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At least 127 records · Page 7

Plutonium Oxide Containment and the Potential for Water-Borne Transport as a Consequence of ARIES Oxide Processing Operations

The question of oxide containment during processing and storage has become a primary concern when considering the continued operability of the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). An Evaluation of the Safety of the Situation (ESS), “Potential for Criticality in a Glovebox Due to a Fire” (TA55-ESS-14-002-R2, since revised to R3) first issued in May, 2014 summarizes these concerns: “The safety issue of fire water potentially entering a glovebox is: the potential for the water to accumulate in the bottom of a glovebox and result in an inadvertent criticality due to the presence of fissionable materials in the glovebox locations and the increased reflection and moderation of neutrons from the fire water accumulation.” As a result, the existing documented safety analysis (DSA) was judged inadequate and, while it explicitly considered the potential for criticality resulting from water intrusion into gloveboxes, criticality safety evaluation documents (CSEDs) for the affected locations did not evaluate the potential for fire water intrusion into a glovebox.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Towards a Cyber Defense Framework for SCADA Systems Based on Power Consumption Monitoring

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is an industrial automation system that remotely monitor, and control critical infrastructures. SCADA systems are major targets for espionage and sabotage attackers. According to the 2015 Dell security annual threat report, the number of cyber-attacks against SCADA systems has doubled in the past year. Cyber-attacks (i.e., buffer overflow, rootkits and code injection) could cause serious financial losses and physical infrastructure damages. Moreover, some specific cyber-attacks against SCADA systems could become a threat to human life. Current commercial off-the-shelf security solutions are insufficient in protecting SCADA systems against sophisticated cyber-attacks. In 2014 a report by Mandiant stated that only 69% of organizations learned about their breaches from third entities, meaning that these companies lack of their own detection system. Furthermore, these breaches are not detected in real-time or fast enough to prevent further damages. The average time between compromise and detection (for those intrusions that were detected) was 205 days. To address this challenge, we propose an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that detects SCADA-specific cyber-attacks by analyzing the power consumption of a SCADA device. Specifically, to validate the proposed approach, we chose to monitor in real-time the power usage of a a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). To this end, we configured the hardware of the tetsbed by installing the required sensors to monitor and collect its power consumption. After that two SCADA-specific cyber-attacks were simulated and TracerDAQ Pro was used to collect the power consumption of the PLC under normal and anomalous scenarios. Results showed that is possible to distinguish between the regular power usage of the PLC and when the PLC was under specific cyber-attacks.

Hernandez Jimenez, Jarilyn M↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 539 are located within Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada National Security Site. Corrective Action Unit 539 comprises the following CASs: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 539 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed documentation on historical and current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Conducted radiological walkover surveys of railroad tracks in both Areas 25 and 26. • Collected ballast and soil samples and calculated internal dose estimates for radiological releases. • Collected in situ thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements and calculated external dose estimates for radiological releases. • Removed lead bricks as potential source material (PSM) and collected verification samples. • Implemented corrective actions as necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Implemented an FFACO use restriction (UR) for radiological contamination at CAS 25-99-21. The approved UR form and map are provided in Appendix F and will be filed in the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Facility Information Management System; the FFACO database; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. From November 29, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: • At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. • At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed low-level radioactive waste. Wastes were disposed of in the appropriate onsite landfills. The NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is required at CAS 26-99-05. • Closure in place is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A UR is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 539. • Corrective Action Unit 539 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Remediation Residential Properties Contaminated with LLRW as Part of the Port Hope Area Initiative - The Importance of Effective Community Consultation - 18591

