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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

NASA Spinoff Article: Automated Procedures To Improve Safety on Oil Rigs

On May 11th, 2013, two astronauts emerged from the interior of the International Space Station (ISS) and worked their way toward the far end of spacecraft. Over the next 51/2 hours, the two replaced an ammonia pump that had developed a significant leak a few days before. On the ISS, ammonia serves the vital role of cooling components-in this case, one of the station's eight solar arrays. Throughout the extravehicular activity (EVA), the astronauts stayed in constant contact with mission control: every movement, every action strictly followed a carefully planned set of procedures to maximize crew safety and the chances of success. Though the leak had come as a surprise, NASA was prepared to handle it swiftly thanks in part to the thousands of procedures that have been written to cover every aspect of the ISS's operations. The ISS is not unique in this regard: Every NASA mission requires well-written procedures-or detailed lists of step-by-step instructions-that cover how to operate equipment in any scenario, from normal operations to the challenges created by malfunctioning hardware or software. Astronauts and mission control train and drill extensively in procedures to ensure they know what the proper procedures are and when they should be used. These procedures used to be exclusively written on paper, but over the past decade, NASA has transitioned to digital formats. Electronic-based documentation simplifies storage and use, allowing astronauts and flight controllers to find instructions more quickly and display them through a variety of media. Electronic procedures are also a crucial step toward automation: once instructions are digital, procedure display software can be designed to assist in authoring, reviewing, and even executing them.

traclabs↗
NASA NTRS2018

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission POS

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. To accommodate this with regards to Navigation, the SLS utilizes an internally redundant Inertial Navigation System (INS) with built-in capability to detect, isolate, and recover from first failure conditions and still maintain adherence to performance requirements. The unit utilizes multiple hardware- and software-level techniques to enable detection, isolation, and recovery from these events in terms of its built-in Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) algorithms. Successful operation is defined in terms of sufficient navigation accuracy at insertion while operating under worst case single sensor outages (gyroscope and accelerometer faults at launch). In addition to first fault detection and recovery, the SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the INS to detect a second fault, tracking any unacceptable uncertainty in knowledge of the vehicle's state. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error and sensor faults can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environments and outside of its performance envelope causing loss of mission, or worse, loss of crew. The criteria for operation under second faults allows for a larger set of achievable missions in terms of potential fault conditions, due to the INS operating at the edge of its capability. As this performance is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design space. Due to the implications of the vehicle response to abort conditions (such as a potentially failed INS), it is important to consider a wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both magnitude and time. As such, the Navigation team is taking advantage of the INS's capability to schedule and change fault detection thresholds in flight. These values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success, and reducing the probability of false positives (defined as when the INS would report a second fault condition resulting in loss of mission, but the vehicle would still meet insertion requirements within system-level margins). This paper will describe an optimization approach using Genetic Algorithms to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events as a function of potential fault magnitude and time of fault over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach, and performance assessment of the results will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this process to second fault detection to maximize mission probability of success.

Anzalone, Evan↗
NASA NTRS1991

Space transfer vehicle concepts and requirements. Volume 1: Executive summary

The objectives of the Space Transfer Vehicle (STV) Concepts and Requirements studies were to provide sensitivity data on usage, economics, and technology associated with new space transportation systems. The study was structured to utilize data on the emerging launch vehicles, the latest mission scenarios, and Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) payload manifesting and schedules, to define a flexible, high performance, cost effective, evolutionary space transportation system for NASA. Initial activities were to support the MSFC effort in the preparation of inputs to the 90 Day Report to the National Space Council (NSC). With the results of this study establishing a point-of-departure for continuing the STV studies in 1990, additional options and mission architectures were defined. The continuing studies will update and expand the parametrics, assess new cargo and manned ETO vehicles, determine impacts on the redefined Phase 0 Space Station Freedom, and to develop a design that encompasses adequate configuration flexibility to ensure compliance with on-going NASA study recommendations with major system disconnects. In terms of general requirements, the objectives of the STV system and its mission profiles will address crew safety and mission success through a failure-tolerant and forgiving design approach. These objectives were addressed through the following: engine-out capability for all mission phases; built-in-test for vehicle health monitoring to allow testing of all critical functions such as, verification of lunar landing and ascent engines before initiating the landing sequence; critical subsystems will have multiple strings for redundancy plus adequate supplies of onboard spares for removal and replacement of failed items; crew radiation protection; and trajectories that optimize lunar and Mars performance and flyby abort capabilities.

