us what to do about it, how long until something must be done and why its important that something be done and will begin to approach the complex reasoning that is generally required for an optimal approach to automated system health management. This advice is based on the criticality and various timing elements, such as durations of activities and of component repairs, failure effects delay, and other factors. The failure advice is provided to operators (crew and mission controllers) together with the diagnostic and effects information. The operators also have the option to drill down for more information about the failure and the reasons for any suggested priorities.

spacecraft health maintenance↗

A comparison of two Shuttle launch and entry suits - Reach envelope, isokinetic strength, and treadmill tests

A quantification has been conducted of any existing differences between the performance, in operational conditions, of the Space Shuttle crew Launch Entry Suit (LES) and the new Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES). While LES is a partial-pressure suit, the ACES system which is being considered as a replacement for LES is a full-pressure suit. Three tests have been conducted with six subjects to ascertain the suits' reach envelope, strength, and treadmill performance. No significant operational differences were found between the two suit designs.

Schafer, Lauren E.↗

Early Impacts of a Human-in-the-Loop Evaluation in a Space Vehicle Mock-up Facility

The development of a new space vehicle, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), provides Human Factors engineers an excellent opportunity to have an impact early in the design process. This case study highlights a Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) evaluation conducted in a Space Vehicle Mock-Up Facility and will describe the human-centered approach and how the findings are impacting design and operational concepts early in space vehicle design. The focus of this HITL evaluation centered on the activities that astronaut crewmembers would be expected to perform within the functional internal volume of the Crew Module (CM) of the space vehicle. The primary objective was to determine if there are aspects of a baseline vehicle configuration that would limit or prevent the performance of dynamically volume-driving activities (e.g. six crewmembers donning their suits in an evacuation scenario). A second objective was to step through concepts of operations for known systems and evaluate them in integrated scenarios. The functional volume for crewmember activities is closely tied to every aspect of system design (e.g. avionics, safety, stowage, seats, suits, and structural support placement). As this evaluation took place before the Preliminary Design Review of the space vehicle with some designs very early in the development, it was not meant to determine definitely that the crewmembers could complete every activity, but rather to provide inputs that could improve developing designs and concepts of operations definition refinement.

Byrne, Vicky↗

Cockpit Interruptions and Distractions: Effective Management Requires a Careful Balancing Act

Managing several tasks concurrently is an everyday part of cockpit operations. For the most part, crews handle concurrent task demands efficiently, yet crew preoccupation with one task to the detriment of performing other tasks is one of the more common forms of error in the cockpit. Most pilots are familiar with the December 1972 L1011 crash that occurred when the crew became preoccupied with a landing gear light malfunction and failed to notice that someone had inadvertently bumped off the autopilot. More recently a DC-9 landed gear-up in Houston when the crew, preoccupied with an stabilized approach, failed to recognize that the gear was not down because they had not switched the hydraulic pumps to high. We have recently started a research project to study why crews are vulnerable to these sorts of errors. As part of that project we reviewed NTSB reports of accidents attributed to crew error; we concluded that nearly half of these accidents involved lapses of attention associated with interruptions, distractions, or preoccupation with one task to the exclusion of another task. We have also analyzed 107 ASRS reports involving competing tasks; we present here some of our conclusions from those ASRS reports. These 107 reports involved 21 different types of routine tasks crews neglected at a critical moment while attending to another task. Sixty-nine percent of the neglected tasks involved either failure to monitor the current status or position of the aircraft or failure to monitor the actions of the pilot flying or taxiing. Thirty-four different types of competing activities distracted or preoccupied the pilots. Ninety percent of these competing activities fell into one of four broad categories: communication (e.g., discussion among crew or radio communication), heads-down work (e.g., programming the FMS or reviewing approach plates), responding to abnormals, or searching for VMC traffic. We will discuss examples of each of these four categories and suggest things crews can do to reduce their vulnerability to these and similar situations.

Dismukes, R. K.↗

An Exploratory Study of Runway Arrival Procedures: Time Based Arrival and Self-Spacing

The ability of a flight crew to deliver their aircraft to its arrival runway on time is important to the overall efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS). Over the past several years, the NAS has been stressed almost to its limits resulting in problems such as airport congestion, flight delay, and flight cancellation to reach levels that have never been seen before in the NAS. It is predicted that this situation will worsen by the year 2025, due to an anticipated increase in air traffic operations to one-and-a-half to three times its current level. Improved arrival efficiency, in terms of both capacity and environmental impact, is an important part of improving NAS operations. One way to improve the arrival performance of an aircraft is to enable the flight crew to precisely deliver their aircraft to a specified point at either a specified time or specified interval relative to another aircraft. This gives the flight crew more control to make the necessary adjustments to their aircraft s performance with less tactical control from the controller; it may also decrease the controller s workload. Two approaches to precise time navigation have been proposed: Time-Based Arrivals (e.g., required times of arrival) and Self-Spacing. Time-Based Arrivals make use of an aircraft s Flight Management System (FMS) to deliver the aircraft to the runway threshold at a given time. Self-Spacing enables the flight crew to achieve an ATC assigned spacing goals at the runway threshold relative to another aircraft. The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), a multi-agency initiative established to plan and coordinate the development of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), has asked for data for both of these concepts to facilitate future research and development. This paper provides a first look at the delivery performance of these two concepts under various initial and environmental conditions in an air traffic simulation environment.

Houston, Vincent E.↗

Smart Habitat: Identifying Technological Countermeasures to Address Health and Performance Risks during Long-Duration Exploration Missions

During proposed long-duration Exploration Missions, crews must become increasingly autonomous, as they will be unable to rely on consistent input and guidance from ground-based mission control operations. While it is known that smart technologies will play a crucial role in future long-duration Exploration Missions, it is not known which manner of devices and systems may best mitigate the expected risks to crew. The purpose of this project was to identify both current and emerging technologies which may act as health and performance countermeasures on long-duration Exploration Missions.

Ryan A. Lange↗

Oculometric Surveillance of Neuro-Ocular Function

Future missions to the moon or Mars will require the crew to monitor and assess their health and performance more autonomously, with approaches easily useable and interpretable by non-clinicians. If an autonomous oculometric diagnostic-support system proves to be a reliable predictor of impending impairment of visual function in the case of primary ocular pathology on Earth, then it could also be applied in the future to the surveillance of crew to detect the potential progression of sensorimotor and neuro-ocular compromises during extended spaceflight missions, e.g., SANS, and thus guide earlier and more effective countermeasure intervention. Towards that goal, we intend to determine if a set of largely independent eye-movement metrics, called oculometrics, measured using a simple voluntary eye-tracking task that can be completed in just 5 minutes per eye, could provide clinically valid biomarkers of functional visual deficits due to primary ocular pathology. The premise is that oculometrics could be used to monitor slowly evolving ocular pathologies, potentially detecting them even before structural evidence appears in ocular imaging or other current state-of-the-art clinical measures. This study investigates how NASA’s patented oculometric assessment of visual and visuomotor function, shown to correlate with performance in a manual control task, will correlate with standard ophthalmological tests to confirm clinical and thus operational, validity.

eye movements↗

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