Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Columbia Investigation”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7

Probabilistic Modeling of Space Shuttle Debris Impact

On Feb 1, 2003, the Shuttle Columbia was lost during its return to Earth. As a result of the conclusion that debris impact caused the damage to the left wing of the Columbia Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) during ascent, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that an assessment be performed of the debris environment experienced by the SSV during ascent. A flight rationale based on probabilistic assessment is used for the SSV return-to-flight. The assessment entails identifying all potential debris sources, their probable geometric and aerodynamic characteristics, and their potential for impacting and damaging critical Shuttle components. A probabilistic analysis tool, based on the SwRI-developed NESSUS probabilistic analysis software, predicts the probability of impact and damage to the space shuttle wing leading edge and thermal protection system components. Among other parameters, the likelihood of unacceptable damage depends on the time of release (Mach number of the orbiter) and the divot mass as well as the impact velocity and impact angle. A typical result is visualized in the figures below. Probability of impact and damage, as well as the sensitivities thereof with respect to the distribution assumptions, can be computed and visualized at each point on the orbiter or summarized per wing panel or tile zone.

Huyse, Luc J.↗

Shuttle Entry Imaging Using Infrared Thermography

During the Columbia Accident Investigation, imaging teams supporting debris shedding analysis were hampered by poor entry image quality and the general lack of information on optical signatures associated with a nominal Shuttle entry. After the accident, recommendations were made to NASA management to develop and maintain a state-of-the-art imagery database for Shuttle engineering performance assessments and to improve entry imaging capability to support anomaly and contingency analysis during a mission. As a result, the Space Shuttle Program sponsored an observation campaign to qualitatively characterize a nominal Shuttle entry over the widest possible Mach number range. The initial objectives focused on an assessment of capability to identify/resolve debris liberated from the Shuttle during entry, characterization of potential anomalous events associated with RCS jet firings and unusual phenomenon associated with the plasma trail. The aeroheating technical community viewed the Space Shuttle Program sponsored activity as an opportunity to influence the observation objectives and incrementally demonstrate key elements of a quantitative spatially resolved temperature measurement capability over a series of flights. One long-term desire of the Shuttle engineering community is to calibrate boundary layer transition prediction methodologies that are presently part of the Shuttle damage assessment process using flight data provided by a controlled Shuttle flight experiment. Quantitative global imaging may offer a complementary method of data collection to more traditional methods such as surface thermocouples. This paper reviews the process used by the engineering community to influence data collection methods and analysis of global infrared images of the Shuttle obtained during hypersonic entry. Emphasis is placed upon airborne imaging assets sponsored by the Shuttle program during Return to Flight. Visual and IR entry imagery were obtained with available airborne imaging platforms used within DoD along with agency assets developed and optimized for use during Shuttle ascent to demonstrate capability (i.e., tracking, acquisition of multispectral data, spatial resolution) and identify system limitations (i.e., radiance modeling, saturation) using state-of-the-art imaging instrumentation and communication systems. Global infrared intensity data have been transformed to temperature by comparison to Shuttle flight thermocouple data. Reasonable agreement is found between the flight thermography images and numerical prediction. A discussion of lessons learned and potential application to a potential Shuttle boundary layer transition flight test is presented.

Horvath, Thomas↗

Supersonic/Hypersonic Laminar Heating Correlations for Rectangular and Impact-Induced Open and Closed Cavities

Impact and debris damage to the Space Shuttle Orbiter Thermal Protection System tiles is a random phenomenon, occurring at random locations on the vehicle surface, resulting in random geometrical shapes that are exposed to a definable range of surface flow conditions. In response to the 2003 Final Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, wind tunnel aeroheating experiments approximating a wide range of possible damage scenarios covering both open and closed cavity flow conditions were systematically tested in hypersonic ground based facilities. These data were analyzed and engineering assessment tools for damage-induced fully-laminar heating were developed and exercised on orbit. These tools provide bounding approximations for the damaged-surface heating environment. This paper presents a further analysis of the baseline, zero-pressure-gradient, idealized, rectangular-geometry cavity heating data, yielding new laminar correlations for the floor-averaged heating, peak cavity endwall heating, and the downstream decay rate. Correlation parameters are derived in terms of cavity geometry and local flow conditions. Prediction Limit Uncertainty values are provided at the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels of significance. Non-baseline conditions, including non-rectangular geometries and flows with known pressure gradients, are used to assess the range of applicability of the new correlations. All data variations fall within the 99% Prediction Limit Uncertainty bounds. Importantly, both open-flow and closed-flow cavity heating are combined into a single-curve parameterization of the heating predictions, and provide a concise mathematical model of the laminar cavity heating flow field with known uncertainty.

