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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7

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DOE OSTI2025

Rancor Integrated Procedure System (RIPS): A Computer-Based Procedure Platform for Advanced Reactor Research

The Rancor Microworld Simulator is a simplified, pressurized water, small modular reactor simulator that includes a multi-unit plant model server, an advanced digital human-machine control interface, and the Rancor Integrated Procedure System (RIPS). Rancor provides a research and development tool that can be used for collecting operator performance data and for prototyping concepts of operations (ConOps) for advanced reactor development. RIPS is meant as a research tool and includes many unique features: (1) RIPS has a robust procedure authoring system. (2) RIPS has the capability to run any of the three IEEE-Std-1786 computer-based procedure types. (3) RIPS can be configured to take on the look and feel of different vendors’ computer-based procedure systems for the purpose of developing and evaluating different ConOps for plant upgrades or new builds. (4) RIPS includes the capability for logging operator procedure use, including integrating procedure logs with Rancor simulator logs, thereby allowing automated data collection of operator scenario runs. (5) RIPS integrates with the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER), a dynamic human reliability analysis environment that creates a digital human twin or virtual operator to mimic reactor operator performance. (6) RIPS includes support for automation of plant monitoring and control functions. While RIPS is explicitly built into Rancor, it may also be used with full-scope training simulators. This functionality allows RIPS to be used for existing plants and advanced reactors under development.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS2019

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗

NASA NTRS1986

Some computational techniques for estimating human operator describing functions

Computational procedures for improving the reliability of human operator describing functions are described. Special attention is given to the estimation of standard errors associated with mean operator gain and phase shift as computed from an ensemble of experimental trials. This analysis pertains to experiments using sum-of-sines forcing functions. Both open-loop and closed-loop measurement environments are considered.

Levison, W. H.↗

NASA NTRS1962

RELIABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP

Reliability and human factors

RELIABILITY↗

NASA NTRS2005

On Space Exploration and Human Error: A Paper on Reliability and Safety

NASA space exploration should largely address a problem class in reliability and risk management stemming primarily from human error, system risk and multi-objective trade-off analysis, by conducting research into system complexity, risk characterization and modeling, and system reasoning. In general, in every mission we can distinguish risk in three possible ways: a) known-known, b) known-unknown, and c) unknown-unknown. It is probably almost certain that space exploration will partially experience similar known or unknown risks embedded in the Apollo missions, Shuttle or Station unless something alters how NASA will perceive and manage safety and reliability

Bell, David G.↗

NASA NTRS2013

HRA Aerospace Challenges

Compared to equipment designed to perform the same function over and over, humans are just not as reliable. Computers and machines perform the same action in the same way repeatedly getting the same result, unless equipment fails or a human interferes. Humans who are supposed to perform the same actions repeatedly often perform them incorrectly due to a variety of issues including: stress, fatigue, illness, lack of training, distraction, acting at the wrong time, not acting when they should, not following procedures, misinterpreting information or inattention to detail. Why not use robots and automatic controls exclusively if human error is so common? In an emergency or off normal situation that the computer, robotic element, or automatic control system is not designed to respond to, the result is failure unless a human can intervene. The human in the loop may be more likely to cause an error, but is also more likely to catch the error and correct it. When it comes to unexpected situations, or performing multiple tasks outside the defined mission parameters, humans are the only viable alternative. Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) identifies ways to improve human performance and reliability and can lead to improvements in systems designed to interact with humans. Understanding the context of the situation that can lead to human errors, which include taking the wrong action, no action or making bad decisions provides additional information to mitigate risks. With improved human reliability comes reduced risk for the overall operation or project.

DeMott, Diana↗

NASA NTRS2013

Launch and Assembly Reliability Analysis for Mars Human Space Exploration Missions

NASA s long-range goal is focused upon human exploration of Mars. Missions to Mars will require campaigns of multiple launches to assemble Mars Transfer Vehicles in Earth orbit. Launch campaigns are subject to delays, launch vehicles can fail to place their payloads into the required orbit, and spacecraft may fail during the assembly process or while loitering prior to the Trans-Mars Injection (TMI) burn. Additionally, missions to Mars have constrained departure windows lasting approximately sixty days that repeat approximately every two years. Ensuring high reliability of launching and assembling all required elements in time to support the TMI window will be a key enabler to mission success. This paper describes an integrated methodology for analyzing and improving the reliability of the launch and assembly campaign phase. A discrete event simulation involves several pertinent risk factors including, but not limited to: manufacturing completion; transportation; ground processing; launch countdown; ascent; rendezvous and docking, assembly, and orbital operations leading up to TMI. The model accommodates varying numbers of launches, including the potential for spare launches. Having a spare launch capability provides significant improvement to mission success.