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NASA NTRS2025

South Pole Lunar Lighting Studies for Driving Exploration on the Lunar Surface

NASA’s Artemis lunar missions will face new exploration challenges due to inherently low sun angles in the lunar south pole region. Whereas the Apollo missions were afforded sunlight for approximately 8 to 50-degrees above the horizon, sunlight for the next lunar missions will only be 1 to 2-degrees about the horizon. With this low angle, long shadows and high contrasts of light and dark areas will be faced by the crew and remote teleop operators while exploring the lunar surface. With this in mind, NASA developed an integrated virtual Lighting and Navigation Simulation to understand these challenges. Two studies have been conducted in this Lunar South Pole environment to evaluate the effects of natural and artificial lighting on driving and navigating a lunar rover across the surface. Early NASA studies, such as this, are used to aid in developing techniques and explore concepts of operations to promote mission success and crew safety. In the Phase One development evaluation, six astronauts were teleported to ten different lighting conditions. For each location, drivers were to drive to an imaginary target approximately 200-meters straight ahead and provide subjective feedback on their ability to drive under the given lighting conditions. Phase Two, a more operational study, four astronauts and a remote operator tested five different Artemis lunar mission scenarios. Results indicated sun direction at such low angles, especially when driving a high speed, can severely impact the crew’s ability to safely drive the rover. In the up-sun situation, with the sun directly in the driver’s eyes and compounded long shadows, the consistent preference among drivers was to initiate a tacking strategy of approximately +/- 20 to 30-degrees to improve visibility. This maneuver does require more time and rover energetics. Conversely, driving down-sun required the crew to tack as well to avoid the shadow of rover blocking the terrain. Less appreciated is how the surrounding landscape is lit. Traveling into shadowed areas, especially while facing a lit terrain beyond the shadowed area, drivers enter at their own risk due to pupil contraction making artificial lights useless. Additionally, the constant transitioning between dark and light areas are mentally taxing to the crew and natural navigational references such as the stars are invisible and therefore unusable. Slope and depth magnitude are very difficult hazards to judge when approaching a shadowed crater. This naturally leads to slower driving speeds than originally anticipated. As for observing scientifically interesting features, assessing them accurately varies greatly by the lighting condition. In most cases, the task can be completed, but the strategy is to use the sun to one’s advantage. Crew workload distribution in the cockpit for driving operations was split amongst crew. The driver primarily focused attention on visual terrain (80%) but referenced displays approximately 20% of the time, while the co-pilot/navigator generally provided directional cues to the driver. These natural lighting conditions present significant challenges for safe rover operations; however, early studies having given investigators a “first-look” into understanding of how operating on the South Lunar Pole can be accomplished.

LTv↗
NASA NTRS2008

Lab-on-a-Chip: From Astrobiology to the International Space Station

The continual and long-term habitation of enclosed environments, such as Antarctic stations, nuclear submarines and space stations, raises unique engineering, medical and operational challenges. There is no easy way out and no easy way to get supplies in. This situation elevates the importance of monitoring technology that can rapidly detect events within the habitat that affect crew safety such as fire, release of toxic chemicals and hazardous microorganisms. Traditional methods to monitor microorganisms on the International Space Station (ISS) have consisted of culturing samples for 3-5 days and eventual sample return to Earth. To augment these culture methods with new, rapid molecular techniques, we developed the Lab-on-a-Chip Application Development - Portable Test System (LOCAD-PTS). The system consists of a hand-held spectrophotometer, a series of interchangeable cartridges and a surface sampling/dilution kit that enables crew to collect samples and detect a range of biological molecules, all within 15 minutes. LOCAD-PTS was launched to the ISS aboard Space Shuttle Discovery in December 2006, where it was operated for the first time during March-May 2007. The surfaces of five separate sites in the US Lab and Node 1 of ISS were analyzed for endotoxin, using cartridges that employ the Limulus Amebocyte Lysate (LAL) assay; results of these tests will be presented. LOCAD-PTS will remain permanently onboard ISS with new cartridges scheduled for launch in February and October of 2008 for the detection of fungi (Beta-glucan) and Gram-positive bacteria (lipoteichoic acid), respectively.