Everhart, Joel L.↗

NASA Standard for Models and Simulations: Philosophy and Requirements Overview

Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the NASA Administrator chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify those CAIB report elements with NASA-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. One such measure was the development of a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations. This report describes the philosophy and requirements overview of the resulting NASA Standard for Models and Simulations.

Blattnig, St3eve R.↗

White Paper on Factors of Safety

Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report, the "Diaz Team" identified CAIB Report elements with Agency-wide applicability. The "Diaz Report", A Renewed Commitment To Excellence, generated an action to "Review current policies and waivers on safety factors". This document addresses this action.

Raju, Ivatury↗

Changing the Safety and Mission Assurance (S and MA) Paradigm

This slide presentation reviews the change in the work and impact of the Safety and Mission Assurance directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center. It reviews the background and the reasons given for a strong Safety & Mission Assurance presence in all planning for space flight. This was pointed out by the Rogers Commission Report after the Space Challenger accident, by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) and by a 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study (NESS) Team. The overall objective of the work in this area was to improve and maintain S&MA expertise and skills. Training for this work was improved and the S&MA organization was reorganized. This has resulted in a paradigm shift for NASA's safety efforts, which is described. The presentation then reviews the impact of the new S&MA work in the Ares I design and development.

Malone, Roy W.↗

Modeling and Simulation at NASA

This slide presentation is composed of two topics. The first reviews the use of modeling and simulation (M&S) particularly as it relates to the Constellation program and discrete event simulation (DES). DES is defined as a process and system analysis, through time-based and resource constrained probabilistic simulation models, that provide insight into operation system performance. The DES shows that the cycles for a launch from manufacturing and assembly to launch and recovery is about 45 days and that approximately 4 launches per year are practicable. The second topic reviews a NASA Standard for Modeling and Simulation. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board made some recommendations related to models and simulations. Some of the ideas inherent in the new standard are the documentation of M&S activities, an assessment of the credibility, and reporting to decision makers, which should include the analysis of the results, a statement as to the uncertainty in the results,and the credibility of the results. There is also discussion about verification and validation (V&V) of models. There is also discussion about the different types of models and simulation.

Steele, Martin J.↗

Development of NASA's Models and Simulations Standard

From the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, there were several NASA-wide actions that were initiated. One of these actions was to develop a standard for development, documentation, and operation of Models and Simulations. Over the course of two-and-a-half years, a team of NASA engineers, representing nine of the ten NASA Centers developed a Models and Simulation Standard to address this action. The standard consists of two parts. The first is the traditional requirements section addressing programmatics, development, documentation, verification, validation, and the reporting of results from both the M&S analysis and the examination of compliance with this standard. The second part is a scale for evaluating the credibility of model and simulation results using levels of merit associated with 8 key factors. This paper provides an historical account of the challenges faced by and the processes used in this committee-based development effort. This account provides insights into how other agencies might approach similar developments. Furthermore, we discuss some specific applications of models and simulations used to assess the impact of this standard on future model and simulation activities.

simulation↗

NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0

Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.

Groen, Frank↗

Effect of Clouds on Optical Imaging of the Space Shuttle During the Ascent Phase: A Statistical Analysis Based on a 3D Model

Clouds are highly effective in obscuring optical images of the Space Shuttle taken during its ascent by ground-based and airborne tracking cameras. Because the imagery is used for quick-look and post-flight engineering analysis, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommended the return-to-flight effort include an upgrade of the imaging system to enable it to obtain at least three useful views of the Shuttle from lift-off to at least solid rocket booster (SRB) separation (NASA 2003). The lifetimes of individual cloud elements capable of obscuring optical views of the Shuttle are typically 20 minutes or less. Therefore, accurately observing and forecasting cloud obscuration over an extended network of cameras poses an unprecedented challenge for the current state of observational and modeling techniques. In addition, even the best numerical simulations based on real observations will never reach "truth." In order to quantify the risk that clouds would obscure optical imagery of the Shuttle, a 3D model to calculate probabilistic risk was developed. The model was used to estimate the ability of a network of optical imaging cameras to obtain at least N simultaneous views of the Shuttle from lift-off to SRB separation in the presence of an idealized, randomized cloud field.

