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124 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Resilient U.S. Land Ports of Entry

The continued operation of Land Ports of Entry (LPOE), managed by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and General Services Administration% is vital to the U.S. economy and security. Border faculties are included in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Government Facilities Sector2, one of the 16 critical infrastructures "whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.'" Specifically, disruptions to the flow of border crossing traffic, in the form of closures or increased border crossing wait times, impact the economy and security of all countries involved. This paper describes a process for analyzing and improving the resilience of U.S. Land Ports of Entry. For LPOE, the team believes that energy resilience is the primary objective due to the complete reliance on the e-manifest system and the increasing use of Multi-Energy Portals (MEPs). Emanifests are part of CPB's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). They document several key pieces of information about cargo vehicles wishing to cross the border into the United States and are submitted before arriving at the port. Vehicles can be flagged for more invasive inspection based on the content of the e-manifest. MEPs are a non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology used to scan the contents of the cargo. Together MEPs and ACE serve an important role in aiding CBP with their mission to protect "the public from dangerous people and materials", and "enabling legitimate trade and travel.'" To analyze resilience of a port, the team would need to understand the port's current energy usage, which systems depend on energy and what backup systems exist, and any emergency operation plans that dictate how systems are operated in the event of a power outage. The team would also need to determine the design basis threats (DBTs) for the LPOE which could include natural disasters, manmade events, and accidents. The magnitudes of the DBTs are calculated and are then translated to expected impacts on the infrastructure and systems at the port. With this information gathered, existing LPOE models developed here at Sandia National Laboratories could be extended to support decisions about resilience. Current models are implemented in FlexSim, a 3rd party discrete event simulator. FlexSim provides 3-D visuals of physical layout that can reveal valuable insights, allows input to be variable (e.g. time it takes to interact with the CBP officer at primary inspection can vary) so that a whole range of possibilities can be captured in the results, and can be used to collect user-defined output metrics. Current LPOE models focus on cargo vehicle traffic, and process changes caused by the installation of new drive-through MEPs. Extending them to address resilience questions would require the addition of key pieces of information learned during the resilience analysis including critical systems, failure rates, and process changes for when failures occur. The primary output metric for current models is border crossing wait time. Additional metrics would also be added to the model to gain a more complete understanding of impacts related to resilience, for example, MEP scan rate. Once complete, the model could be used to analyze the effectiveness of mitigation strategies representing some future state.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2022