Maule, Jake↗
NASA NTRS2015

Transformational Phenomena as Predictors of Aircraft Accidents: What Goes Around Comes Around

Flight crew confusion, excessive stressworkload, and ineffective Crew Resource Management among other issues arising from dependence on automated systems on the flight deck have been identified as major causal factors in multiple fatal accidents, significant incidents and near misses. Many Loss of Control events have been traced to display of erroneous flight data and auto-flight system mode status to the crew. Safety was compromised by not having sufficiently obvious and unambiguous information available in order to permit quick diagnosis of aircraft status and then appropriate action to regain control of the aircraft energy state or trajectory. Continually evolving training and operational requirements related to aircraft automation have also presented critical challenges to commercial aviation. During times of high demand and low supply of experienced pilots (which is today the case in South-East Asia, for instance), basic training in manual flight may be minimal and as low as a few hundred flight hours on light aircraft before beginning training on advanced, highly automated aircraft. Predominant use of automation may cause aircrew trained in this way to have trouble performing traditionally simple operations such as manually switching to other runways or overriding the autopilot in tight situations. Inadequate crew training andor experience coupled with attempted manual flight in highly automated airplanes may more easily lead to loss of aircraft control in unusual situations such as high-altitude stallsupsets, traffic avoidance or maneuvering. Loss of basic piloting skills through increasing dependence on automation may exacerbate this problem. Finally, design changes by nature take a long time and are very costly. Incorporating novel automated functionality into new aircraft designs is technically feasible and desirable. However, it may take many years for these changes to have a significant impact on tomorrows fleet, given the time it takes to develop a new aircraft and for these aircraft to become a significant fraction of the fleet. This paper will review and summarize the findings and recommendations from a 2004 study of the topic, Increasing reliance on flight deck automation conducted by the Future Aviation Safety Team at the behest of the Joint Safety Strategy Initiative (JSSI) within the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) organization that existed at the time. Although this study was conducted more than ten years ago, its findings and recommendations are as relevant now as then and into the future.

safety↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA Commercial Crew Program Crew Transportation System Certificate of Flight Readiness Plan

NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Crew Transportation System (CTS) Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) is the authorization granted by the Agency that certifies the flight readiness of a Commercial Provider’s CTS to conduct a flight test or mission to transport NASA Crew to and from the ISS. The Commercial Provider is responsible for developing and executing its plan for certifying the flight readiness of its CTS. The CCP with the International Space Station (ISS) Program must substantiate the Commercial Provider’s CoFR assertion to ensure compliance with NASA requirements and NASA Crew safety. NASA CCP CTS CoFR is the approval of the Commercial Provider’s evidence that: • The physical as-built CTS was produced, assembled, integrated, and tested within the approved production and operational constraints. • The mission specific requirements are enveloped within the certified CTS capabilities. • The CTS personnel are trained and certified to support the mission. • All aspects of the CTS are ready for the mission.

Certification of Flight Readiness↗
NASA NTRS2009

Noise Control in Space Shuttle Orbiter

Acoustic limits in habitable space enclosures are required to ensure crew safety, comfort, and habitability. Noise control is implemented to ensure compliance with the acoustic requirements. The purpose of this paper is to describe problems with establishing acoustic requirements and noise control efforts, and present examples of noise control treatments and design applications used in the Space Shuttle Orbiter. Included is the need to implement the design discipline of acoustics early in the design process, and noise control throughout a program to ensure that limits are met. The use of dedicated personnel to provide expertise and oversight of acoustic requirements and noise control implementation has shown to be of value in the Space Shuttle Orbiter program. It is concluded that to achieve acceptable and safe noise levels in the crew habitable space, early resolution of acoustic requirements and implementation of effective noise control efforts are needed. Management support of established acoustic requirements and noise control efforts is essential.

