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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Experimental requirements for measuring vestibular and cardiovascular physiology responses using orbital onboard human centrifuge during Apollo Applications Program
Systems and test specifications for developing space research human centrifuge engineering prototype for Apollo Applications Program orbital onboard experiment
Prelaunch checkout and payload integration test requirements for combined mission flights of Apollo applications program
Payload and module integration development and qualification test plan for combined mission flights of Apollo applications program
Radiation was found not to be an operational problem during the Apollo program. Doses received by the crewmen of Apollo missions 7 through 17 were small because no major solar-particle events occurred during those missions. One small event was detected by a radiation sensor outside the Apollo 12 spacecraft, but no increase in radiation dose to the crewmen inside the spacecraft was detected. Radiation protection for the Apollo program was focused on both the peculiarities of the natural space radiation environment and the increased prevalence of manmade radiation sources on the ground and onboard the spacecraft. Radiation-exposure risks to crewmen were assessed and balanced against mission gain to determine mission constraints. Operational radiation evaluation required specially designed radiation detection systems onboard the spacecraft in addition to the use of satellite data, solar observatory support, and other liaison. Control and management of radioactive sources and radiation-generating equipment was important in minimizing radiation exposure of ground-support personnel, researchers, and the Apollo flight and backup crewmen.
The day will come when the United States will want to return to the Earth's Moon. When that occurs, NASA may look to the Apollo program for technical and inspirational guidance. The Apollo program, however, was designed to be an end to itself--the landing of a man on the Moon and his return safely within the decade of the 1960's. When that was accomplished, the program folded because it was not self-sustaining. The next time we return to the Moon, we should base our planning on a program that is designed to be a sustained effort for an indefinite period. It is the thrust of this report that the South Pole Station of the National Science Foundation can be used to develop analogs for the construction, funding, and logistical support of a lunar base. Other analogs include transportation and national efforts versus international cooperation. A recommended lunar base using the South Pole Station as inspiration is provided, as well as details concerning economical construction of the base over a 22-year period.
The following are presented: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics Charter; Exploring NASA's Roots, the History of NASA Langley Research Center; NASA Langley's National Historic Landmarks; The Mustang Story: Recollections of the XP-51; Testing the First Supersonic Aircraft: Memoirs of NACA Pilot Bob Champine; NASA Langley's Contributions to Spaceflight; The Rendezvous that was Almost Missed: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous and the Apollo Program; NASA Langley's Contributions to the Apollo Program; Scout Launch Vehicle Program; NASA Langley's Contributions to the Space Shuttle; 69 Months in Space: A History of the First LDEF; NACA TR No. 460: The Characteristics of 78 Related Airfoil Sections from Tests in the Variable-Density Wind Tunnel; NACA TR No. 755: Requirements for Satisfactory Flying Qualities of Airplanes; 'Happy Birthday Langley' NASA Magazine Summer 1992 Issue.
Environmental testing and static firing of pitch control motor for Apollo spacecraft launch escape system
A documentary view of the Apollo 17 journey to Taurus-Littrow, the final lunar landing mission in the Apollo program is discussed. The film depicts the highlights of the mission and relates the Apollo program to Skylab, the Apollo-Soyuz linkup and the Space Shuttle.
Mathematical model for optimizing design criteria for Apollo man/spacecraft system and incorporating extensive physical and digital simulation of basic crew motions
Chemical propellants in Apollo program, noting Saturn launch vehicle and spacecraft propulsion
Development of electrolytic silver ion generator for water sterilization in Apollo water systems
The decision to accomplish the lunar landing mission by use of the lunar orbit rendezvous technique required that a docking system be developed to allow: (1) spacecraft modules to be structurally joined, (2) intravehicular transfer of the crew and equipment, and (3) separation of the modules. The basic design criteria of the docking system, the evolution process, and the various docking concepts considered for the Apollo program are presented. Docking systems that were considered for the Apollo program included both impact and nonimpact systems; a probe and drogue impact system was selected. Physical and functional descriptions of the probe and drogue, the crew transfer tunnel, and docking ring latches are presented for both the early configuration and the present configuration as influenced by the development and qualification test programs. In addition, preflight checkout activity and mission performance of the system are discussed.
A series of charts and diagrams is used to provide a detailed overview of the evolution of NASA space exploration architectures. The pre-Apollo programs including the Werner von Braun feasibility study are discussed and the evolution of the Apollo program itself is treated in detail. The post-Apollo era is reviewed and attention is given to the resurgence of strategic planning exemplified by both ad hoc and formal efforts at planning. Results of NASA's study of the main elements of the Space Exploration Initiative which examined technical scenarios, science opportunities, required technologies, international considerations, institutional strengths and needs, and resource estimates are presented. The 90-day study concludes that, among other things, major investments in challenging technologies are required, the scientific opportunities provided by the program are considerable, current launch capabilities are inadequate, and Space Station Freedom is essential.