FY22 Progress on Computational Modeling of the Water-Based NSTF

This report summarizes the system-level modeling effort by Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) of the Natural convection Shutdown heat removal Test Facility (NSTF) in FY22. As an extension of the effort from FY21, this year’s work focuses primarily on the two-phase modeling of the NSTF using RELAP5-3D, particularly with the inclusion of the cavity model. The results from simulations were used to compare against experimental data for benchmarking purposes of the RELAP5 deck. Additionally, RELAP5 was used as a predictive tool to guide planned test operations and identify expected system behaviors. In the first part of this report, details are provided of the cavity omitted model where heat flux is applied directly as a boundary condition to the risers. The general trend predicted by the RELAP5 model matches that from the experimental data when a single-phase natural circulation flow is first established, followed by an oscillatory two-phase period and finally a stable two-phase flow. However, the onset of oscillations is predicted early by the model due to the smaller thermal mixing region in the tank. However, by expanding the simulated thermal mixing region in the tank, the onset of oscillations predicted by the model is able to match that from the experiment. These oscillations where studied in depth and are deduced to be flashing-induced instability. The model was then modified to simulate an accident scenario case where a representative heat load based on the full-scale Framatome’s 625 MW t SC-HTGR was applied directly to the riser channels. The simulated initial and boundary conditions were identical to those performed experimentally, facilitating direct comparisons between the predicted and experimental results. It was determined that the results showed some discrepancies remain, likely due to the overprediction of vapor generation rate by the computer model. In the second part of this report, the cavity model is re-introduced where it is observed that the RELAP5 prediction is now able to capture the major trends of the observed flow commonly observed during two-phase conditions. However, the onset of oscillations is once again predicted early by the model, possibly caused by the underprediction of heat loss from the heater and cavity. This is likely due to the omission of support structures in the cavity that can act as additional pathways for heat to escape to the environment. To overcome the underprediction of heat loss, part of the insulation surrounding the cavity side panels and the back of the heaters are removed to allow heat to escape directly to the environment, which then improves the RELAP5 prediction. Parametric studies are also performed to investigate the effects of heater power, tank inventory level, and tank gas space pressure on flow behaviors, also in direct comparison to conditions tested experimentally. User option-61 in the RELAP5-3D input deck, which changes the heat transfer coefficient correlations used for calculating the vapor generation, is also investigated where it is found that by enabling the option, the overall duration of oscillations is increased and matches that from the experiment better. The RELAP5 model is further benchmarked with a header inlet- throttling case where it is observed that the prediction from the model fails to capture some major features observed in the experiment. By using a modified loss coefficient curve for the valve, the accuracy of the prediction is improved where most of the major features observed in the experiment are predicted by the model. Lastly, the model is benchmarked with an inventory depletion scenario where it is observed that despite the modeling limitation of RELAP5, the prediction shows good agreement with the experimental data where major trends and features are captured by the model. Future work will see continued development of the current RELAP5-3D input deck of the NSTF to both improve the accuracy of the model’s predictive capability and continuing serving the experimental program. The mutually beneficial relationship between analysis and experimental efforts has become integral to the parent NSTF program, and the greater objective to fully understand and accurately predict the heat removal performance of a full scale RCCS concept.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Supplemental Structural Analyses Used in Support of Certification of the Defense Programs Package 3

The Defense Programs Package (DPP)-3 is to be certified by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Packaging and Transportation Division (PTD). Certification is based on successful physical testing of the package, and six certification test units (CTUs) have been subjected to the normal conditions of transport (NCT) and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) outlined in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 (10 CFR 71). During regulatory testing of one of the CTUs, the drum lid closure bolt closest to the impact surface failed during the HAC 30-ft side drop. One of the testing goals for this CTU was to minimize the thermal pathway from the drum exterior shell to the containment vessel (CV) flange and O-rings, leading to the maximum damage scenario in preparation for thermal testing at 1475 °F. Therefore, the puncture bar impact proceeded as originally planned by striking the side wall of the package exterior closest to the location of the CV flange. This puncture bar impact did not attempt to exploit the region of the failed drum lid closure bolt to potentially cause more damage to the package. After the conclusion of regulatory testing, the DPP-3 package finite element model was used to numerically evaluate the effects of puncture bar impacts to the drum exterior in the vicinity of the failed drum lid closure bolt to further demonstrate the robustness of the DPP-3 design. Three alternate puncture bar impact locations and orientations were evaluated to demonstrate that these puncture bar impacts would not substantially reduce the effectiveness of the DPP-3 packaging. This paper describes the supplemental finite element models performed and structural analysis results that demonstrate the alternate HAC 40-in. puncture bar impact tests would have no deleterious effect on the performance of the DPP-3.

Sakalaukus Jr., Peter J.↗
DOE OSTI2023

BISON analysis of FeCrAl and Zircaloy cladding deformation during simulated BWR cyclic dryout conditions

The BISON fuel performance analysis code has been used to study FeCrAl and Zircaloy cladding performance to better understand cladding deformation behavior in boiling water reactors during conditions caused by anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) or by anticipated transients without scram (ATWS). BISON models of novel separate effects tests simulating ATWS events predicted mechanical responses to thermal cycling boundary conditions. Here, we assessed FeCrAl and Zircaloy deformation and burst models to determine those best suited for cyclic dryout event analysis. In addition, we compared diametral strain profiles of the post-experiment claddings to simulation results. The capability of the BISON code for modeling BWR AOO or ATWS events is promising.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Structural Features of Zirconium-Based Metal–Organic Frameworks Affecting Radiolytic Stability

