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Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): CIL issues resolution report, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. The NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed is believed to be technically accurate and complete. No assessment issues remain that has safety implications. Volume 1 contain worksheets for the following sybsystems: Landing and Deceleration Subsystem; Purge, Vent and Drain Subsystem; Active Thermal Control and Life Support Systems; Crew Equipment Subsystem; Instrumentation Subsystem; Data Processing Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem; Hydraulics and Water Spray Boiler Subsystem; and Mechanical Actuation Subsystem.

Urbanowicz, Kenneth J.↗

Problems involving combined loading

The first problem was to determine the capability of a ground support equipment (GSE) rack knee bracket for handling a spacelab rack. The geometric center of gravity was calculated for the upper and lower part of the rack and found to be in the center of gravity's allowable envelope. The second problem was to determine the exact margin of safety for an axial load and a shear load on a bolt. The equation for failure is axial load squared plus shear load cubed equal one. The third problem was to simplify an expression for stress on a generic non-symmetrical bolt configuration to a form familiar to 'bolt people'. The final problem was the structural analysis of the spacelab rack corner posts.

Miller, Lunelle↗

Operations analysis (study 2.1): Payload designs for space servicing

Potential modes of operating in space in the space shuttle era are documented. The October 1973 NASA Mission Model provides a definition of various NASA and non-DOD automated payload configurations when employed in an expendable mode. The model also specifies a launch schedule for initial deployment of payloads as well as for subsequent replacements at periodic cycles. This model and its associated payload definitions serve as a foundation for the data presented in this report. The reference model has been revised to reflect automated space servicing of payloads as an operational concept instead of the existing expendable approach. The indication is that the bulk of a payload's subsystems and mission equipment require no support over the lifetime of the program. However, failure of a single unit could result in loss of the mission objectives. When space servicing is employed, the approach is to replace only that unit causing the anomaly. This concept affords an opportunity to standardize space replacable units, as well as to reduce the expense of logistics support, by allowing multiple servicing on any single upper stage/shuttle flight.

Wolfe, R. R.↗

Supporting Hazard Analysis for Wildfire Response Using fmdtools and MIKA

The System Wide Safety (SWS) Safety Demonstrator (SD) Series drives development of an increasingly capable In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) focusing on humanitarian applications, starting with wildfire response (SD-1). The goals of this report are to (1) provide an early hazard analysis and mitigation evaluation of wildfire response to support these efforts and (2) provide a demonstration of capabilities of the Fault Model Design Tools (fmdtools) and Manager for Intelligent Knowledge Access (MIKA) tools. fmdtools provides a modeling, simulation, and resiliency analysis framework in which a wildfire response model, the System Modeling and Analysis of Resiliency in Scalable Traffic Management for Emergency Response Operations (SMARt-STEReO), is built. MIKA is an intelligent knowledge manager with several capabilities, including assisting in hazard analysis by extracting and analyzing hazards from historical incident reports. The following topics are covered in the report: Understanding Wildfire Hazard Dynamics. We provide a description and simulated examples of how hazards occur in the SMARt-STEReO model of wildfire response and their effect on its outcome. This provides a common mental model and focuses the analysis presented in the remainder of the report. Wildfire Hazard Identification. MIKA identifies wildfire hazards from three relevant datasets: the ICS-209-PLUS, SAFECOM, and SAFENET. Hazards are manually organized into a taxonomy and MIKA analyzes each hazard’s effects, likelihood, severity, and risk. Evaluating Mitigation Strategies. The SMARt-STEReO wildfire response model built in fmdtools evaluates a subset of identified hazards. Specifically, we simulate the effect of communications faults and equipment faults on operator safety, the effect of changing winds and flammability, and a scenario with multiple ignition points and heavy smoke. Tool Limitations and Usage Considerations. We provide a discussion of appropriate tool use cases as well as limitations and considerations for usage. The tool findings are used to synthesize recommendations for wildfire response operations, which can be captured as part of an IASMS. Key recommendations are as follows: Hazards are identified from a broad spectrum of sources including aircraft subsystems, operational sources, and ground crew operations. Highest risk operational environment hazards identified are Evacuations. The highest risk manned aerial operations hazard categorized is Jumper Operations Mishap. Ground crew hazards that are highest risk are Burns, Cargo Operations Overhead, Dehydration, Entrapment, Falling Objects, Heart Attacks, Heat Exhaustion, Inadequate Training or Certification, Vehicle Breakdown, and Vehicle Collision. Modelled containment failures arise from a mismatch between the difficulty of the firefighting scenario and the capacity (e.g., speed, effectiveness, awareness) of the response. In firefighting scenarios where containment is possible (e.g., because the fire does not spread too quickly), these mismatches can occur because of a change in environmental conditions (e.g., wind, flammability, etc) or because of planning, equipment, or communications faults. Improvements to communications increase the capacity of the firefighting response by reducing the time needed to respond to the fire. While surveillance does not increase this capacity by itself, it increases operator safety by increasing state awareness, enabling firefighters to evade approaching fires. Increasing both has a synergistic effect. In general, these performance and resilience increases generalize over fault scenarios as well as unforeseen changes to circumstances (i.e., wind, aridity, etc.). However, these improvements need to be designed so as not to make the system prone to persistent large-scale communications outages, which can reduce performance.

