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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Acquired experience resulting from transforming a chemical installation into a nuclear one

ICIT-Valcea has developed an experimental pilot-scale installation for tritium and deuterium separation. The main objective of this pilot was to demonstrate the water detritiation technology and to transfer this technology to the CANDU reactors of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant. The pilot-scale installation was initiated in 1992. The initial design and construction were performed similarly to chemical plants as the separation of isotopes was focused on only hydrogen and deuterium to assess feasibility. In a second phase we have begun to transform it into a nuclear facility with the aim of separating tritium. Moving to tritium separation has imposed a lot of changes. Changes consisted mainly of: -) re-design of the technological systems for nuclear material processing, applying specific codes and standards (ASME, Romanian nuclear specific pressure boundary prescriptions for code classification); -) design and implementation of new systems, classified as safety systems; -) re-design and implementation of command and control systems, complying with the requirements of reliability and maintenance required for the project promoted; -) revaluation of auxiliary systems (utilities, power supply); -) implementing radiation protection systems, including secondary barriers; -) implementing and maintaining environment operational program specific to the new nuclear plant; -) developing and conducting safety analyzes; and -) the production of specific documentation to obtain the necessary permits for construction, commissioning and operation of the plant.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

Data Link Summary for Peer Review.

New generations of high-temperature (HT) sensors and electronics are enabling increased measurement speed and accuracy allowing collection of more accurate and relevant data by downhole tools. Unfortunately, this increased capability is often not realized due to the bottleneck in the uplink data transmission rates due to poor signal characteristics of HT wireline. The objective of this project is to enable the high transmission rate of raw data from downhole tools such as acoustic logging tools and seismic measurement devices to minimize the need for downhole signal processing. To achieve this objective, Sandia has undertaken the effort to develop an asymmetric high-temperature (HT), highspeed data link system for downhole tools capable of operating at temperatures of 210°C while taking advantage of existing wireline transmission channels. Current data rates over HT single-conductor wireline are limited to approximately 200 kbps. The goal system will be capable of transmitting data from the tool to the surface (uplink) at rates of > 1Mbps over 5,000 feet of single-conductor wireline as well as automatically adapt the data rate to the longer wirelines by adapting modern telecommunications techniques to operate on high temperature electronics. The data rate from the surface to the tool (downlink) will be significantly smaller but sufficient for command and control functions. While 5,000 feet of cable is the benchmark for this effort, improvements apply to all lengths of cable.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Next Generation Qualification: Guralp Systems Affinity Digitizer Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated a new digitizer, the Affinity, manufactured by Guralp Systems Ltd. These digitizers are used to record sensor output for seismic and infrasound monitoring applications. The purpose of the digitizer evaluation was to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, input impedance, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, system noise, response, passband, and timing. The Affinity digitizer is Guralp's latest release in their digitizer product line. The Affinity is available with either 4 or 8 channels at 24 bit resolution. In addition to the 24 bit channels, 16 multiplexed low resolution channels are provided. Other features include the means to accept multiple types of timing sources (e.g. GPS, NTP and PTP) and a web page interface for command and control of the unit.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2016

Nuclear Safeguards Applications Employing Unmanned Airborne Vehicles

This paper describes some potential applications for UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) in international nuclear safeguards. UAV missions can include indoor and outdoor operations including: 1) surveillance, which includes all types of sensors and imagers, 2) command and control augmentation (radio relays and real-time imagery used primarily to coordinate ground operations), and 3) physical sample collection and transport.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Science and Engineering of Cybersecurity by Uncertainty quantification and Rigorous Experimentation (SECURE) (Final Report)

This report summarizes the activities performed as part of the Science and Engineering of Cybersecurity by Uncertainty quantification and Rigorous Experimentation (SECURE) Grand Challenge LDRD project. We provide an overview of the research done in this project, including work on cyber emulation, uncertainty quantification, and optimization. We present examples of integrated analyses performed on two case studies: a network scanning/detection study and a malware command and control study. We highlight the importance of experimental workflows and list references of papers and presentations developed under this project. We outline lessons learned and suggestions for future work.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Proposed Products to Support Shelter-Evacuation Decision Making in the Event of a Nuclear Detonation