FROM↗

A Silent Safety Program

NASA's Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) referred 8 times to the NASA "Silent Safety Program." This term, "Silent Safety Program" was not an original observation but first appeared in the Rogers Commission's Investigation of the Challenger Mishap. The CAIB on page 183 of its report in the paragraph titled 'Encouraging Minority Opinion,' stated "The Naval Reactor Program encourages minority opinions and "bad news." Leaders continually emphasize that when no minority opinions are present, the responsibility for a thorough and critical examination falls to management. . . Board interviews revealed that it is difficult for minority and dissenting opinions to percolate up through the agency's hierarchy. . ." The first question and perhaps the only question is - what is a silent safety program? Well, a silent safety program may be the same as the dog that didn't bark in Sherlock Holmes' "Adventure of the Silver Blaze" because system safety should behave as a devil's advocate for the program barking on every occasion to insure a critical review inclusion. This paper evaluates the NASA safety program and provides suggestions to prevent the recurrence of the silent safety program alluded to in the Challenger Mishap Investigation. Specifically targeted in the CAM report, "The checks and balances the safety system was meant to provide were not working." A silent system safety program is not unique to NASA but could emerge in any and every organization. Principles developed by Irving Janis in his book, Groupthink, listed criteria used to evaluate an organization's cultural attributes that allows a silent safety program to evolve. If evidence validates Jams's criteria, then Jams's recommendations for preventing groupthink can also be used to improve a critical evaluation and thus prevent the development of a silent safety program.

Goodin, James Ronald↗

Flexible Plug Repair for Shuttle Wing Leading Edge

In response to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, a plug repair kit has been developed to enable astronauts to repair the space shuttle's wing leading edge (WLE) during orbit. The plug repair kit consists of several 17.78- cm-diameter carbon/silicon carbide (C/SiC) cover plates of various curvatures that can be attached to the refractory carbon-carbon WLE panels using a TZM refractory metal attach mechanism. The attach mechanism is inserted through the damage in the WLE panel and, as it is tightened, the cover plate flexes to conform to the curvature of the WLE panel within 0.050 mm. An astronaut installs the repair during an extravehicular activity (EVA). After installing the plug repair, edge gaps are checked and the perimeter of the repair is sealed using a proprietary material, developed to fill cracks and small holes in the WLE.

Camarda, Charles J.↗

Dimensions of Credibility in Models and Simulations

Based on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) work in developing a standard for models and simulations (M&S), the subject of credibility in M&S became a distinct focus. This is an indirect result from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), which eventually resulted in an action, among others, to improve the rigor in NASA's M&S practices. The focus of this action came to mean a standardized method for assessing and reporting results from any type of M&S. As is typical in the standards development process, this necessarily developed into defming a common terminology base, common documentation requirements (especially for M&S used in critical decision making), and a method for assessing the credibility of M&S results. What surfaced in the development of the NASA Standard was the various dimensions credibility to consider when accepting the results from any model or simulation analysis. The eight generally relevant factors of credibility chosen in the NASA Standard proved only one aspect in the dimensionality of M&S credibility. At the next level of detail, the full comprehension of some of the factors requires an understanding along a couple of dimensions as well. Included in this discussion are the prerequisites for the appropriate use of a given M&S, the choice of factors in credibility assessment with their inherent dimensionality, and minimum requirements for fully reporting M&S results.

Steele, Martin J.↗

NASA Standard for Models and Simulations: Philosophy and Requirements Overview

Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the NASA Administrator chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify those CAIB report elements with NASA-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. One such measure was the development of a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations. This report describes the philosophy and requirements overview of the resulting NASA Standard for Models and Simulations.

Blattnig, Steve R.↗

NASA Handbook for Models and Simulations: An Implementation Guide for NASA-STD-7009

The purpose of this Handbook is to provide technical information, clarification, examples, processes, and techniques to help institute good modeling and simulation practices in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). As a companion guide to NASA-STD- 7009, Standard for Models and Simulations, this Handbook provides a broader scope of information than may be included in a Standard and promotes good practices in the production, use, and consumption of NASA modeling and simulation products. NASA-STD-7009 specifies what a modeling and simulation activity shall or should do (in the requirements) but does not prescribe how the requirements are to be met, which varies with the specific engineering discipline, or who is responsible for complying with the requirements, which depends on the size and type of project. A guidance document, which is not constrained by the requirements of a Standard, is better suited to address these additional aspects and provide necessary clarification. This Handbook stems from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation (2003), which called for Agency-wide improvements in the "development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations"' that subsequently elicited additional guidance from the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer to include "a standard method to assess the credibility of the models and simulations."2 General methods applicable across the broad spectrum of model and simulation (M&S) disciplines were sought to help guide the modeling and simulation processes within NASA and to provide for consistent reporting ofM&S activities and analysis results. From this, the standardized process for the M&S activity was developed. The major contents of this Handbook are the implementation details of the general M&S requirements ofNASA-STD-7009, including explanations, examples, and suggestions for improving the credibility assessment of an M&S-based analysis.