Hazard analysis↗

Initial Criticality Assessments to Guide FMEAs on Rocket Engine Hot Fire Testing

Presented is an explanation of the use of the Initial Criticality Assessment (ICA) technique, a triage process for prioritizing required Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs), for the European Service Module's main propulsion system's hot-fire test bed at White Sands New Mexico. Rather than instinctively performing many FMEAs of subsystems, or one large system level FMEA where every subcomponent is analyzed, the ICA guided an informed analysis of only the hardware that had a large impact to hazards. The low criticality hardware was documented via the ICA and no FMEA was performed; the work could then focus on the high criticality hardware. Thus a savings of Program resources was achieved. The experiences gained in creating these ICAs for this international collaborative project confirmed that the need for continuous communication across the technical teams is one of the greatest areas of emphasis. The European Space Agency (ESA) is developing the European Service Module (ESM), with its primary contractor, Airbus Defence and Space in Germany, for delivery to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The module will be equipped with a total of 21 engines to support NASA’s Orion spacecraft: one U.S. Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System-Engine (OMS-E), eight auxiliary thrusters and 12 smaller RCS (Reaction Control System) thrusters. The main ESM propulsion system, used for large translational maneuvers, consists of one OMS-E... To qualify the design of the ESM propulsion subsystem (PSS) an all-steel Propulsion Qualification Module (PQM) structure is used to test the propulsion systems on Orion, including “hot firing” of the OMS engine, thrusters, and RCS. The PQM has been developed as a hot-fire test bed to be tested at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). One of the objectives of the testing is to assure that the OMS-E can be safely operated with the PQM. Testing will also demonstrate that the PQM can set the proper upstream pressures and temperatures for the OMS-E to operate nominally given the PQM has never been tested in hot-fire operation with OMS-E before. In order to safely conduct the test campaign, hardware such as the engine subassembly, fluid feed lines, valves, electrical power lines, instrumentation, stiff links, installation Ground Support Equipment (GSE), and diffuser [whose objectives are to collect the exhaust of the OMS-E to actively cool down the exhaust gases, reduce thermal exchanges, and create a vacuum at OMS-E level before igniting], had to be analyzed for any hazards and failure modes.

Fault Tolerance↗

Scaling Impacts in Life Support Architecture and Technology Selection

For long-duration space missions outside of Earth orbit, reliability considerations will drive higher levels of redundancy and/or on-board spares for life support equipment. Component scaling will be a critical element in minimizing overall launch mass while maintaining an acceptable level of system reliability. Building on an earlier reliability study (AIAA 2012-3491), this paper considers the impact of alternative scaling approaches, including the design of technology assemblies and their individual components to maximum, nominal, survival, or other fractional requirements. The optimal level of life support system closure is evaluated for deep-space missions of varying duration using equivalent system mass (ESM) as the comparative basis. Reliability impacts are included in ESM by estimating the number of component spares required to meet a target system reliability. Common cause failures are included in the analysis. ISS and ISS-derived life support technologies are considered along with selected alternatives. This study focusses on minimizing launch mass, which may be enabling for deep-space missions.

