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The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) is a computational model used to help quantify the medical component of spaceflight medical risk.
Extending the seven-day Shuttle Orbiter baseline mission requires an evaluation of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) System in order to determine those changes necessary or desirable so that the Orbiter payload capability will not be seriously compromised. The ECLSS requirements and subsystem options for extended duration Orbiter missions are defined. Each major ECLS subsystem was examined, and potential methods of extending the mission capability were studied. The mission evaluated most extensively for this effort was a 30 day mission with a crew size of seven men. However, missions up to 90 days duration with crew sizes of three to ten men were also examined.
A skill requirement definition method was applied to the problem of determining, at an early stage in system/mission definition, the skills required of on-orbit crew personnel whose activities will be related to the conduct or support of earth-orbital research. The experiment data base was selected from proposed experiments in NASA's Earth Orbital Research and Application Investigation program as related to space shuttle missions, specifically those being considered for sortie lab. Activities during the study, include identification of basic functions dealing with man's research and/or servicing activities on orbit. A crew function taxonomy was prepared relative to these activities. Likely candidate experiments for shuttle sortie missions were selected through extensive review of experiment and mission descriptions. Crew functions and tasks were initially identified for more than fifty representative earth orbital experiments, and a comprehensive task analysis was conducted on these tasks for selected payloads.
Platinum resistance thermometers (PRTs) provide accurate temperature measurements over a wide temperature range and are used extensively on space missions due to their simplicity and linearity. A standard on spacecraft, PRTs are used to provide precision temperature control and vehicle health assessment. This paper reviews the extensive reliability testing of platinum resistor thermometer sensors (PRTs) and bonding methods used on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission and for the upcoming Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) mission. During the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) mission, several key, JPL-packaged PRTs failed on those rovers prior to and within 1-Sol of landing due to thermally induced stresses. Similar failures can be traced back to other JPL missions dating back thirty years. As a result, MSL sought out a PRT more forgiving to the packaging configurations used at JPL, and extensively tested the Honeywell HRTS-5760-B-U-0-12 sensor to successfully demonstrate suitable robustness to thermal cycling. Specifically, this PRT was cycled 2,000 times, simulating three Martian winters and summers. The PRTs were bonded to six substrate materials (Aluminum 7050, treated Magnesium AZ231-B, Stainless Steel 304, Albemet, Titanium 6AL4V, and G-10), using four different aerospace adhesives--two epoxies and two silicones--that conformed to MSL's low out-gassing requirements. An additional epoxy was tested in a shorter environmental cycling test, when the need for a different temperature range adhesive was necessary for mobility and actuator hardware late in the fabrication process. All of this testing, along with electrostatic discharge (ESD) and destructive part analyses, demonstrate that this PRT is highly robust, and not subject to the failure of PRTs on previous missions. While there were two PRTs that failed during fabrication, to date there have been no in-flight PRT failures on MSL, including those on the Curiosity rover. Since MSL, the sensor has gone through a change in construction such that the manufacturer significantly restricts the minimum temperature. However, significant subsequent testing was performed with this new version of the part to show that it indeed is still robust to at least Mars minimum temperatures of -135(sup o)C. The additional completed testing will be described. This work has resulted in a successful sensor package qualification and a reliable bonding method suitable for use over large temperature extremes.