Response strategies implemented in the first few hours to days after a nuclear detonation on the US homeland may save more than 100,000 lives. Effective planning and pre-event capability development can increase the response efficacy and so the number of lives saved. During such an event, the US Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Civil Support (DoD JTF-CS) provides command and control for the DoD forces supporting civil authority response operations. Among other activities, JTF-CS expects to support FEMA as well as State and local agencies in shelter and evacuation response activities. JTF-CS currently uses a manual method to generate evacuation decision making products. This method compares the dose that would be (a) acquired remaining at a given location to that (b) acquired during evacuation along a small number of routes. In these products, evacuation may be warranted when the projected “remain” dose is greater than the “evacuate” dose. This method only provides a limited consideration of the protection buildings provide their occupants. To inform the JTF-CS nuclear detonation response, the DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has tasked Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to design a set of planning and response products to support shelter-evacuation activities. This report documents these products to facilitate DTRA and JTF-CS planning efforts. To provide context, we also provide appendices that summarize US planning guidance response zones, early (<72 h) response strategies, and other key topics.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

TrojAI Alternate Analysis

In this portion of the TrojAI evaluation, we focus on the cyber-network-c2-mar2024 dataset. Recall that in this round ResNet18 and ResNet34 neural networks (NN) were trained on the USTC-TFC2016 dataset with the aim of distinguishing between benign versus botnet command and control (c2) packets. A range of bytes from each packet was reformatted into a 28x28 pixel image, and the collection of reformatted packets served as the training (and testing) data for the two ResNet models. For some of the data a trigger watermark was strategically placed to affect various inputs to the NNs. This watermarked, or poisoned, data in turn created a poisoned, or trojaned NN. The data were poisoned in different ways ultimately creating different trojaned NNs. This collection of trojaned NNs was combined with various versions of not trojaned NNs and served as the training and testing data for the performers. The performers’ task was to construct a classifier to distinguish between the trojaned and not trojaned models. It was previously noted that the performers struggled with the cyber-network-c2-mar2024 dataset, motivating this investigation of potential reasons the performers experienced challenges.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Human Supervision of Autonomous Vehicle Fleet Operations and Associated Passenger Communications: Preprint

Advances in automated vehicle (AV) technology and expanded operations are rapidly emerging with Automated Mobility District (AMD) deployments in global cities. NLR's AMD research addresses critical elements of human supervision of AV fleet operations and associated passenger communications for vehicles in which no driver or safety attendant is present. Although sufficiently advanced AVs no longer have direct oversight by a driver, fleet management remains staffed with operations personnel at the operations command and control (OCC) facility. This paper examines the functionality of the OCC, drawing comparisons of how automated train control and automated people mover OCCs operate. Within an AMD, the OCC manages various vehicle types, sizes, and operational modes, including on-demand and fixed route service, to facilitate a 'network of networks' for transport within a metropolitan area. The OCC serves as oversight for multiple AV fleets assisting AVs via remote operation of vehicles, communication, and dispatching personnel to resolve problems. The OCC also coordinates system operation, geographically staging vehicles, and managing weather, police, and emergency events. Informed by traffic management center (TMC) strategies using highly integrated software and communications, OCCs facilitate seamless information flows. OCC personnel remotely assist passengers and oversee multi-party operation to ensure safety and security. Although social norms mitigate large-capacity unattended vehicle operations, social interaction in multi-party automated small vehicles has little precedent. This poses a new frontier for society and requires research to effectively understand and manage. Future research will monitor OCC implementations, passenger interfaces, and deployment scaling of initial AMD systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Technology Integration Initiative In Support of Outage Management