Lange, Kevin↗

A multi-item maintenance center inventory model for low-demand reparable items

In many military and commercial contexts, complex equipment undergoes scheduled maintenance overhauls at regular intervals during which all failed components are replaced. Failure to have replacements on hand for all failed parts requires emergency measures at premium cost. When reparable parts are highly reliable and expensive, both holding and shortage costs are high. This model determines the reparable parts inventory for a maintenance center under three alternative criteria: (1) maximizing job-completion rate subject to constraint on total holding costs, (2) minimizing total holding costs plus expected job noncompletion costs, and (3) minimizing total holding costs subject to a required minimum job-completion rate. Exact solutions may be obtained using dynamic programming. Approximate solutions, found easily by marginal analysis, have readily computed bounds on possible error. The solution methods for the three formulations are illustrated in a simple example.

Schaefer, M. K.↗

Using probabilistic analysis to assess the reliability of predicted SRB aft-skirt stresses

Probabilistic failure analysis is a tool to predict the reliability of a part or system. Probabalistic techniques were used to predict critical stresses which occur in the solid rocket booster aft-skirt during main engine buildup, immediately prior to lift-off. More than any other hold down post (HDP) load component, the Z loads are sensitive to variations in strains and calibration constants. Also, predicted aft-skirt stresses are strongly affected by HDP load variations. Therefore, the instrumented HDP are not effective load transducers for Z loads, and, when used with aft skirt stress indicator equations, yield estimates with large uncertainty. Monte Carlo simulation proved to be a straight forward way of studying the overlapping effects of multiple parameters on predicted equipment performance. An advantage of probabilistic analysis is the degree of uncertainty of each parameter as stated explicitly by its probability distribution. It was noted, however, that the choice of parameter distribution had a large effect on the simulation results. Many times these distributions must be assumed. The engineer who is designing the part should be responsible for the choice of parameter distribution.

Richardson, James A.↗

X-Ray Transmission Microscope Development

We have succeeded in meeting the goals set out in the proposal. A cadre of detector technologies is available to suit the requirements of the experiment. Resolutions of both real-time and absolute limits to resolution exceed the initial aspirations. Obtaining sufficient contrast is still a significant limitation but can be overcome by Judicious selection of the specimen composition. This can only take time and trial and error for a successful result. The 4th generation furnace provides the capability of real-time in-situ observations of composite alloy development. A low detection sensitivity however, has still made it difficult to observe dendritic growth, although it has been 'seen' in raw video; it was not a recordable signal. We have examined flight ampoules with XTM to observe particle and thermocouple placement, crucible flaws and cracks in collaboration with the Particle Pushing and Engulfment flight experiment (Dr. Stefanescu, UA, P.I.). The value of an in flight XTM to guard against experiment failure and safety assurance is obvious. Although not attributable to equipment limitations, a quest to observe particle pushing was not successful. We tried at length to prepare specimens that would demonstrate particle pushing. Instead, we were successful in imaging the interface deformation due to the thermal field distortion of a ceramic particle or void and to compare to calculated shapes. In theory, we should have been able to make major inroads to this field if the particles could be pushed and the velocities adjusted to make critical measurements. On the other hand, critical issues of sample preparation for the PEP flight experiment were established, particularly the clustering of particles and trapped voids. In this regard, the XTM did prove very useful so that flight specimens would work as expected and to perform post flight analysis. Although not a clear result, particle pushing of precipitates was observed in an Al-Si-Mn alloy. It may be that to be pushed, the particles need to be small and have clean surfaces like one might obtain from in-situ precipitation. The ability to image features in real time skill enable more fundamental and detailed understanding of solidification dynamics in microgravity than had previously been possible, thus, allowing the full benefits of microgravity experiments be applied towards rigorous testing of critical solidification models. The XTM is also a valuable tool for post solidification metallography. The 3-dimensional distribution of solute and solidification features within the specimen volume can be viewed without sectioning or other treatment when the solute has sufficiently higher atomic mass than the solvent. Thus the XTM could provide the first practical method for on orbit microstructural (metallographic) analysis by the astronauts or by telescience.