Platinum resistance thermometers (PRTs) provide accurate temperature measurements over a wide temperature range and are used extensively on space missions due to their simplicity and linearity. A standard on spacecraft, PRTs are used to provide precision temperature control and vehicle health assessment. This paper reviews the extensive reliability testing of platinum resistor thermometer sensors (PRTs) and bonding methods used on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission and for the upcoming Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) mission. During the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) mission, several key, JPL-packaged PRTs failed on those rovers prior to and within 1-Sol of landing due to thermally induced stresses. Similar failures can be traced back to other JPL missions dating back thirty years. As a result, MSL sought out a PRT more forgiving to the packaging configurations used at JPL, and extensively tested the Honeywell HRTS-5760-B-U-0-12 sensor to successfully demonstrate suitable robustness to thermal cycling. Specifically, this PRT was cycled 2,000 times, simulating three Martian winters and summers. The PRTs were bonded to six substrate materials (Aluminum 7050, treated Magnesium AZ231-B, Stainless Steel 304, Albemet, Titanium 6AL4V, and G-10), using four different aerospace adhesives--two epoxies and two silicones--that conformed to MSL's low out-gassing requirements. An additional epoxy was tested in a shorter environmental cycling test, when the need for a different temperature range adhesive was necessary for mobility and actuator hardware late in the fabrication process. All of this testing, along with electrostatic discharge (ESD) and destructive part analyses, demonstrate that this PRT is highly robust, and not subject to the failure of PRTs on previous missions. While there were two PRTs that failed during fabrication, to date there have been no in-flight PRT failures on MSL, including those on the Curiosity rover. Since MSL, the sensor has gone through a change in construction such that the manufacturer significantly restricts the minimum temperature. However, significant subsequent testing was performed with this new version of the part to show that it indeed is still robust to at least Mars minimum temperatures of -135 degrees Centigrade. The additional completed testing will be described. This work has resulted in a successful sensor package qualification and a reliable bonding method suitable for use over large temperature extremes
The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) was originally under development to provide crew transport to the International Space Station after the retirement of the Space Shuttle, and to provide a means for the eventual return of astronauts to the Moon. With the current changes in the future direction of the United States human exploration programs, the focus of the Orion project has shifted to the project s first orbital flight test, designated Orion Flight Test 1 (OFT-1). The OFT-1 is currently planned for launch in July 2013 and will demonstrate the Orion vehicle s capability for performing missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), as well as extensibility beyond LEO for select, critical areas. Among the key flight test objectives are those related to validation of the re-entry aerodynamic and aerothermal environments, and the performance of the thermal protection system (TPS) when exposed to these environments. A specific flight test trajectory has been selected to provide a high energy entry beyond that which would be experienced during a typical low Earth orbit return, given the constraints imposed by the possible launch vehicles. This trajectory resulted from a trade study that considered the relative benefit of conflicting objectives from multiple subsystems, and sought to provide the maximum integrated benefit to the re-entry state-of-the-art. In particular, the trajectory was designed to provide: a significant, measureable radiative heat flux to the windward surface; data on boundary transition from laminar to turbulent flow; and data on catalytic heating overshoot on non-ablating TPS. In order to obtain the necessary flight test data during OFT-1, the vehicle will need to have an adequate quantity of instrumentation. A collection of instrumentation is being developed for integration in the OFT-1 TPS. In part, this instrumentation builds upon the work performed for the Mars Science Laboratory Entry, Descent and Landing Instrument (MEDLI) suite to instrument the OFT-1 ablative heat shield. The MEDLI integrated sensor plugs and pressure sensors will be adapted for compatibility with the Orion TPS design. The sensor plugs will provide in-depth temperature data to support aerothermal and TPS model correlation, and the pressure sensors will provide a flush air data system for validation of the entry and descent aerodynamic environments. In addition, a radiometer design will be matured to measure the radiative component of the reentry heating at two locations on the heat shield. For the back shell, surface thermocouple and pressure port designs will be developed and applied which build upon the heritage of the Space Shuttle Program for instrumentation of reusable surface insulation (RSI) tiles. The quantity and location of the sensors has been determined to balance the needs of the reentry disciplines with the demands of the hardware development, manufacturing and integration. Measurements which provided low relative value and presented significant engineering development effort were, unfortunately, eliminated. The final TPS instrumentation has been optimized to target priority test objectives. The data obtained will serve to provide a better understanding of reentry environments for the Orion capsule design, reduce margins, and potentially reduce TPS mass or provide TPS extensibility for alternative missions.
Turnaround requirements for the manned orbital transfer vehicle (MOTV) baseline and alternate concepts with and without a space operations center (SOC) are defined. Manned orbital transfer vehicle maintenance, refurbishment, resupply, and refueling are considered as well as the most effective combination of ground based and space based turnaround activities. Ground and flight operations requirements for abort are identified as well as low cost approaches to space and ground operations through maintenance and missions sensitivity studies. The recommended turnaround mix shows that space basing MOTV at SOC with periodic return to ground for overhaul results in minimum recurring costs. A pressurized hangar at SOC reduces labor costs by approximately 50%.
The primary change in crew capsule definition is a smaller MOTV crew capsule, switching from a 3-man capsule to a 2-man capsule. A second change permitted crew accommodations for sleeping and privacy to be combined with the flight station. The current baseline DRM, ER1, requires 2 men for 3 to 4 days to repair a multi-disciplined GOE Platform and a modest amount of mission dedicated hardware. A 2-man MOTV crew capsule to be used as a design reference point for the OTV, and its interfaces between the STS and other associated equipment or facilities are described in detail. The functional capabilities of the 2-man capsule, as well as its application to a wide range of generic missions, is also presented. The MOTV turnaround is addressed and significant requirements for both space based and ground based scenarios are summarized.
