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EMP Attachment 3: Dose Assessment Guidance (Rev.3)

This Dose Assessment Guidance (DAG) describes methods used to comply with the reporting requirements for dose to an individual member of the public receptor, collective dose, and biota dose for radionuclide air emissions under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Environmental Monitoring Plan (EMP). The National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (40 CFR 61), Subpart H, is the greatest driver for the requirements. This DAG applies to public dose from radioactive material releases to the air from PNNL-Richland Campus and PNNL Marine and Coastal Research Laboratory. Dose determinations from Richland Campus surveillance of ambient external dose and ambient air particulates is also briefly discussed. This guidance is Attachment 3 to PNNL’s EMP (PNNL-20919) and addresses a discrete, vital subject area of the EMP that is subject to revision independent of the main text of the EMP document.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

An Assessment of Molten Metal Detachment Hazards During Electron Beam Welding in the Space Shuttle Bay at LEO for the International Space Welding Experiment

In 1997, the United States [NASA] and the Paton Electric Welding Institute are scheduled to cooperate in a flight demonstration on the U.S. Space Shuttle to demonstrate the feasibility of welding in space for a possible repair option for the International Space Station Alpha. This endeavor, known as the International Space Welding Experiment (ISWE), will involve astronauts performing various welding exercises such as brazing, cutting, welding, and coating using an electron beam space welding system that was developed by the E.O. Paton Electric Welding Institute (PWI), Kiev Ukraine. This electron beam welding system known as the "Universal Weld System" consists of hand tools capable of brazing, cutting, autogeneous welding, and coating using an 8 kV (8000 volts) electron beam. The electron beam hand tools have also been developed by the Paton Welding Institute with greater capabilities than the original hand tool, including filler wire feeding, to be used with the Universal Weld System on the U.S. Space Shuttle Bay as part of ISWE. The hand tool(s) known as the Ukrainian Universal Hand [Electron Beam Welding] Tool (UHT) will be utilized for the ISWE Space Shuttle flight welding exercises to perform welding on various metal alloy samples. A total of 61 metal alloy samples, which include 304 stainless steel, Ti-6AI-4V, 2219 aluminum, and 5456 aluminum alloys, have been provided by NASA for the ISWE electron beam welding exercises using the UHT. These samples were chosen to replicate both the U.S. and Russian module materials. The ISWE requires extravehicular activity (EVA) of two astronauts to perform the space shuttle electron beam welding operations of the 61 alloy samples. This study was undertaken to determine if a hazard could exist with ISWE during the electron beam welding exercises in the Space Shuttle Bay using the Ukrainian Universal Weld System with the UHT. The safety issue has been raised with regard to molten metal detachments as a result of several possible causes such as welder procedural error, externally applied impulsive forces(s), filler wire entrainment and snap-out, cutting expulsion, and puddle expulsion. Molten metal detachment from either the weld/cut substrate or weld wire could present harm to a astronaut in the space environment it the detachment was ti burn through the fabric of the astronaut Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMC). In this paper an experimental test was performed in a 4 ft. x 4 ft. vacuum chamber at MSFC enabling protective garment to be exposed to the molten metal drop detachments to over 12 inches. The chamber was evacuated to vacuum levels of at least 1 x 10(exp -5) torr (50 micro-torr) during operation of the 1.0 kW Universal Hand Tool (UHT). The UHT was manually operated at the power mode appropriate for each material and thickness. The space suit protective welding garment, made of Teflon fabric (10 oz. per yard) with a plain weave, was placed on the floor of the vacuum chamber to catch the molten metal drop detachments. A pendulum release mechanism consisting of four hammers, each weighing approximately 3.65 lbs, was used to apply an impact forces to the weld sample/plate during both the electron beam welding and cutting exercises. Measurements were made of the horizontal fling distances of the detached molten metal drops. The volume of a molten metal drop can also be estimated from the size of the cut. Utilizing equations, calculations were made to determine chande in surafec area (Delat a(surface)) for 304 stainless steel for cutting based on measurements of metal drop sizes at the cut edges. For the cut sample of 304 stainless steel based on measurement of the drop size at the edge, Delta-a(surface) was determined to be 0.0054 2 in . Calculations have indicated only a small amount of energy is required to detach a liquid metal drop. For example, approximately only 0.000005 ft-lb of energy is necessary to detach a liquid metal steel drop based on the above theoretical analysis. However, some of the energy will be absorbed by the plate before it reaches the metal drop. Based on the theoretical calculations, it was determined that during a weld cutting exercise, the titanium alloy would be the most difficult to detach molten metal droplets followed by stainless steel and then by aluminum. The results of the experimental effort have shown that molten metal will detach if large enough of a hammer blow is applied to the weld sample plate during the full penetration welding and cutting exercises. However, no molten metal detachments occurred as a result of the filler wire snap-out tests from the weld puddle since it was too difficult to cause the metal to flick-out from the pool. Molten metal detachments, though not large in size, did result from the direct application of the electron beam on the end of the filler weld wire.