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a community-based solution for the long-term management of historic low level radioactive waste (LLRW) resulting from 60 years of uranium and radium processing operations in the urban setting of Port Hope, Ontario. The Eldorado refinery, on the shores of Lake Ontario, began refining radium-226 from pitchblende ore, later transitioning to the refining of uranium ore. Process residues were deposited at the Welcome Waste Management Facility in the Municipality of Port Hope until the mid-1950's switching to the Port Granby Waste Management Facility (PGWMF), which continued to accept waste until the late 1980's. Within the community of Port Hope, surveys are being conducted at approximately 4800 individual properties to identify the presence of LLRW resulting from fugitive emissions from the refinery and/or the use of refinery residue as construction backfill within the community. Identification of the presence of LLRW is based on multiple lines of evidence including reviews of historical information, gamma radiation surveys and physical sampling of soil for the presence of four signature contaminants. Of the 4800 properties being surveyed, it is expected that approximately 10% will contain some degree of LLRW requiring physical remediation. Many of the residences requiring remediation will require extensive soil removal, removal and restoration of outbuildings, fences and other structures, and the removal of mature trees, hedges and decorative gardens. For the property owners involved this phase represents the final and most intrusive aspect of the program. As such, the remedial designs must be sensitive to the needs of the community and individual property owners taking into consideration factors such as the need to minimize the disturbance to the neighborhood; maintaining geotechnical and structural stability of homes during excavations; removal and restoration of outbuildings affected by LLRW; removal and replacement of landscaping features (decks, fences, pools etc) and mature trees; radiation protection during earthworks; control of dust and noise; and maintaining safe access by residents. As Community satisfaction is a key metric for the success of the project, constant and effective communication at all stages of the project is necessary to ensure the residents understand the nature and extent of work to be undertaken; any and all inconveniences they can expect during the work; contingencies to deal with those inconveniences (e.g. parking, garbage collection etc); measures to protect their health and safety; scheduling; and what their property will look like at the completion of works. This paper provides an overview of the residential remediation program in Port Hope and describes the consultation efforts with property owners that are integral to the development of final designs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SHARP-Net: Platform for Self-Healing and Attack Resilient PMU Networks

Synchrophasor technology plays a pivotal role in developing the next generation of wide-area monitoring, protection, and control in the smart grid environment. As technology and communications infrastructures evolve, however, so do the attack surfaces in the synchrophasor network that can be exploited by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors to affect power system stability and reliability. In this paper, we propose a novel platform for developing a self-healing and attack-resilient PMU network (SHARP-Net) by instituting a state-of-the-art intrusion detection system (IDS) with an intrusion mitigation system (IMS) and an alert management system (AMS). In particular, the proposed platform detects anomalies during cyberattacks on phasor data concentrators (PDCs) based on the rules defined in the IDS, then the generated alerts are published to the IMS through the AMS. The proposed IMS proceeds to take automated corrective responses to mitigate cyberattacks by reconfiguring the synchrophasor network to isolate the compromised PDCs, and it orchestrates new PDCs to prevent the future propagation of attacks. Further, the IMS restores the system's observability by reconnecting the new PDCs to make the grid attack-resilient. In this work, the SHARP-Net platform is developed by using Python-based libraries, minimega's software-defined network, and virtual machine orchestration. We implement and validate the proposed SHARP-Net architecture by testing a PMU network in the smart grid environment. SHARP-Net showed promising performance in detecting cyberattacks and mitigating them through the network reconfiguration.

computer architecture↗

Strengthening Cybersecurity for Industrial Control Systems: Innovations in Protecting PLC-Based Infrastructure

In this paper, we propose two new approaches aimed at enhancing the security of industrial control systems (ICS) that utilize programmable logic controllers (PLCs) for the control of critical processes. The first approach involves the addition of a unique digital watermark to the PWM control that adjusts the motor speed to control the critical process. This enables efficient detection and identification of any unauthorized modifications to the sensor signals responsible for controlling the plant. The second approach focuses on monitoring the input current (i.e power) drawn by the PLC during the execution of critical process control tasks. Malicious intrusions to change the PLC parameters and/or unauthorized firmware updates can be rapidly detected. Both approaches demonstrate a substantial improvement in the security of ICS, effectively safeguarding against potential cyber-attacks. Experimental results from a laboratory scale water tank level controlled via PLC showcases rapid intrusion detection capabilities.