Metal–organic frameworks (MOFs) NU-1000 and UiO-66 are herein exposed to two different gamma irradiation doses and dose rates and analyzed to determine the structural features that affect their stability in these environments. MOFs have shown promise for the capture and sensing of off-gases at civilian nuclear energy reprocessing sites, nuclear waste repositories, and nuclear accident locations. However, little is understood about the structural features of MOFs that contribute to their stability levels under the ionizing radiation conditions present at such sites. This study is the first of its kind to explore the structural features of MOFs that contribute to their radiolytic stability. Both NU-1000 and UiO-66 are MOFs that contain Zr metal-centers with the same metal absorption cross section. However, the two MOFs exhibit different linker connectivities, linker aromaticities, node densities, node connectivities, and interligand separations. In this study, NU-1000 and UiO-66 were exposed to high (423.3 Gy/min, 23 min, and 37 s) and low (0.78 Gy/min, 4320 min) dose rates of 60 Co gamma irradiation. NU-1000 displayed insignificant radiation damage under both dose rates due to its high linker connectivity, low node density, and low node connectivity. However, low radiation dose rates caused considerable damage to UiO-66, a framework with lower aromaticity and smaller interligand separation. Finally, results suggest that chronic, low-radiation environments are more detrimental to Zr MOF stability than acute, high-radiation conditions.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2021

BISON microstructure-based pulverization criterion in high burnup structure

To improve the economics of commercial nuclear power production, utilities are seeking to increase the allowable burnup limit of UO$_2$ fuel. One of the main factors that contributes to the current burnup limit of 62 GWd/MTU in commercial light water reactors (LWRs) is the risk of fine fragmentation or pulverization during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Pulverization primarily occurs at high burnups, especially when the high burnup structure (HBS) has formed. To allow the industry to pursue increased burnup and develop mitigation strategies, it is essential to have improved capability to predict the onset of pulverization. However, the mechanism of pulverization is not well understood, and the existing predictive capabilities implemented in the BISON fuel performance code are empirical in nature. In this report, mesoscale simulations are used to improve understanding of the formation mechanism of the HBS and how it responds during a LOCA transient, and inform development of a BISON pulverization criterion. A phase-field model was used to simulate the evolution of bubble pressure as a result of HBS formation. The simulations showed that gas atoms diffuse from grain interiors to the new grain boundaries created during HBS formation, and diffuse rapidly along these grain boundaries to reach existing bubbles. This causes an increase in bubble pressure in existing bubbles, leading to bubble growth during steady-state operation. To simulate the response of HBS bubbles to a LOCA transient, a newly developed phase-field model was used; in agreement with preliminary results from FY20, bubble size did not change significantly during the duration of the transient. A phase-field fracture model was used to study fragmentation patterns in the HBS, including using input from the phase-field model as initial conditions. Phase-field fracture simulations were used to determine a pulverization criterion for BISON. A function for the critical pressure for pulverization to occur was fit to data from the phase-field fracture simulations, and this function was implemented as a material property in BISON. For comparison, an analytical criterion for pulverization was developed and implemented within the same material property.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Comparison and investigation of production of specific nuclides by different fission yield data

Generally, passive gamma spectroscopy (PGS) is known as a useful technique for nondestructive measurement of burnup and nuclide production in normal spent nuclear fuel. However, PGS can be used not only for normal spent fuel, but also for molten fuel generated in severe accidents involving core meltdowns. In such cases, it is estimated by the radioactivity ratios of specific nuclides. At the time of the decommissioning of the Three Mile Island's unit 2 reactor, fission products (FPs) such as Cs{sup 134}, Cs{sup 137}, Ce{sup 144}, Eu{sup 154}, Ru{sup 106}, and Sb{sup 125} were concerned. The radioactivity ratios are estimated by numerical simulations. However, there are various uncertainties in numerical simulations. In this study, we evaluated the effect of the difference in fission yield data. We compared the productions of concerned nuclides of Three Mile Island's unit 2 reactor by using Tokyo-tech and JENDL FP Fission Yields Data File 2011(FPY- 2011). Tokyo-tech is newly created by Tsubakihara et al. at Tokyo Institute of Technology. FPY-2011 is currently the latest fission yield data in Japan. In the concerned nuclides, the relative difference (Tokyo-tech/FPY-2011 -1) in the production of Sb{sup 125} is 4.5% and that of Eu{sup 154} is -5.6%. The relative difference in the production of Sb{sup 125} is found to be caused by the difference in the independent yields of Sn{sup 125}, In{sup 125}, Cd{sup 125}, Ag{sup 125}, and Pd{sup 125}. The relative difference in Eu{sup 154} is found to be caused by the relative difference in the production of Sm{sup 152} and the relative difference in the cumulative yield of Eu{sup 153}.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) LEU Fuel Fluid-Structure Interaction Analysis