Fragomeni, James M.↗

Risk analysis: divergent models and convergent interpretations

Material presented at a NASA-sponsored workshop on risk models for exposure conditions relevant to prolonged space flight are described in this paper. Analyses used mortality data from experiments conducted at Argonne National Laboratory on the long-term effects of external whole-body irradiation on B6CF1 mice by 60Co gamma rays and fission neutrons delivered as a single exposure or protracted over either 24 or 60 once-weekly exposures. The maximum dose considered was restricted to 1 Gy for neutrons and 10 Gy for gamma rays. Proportional hazard models were used to investigate the shape of the dose response at these lower doses for deaths caused by solid-tissue tumors and tumors of either connective or epithelial tissue origin. For protracted exposures, a significant mortality effect was detected at a neutron dose of 14 cGy and a gamma-ray dose of 3 Gy. For single exposures, radiation-induced mortality for neutrons also occurred within the range of 10-20 cGy, but dropped to 86 cGy for gamma rays. Plots of risk relative to control estimated for each observed dose gave a visual impression of nonlinearity for both neutrons and gamma rays. At least for solid-tissue tumors, male and female mortality was nearly identical for gamma-ray exposures, but mortality risks for females were higher than for males for neutron exposures. As expected, protracting the gamma-ray dose reduced mortality risks. Although curvature consistent with that observed visually could be detected by a model parameterized to detect curvature, a relative risk term containing only a simple term for total dose was usually sufficient to describe the dose response. Although detectable mortality for the three pathology end points considered typically occurred at the same level of dose, the highest risks were almost always associated with deaths caused by tumors of epithelial tissue origin.

Non-NASA Center↗

NASA Tech Briefs, April 2002

The contents include: 1) Application Briefs; 2) Sneak Preview of Sensors Expo; 3) The Complexity of the Diagnosis Problem; 4) Design Concepts for the ISS TransHab Module; 5) Characteristics of Supercritical Transitional Mixing Layers; 6) Electrometer for Triboelectric Evaluation of Materials; 7) Infrared CO2 Sensor With Built-In Calibration Chambers; 8) Solid-State Potentiometric CO Sensor; 9) Planetary Rover Absolute Heading Detection Using a Sun Sensor; 10) Concept for Utilizing Full Areas of STJ Photodetector Arrays; 11) Development of Cognitive Sensors; 12) Enabling Higher-Voltage Operation of SOl CMOS Transistors; 13) Estimating Antenna-Pointing Errors From Beam Squints; 14) Advanced-Fatigue-Crack-Growth and Fracture- Mechanics Program; 15) Software for Sequencing Spacecraft Actions; 16) Program Distributes and Tracks Organizational Memoranda; 16) Flat Membrane Device for Dehumidification of Air; 17) Inverted Hindle Mount Reduces Sag of a Large, Precise Mirror; 18) Heart-Pump-Outlet/Cannula Coupling; 19) Externally Triggered Microcapsules Release Drugs In Situ; 20) Combinatorial Drug Design Augmented by Information Theory; 21) Multiple-Path-Length Optical Absorbance Cell; 22) Model of a Fluidized Bed Containing a Mixture of Particles; 23) Refractive Secondary Concentrators for Solar Thermal Systems; 24) Cold Flow Calorimeter; 25) Methodology for Tracking Hazards and Predicting Failures; 26) Estimating Heterodyne-Interferometer Polarization Leakage; 27) An Efficient Algorithm for Propagation of Temporal- Constraint Networks; 28) Software for Continuous Replanning During Execution; 29) Surface-Launched Explorers for Reconnaissance/Scouting; 30) Firmware for a Small Motion-Control Processor; 31) Gear Bearings and Gear-Bearing Transmissions; and 32) Linear Dynamometer With Variable Stroke and Frequency.