Huang, Peng-Hao↗

Linear functional minimization for inverse modeling

In this paper, we present a novel inverse modeling strategy to estimate spatially distributed parameters of nonlinear models. The maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimators of these parameters are based on a likelihood functional, which contains spatially discrete measurements of the system parameters and spatiotemporally discrete measurements of the transient system states. The piecewise continuity prior for the parameters is expressed via Total Variation (TV) regularization. The MAP estimator is computed by minimizing a nonquadratic objective equipped with the TV operator. We apply this inversion algorithm to estimate hydraulic conductivity of a synthetic confined aquifer from measurements of conductivity and hydraulic head. The synthetic conductivity field is composed of a low-conductivity heterogeneous intrusion into a high-conductivity heterogeneous medium. Our algorithm accurately reconstructs the location, orientation, and extent of the intrusion from the steady-state data only. Finally, addition of transient measurements of hydraulic head improves the parameter estimation, accurately reconstructing the conductivity field in the vicinity of observation locations.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Potential Chemical Impacts of CO2 Leakage on Underground Source of Drinking Water Assessed by Quantitative Risk Analysis

Many geologic carbon storage site options include not only excellent storage reservoirs bounded by effective seal layers, but also Underground Sources of Drinking Water (USDWs). An effective risk assessment and mitigation plan provides maximum protection for USDWs, to respect not only current policy but also to accommodate likely future USDW-specific regulatory protections. The goal of this study is to quantify possible risks to USDWs, specifically risks associated with chemical impacts on USDWs. Reactive transport models involve tremendous computational expense. Therefore, a secondary purpose of this study is to develop, calibrate and test reduced order models specifically for assessing risks of USDW chemical impacts by CO2 leakage from a storage reservoir. In order to achieve these goals, a geochemical model was developed to interpret changes in water chemistry following CO2 intrusion. A response surface methodology (RSM) based on these geochemical simulations was used to quantify associated risks. The case study example for this analysis is the Ogallala aquifer overlying the Farnsworth unit (FWU), an active commercial-scale CO2-enhanced oil recovery field. Specific objectives of this study include: (1) to understand how CO2 leakage is likely to influence geochemical processes in aquifer sediments; (2) to quantify potential risks to the Ogallala groundwater aquifer due to CO2 leakage from the FWU oil reservoir; and (3) to identify water chemistry factors for early detection criteria. Results indicate that the leakage rate would most likely range between 10-14 – 10-10 kg/(m2·year) for typical and likely leakage pathway permeability ranges. Within this range of CO2 leakage rate, groundwater quality is not likely to be significantly impacted. The worst-case scenario yields trace metal concentrations approximately twice as much as the initial value, but these predicted concentrations are still less than one-fifth of regulation-stipulated maximum contamination levels and do not exceed the no-impact thresholds. Finally, the results of this analysis suggest that pH may be an effective geochemical indicator of CO2 leakage.

CO2 leakage, USDWs, Groundwater quality, Risk anal↗

Status Report for Development of Advanced Process Monitoring Concepts for IAEA Safeguards Sponsored by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)

Process monitoring (PM) is used in international safeguards as an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). For large throughput nuclear facilities such as commercial spent fuel reprocessing plants, it is difficult to satisfy the lAEA's goal for detection probability using NMA alone. And, for an facilities, regardless of their throughput, PM can provide redundant verification for both NMA and containment and surveillance and can be used to detect abnormal plant operation through the use of IAEA's instrumentation and selected operator's process control instrumentation. Examples of PM include (1) continuity of knowledge of nuclear material flows and inventories by monitoring of tank solution levels in reprocessing plants, (2) load cell monitoring of cylinders in GCEPs, (3) thermal power monitoring of large research reactors to detect undeclared operation, and (4) providing data to enable frequent NMA-like evaluation (near-real-time-accounting), which involves a hybrid of NMA and PM, for many facility types. Sensors required for PM include for example sensors for measuring flow, volume, density, level, temperature, and other diverse sensors such as portal monitors, video cameras, motion detectors, and gamma and neutron detectors. Additionally, PM lends itself to remote and/or unattended monitoring which has the potential to reduce the IAEA inspection burden and intrusiveness to the operator.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The role of science supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

