Assessing the microscale heterogeneity in Standard Reference Material 4600 Surrogate Post-detonation Urban Debris
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Uranium interference is a major problem in conventional 238 Pu analysis. In RIMS, a slight detuning of the resonance laser extinguishes the Pu signal so that the 238 U interference can be accurately quantified and subtracted.
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The radioactive decay of aging Pu is dominated by α-decay. This persistent α-decay produces crystalline defects in the form of dislocation loops and helium bubbles that evolve with time. Comparable defects are produced in other metallic alloys when subject to neutron irradiation, and these defects are known to modify the plastic deformation of irradiated materials. Models have been developed for these irradiated materials and validated against experimental confirmations of yield strength and the concomitant microstructural evolution. In this paper, we deploy those previously developed models and apply their mechanics to plutonium aging.
Abstract Particulate mass estimation from 3-pixel images is desirable in many fields. Red–green–blue (RGB) analysis and Boolean logic were shown to estimate the mass of luminescent tracers in microscopic images. With a controlled background intensity, an estimation error of 1.8 to 3.5% was achieved; in uncontrolled backgrounds, an error of about 18% was achieved. RGB analysis is a valuable tool for spatial location of particulates. This work shows it is possible to estimate the particulate mass in an image and gives RGB an extension into mass quantification that has far-reaching impacts in fields involving the fate and transport of particulate matter. Graphical abstract
This acceptable knowledge (AK) Summary Report has been prepared for the Central Characterization Program (CCP) for remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste generated and managed by Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The waste described in this report was predominately generated in the SNL/NM Hot Cell Facility (HCF) during the removal and packaging of experimental material and decontamination operations in Building 6580 at Technical Area (TA)-V. The waste stream also includes a very small amount of waste (estimated at less than 1 gram of fuel similar to that used for research at the HCF) originating from classified research at TA-I. In addition, the waste also includes secondary waste termed by SNL/NM as process generated waste (PGW), created during repackaging operations for this waste at the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF). The waste has been stored at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR) Dense Pack Storage Facility within TA-V or the Manzano Bunkers located at Manzano Base within Kirtland Air Force Base. All of the waste is being repackaged at the AHCF. This report was prepared in accordance with CCP-TP-005, CCP Acceptable Knowledge Documentation (Reference 1), to implement the AK requirements of DOE/WIPP-02-3214, Remote-Handled TRU Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan (WCPIP) (Reference 2); Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Waste Analysis Plan (WIPP-WAP) (Reference 3); and DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP-WAC) (Reference 4).
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Beryllium (Be) isotope measurements provide insight into weapon design, yield, etc. Sample preparation nor measurement capability currently existed at LANL. Potential capability directly benefits nuclear forensics venture. PI Goehring has nearly 20 years of Be chemistry experience, including method implementation with difficult samples.
Study to understand how high-Z mix impacts burn and to help inform scaling of mix to EYC.Ride-along on ignition-scale experiments (e.g., HyE). Main goal is to constrain ICF mix simulations against simultaneous radiochemical and x-ray emission measurements of mix. Future experiments may alter design of W-layer to change mix characteristics.
The Three Mile Island, Unit Two (TMI-2) pressurized water reactor core underwent a significant meltdown in 1979 due to an untimely combination of maintenance problems that led to a loss of feedwater, followed by a series of operational misunderstandings and errors. Primary coolant discharging through a malfunctioning valve represented what was analyzed as a “small-break” loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and ultimately became a full core meltdown. The melted core recovery process required the development of a wide array of tools. After approximately three years of water management and other cleanup actions, the first views of the core revealed a much higher degree of damage than previously expected. Approximately 62 metric tons of the core had melted, leaving only 42 of the 177 fuel assemblies standing with fuel rods intact. The core to be recovered was composed of loose, gravel-like and granular particulate material and a central solidified mass of formerly molten fuel. Molten fuel had also penetrated some of the pressure vessel internals and resolidified below the main core support structure. Robotic tools that had been designed for the task were of limited effectiveness due to the range of material types and phases.
The Three Mile Island, Unit Two (TMI-2) pressurized water reactor core underwent a significant meltdown in 1979 due to an untimely combination of maintenance problems that led to a loss of feedwater, followed by a series of operational misunderstandings and errors. Primary coolant discharging through a malfunctioning valve represented what was analyzed as a “small-break” loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and ultimately became a full core meltdown. The melted core recovery process required the development of a wide array of tools. After approximately three years of water management and other cleanup actions, the first views of the core revealed a much higher degree of damage than previously expected. Approximately 62 metric tons of the core had melted, leaving only 42 of the 177 fuel assemblies standing with fuel rods intact. The core to be recovered was composed of loose, gravel-like and granular particulate material and a central solidified mass of formerly molten fuel. Molten fuel had also penetrated some of the pressure vessel internals and resolidified below the main core support structure. Robotic tools that had been designed for the task were of limited effectiveness due to the range of material types and phases.
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