Source record↗

Safety Limitations Associated with Commercial 18650 Lithium-ion Cells

In the past decade, NASA-JSC battery group has carried out several tests on the safety of li-ion cells, modules and battery packs. The hazards associated with using commercial li-ion cells in high voltage and high capacity batteries have been determined to be different from those associated with the use of the same cells in low voltage, low capacity packs (less than 15 V and 60 Wh). Tests carried out included overcharge, overdischarge, external and internal short circuits with destructive physical analysis included in most cases. Chemical analysis, X-rays and in some cases CT scans were used for post-test analysis.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗

Results of a Manned Over Pressurization Event in the Extravehicular Mobility Unit Space Suit Assembly

The Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL) is a 102 x 202 x 40-foot-deep tank holding over 6 million gallons of water used to simulate weightlessness for Astronaut training. The maxim "Train Like You Fly" refers to the desire to have the suit perform, during training, as close as possible to how it performs during an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), particularly with respect to mobility. Therefore, the Space Suit Assembly (SSA) used in the NBL is a downgraded hardware version of the flight SSA; it is not designed for the NBL environment or operations. A classification system defines the flight Space Suit Assembly hardware as Class I, and the NBL training hardware SSA as Class IIIW. On July 20, 2017, during a manned training event in the NBL, the SSA was inadvertently over-pressurized to 22 psid; normal operating pressure being 4.3 psid. The suit subject was removed from the suit with no injury. The event was investigated by a NASA Mishap Team. The Team investigated common causes and differences between the Class I and Class IIIW Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). The investigation determined that the event was limited to Class IIIW hardware and its external flow-controlled open loop ventilation systems. The flight EMU is a pressure regulated closed loop ventilation system. This paper will examine the differences between the Class I and Class IIIW SSA hardware and provide details of the Mishap Investigation. Corrective actions taken to mitigate risk with hardware, operations, and hazard documentation will be discussed.

Spacesuit↗

Research to Develop Flood Barrier Testing Strategies for Nuclear Power Plants

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has developed regulations regarding the siting and design of nuclear power plants (NPPs) that are aimed at addressing various natural hazards, including flooding. Flood barriers are designed to prevent water from entering NPP areas containing structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety. The barriers are used at NPPs along with drains, sumps, pumps, valves, plugs, and site grading as part of the plant flood protection features that protect SSCs from experiencing external or internal flooding and mitigate the effects of flooding on NPP operations. The performance of flood protection features, including flood barriers at NPPs, has been an ongoing concern. Domestic and international operational experience provides clear indications that flood barrier performance has significant safety implications, especially for aging NPPs. The observed deficiencies show that flood barriers should be designed and installed properly, then adequately tested, inspected, and maintained in order to ensure that they perform their intended functions during flooding events. Here, this paper reviews available information related to flood barriers employed at U.S. NPPs and provides an overview and categorization of NPP flood barriers. It identifies potential domestic and international flood barrier testing facilities, including operating and decommissioned U.S. NPPs. Finally, this paper presents the technical and logistical considerations that should be made when developing specific testing strategies and protocols for flood barriers, such as the selection of flood barriers, test locations, testing approach, performance criteria, and testing parameters.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Ignition, Transition, Flame Spread in Multidimensional Configurations in Microgravity

Ignition of solid fuels by external thermal radiation and subsequent transition to flame spread are processes that not only are of considerable scientific interest but which also have fire safety applications. A material which undergoes a momentary ignition might be tolerable but a material which permits a transition to subsequent flame spread would significantly increase the fire hazard in a spacecraft. Therefore, the limiting condition under which flame cannot spread should be calculated from a model of the transition from ignition instead of by the traditional approach based on limits to a steady flame spread model. However, although the fundamental processes involved in ignition have been suggested there have been no definitive experimental or modeling studies due to the flow motion generated by buoyancy near the heated sample surface. In this study, microgravity experiments which required longer test times such as in air and surface smoldering experiment were conducted in the space shuttle STS-75 flight; shorter experimental tests such as in 35% and 50% oxygen were conducted in the droptower in the Japan Microgravity Center, JAMIC. Their experimental data along with theoretically calculated results from solving numerically the time-dependent Navier-Stokes equations are summarized in this paper.