The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR ® ) is one of five U.S. high performance research reactors (USHPRR), plus one critical facility, that are actively collaborating with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M 3 ) Reactor Conversion Program to convert from highly enriched uranium (HEU, ≥ 20 wt.% U-235) to low-enriched uranium (LEU, < 20 wt.% U-235) fuel. A new type of LEU fuel with very high density, based on an alloy of uranium and 10 weight percent molybdenum (U-10Mo), is expected to allow the conversion to LEU of USHPRR that have been found unable to be converted with previously qualified uranium silicide-aluminum (U 3 Si 2 -Al) dispersion fuel. MURR has been working with the USHPRR Reactor Conversion (RC) Pillar at Argonne National Laboratory to perform fuel element design and fuel cycle performance analyses, steady-state thermal hydraulics safety analyses, and accident safety analyses in preparation for the conversion of MURR and to support a preliminary Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for conversion to LEU fuel. In this work, Fluid-structure interaction (FSI) analysis at the fuel element level, as compared to the fuel plate level of the previous work. is performed which models all components of the MURR LEU fuel element, including fuel plates and the supporting structures e.g., side plates, end fittings, and combs. Therefore, the effect of supporting structures on the coolant flow distribution, the fuel plate deflection, and the resulting coolant channel gap reduction can be evaluated. In addition to the nominal element geometry and flow rate, the tolerances in the geometry dimensions of coolant channel and plate thickness, the effect of a comb on plate deflection, and the uncertainty of the flow rate per element are considered in this work. The effect of comb on plate displacement is quantified through two bounding cases: the case assuming a perfect bond between the comb and plates and the case neglecting the comb effect. Note that in this analysis, the FSI has been decoupled from the other structural effects caused by irradiation (e.g., swelling and irradiation creep). Assessment of combined effects is planned for a later stage of this project.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluation of Atmospheric Conditions Leading to a Fumigation Event

During the afternoon of 30 January 2022, the Savannah River Site experienced unusual temperature conditions leading to a fumigation event that triggered safety alarms and caused considerable confusion about the cause of the event. Normally, it is assumed that fumigation events occur early in the day once surface heating has begun. While most fumigation events are related to the breakup of a nocturnal inversion, this event was related to synoptic atmospheric conditions, which provided a more unique scenario that led to the fumigation event. The unusual synoptic atmospheric conditions led to the downwash and fumigation of the elevated plume, causing a pollutant to mix rapidly to the surface. These conditions could have potentially harmed workers within the facility, since the plume was directed toward a building air intake system. Here, we seek to outline the conditions that led to this unusual fumigation event and provide results of two-dimensional (2D) wind modeling of the event to characterize these conditions for future operational guidance of the facility air intake systems. This work sets the groundwork for future high-resolution modeling to explore the mechanisms and thresholds affecting fumigation on the facility-specific short distance scales and improve forecasting of non-standard fumigation events to protect human health.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Success Path Method: Conformance with Safety Management Systems