Kaukler, William F.↗

EVA Performance Prediction

Astronaut physical performance capabilities in micro gravity EV A or on planetary surfaces when encumbered by a life support suit and debilitated by a long exposure to micro gravity will be less than unencumbered pre flight capabilities. The big question addressed by human factors engineers is: what can the astronaut be expected to do on EVA or when we arrive at a planetary surface? A second question is: what aids to performance will be needed to enhance the human physical capability? These questions are important for a number of reasons. First it is necessary to carry out accurate planning of human physical demands to ensure that time and energy critical tasks can be carried out with confidence. Second it is important that the crew members (and their ground or planetary base monitors) have a realistic picture of their own capabilities, as excessive fatigue can lead to catastrophic failure. Third it is important to design appropriate equipment to enhance human sensory capabilities, locomotion, materials handling and manipulation. The evidence from physiological research points to musculoskeletal, cardiovascular and neurovestibular degradation during long duration exposure to micro gravity . The evidence from the biomechanics laboratory (and the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory) points to a reduction in range of motion, strength and stamina when encumbered by a pressurized suit. The evidence from a long history of EVAs is that crewmembers are indeed restricted in their physical capabilities. There is a wealth of evidence in the literature on the causes and effects of degraded human performance in the laboratory, in sports and athletics, in industry and in other physically demanding jobs. One approach to this challenge is through biomechanical and performance modeling. Such models must be based on thorough task analysis, reliable human performance data from controlled studies, and functional extrapolations validated in analog contexts. The task analyses currently carried out for EVA activities are based more on extensive domain experience than any formal analytic structure. Conversely, physical task analysis for industrial and structured evidence from training and EV A contexts. Again on earth there is considerable evidence of human performance degradation due to encumbrance and fatigue. These industrial models generally take the form of a discounting equation. The development of performance estimates for space operations, such as timeline predictions for EVA is generally based on specific input from training activity, for example in the NBL or KC135. uniformed services tasks on earth are much more formalized. Human performance data in the space context has two sources: first there is the micro analysis of performance in structured tasks by the space physiology community and second there is the less structured evidence from training and EV A contexts.

Peacock, Brian↗

A Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of Human Space Missions for the Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM)

The Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM) Project u7ill study and solve systems-level integration issues for exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), through the design and development of a ground-based facility for developing revolutionary integrated systems for joint human-robotic missions. This paper describes a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of human space missions that was developed to help define the direction and priorities for AIM. Risk analysis is required for all major NASA programs and has been used for shuttle, station, and Mars lander programs. It is a prescribed part of early planning and is necessary during concept definition, even before mission scenarios and system designs exist. PRA cm begin when little failure data are available, and be continually updated and refined as detail becomes available. PRA provides a basis for examining tradeoffs among safety, reliability, performance, and cost. The objective of AIM's PRA is to indicate how risk can be managed and future human space missions enabled by the AIM Project. Many critical events can cause injuries and fatalities to the crew without causing loss of vehicle or mission. Some critical systems are beyond AIM's scope, such as propulsion and guidance. Many failure-causing events can be mitigated by conducting operational tests in AIM, such as testing equipment and evaluating operational procedures, especially in the areas of communications and computers, autonomous operations, life support, thermal design, EVA and rover activities, physiological factors including habitation, medical equipment, and food, and multifunctional tools and repairable systems. AIM is well suited to test and demonstrate the habitat, life support, crew operations, and human interface. Because these account for significant crew, systems performance, and science risks, AIM will help reduce mission risk, and missions beyond LEO are far enough in the future that AIM can have significant impact.

