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At least 127 records · Page 7

Analysis of Nuclear Materials on Both Sides of Regulatory Control: from IAEA Safeguards to Global Counter-Nuclear Smuggling

Global nuclear security is dependent upon the sustained and verifiable control of radiological and nuclear (R/N) materials within nuclear facilities, under the administrative purview of national governments. It is the responsibility of each country to account for their R/N materials holdings and to ensure that they do not escape regulatory control and fall into the wrong hands. The Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is tasked with providing support to foreign partners in developing the tools and expertise to detect, disrupt, and investigate R/N materials encountered out of regulatory control, in such circumstances as at border crossings and other checkpoints, or in the course of routine policework. Thankfully, such incidents are infrequent, and NSDD continues to work bilaterally with partner countries to strengthen their capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling and trafficking incidents in their countries. For the vast majority of R/N materials that remain under regulatory control, however, it is critical that their safe storage and use be independently verified. Even a single loss incident of R/N materials, particularly of special nuclear materials (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium) has the potential to cause a catastrophe. How can the international community be assured that R/N materials currently under national regulatory control remain there?

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

The 2021 Defense Strategy Review and Modern Strategic Conflict (Workshop Summary)

On December 15-17, 2020, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The 2021 Defense Strategy Review and Modern Strategic Conflict.” This session was the 7 th Annual Deterrence Workshop that CGSR organized, bringing together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities of the United States and its allies. The workshop examined the challenges of regional wars and multi-domain competition and how a potential 2021 defense strategy review should address them. A special attention was paid to the question of escalation and how it can be controlled at various levels of conflict.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Nuclear Posture in 2030 and Beyond (Workshop Summary)

On June 8-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Nuclear Posture in 2030 and Beyond.” This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities. The workshop aimed to examine the existing modernization plans, the challenges that might obstruct their implementation, and the new deterrence requirements that might emerge in the future, in light of the modernization efforts of Russia and China.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

U.S. Nuclear Declaratory Policy 2021: the Renewed Debate about Sole Purpose and No-First-Use. Annotated Bibliography

Declaratory policy and public statements about the potential use of nuclear weapons serve many important roles. They provide an assessment of the security environment, and inform the public debate. These statements also enhance deterrence messages and signals towards adversaries, and reassure allies and partners. On the global level, U.S. declaratory policy has the potential to shape international trends and norms, influence nuclear proliferation, and it may also affect the policy decisions of other nuclear possessors. As the Biden administration reviews the elements of U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, the issue of sole purpose and no-first-use is likely to resurface. Previous administrations have examined these policies in multiple rounds of review, and they decided that the time was not right for such declarations. This literature review was prepared to inform the debate by collecting some of the most prominent articles on the topic that highlight the potential risks and benefits of these policies.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Request for Proposal: MSI Workforce Program Funding Opportunity

Los Alamos National Laboratory is a multidisciplinary research institution engaged in strategic science on behalf of national security. The Laboratory strives to enhance national security and make the world safer through research and advances in innovative science and technology. The Lab inspires the talent of its workforce and the region to solve problems related to defense, energy, environment, infrastructure, health, and global security concerns. LANL currently employs 11,700 and anticipates hiring 1000 plus people this year. The LANL mission is critical to meeting military requirements to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent is modern, responsive, and resilient. LANL is designated by NNSA as the nation’s Plutonium Center of Excellence. LANL has an experienced and skilled workforce, high-hazard nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure, and unique plutonium processing, fabrication, and experimental capabilities.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Advanced Simulation and Computing (FY22 Implementation Plan Rev 0)

The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. Specific work activities and scope contained in this Implementation Plan (IP) represent the full-year annual operating plan for FY22. The Initial IP, effective , should be consistent with the Department’s Base Table when operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR). The final IP, effective date TBD, is consistent with the final, enacted appropriation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Evolution of Programmatic Asset Lifecycle Planning at MESA

Early on in 2018 Sandia recognized the Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications (MESA) Programmatic Asset Lifecycle Planning capability to be unpredictable, inconsistent, reactive, and unable to provide strong linkage to the sponsor's needs. The impetus for this report is to share learnings from MESA's journey towards maturing this capability. This report describes re-building the foundational elements of MESA's Programmatic Asset Lifecycle Planning capability using a risk-based, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) approach. To begin, MESA's decades-old Piano Chart + Ad Hoc Hybrid Methodology is described with a narrative of its strengths and weaknesses. Then its replacement, the MCDA /Analytical Hierarchy Process, is introduced with a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. To generate a realistic Programmatic Asset Lifecycle Planning budget outlook, MESA used its rolling 20-year Extended Life Program Plan (MELPP) as a baseline. The new MCDA risk-based prioritization methodology implements DOE/NNSA guidelines for prioritization of DOE activities and provides a reliable, structured framework for combining expert judgement and stakeholder preferences according to an established scientific technique. An in-house Hybrid Decision Support System (HDSS) software application was developed to facilitate production of several key deliverables. The application enables analysis of the prioritization decisions with charts to display and provide linkage of MESA's funding requests to the stakeholders' priorities, strategic objectives, nuclear deterrence programs, MESA priorities, and much more.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DARHT : Enduring Lessons from a Technical Project in a National Laboratory Context [Slides]