Cates, Grant R.↗

NASA NTRS2007

GN&C Engineering Best Practices For Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) recently completed an in-depth assessment to identify a comprehensive set of engineering considerations for the Design, Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) of safe and reliable human-rated spacecraft systems. Reliability subject matter experts, discipline experts, and systems engineering experts were brought together to synthesize the current "best practices" both at the spacecraft system and subsystems levels. The objective of this paper is to summarize, for the larger Community of Practice, the initial set of Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) engineering Best Practices as identified by this NESC assessment process.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

NASA NTRS2007

GN&C Engineering Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

NASA NTRS2008

GN&C Engineering Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft System

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Rancor-HUNTER: Using a Simulator Engine for Realistic Human Performance Modeling of Nuclear Power Operations

The Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) is a software system to simulate human performance in support of human reliability analysis (HRA) in nuclear power plants. This paper summarizes recent work to integrate HUNTER with a plant simulator, namely the Rancor Microworld Simulator. Rancor is an offshoot of earlier work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to support plant modernization. The graphical software tools used to mimic digital human-system interface upgrades at INL’s Human Systems Simulation Laboratory were linked to the Rancor Microworld Simulator, an INL-developed simplified plant model. HUNTER becomes a “virtual operator” coupled to the Rancor simulator, thereby allowing a tight coupling between a digital human twin and a digital twin of the plant. Rancor-HUNTER may be run through Monte Carlo iterations across a dynamic range of performance shaping factors, thereby producing distributions of human performance in terms of procedure paths, errors instantiations, and task durations. This paper overviews the various unique features of Rancor-HUNTER and presents an example run of Rancor-HUNTER for a startup scenario.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS2014

Defining Reliability and Robustness from a Human Factors Perspective

A human factors team was tasked with assessing best practices for developing a crewed space vehicle that is both reliable and robust. The team identified two broad dimensions of human factors are relevant to system design. Namely, the attributes of the product, and the processes used to develop the product. The “product” includes hardware, software, documentation, training systems, and procedures throughout all phases of the system life, including construction, testing, operation and maintenance. Three product attributes relevant to robustness are the extent to which task demands are within human capabilities, the capacity of the system to cope with unanticipated human actions, and the ability of the system to make use of unique human capabilities during non-routine situations. The “process” dimension of human factors relates to the activities that start in the early stages of design, and continue throughout the life of the system. There are, of course, no guarantees that a formal consideration of human factors throughout the design process will identify all the relevant human issues. In the absence of such a consideration, however, problems are virtually assured.

Hobbs, Alan↗

NASA NTRS2016

The Threat of Uncertainty: Why Using Traditional Approaches for Evaluating Spacecraft Reliability are Insufficient for Future Human Mars Missions

Through the Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) study, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to evaluate potential approaches for sending humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). A key aspect of these missions is the strategy that is employed to maintain and repair the spacecraft systems, ensuring that they continue to function and support the crew. Long duration missions beyond LEO present unique and severe maintainability challenges due to a variety of factors, including: limited to no opportunities for resupply, the distance from Earth, mass and volume constraints of spacecraft, high sensitivity of transportation element designs to variation in mass, the lack of abort opportunities to Earth, limited hardware heritage information, and the operation of human-rated systems in a radiation environment with little to no experience. The current approach to maintainability, as implemented on ISS, which includes a large number of spares pre-positioned on ISS, a larger supply sitting on Earth waiting to be flown to ISS, and an on demand delivery of logistics from Earth, is not feasible for future deep space human missions. For missions beyond LEO, significant modifications to the maintainability approach will be required.Through the EMC evaluations, several key findings related to the reliability and safety of the Mars spacecraft have been made. The nature of random and induced failures presents significant issues for deep space missions. Because spare parts cannot be flown as needed for Mars missions, all required spares must be flown with the mission or pre-positioned. These spares must cover all anticipated failure modes and provide a level of overall reliability and safety that is satisfactory for human missions. This will require a large amount of mass and volume be dedicated to storage and transport of spares for the mission. Further, there is, and will continue to be, a significant amount of uncertainty regarding failure rates for spacecraft components. This uncertainty makes it much more difficult to anticipate failures and will potentially require an even larger amount of spares to provide an acceptable level of safety. Ultimately, the approach to maintenance and repair applied to ISS, focusing on the supply of spare parts, may not be tenable for deep space missions. Other approaches, such as commonality of components, simplification of systems, and in-situ manufacturing will be required.

