Results for “Interface Tracking Method” — Page 7

NASA NTRS2023

Safety Case for Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operations at NASA Langley Research Center

This Technical Memorandum (TM) is written to provide for dissemination of the methods and safety considerations for operations of small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)at NASA Langley Research Center. It includes the Safety Case used to acquire a BVLOS Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the FAA and is being published to enable others to benefit from this work. The intended operations, subject to approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), will include a combination of Within Visual Line of Sight (WVLOS) and Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights, comprising of at most five sUAS operating concurrently, with no more than three operating BVLOS. Flights will occur in a subset of the Langley Air Force Base (LAFB) Class D airspace (KLFI) at a maximum altitude of 400 ft AGL. Most operations within this subset will take place in the City Environment Range Testing for Autonomous Integrated Navigation (CERTAIN) Range. The CERTAIN Range includes airspace inside the borders of NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). Additional airspace over the northern section of CERTAIN will be requested as part of the Certificate of Authorization (COA). NASA LaRC BVLOS operations on the CERTAIN Range can be broken down into five critical components needed to meet the 14 CFR § 91.113 see and avoid requirement: 1) procedural deconfliction with LAFB for UAS operations at or below 400 ft and manned aircraft at or above 900’ AGL; 2) ground equipment for detection of intruder aircraft and to support communications between crewmembers ; 3) sUAS vehicles with advanced onboard automation capable of autonomously maintaining safe separation; 4) BVLOS standardized operating procedures (SOPs); 5) and personnel to execute the flight operations in accordance with the SOPs and respond to airborne contingencies. The introduction of new ground equipment includes the use of the Remote Operations for Autonomous Missions (ROAM) UAS Operations Center, development and use of an Integrated Airspace Display (IAD), use of the L-STAR and GA-9120 radars, and the incorporation of standardized Vertiports. The ROAM Operations Center will be the central point for all BVLOS sUAS operations. All command and control (C2), voice communications and airspace awareness displays will reside inside ROAM. The IAD will provide raw data from ADS-B, FLARM, radar tracks and telemetered GPS vehicle positions for interpretation by an Airspace Monitor. The radars will search the class D airspace around the CERTAIN Range and serve as a backup to procedural deconfliction procedures coordinated with LAFB. In the event of a procedural deconfliction breakdown, radar detections of non-participating aircraft will be available so that the 91.113 see and avoid requirement can still be safely met. Finally, the incorporation of Vertiports will have video and network connectivity that enables large numbers of sUAS launches and recoveries from a single location. This is a continuation of the remote command and control of unpiloted aircraft component focused on evaluating unpiloted aircraft flight crew roles and responsibilities, control interfaces and the associated data links needed to operate a fleet of aircraft within a UAM Ecosystem. This work supports the development of future aviation operational concepts based on an Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level (UML) 4 environment (Patterson, 2020). It is assumed that future airspace will include hundreds of simultaneous aircraft operations within the airspace, therefore scalable operations are essential for enabling this future airspace to become a reality. Follow on work includes envisioned flights that expand operations beyond the CERTAIN range and lead to an effective Maritime Surveillance capability.

Matthew W Coldsnow↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Manual Crew Override of Vehicle Landings Following G-Transitions

BACKGROUND Manual control during exploration spaceflight consists of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. This crew override capability is critical to enable overall mission success during landing contingencies. However, the introduction of manual override capabilities must be implemented to enable crews to mitigate risks introduced by human error. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. While training and landing aids enable successful landing through disorientation, these adaptive changes may increase cognitive demand that needs to be accounted for in the manual control strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition to develop appropriate countermeasures. METHODS In this study, we will examine operational piloting tasks following International Space Station (ISS) missions in a simulated lunar landing using a six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) motion base. The motion-based simulation will be implemented in our laboratory at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and will be available within hours following the return from commercial crew landings. The primary goals of this study are (1) to understand the impact of spaceflight on crew ability to perform manual crew override tasks, (2) to examine how adaptive changes in vestibular and cognitive function relate to changes in manual crew override proficiency, and (3) compare performance during late “just-in-time” on-board training with early post-flight crew performance. The impact of spaceflight on piloting capability will be assessed from pre- versus post-flight changes in crewmembers assigned to either short duration (< 30 day) or long duration (~6- month) missions to the International Space Station (ISS). Individual differences in post-flight vestibular and cognitive changes include motion sickness reports, measures of tilt motion perception accuracy and precision, and dual-task tracking. During the 6DOF lunar simulation, the crew will manually takeover attitude and rate-of-descent to the nominal or re-designated landing aim point during the approach phase. The outcome measures for the lunar crew override tasks will be the percent time maintaining actual vehicle states, e.g., attitude and rate-of-descent, within recommended guidance during the landing approach, number and maximum deviation outside limits, and root mean square error (RMSE). Given that “just-in-time” (JIT) training is an operational expectation for the Human Landing System (HLS) program, all participants will perform late inflight JIT training for each manual crew override task in which they will participate. Crew proficiency will be captured inflight during JIT training that will be implemented on a laptop with hand controllers to allow the crewmember to practice the landing task procedures like the approach implemented for JIT training with Shuttle landing and ISS telerobotic tasks. COUNTERMEASURE UPDATES The lunar lander simulation has been implemented onto a two-laptop display system where subjects select from alternative landing points, based upon avoiding hazards that the on-board system identifies during the landing. The subject makes inputs using a rotational hand controller (i.e., joystick) and a translational hand controller, which are processed by simulated vehicle dynamics to update the vehicle attitude and rate of descent. Subjects will utilize a combination of flight, situation, and status displays to monitor the state of the simulated vehicle. The simulation exports tilt and translation movements to a 6DOF motion base synced to visual movements and provides representative vestibular cues to the subject while performing the task inside an enclosed cabin featuring a simulated lunar out-the-window view and a heads-down lander cockpit view. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew override capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew override performance will help better characterize the manual control risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. The inclusion of “just-in-time” on-board training will ensure we are characterizing changes in override proficiency with this expected countermeasure in place. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors acknowledge contributions from Draper, HLS Joint Test Panel, Crew HLS Interfaces for Piloting Working Group, and Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) Lab toward the development of the lunar landing simulation. This project is funded by the Human Health Countermeasures Element.

Austin M Bollinger↗