The presentation briefly addresses three topics. First, science has played an important role throughout the history of the WIPP project, beginning with site selection in the middle 1970s. Science was a key part of site characterization in the 1980s, providing basic information on geology, hydrology, geochemisty, and the mechanical behavior of the salt, among other topics. Science programs also made significant contributions to facility design, specifically in the area of shaft seal design and testing. By the middle 1990s, emphasis shifted from site characterization to regulatory evaluations, and the science program provided one of the essential bases for certification by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1998. Current science activities support ongoing disposal operations and regulatory recertification evaluations mandated by the EPA. Second, the EPA regulatory standards for long-term performance frame the scientific evaluations that provide the basis for certification. Unlike long-term dose standards applied to Yucca Mountain and proposed repositories in other nations, the WIPP regulations focused on cumulative releases during a fixed time interval of 10,000 years, and placed a high emphasis on the consequences of future inadvertent drilling intrusions into the repository. Close attention to the details of the regulatory requirements facilitated EPA's review of the DOE's 1996 Compliance Certification Application. Third, the scientific understanding developed for WIPP provided the basis for modeling studies that evaluated the long-term performance of the repository in the context of regulatory requirements. These performance assessment analyses formed a critical part of the demonstration that the site met the specific regulatory requirements as well as providing insight into the overall understanding of the long-term performance of the system. The presentation concludes with observations on the role of science in the process of developing a disposal system, including the importance of establishing the regulatory framework, building confidence in the long-term safety of the system, and the critical role of the regulator in decision making.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TH-A-12A-01: Medical Physicist's Role in Digital Information Security: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Best Practices

I. Information Security Background (Speaker = Kevin McDonald) Evolution of Medical Devices Living and Working in a Hostile Environment Attack Motivations Attack Vectors Simple Safety Strategies Medical Device Security in the News Medical Devices and Vendors Summary II. Keeping Radiation Oncology IT Systems Secure (Speaker = Bruce Curran) Hardware Security Double-lock Requirements “Foreign” computer systems Portable Device Encryption Patient Data Storage System Requirements Network Configuration Isolating Critical Devices Isolating Clinical Networks Remote Access Considerations Software Applications / Configuration Passwords / Screen Savers Restricted Services / access Software Configuration Restriction Use of DNS to restrict accesse. Patches / Upgrades Awareness Intrusion Prevention Intrusion Detection Threat Risk Analysis Conclusion Learning Objectives: Understanding how Hospital IT Requirements affect Radiation Oncology IT Systems. Illustrating sample practices for hardware, network, and software security. Discussing implementation of good IT security practices in radiation oncology. Understand overall risk and threats scenario in a networked environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Gasbuggy Site Assessment and Risk Evaluation

The Gasbuggy site is in northern New Mexico in the San Juan Basin, Rio Arriba County (Figure 1-1). The Gasbuggy experiment was designed to evaluate the use of a nuclear detonation to enhance natural gas production from the Pictured Cliffs Formation, a tight, gas-bearing sandstone formation. The 29-kiloton-yield nuclear device was placed in a 17.5-inch wellbore at 4,240 feet (ft) below ground surface (bgs), approximately 40 ft below the Pictured Cliffs/Lewis shale contact, in an attempt to force the cavity/chimney formed by the detonation up into the Pictured Cliffs Sandstone. The test was conducted below the southwest quarter of Section 36, Township 29 North, Range 4 West, New Mexico Principal Meridian. The device was detonated on December 10, 1967, creating a 335-ft-high chimney above the detonation point and a cavity 160 ft in diameter. The gas produced from GB-ER (the emplacement and reentry well) during the post-detonation production tests was radioactive and diluted, primarily by carbon dioxide. After 2 years, the energy content of the gas had recovered to 80 percent of the value of gas in conventionally developed wells in the area. There is currently no technology capable of remediating deep underground nuclear detonation cavities and chimneys. Consequently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must continue to manage the Gasbuggy site to ensure that no inadvertent intrusion into the residual contamination occurs. DOE has complete control over the 1/4 section (160 acres) containing the shot cavity, and no drilling is permitted on that property. However, oil and gas leases are on the surrounding land. Therefore, the most likely route of intrusion and potential exposure would be through contaminated natural gas or contaminated water migrating into a producing natural gas well outside the immediate vicinity of ground zero. The purpose of this report is to describe the current site conditions and evaluate the potential health risks posed by the most plausible contaminant exposure scenario, drilling of natural gas wells near the site. The results of this risk evaluation will guide DOE's future surveillance and monitoring activities in the area to ensure that site conditions are adequately protective of human health. This evaluation is not a comprehensive risk assessment for the site; it is intended to provide assurance that DOE's monitoring approach can detect the presence of site-related contamination at levels well below those that would pose an unacceptable risk to human health.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Detection and response to unauthorized access to a communication device