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is the world’s first flash x-ray facility able to take multiple high-resolution radiographs of the interior features of fast-moving dense objects during a single experiment. DARHT’s radiography and complimentary diagnostics makes it an important diagnostic tool in support of the US Department of Energy’s (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)’s stewardship of the US nuclear deterrent. The project to construct DARHT ran from 1988 through 2003. Initial Operating Capability along a single axis began in 1999. A technical issue delayed Critical Decision 4 for the full dual-axis capability until 2008. DARHT was characterized by several directed changes resulting from an environmental impact study, changes to the global security context resulting from the end of underground nuclear testing, and rapid evolution of applicable technology. Conventional building and lab-space construction were part of the project, but the project was dominated by Special Facility Equipment that, together with the mission to support the nuclear weapons program, required the project to be completed by national laboratories. Although the project pre-dated implementation of DOE Order 413.3, several important lessons for national laboratory projects remain applicable today and will be discussed here, including projects appropriate for the national laboratory environment, scope stability, risk acceptance and mitigation, communication, and collaboration. Finally, considerations for DOE contractor project managers are offered based upon the DARHT experience.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The Analysis and Support for LANL Technology Testbed: High Altitude Balloon Gondola and Orion Eagle Gamma Ray Detection Instrument

The Analysis and Support for LANL Technology Testbed: High Altitude Balloon Gondola and Orion Eagle Gamma-Ray Detection Instrument is a project where Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in conjunction with the University of Michigan, are looking into gamma-ray detection in a space-like environment. The purpose of the detection is to work on instruments that can assist with planetary exploration and nuclear deterrents using a High-Altitude Balloon (HAB). For this paper, the main focus is on the mechanical aspects related to the structural analysis of the gondola. It is vital to understand the structural analysis because it helps determine if the gondola can survive the changes in the environment and the different forces or shocks that it will experience when the parachute is deployed and at landing. Additionally, NASA's Balloon Program Office (BPO) has specific requirements to meet to achieve flight certifications. Part of those certifications requires the gondola to simulate different scenarios at specific conditions with various forces applied and orientations. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the calculations of each method and the force applied to get the right results. Once that is done, the information is inputted into the structural analysis modeling system. The system will aid the mechanical team in assessing the conditions of the gondola at each scenario and determine its margin of safety. After the gondola and instrument are certified, the payload will be able to fly. The HAB and payload are launched from NASA's Columbia Scientific Balloon Facility (CSBF) at Fort Sumner, NM. The official flight was on September 26th, 2021.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Global Security & Strategic Partnerships Programs

Serving the Nation: Our Missions include Providing the Nuclear Deterrent for our Nation and Allies; Leading Nuclear Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism / Counterproliferation efforts to make the world a safer place; Supplying Enriched Uranium Material for Reactors – Naval Propulsion, Army, NASA, Universities, Isotope Production Reactors; Providing High Explosives for the Stockpile and Strategic Partners; Delivering Solutions – Solve emerging national security challenges

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Physical Sciences Vistas: Perspectives on Excellence in Community Relations (Issue 1, 2022)

This is the first 2022 issue of Physical Sciences Vistas, with a focus on “excellence in community relations.” The achievements in this area help LANL realize the goal of being "recognized as a force for good" and promotes the lab's "strategic objectives of nuclear deterrence, threat reduction, technical leadership, and trustworthy operations." Some of the highlights in this issue include LANL's new outreach program, featuring interactive travel labs, outstanding achievements in pollution prevention and how LANL is "supporting opportunities for Indigenous women in physics."

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Request for Information on Establishing a New Manufacturing Institute (DE-FOA-0002564)

Deep decarbonization of major industries such as metals manufacturing requires extensive process integration and controls to manage feedstocks, side reactions, heat, water, and waste streams. The scale of the energy and capital investment requires that process integration be validated to a high level of confidence with no bias. Industries such as steel production have very thin profit margins. Therefore, lack of confidence in process integration, product quality, and economics is a major deterrence to changes in manufacturing capital investment. Public sector investment in reconfigurable pilot testbeds and a first-of-a-kind plant would be necessary to de-risk technical and financial barriers prior to industry-wide buildout. DOE should consider a National Lab-led hub for the testbeds. Lab testbeds could be utilized in campaigns and allow multiple industrial partners to evaluate and validate technologies prior to making major capital investments.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Complex Functional Materials

The Complex Functional Materials (CFM) area of leadership focuses on the identification and development of materials comprised of multiple components or building blocks that are integrated or chemically bound together to achieve a desired function or response. Soft materials, such as polymers, as well as structural properties at the meso- and micro-scale that control materials function are particularly emphasized in this leadership area. Further, complex functional materials are generally developed to satisfy multiple materials design criteria all of which are essential to the overall application. CFM supports applications that are aligned with all three Los Alamos National Laboratory mission areas. These mission areas are: materials for nuclear deterrence, materials for energy security, and materials for global security

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

The Flavius Factor

The Flavius Factor is documentary made in the mid-1980's that examines some of the theories of deterrence for that time period. Narrated by Charlton Heston. DC reviewed by Darrin Wallace (3/22/22) and confirmed unclassified to move from the red network to the yellow, but still requires LA-UR to be assigned. 27:25 in length.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