Jones, Harry W.↗

Accelerated Aging System for Prognostics of Power Semiconductor Devices

Prognostics is an engineering discipline that focuses on estimation of the health state of a component and the prediction of its remaining useful life (RUL) before failure. Health state estimation is based on actual conditions and it is fundamental for the prediction of RUL under anticipated future usage. Failure of electronic devices is of great concern as future aircraft will see an increase of electronics to drive and control safety-critical equipment throughout the aircraft. Therefore, development of prognostics solutions for electronics is of key importance. This paper presents an accelerated aging system for gate-controlled power transistors. This system allows for the understanding of the effects of failure mechanisms, and the identification of leading indicators of failure which are essential in the development of physics-based degradation models and RUL prediction. In particular, this system isolates electrical overstress from thermal overstress. Also, this system allows for a precise control of internal temperatures, enabling the exploration of intrinsic failure mechanisms not related to the device packaging. By controlling the temperature within safe operation levels of the device, accelerated aging is induced by electrical overstress only, avoiding the generation of thermal cycles. The temperature is controlled by active thermal-electric units. Several electrical and thermal signals are measured in-situ and recorded for further analysis in the identification of leading indicators of failures. This system, therefore, provides a unique capability in the exploration of different failure mechanisms and the identification of precursors of failure that can be used to provide a health management solution for electronic devices.

Celaya, Jose R.↗

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗

Development of software to improve AC power quality on large spacecraft

To insure the reliability of a 20 kHz, alternating current (AC) power system on spacecraft, it is essential to analyze its behavior under many adverse operating conditions. Some of these conditions include overloads, short circuits, switching surges, and harmonic distortions. Harmonic distortions can become a serious problem. It can cause malfunctions in equipment that the power system is supplying, and, during distortions such as voltage resonance, it can cause equipment and insulation failures due to the extreme peak voltages. To address the harmonic distortion issue, work was begun under the 1990 NASA-ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program. Software, originally developed by EPRI, called HARMFLO, a power flow program capable of analyzing harmonic conditions on three phase, balanced, 60 Hz AC power systems, was modified to analyze single phase, 20 kHz, AC power systems. Since almost all of the equipment used on spacecraft power systems is electrically different from equipment used on terrestrial power systems, it was also necessary to develop mathematical models for the equipment to be used on the spacecraft. The modelling was also started under the same fellowship work period. Details of the modifications and models completed during the 1990 NASA-ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program can be found in a project report. As a continuation of the work to develop a complete package necessary for the full analysis of spacecraft AC power system behavior, deployment work has continued through NASA Grant NAG3-1254. This report details the work covered by the above mentioned grant.

Kraft, L. Alan↗

DE 1 RIMS operational characteristics

The Retarding Ion Mass Spectrometer (RIMS) on the Dynamics Explorer 1 spacecraft observes both the thermal and superthermal (50 eV) ions of the ionosphere and inner magnetosphere. It is capable of measuring the detailed species distribution function of these ions in many cases. It was equipped with an integral electrometer to permit in-flight calibration of the detector sensitivities and variations thereof. A guide to understanding the RIMS data set is given. The reduction process from count rates to physical quantities is discussed in some detail. The procedure used to establish in-flight calibration is described, and results of a comparison with densities from plasma wave measurements are provided. Finally, a discussion is provided of various anomalies in the data set, including changes of channeltron efficiency with time, spin modulation of the axial sensor heads, apparent potential differences between the sensor heads, and failures of the radial head retarding potential sweep and of the -Z axial head aperture plane bias. Studies of the RIMS data set should be conducted only with a thorough awareness of the material presented here, or in collaboration with one of the scientists actively involved with RIMS data analysis.

Olsen, R. C.↗

Isothermal thermogravimetric data acquisition analysis system

The description of an Isothermal Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) Data Acquisition System is presented. The system consists of software and hardware to perform a wide variety of TGA experiments. The software is written in ANSI C using Borland's Turbo C++. The hardware consists of a 486/25 MHz machine with a Capital Equipment Corp. IEEE488 interface card. The interface is to a Hewlett Packard 3497A data acquisition system using two analog input cards and a digital actuator card. The system provides for 16 TGA rigs with weight and temperature measurements from each rig. Data collection is conducted in three phases. Acquisition is done at a rapid rate during initial startup, at a slower rate during extended data collection periods, and finally at a fast rate during shutdown. Parameters controlling the rate and duration of each phase are user programmable. Furnace control (raising and lowering) is also programmable. Provision is made for automatic restart in the event of power failure or other abnormal terminations. Initial trial runs were conducted to show system stability.