The Little Joe II Qualification Test Vehicle, Model 12-50-1, was launched from Army Launch Area 3 {ALA-3) at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, on 28 August 1963. This was the first launch of this class of boosters. The Little Joe II Launch Vehicle was designed as a test vehicle for boosting payloads into flight. For the Apollo Program, its mission is to serve as a launch vehicle for flight testing of the Apollo spacecraft. Accomplishment of this mission requires that the vehicle be capable of boosting the Apollo payload to parameters ranging from high dynamic pressures at low altitude to very high altitude flight. The fixed-fin 12-50 version was designed to accomplish the low-altitude parameter. The 12-51 version incorporates an attitude control system to accomplish the high altitude mission. This launch was designed to demonstrate the Little Joe II capability of meeting the high dynamic pressure parameter for the Apollo Program. For this test, a boiler-plate version of the Apollo capsule, service module and escape tower were attached to the launch vehicle to simulate weight, center of gravity and aerodynamic shape of the Apollo configuration. No attempt was made to separate the payload in flight. The test was conducted in compliance with Project Apollo Flight Mission Directive for QTV-1, NASA-MSC, dated 3 June 1963, under authority of NASA Contract NAS 9-492,
NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) was established as the gateway to exploring beyond earth. Since the establishment of KSC in December 1963, the Center has been critical in the execution of the United States of Americas bold mission to send astronauts beyond the grasp of the terra firma. On May 25, 1961, a few weeks after a Soviet cosmonaut became the first person to fly in space, President John F. Kennedy laid out the ambitious goal of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth by the end of the decade. The resultant Apollo program was massive endeavor, driven by the Cold War Space Race, and supported with a robust budget. The Apollo program consisted of 18 launches from newly developed infrastructure, including 12 manned missions and six lunar landings, ending with Apollo 17 that launched on December 7, 1972. Continuing to use this infrastructure, the Skylab program launched four missions. During the Skylab program, KSC infrastructure was redesigned to meet the needs of the Space Shuttle program, which launched its first vehicle (STS-1) on April 12, 1981. The Space Shuttle required significant modifications to the Apollo launch pads and assembly facilities, as well as new infrastructure, such as Orbiter and Payload Processing Facilities, as well as the Shuttle Landing Facility. The Space Shuttle was a workhorse that supported many satellite deployments, but was key for the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station, which required additional facilities at KSC to support processing of the flight hardware. After reaching the new Millennium, United States policymakers searched for new ways to reduce the cost of space exploration. The Constellation Program was initiated in 2005 with a goal of providing a crewed lunar landing with a much smaller budget. The very successful Space Shuttle made its last launch on July 8, 2011, after 135 missions. In the subsequent years, KSC continues to evolve, and this paper will address past and future efforts of the transformation of the KSC Apollo and Space Shuttle heritage infrastructure into a more versatile, multi-user spaceport. The paper will also discuss the US Congressional and NASA initiatives for developing and supporting multiple commercial partners, while simultaneously supporting NASAs human exploration initiative, consisting of Space Launch System (SLS), Orion spacecraft and associated ground launch systems. In addition, the paper explains the approach with examples for NASA KSC to leverage new technologies and innovative capabilities developed to reduce the cost to individual users.
Description of the Apollo 14 mission within the general context of the entire Apollo program. In the Apollo 14 mission, which ended successfully on Feb. 9, 1971, more time was spent on extravehicular activities than in previous missions. In addition, enlarged propellant tanks permitted a larger payload, and some 42 kilograms of samples were brought back.
The objective of this paper is to present and discuss a scenario and the requirements for flight testing of hypersonic airbreathing propulsion leading to the development of computational design technology. Flight Testing for this development is a significant part of a triad/synergistic, design approach which integrates computations, flight testing, and ground testing. These three complementary, design developmental tools have various capabilities and limitations. An incremental approach is necessary to use and to develop these tools effectively and efficiently. This computational technology must be developed keeping in focus the aerospace plane that is to be developed. The criteria for selecting the right plane are presented and consequently, the appropriate flight tests are identified. Two conceptual, flight-test systems are suggested considering the following: (1) the relevant, lessons learned from previous and current United States hypersonic programs, from the Apollo program, from the Space Shuttle program, and from the space station program; (2) the current need for a low risk, affordable access to space; and (3) the design challenge for hypersonic airbreathing propulsion testing. How these systems may be used for developing the computational design technology is described. The requirements for conducting propulsion- design computations, sources of uncertainties in these computations, and a guide for establishing the credibility of these computations are also presented.