A communication gateway consistent with the present disclosure may detect unauthorized physical or electronic access and implement security actions in response thereto. A communication gateway may provide a communication path to an intelligent electronic device (IED) using an IED communications port configured to communicate with the IED. The communication gateway may include a physical intrusion detection port and a network port. The communication gateway may further include control logic configured to evaluate physical intrusion detection signal. The control logic may be configured to determine that the physical intrusion detection signal is indicative of an attempt to obtain unauthorized access to one of the communication gateway, the IED, and a device in communication with the gateway; and take a security action based upon the determination that the indication is indicative of the attempt to gain unauthorized access.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

241-AY-102 Leak detection pit drain line visual inspection - 15678

In October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS) determined that waste had leaked into the annulus of Tank 241-AY-102. WRPS conducted an extensive review of Tank AY-102 and increased both inspection and monitoring of the tank; however, the precise cause and location of the leak could not be determined. In parallel with the leak in the primary tank, the Tank AY-102 leak detection pit (LDP) was accumulating water through the drain system external to the secondary tank liner. Liquid collecting in the LDP is suspected to be from water intrusion and collects at a rate such that the LDP must be pumped routinely. Following a routine pumping event on June 20, 2013, elevated radiation dose rates were noted on the transfer hose and surface contamination readings were found on the transfer pump when it was removed from the Tank AY-102 LDP. These two field readings suggested that tank waste from a secondary liner breach could be leaking into the LDP. As a result, WRPS initiated a plan to ascertain the integrity of the secondary tank liner including a robotic inspection of the LDP. To perform the robotic visual inspection, a custom robotic crawler with a deployment device was designed, built, and operated by IHI Southwest for WRPS to inspect the 6 in (152 mm) leak detection pit drain line. To ensure success when deployed in the field, the inspection equipment was demonstrated at both the IHI facility in Denver, Colorado, and the Hanford Site using full scale piping mockups. On November 20, 2013 WRPS inspected the 6 in (152 mm) diameter drain line. The deployment device successfully attached to the drain line, and the crawler entered the drain line and traversed to within approximately 7 ft (2.1 m) of the central sump located under the center of the tank before losing traction. Crawler performance was satisfactory, and the quality of the camera image and lighting provided sufficient detail to document the current condition of the visible regions of the pipe. The inspection showed that the majority of the drain line was dry. Two wet areas were observed, a portion of the line nearest the LDP and a portion near the center of the tank. The portion nearest the LDP was under water prior to pumping on November 14, 2013. Although sediment and debris were seen during the inspection, it is believed to be construction debris and corrosion products. No material was found in the inspection that looked like tank waste or the material seen in the Tank AY-102 annulus (i.e., no greenish or yellowish deposits or dark fluids, dried salt deposits, or crystalline material). The contamination levels seen on the crawler were consistent with past values seen on LDP pumping equipment. Sampling and analysis of the recovered residues from the crawlers did not find material consistent with tank waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review of Intrusion Detection Methods and Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

