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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7

Cyber Physical Security (CPS) Extension to Air Traffic Management (ATM) Testbed

The Air Traffic Management (ATM) Testbed is being developed at NASA to enable benefit, impact, safety and cost assessments for accelerating the deployment of Concept and Technologies (C&T) in the National Airspace System (NAS). Today, C&T introduction into the NAS takes decades. The primary reason for this is an inability to assess the operational impact of the interaction between the proposed C&T and operationally deployed systems (Realistic Technologies) in terms of NAS-wide safety, traffic flow efficiency, roles and workload of controllers and traffic managers, and impact on airline fleet operations. Transition of C&T to operations requires mathematical modeling and simulation, Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) testing and shadow-mode evaluation driven by operational data. Whereas interaction with the operational system during testing and stages of deployment is not permissible due to safety concerns, it is certainly possible to create a simulation environment that closely mimics the NAS using the same operational systems/hardware for enabling such assessments. This presentation focuses on a proposed Cyber Physical Security extension to the ATM Testbed for creating a modeling and simulation architecture to study how well the Air Traffic Management system will perform and analyze effectiveness of mitigating security measures against particular cyber-attack scenarios.

Datta, Koushik↗

UV/Visible Telescope with Hubble Disposal

Submission Overview: Our primary objective is to convey a sense of the significant advances possible in astrophysics investigations for major Cosmic Origins COR program goals with a 2.4m telescope asset outfitted with one or more advanced UV visible instruments. Several compelling science objectives were identified based on community meetings these science objectives drove the conceptual design of instruments studied by the COR Program Office during July September 2012. This RFI submission encapsulates the results of that study, and suggests that a more detailed look into the instrument suite should be conducted to prove viability and affordability to support the demonstrated scientific value. This study was conducted in the context of a larger effort to consider the options available for a mission to dispose safely of Hubble hence, the overall architecture considered for the mission we studied for the 2.4m telescope asset included resource sharing. This mitigates combined cost and risk and provides naturally for a continued US leadership role in astrophysics with an advanced, general-purpose UV visible space telescope.

Benford, Dominic J.↗

Failure Modes and Mitigation Strategies for a Turboelectric Aircraft Concept with Turbine Electrified Energy Management

The electrification of gas turbine engines represents a major step-change in aircraft propulsion systems commonly known as Electrified Aircraft Propulsion (EAP). EAP involves the integration of electric machines potentially functioning as generators for large scale power extraction, as motors providing electrical augmentation of the engine spools, and even as a means of driving propulsors beyond the immediate scope of the engine. It may also include the use of energy storage. These and other characteristics of hybrid electric propulsion systems are relatively new to aircraft propulsion. The expanded propulsion architecture can be leveraged to improve propulsive efficiency and achieve better vehicle aerodynamics and controllability. It can also allow for additional benefits such as those enabled through Turbine Electrified Energy Management (TEEM). As the propulsion system and its functions expand, new failure modes are introduced. Due to the highly coupled nature of the propulsion system, failures could propagate throughout the system in ways that are unique to the new EAP architectures. To build confidence in the safety and practicality of EAP concepts, these failure modes need to be identified, explored, and addressed through mitigation strategies. This paper seeks to evaluate failure modes and failure mitigation strategies for the EAP concept known as the Single aisle Turboelectric AiRCaft with Aft Boundary Layer propulsor (STARC-ABL). The TEEM control concept is applied to improve transient operability. Several failure modes are considered and control based failure mitigation strategies are proposed with the goal of retaining operability and overall thrust. The results demonstrate the ability to maintain operability and a substantial amount of thrust in the event of various types of failures. Some challenges are also identified and discussed.

Turbine Electrified Energy Management↗

Demonstration of automated proximity and docking technologies

An autodock was demonstrated using straightforward techniques and real sensor hardware. A simulation testbed was established and validated. The sensor design was refined with improved optical performance and image processing noise mitigation techniques, and the sensor is ready for production from off-the-shelf components. The autonomous spacecraft architecture is defined. The areas of sensors, docking hardware, propulsion, and avionics are included in the design. The Guidance Navigation and Control architecture and requirements are developed. Modular structures suitable for automated control are used. The spacecraft system manager functions including configuration, resource, and redundancy management are defined. The requirements for autonomous spacecraft executive are defined. High level decisionmaking, mission planning, and mission contingency recovery are a part of this. The next step is to do flight demonstrations. After the presentation the following question was asked. How do you define validation? There are two components to validation definition: software simulation with formal and vigorous validation, and hardware and facility performance validated with respect to software already validated against analytical profile.