Kashiwagi, Takashi↗

Adaptive Interface Approach Using a Real Time Biocybernetic System: Control of Hazardous Awareness

The focus of this current grant was to continue our work which focused on the manner in which psychophysiological markers can be used to index hazardous states of awareness and to explore the feasibility of developing on-line systems that utilize real time feedback to modify on-going behavioral processes. In this work we have incorporated a multifaceted approach which includes psychophysiological, subjective, and performance based measures. We have considered this from both an internal and external perspective as reflected in work from a variety of labs.

Ray, William J.↗

Thermal Insulation Strips Conserve Energy

Launching the space shuttle involves an interesting paradox: While the temperatures inside the shuttle s main engines climb higher than 6,000 F hot enough to boil iron for fuel, the engines use liquid hydrogen, the second coldest liquid on Earth after liquid helium. Maintained below 20 K (-423 F), the liquid hydrogen is contained in the shuttle s rust-colored external tank. The external tank also contains liquid oxygen (kept below a somewhat less chilly 90 K or -297 F) that combines with the hydrogen to create an explosive mixture that along with the shuttle s two, powdered aluminum-fueled solid rocket boosters allows the shuttle to escape Earth s gravity. The cryogenic temperatures of the main engines liquid fuel can cause ice, frost, or liquefied air to build up on the external tank and other parts of the numerous launch fueling systems, posing a possible debris risk when the ice breaks off during launch and causing difficulties in the transfer and control of these cryogenic liquid propellants. Keeping the fuel at the necessary ultra-cold temperatures while minimizing ice buildup and other safety hazards, as well as reducing the operational maintenance costs, has required NASA to explore innovative ways for providing superior thermal insulation systems. To address the challenge, the Agency turned to an insulating technology so effective that, even though it is mostly air, a thin sheet can prevent a blowtorch from igniting a match. Aerogels were invented in 1931 and demonstrate properties that make them the most extraordinary insulating materials known; a 1-inch-thick piece of aerogel provides the same insulation as layering 15 panes of glass with air pockets in between. Derived from silica, aluminum oxide, or carbon gels using a supercritical drying process - resulting in a composition of almost 99-percent air - aerogels are the world s lightest solid (among 15 other titles they hold in the Guinness World Records), can float indefinitely on water if treated to be hydrophobic, and can withstand extremely hot temperatures (from 1,100 F to 3,000 F depending on the type of aerogel) down to cryogenic levels, making this "frozen smoke" ideal for use in space. Because of its low weight and ability to withstand temperature extremes, an aerogel was even used as the space-based catcher s mitt to trap comet particles and space dust for NASA s Stardust mission, launched in 1999. All of this remarkable technology s characteristics were ideal for NASA s purposes except one: The aerogels were extremely brittle. Through a long-term partnership between Kennedy Space Center and Aspen Aerogels Inc., of Northborough, Massachusetts, researchers developed a flexible, durable form of aerogel that NASA has since used as cryogenic insulation for space shuttle launch systems. Through Aspen Aerogels, the technology has made oil pipeline insulation, extreme weather clothing, and infrared shielding for combat helicopters.