The Cassini spacecraft is now in its second Saturn tour extension, the Solstice Mission. By emphasizing propellant preservation over minimizing maneuver cycles, the Cassini Project is meeting the challenge of mission completion in 2017. Since June 2012, 18 of 21 maneuvers were performed to closely maintain the prescribed trajectory, saving downstream propellant. These and other maneuvers during the third year of the Solstice Mission (June 2012 to August 2013) are highlighted in this paper: 31 planned maneuvers targeted to 11 Titan flybys and the last planned Rhea encounter. An assessment of the updated maneuver execution-error models will also be presented.
The NASA Vision for Space Exploration is focused on the return of astronauts to the Moon. While navigation systems have already been proven in the Apollo missions to the moon, the current exploration campaign will involve more extensive and extended missions requiring new concepts for lunar navigation. In contrast to Apollo missions, which were limited to the near-side equatorial region of the moon, missions under the Exploration Systems Initiative will require navigation on the moon's limb and far-side. As these regions have poor Earth visibility, a navigation system comprised solely of Earth-based tracking stations will not provide adequate navigation solutions in these areas. In this paper, a Dilution of Precision (DoP) based analysis of the performance of a network of Moon orbiting satellites is provided. The analysis extends previous analysis of a Lunar Network (LN) of navigation satellites by providing an assessment of the capability associated with a variety of assumptions. These assumptions are with regard to the navigation receiver and satellite visibility. The assessment is accomplished by making appropriately formed estimates of DoP. Different adaptations of DoP (i.e., GDoP, PDoP, etc.) are associated with a different set of assumptions regarding augmentations to the navigation receiver or transceiver.
The NASA Vision for Space Exploration is focused on the return of astronauts to the Moon. While navigation systems have already been proven in the Apollo missions to the moon, the current exploration campaign will involve more extensive and extended missions requiring new concepts for lunar navigation. In this document, the results of an autonomous navigation error propagation assessment are provided. The analysis is intended to be the baseline error propagation analysis for which Earth-based and Lunar-based radiometric data are added to compare these different architecture schemes, and quantify the benefits of an integrated approach, in how they can handle lunar surface mobility applications when near the Lunar South pole or on the Lunar Farside.
The NASA Vision for Space Exploration is focused on the return of astronauts to the Moon. Although navigation systems have already been proven in the Apollo missions to the Moon, the current exploration campaign will involve more extensive and extended missions requiring new concepts for lunar navigation. In contrast to Apollo missions, which were limited to the near-side equatorial region of the Moon, those under the Exploration Systems Initiative will require navigation on the Moon's limb and far side. These regions are known to have poor Earth visibility, but unknown is the extent to which a navigation system comprised solely of Earth-based tracking stations will provide adequate navigation solutions in these areas. This report presents a dilution-of-precision (DoP)-based analysis of the performance of a network of Earth-based assets. This analysis extends a previous analysis of a lunar network (LN) of navigation satellites by providing an assessment of the capability associated with a variety of assumptions. These assumptions pertain to the minimum provider elevation angle, nadir and zenith beam widths, and a total single failure in one of the Earth-based assets. The assessment is accomplished by making appropriately formed estimates of DoP. Different adaptations of DoP, such as geometrical DoP and positional DoP (GDoP and PDoP), are associated with a different set of assumptions regarding augmentations to the navigation receiver or transceiver.
The NASA Vision for Space Exploration is focused on the return of astronauts to the Moon. Although navigation systems have already been proven in the Apollo missions to the Moon, the current exploration campaign will involve more extensive and extended missions requiring new concepts for lunar navigation. In contrast to Apollo missions, which were limited to the near-side equatorial region of the Moon, those under the Exploration Systems Initiative will require navigation on the Moon's limb and far side. Since these regions have poor Earth visibility, a navigation system comprised solely of Earth-based tracking stations will not provide adequate navigation solutions in these areas. In this report, a dilution-of-precision (DoP)-based analysis of the performance of a network of Moon orbiting satellites is provided. This analysis extends a previous analysis of a lunar network (LN) of navigation satellites by providing an assessment of the capability associated with a variety of assumptions. These assumptions pertain to the minimum surface user elevation angle and a total single satellite failure in the lunar network. The assessment is accomplished by making appropriately formed estimates of DoP. Different adaptations of DoP, such as geometric DoP and positional DoP (GDoP and PDoP), are associated with a different set of assumptions regarding augmentations to the navigation receiver or transceiver.