Anderson, Robert L.↗

Identification of Safety Metrics for Airport Surface Operations

A large fraction of safety incidents occurs on the ground during airport surface operations. Although these incidents are mostly non-fatal with a few exceptions, they are high profile incidents that remain a source of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), major airlines, and other stakeholders of the National Airspace System (NAS). These incidents have historically been mitigated by implementing changes to regulations, policies, and procedures over time. This approach has minimized but not eliminated the risk of occurrence of safety incidents. It is thus important to develop integrated techniques to assess, model, and prevent these incidents by analyzing the risk and likelihood of occurrence and communicating results of the analysis to decision-making personnel who can mitigate and prevent incidents in real time. The work presented in this paper builds on a previously developed architecture for safety, Real-Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM), to enable monitoring and prediction of the safety of the NAS. In the RTSM framework, hazards to flight are translated to safety metrics such as wake vortex encounters or loss of separation, that can be modeled and analyzed offline and also predicted and monitored in real time (online). The intent of this paper is to integrate predictable incidents that occur during surface and ground operations into the safety portfolio of the RTSM project by (i) identifying suitable information sources from which ground incidents can be studied, (ii) developing safety metrics correlated with surface operations, and (iii) recommending suitable data sources that can be quantified and used for the computation of pertinent safety metrics.

safety↗

Leverage Points for System Health Management of Autonomous Systems

Systems Health Management (SHM) is one of three basic functionalities that constitute an autonomous capability of a system. The other two functionalities are Planning & Scheduling, and Task Execution. In an autonomous system, variable autonomy is often distinct from variable authority to sense, decide, and act. There are quantifiable Levels of Autonomy that can be achieved by tuning different portions of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop to provide flexibility and control. This approach is tabulated for multiple domains such as spacecraft and aerial vehicles. Examining SHM through a Systems Thinking lens helps us understand its stocks and flows, loops, and delays. Systems thinking, and modeling, is a useful way to understand change and complexity of systems of many types. There are certain archetypes that underlie well-known autonomy architectures. And there often are leverage points - best places to intervene in a system - that can resolve or mitigate some fundamental challenges in the design and deployment of autonomous systems. I identify these levers and present the ones that have been successfully used in NASA missions.

Systems Thinking↗

Model-Driven Development of Safety Architectures

We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.

Safety case↗

Zero-Trust Architecture for Autonomous Edge Computing

We are at the apex of an aviation revolution where autonomy will play a central role in enabling complex, multi-agent systems to communicate, interact, and collaborate on a myriad of applications spanning autonomous swarms to wild-fire management. Autonomy is not an absolute but rather a spectrum ranging from a system requiring significant human intervention to one requiring little to none [1]. For example, the extreme, in the case of an autonomous aircraft, is one that operates independently in the airspace interacting with all other elements (air traffic controllers, other pilots) as if it were a human pilot. Critical to this vision is an architecture that enables autonomous agents to interact with minimal latency. Edge computing is an emerging architecture where compute and storage is pushed to the ‘edge’ of the network in order to minimize the round-trip time from agent to resource thereby mitigating the latency associated with cloud-only based approaches. Additionally, services can generate massive amounts of data (e.g., video feeds), which may require analysis in near real-time. Moving this data to the cloud for further processing may not be feasible due to latency, bandwidth, and cost. Privacy, security, and reliability can also be improved by edge computing architectures. However, this geo-distributed and dynamic* architecture complicates the establishment of unambiguous network security boundaries and can lead to vulnerabilities including man in the middle attacks, replay attacks, physical security breaches of edge nodes, signal interception, etc. This motivates the need for zero-trust architectures [2–4] which de-emphasize the notion of static network perimeters and, as the name implies, do not instill any innate trust in any particular agent. It is required that all agents must be authorized and approved in every transaction. In this paper, we present a zero-trust architecture suitable for edge-computing applications that demand significant low-latency, security, privacy, and reliability.

zero trust↗

The Trailblazer Program

This paper presents the "Three Pillars of Success" for the Trailblazer Program. The topics include: 1) The "Rocket Equation" for SSTO (Single Stage To Orbit); 2) The Rocket I* Barrier; 3) Rocket-Based Combined-Cycle Engine; 4) Potential for Reusability; 5) Factors Mitigating RBCC Performance; 6) The "Trailblazer" Program; 7) Trailblazer Performance Goals; 8) Trailblazer Reference Vehicle; and 9) Trailblazer Program Architecture.

Trefney, Charles J.↗

Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission Space Suit and EVA System Architecture Trade Study

This paper discusses the Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission (ARCM) space suit and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) architecture trade study and the current state of the work to mature the requirements and products to the mission concept review level. The mission requirements and the resulting concept of operations will be discussed. A historical context will be presented as to present the similarities and differences from previous NASA missions. That will set the stage for the trade study where all options for both pressure garment and life support were considered. The rationale for the architecture decisions will then be presented. Since the trade study did identity risks, the subsequent tests and analyses that mitigated the risks will be discussed. Lastly, the current state of the effort will be provided.

