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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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112 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Interannual Variations in Aerosol Sources and Their Impact on Orographic Precipitation Over California's Central Sierra Nevada

Aerosols that serve as cloud condensation nuclei (CCN) and ice nuclei (IN) have the potential to profoundly influence precipitation processes. Furthermore, changes in orographic precipitation have broad implications for reservoir storage and flood risks. As part of the CalWater I field campaign (2009-2011), the impacts of aerosol sources on precipitation were investigated in the California Sierra Nevada. In 2009, the precipitation collected on the ground was influenced by both local biomass burning (up to 79% of the insoluble residues found in precipitation) and long-range transported dust and biological particles (up to 80% combined), while in 2010, by mostly local sources of biomass burning and pollution (30-79% combined), and in 2011 by mostly long-range transport from distant sources (up to 100% dust and biological). Although vast differences in the source of residues was observed from year-to-year, dust and biological residues were omnipresent (on average, 55% of the total residues combined) and were associated with storms consisting of deep convective cloud systems and larger quantities of precipitation initiated in the ice phase. Further, biological residues were dominant during storms with relatively warm cloud temperatures (up to -15 C), suggesting these particles were more efficient IN compared to mineral dust. On the other hand, lower percentages of residues from local biomass burning and pollution were observed (on average 31% and 9%, respectively), yet these residues potentially served as CCN at the base of shallow cloud systems when precipitation quantities were low. The direct connection of the source of aerosols within clouds and precipitation type and quantity can be used in models to better assess how local emissions versus long-range transported dust and biological aerosols play a role in impacting regional weather and climate, ultimately with the goal of more accurate predictive weather forecast models and water resource management.

Creamean, J. M.↗
DOE OSTI2024

HERO CarbonSAFE Phase 2 Project in the Columbia River Basalt Group

The Hermiston, Oregon Basalt CarbonSAFE Phase II project (HERO CarbonSAFE) seeks to accelerate the deployment of commercial carbon dioxide (CO2) storage projects in basaltic rocks. Basalt CO2 storage has several advantages to conventional saline storage reservoirs including 1. The potential for rapid mineralization of CO2, 2. Associated decreases in pressure and CO2 migration risks, 3. Reduced long-term monitoring requirements with respect to plume tracking, 4. Widespread geographic distribution and, 5. Large storage potential due to thickness, porosity, and CO2 interactions with basalt. And for locations such as the Pacific Northwest, Hawaii, Iceland, India and Japan, basalts may offer the only economically feasible option for local CO2 storage. However, there are limited field-scale assessments of CO2 storage in basalt, and current carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) permitting and regulatory frameworks were developed for conventional saline reservoirs. HERO CarbonSAFE is designed to address research gaps and uncertainties associated with basalt storage. Specifically, the project will assess the feasibility of CO2 injection in the deep layered basalts, long-term storage (mineralization), practical approaches for large-scale implementation (50+ million metric tons of CO2 over 30 years), lithology-specific risks, and the technoeconomic potential for CO2 storage in basalts. The HERO CarbonSAFE project will assess feasibility of developing a commercial-scale (50+ million metric tons of CO2) geological storage complex within the Columbia River Basalt Group (CRBG), a layered continental flood basalt complex that underlies Calpine’s natural gas-fired Hermiston Power Project (HPP) in Hermiston, OR (Figure 1). Under this 2-year CarbonSAFE Phase II project, the HERO team will conduct a data acquisition campaign that includes drilling a stratigraphic well to a total depth of ~1,500 m into the thick layered basalts proximal to HPP. A comprehensive well logging and hydrologic testing program will be augmented with new core collected from flow zones and sealing units, and comprehensive laboratory testing to help refine the kinetic rates of mineralization. The newly acquired information will be integrated with existing data from regional wells to correlate basalt injection zone properties to develop storage hub/commercial-scale models. Using these models, the project team will evaluate injection scenarios to define the technical and economic potential for storing a minimum of 50 million metric tons of CO2 over a 30-year period, along with a robust sensitivity analysis on key parameters governing reservoir viability for sustainable injection over a commercial project lifetime. Specific technical objectives of HERO are: (1) assessing the reservoir response of a series of stacked layered reservoir flowtop sequences occurring in this area of the CRBG to commercial-scale injection volumes; (2) extending prior efforts by the project team to characterize the deep layered basalts encountered in regional studies, to leverage prior investments by U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Carbon Storage program; (3) leveraging DOE’s mineralization characterization efforts to advance model parametrization for commercial scale injection of CO2 in basalts; (4) conducting risk assessments associated with scaling up to commercial storage hub injection goals, while validating DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) tools, to identify potential constraints that would prevent the CRBG from serving as a commercial-scale storage complex; (5) developing mitigation plans to address identified risks; (6) developing a commercial-scale injection and monitoring, verification and accounting (MVA) strategy; (7) utilizing computational models to define and minimize, if possible, the Area of Review (AoR) under Class VI regulations; and (8) developing a robust CO2 management strategy for CRBG that also considers a regional source/sink approach that is responsive to stakeholder needs and industrial demand. Specific institutional objectives are: (1) identifying and developing plans to mitigate the nontechnical challenges associated with the build-out of a commercial-scale storage complex within the CRBG with integrated CO2 sources; (2) implementing the community outreach plan; (3) conducting regulatory research, including a survey of issues related to pore space ownership, MVA and long-term assurance of mineralization-based storage, to support an eventual application for a UIC Class VI permit; (4) advancing the project’s plan for CO2 liability management; and (5) continuing to refine and update the project’s economic model. The final objective is the preparation of a comprehensive Site Characterization Plan that draws upon the technical and institutional feasibility assessments to prepare the project for future commercialization efforts.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Identifying human failure events (HFEs) for external hazard probabilistic risk assessment

In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