The NASA Vision for Space Exploration is focused on the return of astronauts to the Moon. While navigation systems have already been proven in the Apollo missions to the moon, the current exploration campaign will involve more extensive and extended missions requiring new concepts for lunar navigation. In contrast to Apollo missions, which were limited to the near-side equatorial region of the moon, missions under the Exploration Systems Initiative will require navigation on the moon's limb and far-side. As these regions have poor Earth visibility, a navigation system comprised solely of Earth-based tracking stations will not provide adequate navigation solutions in these areas. In this paper, a Dilution of Precision (DoP) based analysis of the performance of a network of Moon orbiting satellites is provided. The analysis extends previous analysis of a Lunar Network (LN) of navigation satellites by providing an assessment of the capability associated with a variety of assumptions. These assumptions are with regard to the navigation receiver and satellite visibility. The assessment is accomplished by making appropriately formed estimates of DoP. Different adaptations of DoP (i.e. GDoP, PDoP, etc.) are associated with a different set of assumptions regarding augmentations to the navigation receiver or transceiver. A significant innovation described in this paper is the "Generalized" Dilution of Precision. In the same sense that the various versions of DoP can be represented as a functional of the observability grammian, Generalized DoP is defined as a functional of the sum of observability grammians associated with a batch of radiometric measurements. Generalized DoP extends the DoP concept to cases in which radiometric range and range-rate measurements are integrated over time to develop an estimate of user position (referred to here as a 'dynamic' solution.) Generalized DoP allows for the inclusion of cases in which the receiver location is underdetermined when assessed in the usual 'kinematic' sense. The Generalized DoP concept is thereby a method to assess the navigation capability associated with constellations with sparse coverage. This alleviates the burden of performing a full "covariance analysis" for each point on the surface of the Moon.
The Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) discipline actively participates as a project member to achieve their common objective of full mission success while also providing an independent risk assessment to the Project Manager. The cornerstone element of MOA is the independent assessment of the risks the project faces in executing its mission. Especially as the project approaches critical mission events, it becomes imperative to clearly identify and assess the risks the project faces. This has been the paradigm for robotic space exploration missions, but does the same apply to commercial space operations? This is the question which is the driver for this year's MOA track at the 18th Annual Improving Space Operations workshop in April at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the question we examine in this paper. Corollaries to this driving question are why shouldn't MOA apply and are there factors beyond mission success with acceptable risk which apply to commercial space operations that are not present in government scientific missions? To address these questions, areas we focus on include risk (both mission and profit) management for commercial space operations and the practical extension of robotic mission MOA to commercial space operations. Another key area to look at is command file errors which are a major concern for deep space robotic missions, but can we worry about them less with manned missions or unmanned supply mission? Further, with the growing concern about space debris, we delve into the role of MOA relative to End-of-Mission activities. This paper examines these topics and in particular the perspectives presented at the workshop to begin charting the appropriate course for MOA in the emerging sector of Commercial Space Operations.
The NASA vision of exploration is focused on the return of astronauts to the Moon [1]. While navigation systems have already been proven in the Apollo missions to the moon, the current exploration campaign will involve more extensive and extended missions requiring new concepts for lunar navigation. In contrast to Apollo missions, which were limited to the near-side equatorial region of the moon, missions under the Exploration Systems Initiative will require navigation on the moon’s limb and far-side. As these regions have poor Earth visibility, a navigation system comprised solely of Earth-based tracking stations will not provide adequate navigation solutions in these areas. In this paper, a Dilution of Precision (DoP) based analysis of the performance of a network of Moon orbiting satellites is provided. The analysis extends previous analysis of a Lunar Network (LN) of navigation satellites by providing an assessment of the capability associated with a variety of assumptions regarding the navigation receiver and satellite visibility. The assessment is accomplished by making appropriately formed estimates of DoP, with different adaptations of DoP (i.e. GDoP, PDoP, etc.) being associated with a different set of assumptions regarding augmentations to the navigation receiver or transceiver A significant innovation described in this paper is the “Generalized” Dilution of Precision. In the same sense that the various versions of DoP can be represented as a functional of the observability grammian, Generalized DoP is defined as a functional of the sum of observability grammians associated with a batch of radiometric measurements. Generalized DoP extends the DoP concept to cases in which radiometric range and range-rate measurements are integrated over time to develop an estimate of user position (referred to here as a ‘dynamic’ solution.) Generalized DoP allows for the inclusion of cases in which the receiver location is underdetermined when assessed in the usual ‘kinematic’ sense. The Generalized DoP concept is thereby a method to assess the navigation capability associated with constellations with sparse coverage without the burden of performing a full “covariance analysis” for each point on the surface of the Moon.