Goodman, Jerry R.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Multipurpose Crew Restraints for Long Duration Space Flights

With permanent human presence onboard the International Space Station (ISS), a crew will be living and working in microgravity, interfacing with their physical environment. Without optimum restraints and mobility aids (R&MA' s), the crewmembers may be handicapped for perfonning some of the on-orbit tasks. In addition to weightlessness, the confined nature of a spacecraft environment results in ergonomic challenges such as limited visibility and access to the activity area and may cause prolonged periods of unnatural postures. Thus, determining the right set of human factors requirements and providing an ergonomically designed environment are crucial to astronauts' well-being and productivity. The purpose of this project is to develop requirements and guidelines, and conceptual designs, for an ergonomically designed multi-purpose crew restraint. In order to achieve this goal, the project would involve development of functional and human factors requirements, design concept prototype development, analytical and computer modeling evaluations of concepts, two sets of micro gravity evaluations and preparation of an implementation plan. It is anticipated that developing functional and design requirements for a multi-purpose restraint would facilitate development of ergonomically designed restraints to accommodate the off-nominal but repetitive tasks, and minimize the performance degradation due to lack of optimum setup for onboard task performance. In addition, development of an ergonomically designed restraint concept prototype would allow verification and validation of the requirements defined. To date, we have identified "unique" tasks and areas of need, determine characteristics of "ideal" restraints, and solicit ideas for restraint and mobility aid concepts. Focus group meetings with representatives from training, safety, crew, human factors, engineering, payload developers, and analog environment representatives were key to assist in the development of a restraint concept based on previous flight experiences, the needs of future tasks, and crewmembers' preferences. Also, a catalog with existing IVA/EVA restraint and mobility aids has been developed. Other efforts included the ISS crew debrief data on restraints, compilation of data from MIR, Skylab and ISS on restraints, and investigating possibility of an in-flight evaluation of current restraint systems. Preliminary restraint concepts were developed and presented to long duration crewmembers and focus groups for feedback. Currently, a selection criterion is being refined for prioritizing the candidate concepts. Next steps include analytical and computer modeling evaluations of the selected candidate concepts, prototype development, and microgravity evaluations.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRS2001

Survey of Advanced Booster Options for Potential Shuttle Derivative Vehicles

A never-ending major goal for the Space Shuttle program is to continually improve flight safety, as long as this launch system remains in operational service. One of the options to improve system safety and to enhance vehicle performance as well, that has been seriously studied over the past several decades, is to replace the existing strap-on four segment solid rocket boosters (SRB's) with more capable units. A number of booster upgrade options have been studied in some detail, ranging from five segment solids through hybrids and a wide variety of liquid strap-ons (both pressure and pump fed with various propellants); all the way to a completely reusable liquid fly back booster (complete with air breathing engines for controlled landing and return). All of these possibilities appear to offer improvements in varying degrees; and each has their strengths and weaknesses from both programmatic and technical points of view. The most beneficial booster upgrade/design, if the shuttle program were to continue long enough to justify the required investment, would be an approach that greatly increased both vehicle and crew safety. This would be accomplished by increasing the minimum range/minimum altitude envelope that would readily allow abort to orbit (ATO), possibly even to zero/zero, and possibly reduce or eliminate the Return to Launch Site (RTLS) and even the Trans Atlantic Landing (TAL) abort mode requirements. This paper will briefly survey and discuss all of the various booster'upgrade options studied previously, and compare their relative attributes. The survey will explicitly discuss, in summary comparative form, options that include: five segment solids; several hybrid possibilities; pressure and/or pump-fed liquids using either LO2/kerosene, H2O/kerosene and LO2/J2, any of which could be either fully expendable, partly or fully reusable; and finally a fully reusable liquid fly back booster system, with a number of propellant and propulsion system options. Performance and configuration comparison illustrations and tables will be included to provide a comprehensive survey for the paper.

Sackheim, Robert L.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Aeroassisted manned transfer vehicle (TAXI) for advanced Mars Transportation: NASA/USRA 1987 Senior Design Project

A conceptual design study of an aeroassisted orbital transfer vehicle is discussed. Nicknamed TAXI, it will ferry personnel and cargo: (1) between low Earth orbit and a spacecraft circling around the Sun in permanent orbit intersecting gravitational fields of Earth and Mars, and (2) between the cycling spacecraft and a Mars orbiting station, co-orbiting with Phobos. Crew safety and mission flexibility (in terms of ability to provide a wide range of delta-V) were given high priority. Three versions were considered, using the same overall configuration based on a low L/D aerobrake with the geometry of a raked off elliptical cone with ellipsoidal nose and a toroidal skirt. The propulsion system consists of three gimballed LOX/LH2 engines firing away from the aerobrake. The versions differ mainly in the size of the aeroshields and propellant tanks. TAXI A version resulted from an initial effort to design a single transfer vehicle able to meet all delta-V requirements during the 15-year period (2025 to 2040) of Mars mission operations. TAXI B is designed to function with the cycling spacecraft moving in a simplified, nominal trajectory. On Mars missions, TAXI B would be able to meet the requirements of all the missions with a relative approach velocity near Mars of less than 9.3 km/sec. Finally, TAXI C is a revision of TAXI A, a transfer vehicle designed for missions with a relative velocity near Mars larger than 9.3 km/sec. All versions carry a crew of 9 (11 with modifications) and a cargo of 10000 lbm. Trip duration varies from 1 day for transfer from LEO to the cycling ship to nearly 5 days for transfer from the ship to the Phobos orbit.