Stromgren, Chel↗

NASA NTRS2004

Lunar precursor missions for human exploration of Mars--III: studies of system reliability and maintenance

Discussions of future human expeditions into the solar system generally focus on whether the next explorers ought to go to the Moon or to Mars. The only mission scenario developed in any detail within NASA is an expedition to Mars with a 500-day stay at the surface. The technological capabilities and the operational experience base required for such a mission do not now exist nor has any self-consistent program plan been proposed to acquire them. In particular, the lack of an Abort-to-Earth capability implies that critical mission systems must perform reliably for 3 years or must be maintainable and repairable by the crew. As has been previously argued, a well-planned program of human exploration of the Moon would provide a context within which to develop the appropriate technologies because a lunar expedition incorporates many of the operational elements of a Mars expedition. Initial lunar expeditions can be carried out at scales consistent with the current experience base but can be expanded in any or all operational phases to produce an experience base necessary to successfully and safely conduct human exploration of Mars. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Moon↗

NASA NTRS2017

EVA Human Health and Performance Benchmarking Study Overview and Development of a Microgravity Protocol

The primary objective of this study is to develop a protocol to reliably characterize human health and performance metrics for individuals working inside various EVA suits under realistic spaceflight conditions. Expected results and methodologies developed during this study will provide the baseline benchmarking data and protocols with which future EVA suits and suit configurations (e.g., varied pressure, mass, center of gravity [CG]) and different test subject populations (e.g., deconditioned crewmembers) may be reliably assessed and compared. Results may also be used, in conjunction with subsequent testing, to inform fitness-for-duty standards, as well as design requirements and operations concepts for future EVA suits and other exploration systems.

Norcross, Jason↗

NASA NTRS2004

Human-Robot Planetary Exploration Teams

The EVA Robotic Assistant (ERA) project at NASA Johnson Space Center studies human-robot interaction and robotic assistance for future human planetary exploration. Over the past four years, the ERA project has been performing field tests with one or more four-wheeled robotic platforms and one or more space-suited humans. These tests have provided experience in how robots can assist humans, how robots and humans can communicate in remote environments, and what combination of humans and robots works best for different scenarios. The most efficient way to understand what tasks human explorers will actually perform, and how robots can best assist them, is to have human explorers and scientists go and explore in an outdoor, planetary-relevant environment, with robots to demonstrate what they are capable of, and roboticists to observe the results. It can be difficult to have a human expert itemize all the needed tasks required for exploration while sitting in a lab: humans do not always remember all the details, and experts in one arena may not even recognize that the lower level tasks they take for granted may be essential for a roboticist to know about. Field tests thus create conditions that more accurately reveal missing components and invalid assumptions, as well as allow tests and comparisons of new approaches and demonstrations of working systems. We have performed field tests in our local rock yard, in several locations in the Arizona desert, and in the Utah desert. We have tested multiple exploration scenarios, such as geological traverses, cable or solar panel deployments, and science instrument deployments. The configuration of our robot can be changed, based on what equipment is needed for a given scenario, and the sensor mast can even be placed on one of two robot bases, each with different motion capabilities. The software architecture of our robot is also designed to be as modular as possible, to allow for hardware and configuration changes. Two focus areas of our research are safety and crew time efficiency. For safety, our work involves enabling humans to reliably communicate with a robot while moving in the same workspace, and enabling robots to monitor and advise humans of potential problems. Voice, gesture, remote computer control, and enhanced robot intelligence are methods we are studying. For crew time efficiency, we are investigating the effects of assigning different roles to humans and robots in collaborative exploration scenarios.

Tyree, Kimberly↗

NASA NTRS2008

Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C): Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems

In 2007 the NESC completed an in-depth assessment to identify, define and document engineering considerations for the Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) of human-rated spacecraft systems. This study had been requested by the Astronaut Office at JSC to help them to better understand what is required to ensure safe, robust, and reliable human-rated spacecraft systems. The 22 GN&C engineering Best Practices described in this paper are a condensed version of what appears in the NESC Technical Report. These Best Practices cover a broad range from fundamental system architectural considerations to more specific aspects (e.g., stability margin recommendations) of GN&C system design and development. 15 of the Best Practices address the early phases of a GN&C System development project and the remaining 7 deal with the later phases. Some of these Best Practices will cross-over between both phases. We recognize that this set of GN&C Best Practices will not be universally applicable to all projects and mission applications.

Lebsock, Ken↗

NASA NTRS2001

Thermal Design of a Collapsible Cryogenic Vessel

Strategic planning for human exploration missions to Mars has conclusively identified in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) as an enabling technology. Most mission scenarios include an ISRU plant to produce propellants for ascent from Mars as well as the production of backup reserves of water, oxygen, and process gases. Current mission scenarios call for an ISRU plant to be deployed and then produce and store the required propellants and life support reserves before the arrival of the first human mission. Reliable cryogenic propellant liquefaction and storage technologies for extended period missions are especially critical. This report examines the cryogenic storage problem for liquid oxygen produced by an ISRU plant for a human mission scenario. The analysis examines various hardware configurations including insulation types, packaging techniques, and required cryocoolers to minimize the initial launch mass to low Earth orbit. Results of the analyses indicate that high vacuum insulation systems requiring vacuum pressures below one millitorr will be required to minimize the 'initial launch mass into low Earth orbit even though the temperature on the surface of Mars is much lower than Earth.

Hegab, Hisham E.↗