Mars Express (MEX), the first planetary mission of the European Space Agency (ESA), reached Mars on December 25th 2003. Since then it is performing routine operations. Its operational phase had to cover one Martian year, with the possibility of an extension for a second Martian year (i.e. until November 2007). The end of the mission extension is approaching but, given the good health of the payload instruments and the high science return of the mission, there is a strong will to achieve further extensions. Mars Express is also seen as an important asset, capable to provide relay functions for future Martian missions. The ESA Science Program Committee has recently approved a second extension of the MEX mission until May 2009 and even further extensions are possible. Mars Express has an eccentric quasi-polar orbit with a period of approximately 6.72 hours and a pericentre height of about 300 km. Science observations are mainly performed at pericentre (but not only). In addition the orbit has a resonance of 11 revolutions per 3 Martian days. This means that ground tracks corresponding to orbits separated by 11 revolutions are adjacent, such that a given area can be covered by the on-board camera without leaving gaps. The J2 effect of Mars causes a drift of both ascending node and argument of pericentre. The drift of argument of pericentre makes it possible to observe periodically all Mars latitudes from close distance. Illumination conditions at pericentre are influenced by both the drift of the argument of pericentre and the drift of ascending node, as well as by the rotation of Mars around the Sun. The original MEX routine orbit was optimized for the duration of the nominal mission and extension, such that it produced a balanced share of day-side observations (for the optical instruments) and night-side observations (for the radar). The orbit was thus not optimized for the time beyond the assumed extension. Indeed, the evolution of the ascending node and argument of pericentre would cause in the following years a drift of the pericentre towards night-side observation conditions, hence uninteresting for the optical instruments. In order to prevent this an optimisation process for the future routine orbit has taken place. The share between day-side and night-side observations can be controlled by adjusting the drift of argument of pericentre and ascending node. This can in particular be achieved by changing the semimajor axis, eccentricity and/or inclination. A change of inclination is inefficient compared to a change in semimajor axis and eccentricity, and has therefore been discarded. An in-plane maneuvre can be performed to change both semi-major axis and eccentricity, and thus the period of the orbit. Although an apocentre manoeuvre is cheaper in terms of deltaV, it would result in raising the pericentre height, which is unfavourable for close observations. Hence a pericentre manoeuvre is proposed, which will increase the apocentre height. A repeat cycle is still required to allow mapping areas with adjacent ground tracks, so the change of semimajor axis must result in a new resonance. Resonances 18:5, 25:7 and 7:2 have been considered as potential candidates. The resulting long term evolution of the observation conditions has been analysed. Finally it has been decided to perform a change of orbit to reach the 18:5. Another aspect of the optimisation process is the control of the ground track. The previous MEX reference trajectory included regular maneuvres at every apocentre in order to adjust the orbital period, such that the separation of the ground tracks would be optimal, regardless of the latitude of pericentre. The implementation of the actual delatVs on-board was done partly by optimizing the attitude of reaction-wheel desaturation activities. Despite of it, this strategy has a significant propellant cost, because it prevents to optimize reaction wheel de-saturation activities to minimize propellant consumption. Therore, with the aim at preserving propellant resources for a long time extension it has been agreed to stop the ground-track control. This requires now a more accurate science operation planning, with improved attitude pointing control. Finally, the approach to phase Mars Express to provide back-up relay functions for NASA Phoenix landing is explained. In the context of the routine trajectory optimisation a new requirement for close fly-bys at Phobos, with different observation geometries, has been specified. The approach to fulfill this requirement is explained.
Drawing upon the extensive Soviet and Skylab medical observations, the need for artificial gravity (g) on a manned Mars mission is discussed. Little hard data derived from well done experiments exist. This dearth of information is primarily due to two factors. Inability to collect tissues from astronauts for ethical or operational reasons. Second, there was not opportunities to fly animals in space to systematically evaluate the extent of the problem, and to develop and then to prove the effectiveness of countermeasures. The Skylab and space station will provide the opportunity to study these questions and validate suggested solutions.