Recent trends in the growth of distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric grid and newfound malware frameworks that target internet of things (IoT) devices is driving an urgent need for more reliable and effective methods for intrusion detection and prevention. Cybersecurity intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are responsible for detecting threats by monitoring and analyzing network data, which can originate either from networking equipment or end-devices. Creating intrusion detection systems for PV/DER networks is a challenging undertaking because of the diversity of the attack types and intermittency and variability in the data. Distinguishing malicious events from other sources of anomalies or system faults is particularly difficult. New approaches are needed that not only sense anomalies in the power system but also determine causational factors for the detected events. In this report, a range of IDS approaches were summarized along with their pros and cons. Using the review of IDS approaches and subsequent gap analysis for application to DER systems, a preliminary hybrid IDS approach to protect PV/DER communications is formed in the conclusion of this report to inform ongoing and future research regarding the cybersecurity and resilience enhancement of DER systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Performance Assessment Results for the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility - 19134

In 2014, the US DOE Office of River Protection and its contractors began to develop a performance assessment for the near-surface disposal of low-level and mixed low-level waste at the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility. The Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility is a doubly-lined landfill that was constructed between 2004 and 2006 to be the disposal facility for the vitrified low-activity waste containers that will be produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The disposal facility is also expected to receive solid secondary waste produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant and other solid wastes from site activities. The constructed facility is awaiting authorization to receive waste. Although no waste destined for the facility is currently being generated, operations cannot begin until the facility has received a Disposal Authorization Statement from US DOE and a permit modification from the State of Washington Department of Ecology. Both the Disposal Authorization Statement and permit modification require a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for the next 1,000 to 10,000 years. Based on the analyses presented in the Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment, US DOE issued a conditional Disposal Authorization Statement for the facility in June 2018. Demonstrating the long-term performance of the facility to be protective of human health and the environment was evaluated under the requirements of US DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Computer simulations were performed to evaluate whether or not the disposal facility would comply with the performance objectives specified in the order. The evaluation was performed using numerical models to simulate source term releases from vitrified and cement-based waste forms. Source term releases were subsequently transported through an air pathway and a groundwater pathway to a point of compliance 100 meters from the disposed of waste. In addition, an analysis evaluating the consequences of an inadvertent intrusion into the waste was also performed. In accordance with US DoE's technical standard for performance assessments, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate that the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility, together with the engineered features of the waste forms and natural features of the selected site, provides a reasonable expectation that the low-level waste and mixed low-level waste disposal will meet the radiological performance objectives established by US DOE. Post-closure doses to future members of the public were evaluated after the time of closure and included a 100-year period of institutional controls that limited exposure immediately following closure of the facility. Calculated doses to a future member of the public from the air pathway were below the 100 μSv/yr dose performance objective. Calculated doses to a future member of the public from all exposure pathways, including the air pathway and the groundwater pathway, were below the 250 μSv/yr dose performance objective. Doses following an inadvertent intrusion into the facility after the institutional control period were below the 5 mSv acute dose performance measure and the 1 mSv/yr chronic dose performance measure. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review: Safe and sustainable groundwater supply in China

Exploitation of groundwater has greatly increased since the 1970s to meet the increased water demand due to fast economic development in China. Correspondingly, the regional groundwater level has declined substantially in many areas of China. Water sources are scarce in northern and northwestern China, and the anthropogenic pollution of groundwater has worsened the situation. Groundwater containing high concentrations of geogenic arsenic, fluoride, iodine, and salinity is widely distributed across China, which has negatively affected safe supply of water for drinking and other purposes. In addition to anthropogenic contamination, the interactions between surface water and groundwater, including seawater intrusion, have caused deterioration of groundwater quality. The ecosystem and geo-environment have been severely affected by the depletion of groundwater resources. Land subsidence due to excessive groundwater withdrawal has been observed in more than 50 cities in China, with a maximum accumulated subsidence of 2–3 m. Groundwater-dependent ecosystems are being degraded due to changes in the water table or poor groundwater quality. This paper reviews these changes in China, which have occurred under the impact of rapid economic development. The effects of economic growth on groundwater systems should be monitored, understood and predicted to better protect and manage groundwater resources for the future.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