All industrial facilities deal with safety hazards such as equipment failures, chemical and toxic releases, and fires and explosions just to name a few. A disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems and processes that handle hazardous substances by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices is called process safety. The goal of such framewoks is to prevent the release of energy or material that could cause harm to people or damage to equipment and/or environment. Process safety covers all aspects of facility operation also including design, maintenance, and human and organizational factors that could possibly have effect on process safety. As it will be seen from the discussion below, process safety is just one of the pieces of the much bigger matter, a safety culture. Many industries have long recognized the importance of safety culture in their day-to-day operation. Although the definition of safety culture can slightly differ from organization to organization, in general, a safety culture is how things are done to demonstrate a commitment to safety by everyone involved. An organization acquires safety culture over time as the product of individual and group values, actions, and behaviors toward overall safety. It is important to note that safety culture should not be viewed as some static state that an organization wants to reach. It is more like a constantly evolving level of “how things are done when nobody is watching.” Safety culture is an inherent characteristic of an organization, it is always present, but the level can range on a continuum from undesirable to desirable or more commonly used, from negative to positive. An example for an undesirable, negative safety culture would be a company in which accidents resulting in harm (physical and/or emotional) of its employees, equipment or surrounding environment and community occur frequently. At the other end of the spectrum would be a company in which such accidents are rare or do not occur at all (desired or positive safety culture). Every company/industry exists somewhere within this spectrum.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

REGULATORY TESTING AND POSTTEST ANALYSIS OF THE DPP-3 TYPE B SHIPPING CONTAINER FOR NCT AND HAC TESTS

The safe transportation of radioactive material using appropriately designed and certified transportation packages is important to protect the public and environment. Therefore, a comprehensive and rigorous system of packaging requirements are required. The purpose of this test protocol is to determine the effects of drop testing on package performance in a Type B shipping package (DPP-3). Required physical tests for the DPP-3 package include normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions test requirements. The preparation, regulatory testing, and post-test evaluation of a Type B shipping package tested to the 10 CFR 71.71 and 10 CFR 71.73 requirements will be presented. Six packages were tested and the responses when subjected to the HAC sequence of free drop, puncture, and thermal tests according to 10 CFR 71.73 were measured. The posttest helium leak test showed a leak rate less than 1 × 10-7 He-cc/sec which means that the containment boundary was maintained after the regulatory testing, therefore maintaining a leak tight environment. To determine the amount of change in the package performance measurements, statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 26. The null hypothesis of the testing was that there would not be a change in the measurements from pre to post-testing large enough to find statistical significance. Therefore, a finding of statistical significance indicated too much variability in the package design and was deemed an unfavorable finding. A repeated measures t-test was used to analyze the drum lids and CV torques. A one-way ANOVA was used to analyze height and diameter packages. Results of the repeated measures t-test indicated that all six containment vessel lid torques were statistically significant. However only three out of the six drum lid torques were statistically significant. Therefore, design of the lids caused more variability than necessary when subjected to the following drop tests: 1.) horizontal and cold; 2.) vertical lid down; and 3.) corner with lid up. Results of the one-way ANOVA analysis on height indicated that four out of the six CTUs were statistically significant. Thus, design of the CTUs caused more variability then necessary when subjected to the following drop tests: 1.) horizontal hot; 2.) horizontal cold; 3.) corner lid up; and 4.) corner lid down. Results of the one-way ANOVA analysis on diameter indicated that all six CTUs were statistically significant. Thus, design of the CTUs caused more variability then necessary when subjected to all of the tests. The DPP-3 design has been shown to be an acceptable design for the transport of radioactive materials. However, results of the statistical analysis reveal a possible improvement in package and test design to reduce variability in package performance measurement before and after testing.

Martinez, Oscar↗
DOE OSTI2023

Light Water Sustainability Program: Optimizing Information Automation Using a New Method Based on System-Theoretic Process Analysis