Source record↗

Analysis of Possible Explosions at Kennedy Space Center Due to Spontaneous Ignition of Hypergolic Propellants

NASA's Constellation Program plan currently calls for the replacement of the Space Shuttle with the ARES I & V spacecraft and booster vehicles to send astronauts to the moon and beyond. Part of the ARES spacecraft is the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which includes the Crew Module (CM) and Service Module (SM). The Orion CM's main propulsion system and supplies are provided by the SM. The SM is to be processed off line and moved to the Vehicle Assembly Building (V AB) for stacking to the first stage booster motors prior to ARES move to the launch pad. The new Constellation Program philosophy to process in this manner has created a major task for the KSC infrastructure in that conventional QD calculations are no longer viable because of the location of surrounding facilities near the VAB and the Multi Purpose Processing Facility (MPPF), where the SM will be serviced with nearly 18,000 pounds of hypergolic propellants. The Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) complex, constructed by NASA in 1994, is located just off E Avenue south of the Operations and Checkout (O&C) building in the Kennedy Space Center industrial area. The MPPF includes a high bay and a low bay. The MPPF high bay is 40.2 m (132 ft) long x 18.9 m (60 ft) wide with a ceiling height of 18.9 m (62 ft). The low bay is a 10.4 m (34 ft) long x 10.4 m (34 ft) wide processing area and has a ceiling height of6.1 m (20 ft). The MPPF is currently used to process non-hazardous payloads. Engineering Analysis Inc. (EAI), under contract with ASRC Aerospace, Inc. in conjunction with the Explosive Safety Office, NASA, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), has carried out an analysis of the effects of explosions at KSC in or near various facilities produced by the spontaneous ignition ofhypergolic fuel stored in the CEV SM. The facilities considered included (1) Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) (2) Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) (3) Canister Rotation Facility (CRF) Subsequent discussion deals with the MPPF analysis. Figure 1 provides a view of the MPPF from the northwest. An interior view ofthe facility is shown in Figure 2. The study was concerned with both blast hazards and hazardous fragments which exceed existing safety standards, as described in Section 2.0. The analysis included both blast and fragmentation effects and was divided into three parts as follows: (1) blast (2) primary fragmentation (3) secondary fragmentation Blast effects are summarized in Section 3.0, primary fragmentation in Section 4.0, and secondary fragmentation (internal and external) in Section 5.0. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.0, while references cited are included in Section 7.0. A more detailed description of the entire study is available in a separate document.

Brown, Stephen↗

Robots and manipulators

Robots are defined and described for various applications. The key feature of robots is programmability, which allows teleoperation, repair work in hazardous situations, and unsupervised operation in industrial functions. Two types of robots now exist: special purpose, with equipment for a specific task; and general purpose, which include nonservo-controlled robots, servo-controlled robots, and sensory control robots. Sensory robots are the most sophisticated, and are equipped with both internal control sensors and external sensors such as TV cameras, pressure detectors, laser range finders, etc. Sensory feedback to a central computer enables the robots to make appropriate modifications to the control program to adapt to new situations. Pattern recognition and scans for size are features of the TV sensors, and programs to develop a universal effector (hand) are outlined. Finally, robot programming in terms of manual, walkthrough, and textual methods are described, and the potential uses of robots for space and undersea construction and repair are discussed.

Heer, E.↗

Avionic Pictorial Tunnel-/Pathway-/Highway-In-The-Sky Workshops

In 1994-96, Langley Research Center held a series of interactive workshops investigating highway-in-the-sky concepts, which enable precise flight path control. These workshops brought together government and industry display designers and pilots to discuss and fly various concepts in an iterative manner. The primary emphasis of the first workshops was the utility and usability of pathways and the pros and cons of various features available. The final workshops were focused on the specific applications to the eXternal Visibility System (XVS) of the NASA High-speed Research Program, which was concerned with replacement of the forward windows in a High-speed Civil Transport with electronic displays and high resolution video cameras to enable a "No-Droop" configuration. The primary concerns in the XVS application were the prevention of display clutter and obscuration of hazards, as the camera image was the primary means of traffic separation in clear visibility conditions. These concerns were not so prominent in the first workshops, which assumed a Synthetic Vision System application in which hazard locations are known and obscuration is handled easily. The resulting consensus concept has been used since in simulation and flight test activities of many Government programs. and other concepts have been influenced by the workshop discussions.