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NASA NTRS2010

Preliminary Design of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control System of the Altair Lunar Lander

Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) is the measurement and control of spacecraft position, velocity, and attitude in support of mission objectives. This paper provides an overview of a preliminary design of the GN&C system of the Lunar Lander Altair. Key functions performed by the GN&C system in various mission phases will first be described. A set of placeholder GN&C sensors that is needed to support these functions is next described. To meet Crew safety requirements, there must be high degrees of redundancy in the selected sensor configuration. Two sets of thrusters, one on the Ascent Module (AM) and the other on the Descent Module (DM), will be used by the GN&C system. The DM thrusters will be used, among other purposes, to perform course correction burns during the Trans-lunar Coast. The AM thrusters will be used, among other purposes, to perform precise angular and translational controls of the ascent module in order to dock the ascent module with Orion. Navigation is the process of measurement and control of the spacecraft's "state" (both the position and velocity vectors of the spacecraft). Tracking data from the Earth-Based Ground System (tracking antennas) as well as data from onboard optical sensors will be used to estimate the vehicle state. A driving navigation requirement is to land Altair on the Moon with a landing accuracy that is better than 1 km (radial 95%). Preliminary performance of the Altair GN&C design, relative to this and other navigation requirements, will be given. Guidance is the onboard process that uses the estimated state vector, crew inputs, and pre-computed reference trajectories to guide both the rotational and the translational motions of the spacecraft during powered flight phases. Design objectives of reference trajectories for various mission phases vary. For example, the reference trajectory for the descent "approach" phase (the last 3-4 minutes before touchdown) will sacrifice fuel utilization efficiency in order to provide landing site visibility for both the crew and the terrain hazard detection sensor system. One output of Guidance is the steering angle commands sent to the 2 degree-of-freedom (dof) gimbal actuation system of the descent engine. The engine gimbal actuation system is controlled by a Thrust Vector Control algorithm that is designed taking into account the large quantities of sloshing liquids in tanks mounted on Altair. In this early design phase of Altair, the GN&C system is described only briefly in this paper and the emphasis is on the GN&C architecture (that is still evolving). Multiple companion papers will provide details that are related to navigation, optical navigation, guidance, fuel sloshing, rendezvous and docking, machine-pilot interactions, and others. The similarities and differences of GN&C designs for Lunar and Mars landers are briefly compared.

Lee, Allan Y.↗
NASA NTRS1969

Estimating reliability by application of matrix representation

Technique based upon matrix representation and matrix collapsing calculates the probability of successfully completing manned missions and of returning the spacecrew safely to earth. This technique provides analytic expressions for each subsystem, making it possible to relate changes in subsystem reliability directly to mission success and crew safety.

Austin, W. L.↗
NASA NTRS1969

Laser Tracking and Ranging System

The Laser Tracking and Ranging System (LTRS) is an optical tracking radar that uses a gallium-arsenide injection laser as the transmitting source. The system is designed to track a small retrodirective corner-reflector array and to provide continuously the range, azimuth, and elevation of the array's position relative to the tracking unit. The development effort was directed toward providing a small, compact and relatively lightweight instrument mainly as a part of the Lunar Surveying System for tracking an astronaut's staff. A number of other applications considered include the LTRS as a navigation instrument for a Lunar Flying Vehicle and as a crew safety device for monitoring an astronaut's situation during any EVA operations.

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NASA NTRS1966

Procedure for Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

This document provides guidelines for the accomplishment of Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on the Apollo program. It is a procedure for analysis of hardware items to determine those items contributing most to system unreliability and crew safety problems.

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