This report describes the interim progress for research supporting the design and optimization of information automation systems for nuclear power plants. Much of the domestic nuclear fleet is currently focused on modernizing technologies and processes, including transitioning toward digitalization in the control room and elsewhere throughout the plant, along with a greater use of automation, artificial intelligence, robotics, and other emerging technologies. While there are significant opportunities to apply these technologies toward greater plant safety, efficiency, and overall cost-effectiveness, optimizing their design and avoiding potential safety and performance risks depends on ensuring that human-performance-related organizational and technical design issues are identified and addressed. This report describes modeling tools and techniques, based on sociotechnical system theory, to support these design goals and their application in the current research effort. The report is intended for senior nuclear energy stakeholders, including regulators, corporate management, and senior plant management. We have developed and employed a method to design an optimized information automation ecosystem (IAE) based on the systems-theoretic constructs underlying sociotechnical systems theory in general and the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) approach in particular. We argue that an IAE can be modeled as an interactive information control system whose behavior can be understood in terms of dynamic control and feedback relationships amongst the system’s technical and organizational components. Up to this point, we have employed a Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) technique to examine a performance- and safety-related incident at an industry partner’s plant that involved the unintentional activation of an emergency diesel generator. This analysis provided insight into the behavior of the plant’s current information control structure within the context of a specific, significant event. Our ongoing analysis is focused on identifying near-term process improvements and longer-term design requirements for an optimized IAE system. The latter analyses will employ a second STAMP-derived technique, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). STPA is a useful modeling tool for generating and analyzing actual or potential information control structures. Finally, we have begun modeling plantwide organizational relationships and processes. Organizational system modeling will supplement our CAST and STPA findings and provide a basis for mapping out a plantwide information control architecture. CAST analysis findings indicate an important underlying contributor to the incident under investigation, and a significant risk to information automation system performance, was perceived schedule pressure, which exposed weaknesses in interdepartmental coordination between and within responsible plant organizations and challenged the resilience of established plant processes, until a human caused the initiating event. These findings are discussed in terms of their risk to overall system performance and their implications for information automation system resilience and brittleness. We present two preliminary information automation models. The proactive issue resolution model is a test case of an information automation concept with significant near-term potential for application and subsequent reduction in significant plant events. The IAE model is a more general representation of a broader, plantwide information automation system. From our results, we have generated a set of preliminary system-level requirements and safety constraints. These requirements will be further developed over the remainder of our project in collaboration with nuclear industry subject matter experts and specialists in the technical systems under consideration. Additionally, we will continue to pursue the system analyses initiated in the first part of our effort, with a particular emphasis on STPA as the main tool to identify weak or weakening control structures that affect the resilience of organizations and programs. Our intent is to broaden the scope of the analysis from an individual use case to a related set of use cases (e.g., maintenance tasks, compliance tasks) with similar human-system performance challenges. This will enable more generalized findings to refine the Proactive Issue Resolution and IAE models, as well as their system-level requirements and safety constraints. We will use organizational system modeling analyses to supplement STPA findings and model development. We conclude the report with a set of summary recommendations and an initial draft list of system-level requirements and safety constraints for optimized information automation systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Investigation of ion irradiation effects on mineral analogues of concrete aggregates

Irradiation can cause prominent damage to reactor concrete aggregates leading to amorphization, strength and modulus decrease, radiation induced volume expansion (RIVE) and micro-cracking, which limits their long-term performance. Here, to develop an improved understanding of irradiation effects in concrete, three mineral analogues of concrete aggregates (limestone, marble and quartzite) were irradiated by 5.5 MeV He ions and 13 MeV Ni ions to surface doses of 0.011 displacements per atom (dpa) and 0.23 dpa, respectively, at room temperature. The two different ion species allow irradiation spectrum effects (ionizing and displacive) to be examined. Irradiation induced cracks were observed in He irradiated limestone and marble, and Ni irradiated quartzite. Full amorphization was observed in Ni irradiated quartzite with 14.3 % RIVE, and ∼25 % hardness and modulus decrease, while almost no change was observed in He irradiated quartzite except 4.35 % RIVE, revealing a possible ionization enhanced diffusion effect for high energy light ions. Furthermore, partial amorphization was observed in Ni irradiated marble and limestone matrix with a 12 % hardness decrease in marble while no amorphization was observed for He irradiation with a 20 % hardness increase in limestone matrix. The role of knock-on damage and irradiation spectrum on amorphization, volumetric expansion and mechanical property changes are discussed. Moreover, the onset and critical doses for amorphization and RIVE in quartz are obtained for ion irradiations at room temperature. The dose dependence of RIVE exhibits a delay compared to the amorphization behavior. The superior irradiation resistance of calcite phase compared to quartz phase implies there could be advantages to using calcareous aggregates and lowering the usage of siliceous aggregates for concrete in nuclear power plants for extended operation beyond 60 years. However, other effects such as corrosion, aging and reactions during severe accidents should also be considered, and further investigations are needed.