Cooper, Kenneth, Jr.↗

Tethered Space Satellite-1 (TSS-1): Technical Roundabouts

In the early 1990's US and Italian scientists collaborated to study the electrodynamics of dragging a satellite on a tether through the electrically charged portion of Earth's atmosphere called the ionosphere. An electrical current induced in the long wire could be used for power and thrust generation for a satellite. Other tether uses include momentum exchange, artificial gravity, deployment of sensors or antennas, and gravity-gradient stabilization for satellites. Before the Tethered Space Satellite (TSS-1), no long tether had ever been flown, so many questions existed on how it would actually behave. The TSS consisted of a satellite with science experiments attached to a 12.5 mile long, very thin (0.10 inch diameter) copper wire assembly wound around a spool in the deployer reel mechanism. With the Space Shuttle at an altitude of 160 nautical miles above earth, the satellite was to be deployed by raising it from the Shuttle bay on a boom facing away from Earth. Once cleared of the bay, the deployer mechanism was to slowly feed out the 12-plus miles of tether. Scientific data would be collected throughout the operation, after which the satellite would be reeled back in. Pre-flight testing system level tests involved setting up a tether receiver to catch the 12.5 mile tether onto another reel as it was being unwound by the deployer reel mechanism. Testing only the reel mechanism is straightforward. This test becomes more complicated when the TSS is mounted on the flight pallet at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The system level tests must be passed before the pallet can be installed into the Space Shuttle cargo bay. A few months before flight, the TSS payload had been integrated onto the Spacelab pallet and system level tests, including unreeling and reeling the tether, had been successfully completed. Some of this testing equipment was then shipped back to the contractor Martin Marietta. Systems-level load analyses, which cannot be run until all information about each payload is finalized, was run in parallel with the physical integration of the hardware into the Shuttle payload bay. The coupled loads analysis, as it is called, incorporates any updates to the model due to system level tests, and any changes that were found during integration. The coupled loads analysis revealed that a single bolt attaching the deployer reel mechanism to the support structure had a "negative margin" - which is an indication that it might fail during operation. Hardware certification rules do not allow for hardware to fly with negative margins, so this issue had to be resolved before the flight. Since there is conservatism in engineering analysis, there is an option to "waive" the margin requirement, and fly the experiment as is. On the other hand, a structural failure of one payload could have serious or catastrophic consequences to other payloads and possibly the mission. Minor design changes or fixes might be feasible within the payload bay prior to launch. Any major design changes that required the spooling test to validate the hardware, or for the pallet to be removed, would cause TSS not to be ready for the Shuttle launch.

O'Connor, Brian↗

First incremental buy for Increment 2 of the Space Transportation System (STS)

Thiokol manufactured and delivered 9 flight motors to KSC on schedule. All test flights were successful. All spent SRMs were recovered. Design, development, manufacture, and delivery of required transportation, handling, and checkout equipment to MSFC and to KSC were completed on schedule. All items of data required by DPD 400 were prepared and delivered as directed. In the system requirements and analysis area, the point of departure from Buy 1 to the operational phase was developed in significant detail with a complete set of transition documentation available. The documentation prepared during the Buy 1 program was maintained and updated where required. The following flight support activities should be continued through other production programs: as-built materials usage tracking on all flight hardware; mass properties reporting for all flight hardware until sample size is large enough to verify that the weight limit requirements were met; ballistic predictions and postflight performance assessments for all production flights; and recovered SRM hardware inspection and anomaly identification. In the safety, reliability, and quality assurance area, activities accomplished were assurance oriented in nature and specifically formulated to prevent problems and hardware failures. The flight program to date has adequately demonstrated the success of this assurance approach. The attention focused on details of design, analysis, manufacture, and inspection to assure the production of high-quality hardware has resulted in the absence of flight failures. The few anomalies which did occur were evaluated, design or manufacturing changes incorporated, and corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence.

Source record↗