Parrish, Russell V.↗

Examination of Icing Induced Loss of Control and Its Mitigations

Factors external to the aircraft are often a significant causal factor in loss of control (LOC) accidents. In today s aviation world, very few accidents stem from a single cause and typically have a number of causal factors that culminate in a LOC accident. Very often the "trigger" that initiates an accident sequence is an external environment factor. In a recent NASA statistical analysis of LOC accidents, aircraft icing was shown to be the most common external environmental LOC causal factor for scheduled operations. When investigating LOC accident or incidents aircraft icing causal factors can be categorized into groups of 1) in-flight encounter with super-cooled liquid water clouds, 2) take-off with ice contamination, or 3) in-flight encounter with high concentrations of ice crystals. As with other flight hazards, icing induced LOC accidents can be prevented through avoidance, detection, and recovery mitigations. For icing hazards, avoidance can take the form of avoiding flight into icing conditions or avoiding the hazard of icing by making the aircraft tolerant to icing conditions. Icing detection mitigations can take the form of detecting icing conditions or detecting early performance degradation caused by icing. Recovery from icing induced LOC requires flight crew or automated systems capable of accounting for reduced aircraft performance and degraded control authority during the recovery maneuvers. In this report we review the icing induced LOC accident mitigations defined in a recent LOC study and for each mitigation describe a research topic required to enable or strengthen the mitigation. Many of these research topics are already included in ongoing or planned NASA icing research activities or are being addressed by members of the icing research community. These research activities are described and the status of the ongoing or planned research to address the technology needs is discussed

Reehorst, Andrew L.↗

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

Brain wave correlates of attentional states: Event related potentials and quantitative EEG analysis during performance of cognitive and perceptual tasks

The increased use of automation in the cockpits of commercial planes has dramatically decreased the workload requirements of pilots, enabling them to function more efficiently and with a higher degree of safety. Unfortunately, advances in technology have led to an unexpected problem: the decreased demands on pilots have increased the probability of inducing 'hazardous states of awareness.' A hazardous state of awareness is defined as a decreased level of alertness or arousal which makes an individual less capable of reacting to unique or emergency types of situations. These states tend to be induced when an individual is not actively processing information. Under such conditions a person is likely to let his/her mind wander, either to internal states or to irrelevant external conditions. As a result, they are less capable of reacting quickly to emergency situations. Since emergencies are relatively rare, and since the high automated cockpit requires progressively decreasing levels of engagement, the probability of being seduced into a lowered state of awareness is increasing. This further decreases the readiness of the pilot to react to unique circumstances such as system failures. The HEM Lab at NASA-Langley Research Center has been studying how these states of awareness are induced and what the physiological correlates of these different states are. Specifically, they have been interested in studying electroencephalographic (EEG) measures of different states of alertness to determine if such states can be identified and, hopefully, avoided. The project worked on this summer involved analyzing the EEG and the event related potentials (ERP) data collected while subjects performed under two conditions. Each condition required subjects to perform a relatively boring vigilance task. The purpose of using these tasks was to induce a decreased state of awareness while still requiring the subject to process information. Each task involved identifying an infrequently presented target stimulus. In addition to the task requirements, irrelevant tones were presented in the background. Research has shown that even though these stimuli are not attended, ERP's to them can still be elicited. The amplitude of the ERP waves has been shown to change as a function of a person's level of alertness. ERP's were also collected and analyzed for the target stimuli for each task. Brain maps were produced based on the ERP voltages for the different stimuli. In addition to the ERP's, a quantitative EEG (QEEG) was performed on the data using a fast Fourier technique to produce a power spectral analysis of the EEG. This analysis was conducted on the continuous EEG while the subjects were performing the tasks. Finally, a QEEG was performed on periods during the task when subjects indicated that they were in an altered state of awareness. During the tasks, subjects were asked to indicate by pressing a button when they realized their level of task awareness had changed. EEG epochs were collected for times just before and just after subjects made this reponse. The purpose of this final analysis was to determine whether or not subjective indices of level of awareness could be correlated with different patterns of EEG.

Freeman, Frederick G.↗

Sealing and External Sterilization of a Sample Container

A method of (1) sealing a sample of material acquired in a possibly b iologically contaminated ("dirty") environment into a hermetic conta iner, (2) sterilizing the outer surface of the container, then (3) d elivering the sealed container to a clean environment has been propos ed. The method now proposed was originally intended to be used to ret urn samples from Mars to Earth, but could also be used on Earth to t ransport material samples acquired in environments that contain biol ogical hazards and/or, in some cases, chemical hazards.

Bar-Cohen, Yoseph↗