Steele, Martin J.↗

NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document for Human Health and Performance Models and Simulations

Rigorous verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) processes are imperative to ensure that models and simulations (MS) are sufficiently reliable to address issues within their intended scope. The NASA standard for MS, NASA-STD-7009 (7009) [1] was a resultant outcome of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to ensure MS are developed, applied, and interpreted appropriately for making decisions that may impact crew or mission safety. Because the 7009 focus is engineering systems, a NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document is being developed to augment the 7009 and provide information, tools, and techniques applicable to the probabilistic and deterministic biological MS more prevalent in human health and performance (HHP) and space biomedical research and operations.

numerical analysis↗

Lessons Learned Study Final Report for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

This report is the final product of a 90-day study performed for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. The study was to assemble lessons NASA has learned from previous programs that could help the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate pursue the Exploration vision. It focuses on those lessons that should have the greatest significance to the Directorate during the formulation of program and mission plans. The study team reviewed a large number of lessons learned reports and data bases, including the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Rogers Commission reports on the Shuttle accidents, accident reports from robotic space flight systems, and a number of management reviews by the Defense Sciences Board, Government Accountability Office, and others. The consistency of the lessons, findings, and recommendations validate the adequacy of the data set. In addition to reviewing existing databases, a series of workshops was held at each of the NASA centers and headquarters that included senior managers from the current workforce as well as retirees. The full text of the workshop reports is included in Appendix A. A lessons learned website was opened up to permit current and retired NASA personnel and on-site contractors to input additional lessons as they arise. These new lessons, when of appropriate quality and relevance, will be brought to the attention of managers. The report consists of four parts: Part 1 provides a small set of lessons, called the Executive Lessons Learned, that represent critical lessons that the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should act on immediately. This set of Executive Lessons and their supporting rationale have been reviewed at length and fully endorsed by a team of distinguished NASA alumni; Part 2 contains a larger set of lessons, called the Selected Lessons Learned, which have been chosen from the lessons database and center workshop reports on the basis of their specific significance and relevance to the near-term work of the Exploration Directorate. These lessons frequently support the Executive lessons but are more general in nature; Part 3 consists of the reports of the center workshops that were conducted as part of this activity. These reports are included in their entirety (approximately 200 pages) in Appendix G and have significance for specific managers; Part 4 consists of the remainder of the lessons that have been selected by this effort and assembled into a database for the use of the Explorations Directorate. The database is archived and hosted in the Lessons Learned Knowledge Network, which provides a flexible search capability using a wide variety of search terms. Finally, a spreadsheet lists databases searched and a bibliography identifies reports that have been reviewed as sources of lessons for this task. NASA has been presented with many learning opportunities. We have conducted numerous programs, some extremely successful and others total failures. Most have been documented with a formal lessons learned activity, but we have not always incorporated these learning opportunities into our normal modes of business. For example, the Robbins Report of 2001 clearly indicates that many project failures of the past two decades were the result of violating well documented best practices, often in direct violation of management instructions and directives. An overarching lesson emerges: that disciplined execution in accordance with proven best practices is the greatest single contributor to a successful program. The Lessons Learned task team offers a sincere hope that the lessons presented herein will be helpful to the Exploration Systems Directorate in charting and executing their course. The success of the Directorate and of NASA in general depends on our collective ability to move forward without having to relearn the lessons of those who have gone before.

Van Laak, Jim↗

NASA's Journey to Safety Culture

One of the organizational causes of the Shuttle Columbia mishap found by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report was a "Broken Safety Culture". Since its release, NASA has strived to improve its Safety Culture In 2009, the Chief of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance asked a member of the Air Force Safety Center and of the CAIB for assistance to develop a NASA Safety Culture Program. This presentation describes the journey that NASA personnel has taken developing a NASA Safety Culture Program to "repair" its Safety Culture.

Dillinger, Tracy↗