Amorphous↗
DOE OSTI2022

AGR-5/6/7 Final Release-to-Birth Ratio Data Analysis

AGR-5/6/7 is the last of a series of Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) experiments conducted in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in support of development and qualification of tristructural isotropic (TRISO) low-enriched fuel for use in the high-temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR). AGR configuration and irradiation conditions are based on prismatic HTGR technology that is distinguished primarily through the use of helium coolant, a low-power-density ceramic core capable of withstanding very high temperatures, and TRISO-coated particle fuel. The AGR tests provide valuable irradiation-performance data to support fuel process development, qualify fuel for normal operation and accident conditions, and support development and validation of fuel performance and fission-product (FP) transport models and codes. Each AGR test consists of multiple independently controlled and monitored capsules containing fuel compacts placed in a graphite cylinder shrouded by a steel shell. Release-to-birth ratios (R/B) for fission-gas isotopes released from each capsule are calculated from release rates, measured by germanium detectors in the Fission Product Monitoring System (FPMS) installed downstream from each capsule, and birth rates calculated using numerical models of FG generation. The R/Bs are a critical measure of the ability of the fuel kernel, the particle coating layers, and the compact matrix to retain fission-gas atoms, preventing their release into the sweep-gas flow, and the impact of initially defective particles and/or particle-coating failures that occur during irradiation. For fission-gas isotopes, particle failure is defined as failure of all coating layers, allowing gaseous fission atoms to escape from a particle. During the first five cycles (162B ? 165A), R/Bs were stable in the 10-8?10-6 range, and no in-pile particle failures were observed, based on the gross gamma counts. The maximum R/B value of around 2 ? 10-6 for Kr-85m resulted from the presence of as-fabricated exposed kernels (based on the high exposed kernel fraction), the dispersed uranium, and high fuel particle temperatures in Capsule 1. Comparison of capsule-measured R/Bs from these early cycles to predictions using the previously developed AGR R/B model demonstrated FG release from the AGR-5/6/7 TRISO fuel was comparable to that of previous experiments. In addition, the Kr-85m R/B per-exposed-kernel values are comparable to R/B values obtained in AGR-3/4 irradiation experiment and four irradiation experiments performed during 1980s: (1) HRB-17/18, (2) COMEDIE-BD1, (3) HFR B1, and (4) HRB-21. In contrast, all measured R/B values are lower than predictions by the commonly used Richards and German models, which are intentionally conservative. A large number of in-pile particle failures occurred in Capsule 1 by the end of Cycle 166A. During the final four cycles (166A ? 168A), apparent damage to the Capsule 1 gas line appeared to cause FG leakage from that capsule into the other four capsules, resulting in an increase in fission gas (FG) detected in the effluent for all capsules. Isolation of the Capsule 1 gas line during the last three cycles also prevented measurement of its FG release. Thus, R/Bs in all capsules after Cycle 166A are highly uncertain because of undefined amount of leakage from Capsule 1, especially for long-lived isotopes. A few hundred in-pile particle failures were estimated for Capsule 1 before the end of Cycle 166A, but the total number of failures is unknown due to the lack of FG release data in the later cycles. Based primarily on evidence from the gross gamma counts during Cycle 168A, approximately 15 particles failed in Capsule 3 and four particles failed in Capsule 2. In-pile failures in Capsule 3 were anticipated because this capsule was designed to operate beyond the HTGR normal operating temperature range. In contrast, no in-pile failures were identified in the top two capsules (4 and 5) based on the absence of the typical spikes in gross gamma counts and low failure estimates using the AGR model, developed in INL/EXT-14-32970, for R/B of the short-lived isotopes (Kr-89 and Xe-137) with minimal leakage from Capsule 1.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