Plant outage management is a high priority concern for the nuclear industry from cost and safety perspectives. Often, command and control during outages is maintained in the outage control center where many of the underlying technologies supporting outage control are the same as those used in the 1980’s. This research reports on the use of advanced integrating software technologies and hand held mobile devices as a means by which to reduce cycle time, improve accuracy, and enhance transparency among outage team members. This paper reports on the first phase of research supported by the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program that is performed in close collaboration with industry to examine the introduction of newly available technology allowing for safe and efficient outage performance. It is thought that this research will result in: improved resource management among various plant stakeholder groups, reduced paper work, and enhanced overall situation awareness for the outage control center management team. A description of field data collection methods, including personnel interview data, success factors, end-user evaluation and integration of hand held devices in achieving an integrated design are also evaluated. Finally, the necessity of obtaining operations cooperation support in field studies and technology evaluation is acknowledged.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Communications systems and methods for subsea processors

A subsea processor may be located near the seabed of a drilling site and used to coordinate operations of underwater drilling components. The subsea processor may be enclosed in a single interchangeable unit that fits a receptor on an underwater drilling component, such as a blow-out preventer (BOP). The subsea processor may issue commands to control the BOP and receive measurements from sensors located throughout the BOP. A shared communications bus may interconnect the subsea processor and underwater components and the subsea processor and a surface or onshore network. The shared communications bus may be operated according to a time division multiple access (TDMA) scheme.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2020

Subsea processor for underwater drilling operations

A subsea processor may be located near the seabed of a drilling site and used to coordinate operations of underwater drilling components. The subsea processor may be enclosed in a single interchangeable unit that fits a receptor on an underwater drilling component, such as a blow-out preventer (BOP). The subsea processor may issue commands to control the BOP and receive measurements from sensors located throughout the BOP. The subsea processor may relay information to the surface for recording or monitoring. The subsea processor may also be programmed with a model from which to base operation of the BOP, such as in emergency conditions.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Deploying Software-Defined Networking in Operational Technology Environments

Software Defined Networking for Operational Technologies, referred to as OT-SDN, is a leading technology to secure critical infrastructure and command and control (C2) systems. As the name implies, OT-SDN networks are programmable, which allows system owners to utilize the characteristics of their physical process to inform the security of their network. There are best practices for deploying OT-SDN into an environment, whether it is all at once or over time (hybrid) that the network is converted to SDN technologies. Through the development of data mining tools and standardized process control, OT-SDN can be deployed reliably. These tools will minimize or eliminate any communication failures during the transition and provide the network owner with complete documentation of their environment. This documentation could enable or facilitate the network owner to pass any audits or policy checks (Authority to Operate) before being allowed to utilize the OT-SDN infrastructure.

Software Defined Networking, Operational Technolog↗
DOE OSTI2022

Module-OT: A Turnkey Solution for Securing Energy Systems

The Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT) is a flexible and lightweight solution for grid-edge devices focusing on end-to-end security. It is a bump- in- the-wire solution acting as a secure conduit for data between devices or systems across a network. It improves the cybersecurity posture of DER systems by providing authentication, authorization, and data integrity to secure DER communications. Additionally, it performs key management, provides data security through whitelisting Internet Protocol addresses and ports, blocks unauthorized connections, controls user access, and allows serial or Ethernet connections for added flexibility. The core software is portable to various Linux-based operating systems and is developed to be customized by the developer and researcher communities. Module-OT has been validated in the lab, has been demonstrated at a 500-KW PV-plus-storage site, and has been proven ready to secure operational technology devices. Its core functionality meets current standards, including validation procedures of the NIST Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 140-2). Because of its capability to provide an accessible and affordable option for stepping up security across modern energy systems, Module-OT can serve as an effective technological option to standardize cybersecurity moving forward.

cryptography↗
DOE OSTI2023

Integrated behavior-based infrastructure command validation

A cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system is provided herein for validating asset commands issued within an infrastructure network. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can be integrated into an infrastructure network to monitor and validate infrastructure asset commands in real-time or while the infrastructure network is active. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can receive or intercept commands issued by asset controllers. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can validate the commands based on a command validation model. The command validation model can represent normal operating behavior of the infrastructure network. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can provide valid commands to the intended infrastructure asset, or can reject invalid commands. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can store validation results for use in updating the command validation model. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can flag or otherwise warn the infrastructure network or administrators of invalid commands.

Akyol, Bora A.↗