Bowie, Jonathan T.↗

Application of Micro-thrusters for Space Observatory Precision Attitude Control

This paper describes the results of a NASA investigation into the benefits of micro-thrusters compared to reaction wheels on future observatory-class missions with tight pointing stability requirements. Pointing repeatability and stability (i.e., jitter) requirements are key for space telescope missions of the future. For example, managing jitter is essential to being able to “image” planets orbiting distant stars. Jitter requirements for missions in this class are difficult to meet with current reaction wheel-based architectures. The reaction wheels are typically the largest pointing disturbance on the spacecraft. Disturbances from reaction wheels can be mitigated, typically by mechanically isolating the wheels, which imposes system complexity and cost. Thrusters capable of thrust forces in the micronewton (μN) range (referred to as micro-thrusters or micronewton thrusters) have been developed to support the Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) mission, which requires drag-free control to place a test mass in near-perfect free-fall Beyond the drag-free control application, micro-thrusters could be used as a substitute for reaction wheels or as a supplement to wheels for fine pointing control. Used in this fashion, micro-thrusters have potential for reducing the cost and technical risks of achieving demanding pointing stability performance on observatory-class missions.

Chiang, Richard Y.↗

Orion GNC Mitigation Efforts for Van Allen Radiation

The Orion Crew Module (CM) is NASA's next generation manned space vehicle, scheduled to return humans to lunar orbit in the coming decade. The Orion avionics and GN&C architectures have progressed through a number of project phases and are nearing completion of a major milestone. The first unmanned test mission, dubbed "Exploration Flight Test One" (EFT-1) is scheduled to launch from NASA Kennedy Space Center late next year and provides the first integrated test of all the vehicle systems, avionics and software. The EFT-1 mission will be an unmanned test flight that includes a high speed re-entry from an elliptical orbit, which will be launched on an expendable launch vehicle (ELV). The ELV will place CM and the ELV upper stage into a low Earth orbit (LEO) for one revolution. After the first LEO, the ELV upper stage will re-ignite and place the combined upper stage/CM into an elliptical orbit whose perigee results in a high energy entry to test CM response in a relatively high velocity, high heating environment. While not producing entry velocities as high as those experienced in returning from a lunar orbit, the trajectory was chosen to provide higher stresses on the thermal protection and guided entry systems, as compared against a lower energy LEO entry. However the required entry geometry with constraints on inclination and landing site result in a trajectory that lingers for many hours in the Van Allen radiation belts. This exposes the vehicle and avionics to much higher levels of high energy proton radiation than a typical LEO or lunar trajectory would encounter. As a result, Van Allen radiation poses a significant risk to the Orion avionics system, and particularly the Flight Control Module (FCM) computers that house the GN&C flight software. The measures taken by the Orion GN&C, Flight Software and Avionics teams to mitigate the risks associated with the Van Allen radiation on EFT-1 are covered in the paper. Background on the Orion avionics subsystem is provided, as well as an overview of the GN&C software architecture. The measures taken to handle radiation induced failure of the one or both of the FCM's are presented, and finally simulation and actual hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) results are shown confirming the validity of the implementation. The paper presents an overview of the Orion avionics architecture describing the GNC sensors, onboard data network as well as the flight control computers and their planned restart capabilities. GN&C sensors include two Orion Inertial Measurement Units (OIMU's), a Vision Processing Unit (VPU) to process camera images, three barometric altimeters and a single GPS receiver. All of the sensors communicate to one of two Power and Data Units (PDU's). The PDU's multiplex analog and serial data from the sensors and write the data to the Orion Data Network (ODN). The OIMU s write measurement messages directly as onto the ODN, but they are routed through PDU network switches.

King, Ellis T.↗

QSPIN: A High Level Java API for Quantum Computing Experimentation

QSPIN is a high level Java language API for experimentation in QC models used in the calculation of Ising spin glass ground states and related quadratic unconstrained binary optimization (QUBO) problems. The Java API is intended to facilitate research in advanced QC algorithms such as hybrid quantum-classical solvers, automatic selection of constraint and optimization parameters, and techniques for the correction and mitigation of model and solution errors. QSPIN includes high level solver objects tailored to the D-Wave quantum annealing architecture that implement hybrid quantum-classical algorithms [Booth et al.] for solving large problems on small quantum devices, elimination of variables via roof duality, and classical computing optimization methods such as GPU accelerated simulated annealing and tabu search for comparison. A test suite of documented NP-complete applications ranging from graph coloring, covering, and partitioning to integer programming and scheduling are provided to demonstrate current capabilities.

Quantu↗

Technological and Medical Human Health and Well-Being Options in Deep Space

Zeroth order, maintenance of human health requires supportive protection from the hazards of space, including supplying breathable air, comfortable temperatures, a supportive diet/nutrition, radiation protection, and sufficient gravity to avoid the combinatorial impacts of such effecting human operability and health. Spacecraft operability must be “fail-safe” to ensure these basic human life support conditions are maintained throughout the mission and the mission(s) must be affordable. There are known effects and unknowns effects regarding aspects of human health for Mars duration missions. Mars has the order of a third g. We have no data regarding the health impacts of this on humans or the combinatorial effects associated with 45% GCR on the Martian surface over time. There is a suspicion that if humans survive such conditions over long times they will evolve to living at reduced g and become “Martians”. Cascading failures and subcritical degradations in systems of systems causing an overall unrecoverable failure are a potential issue. There are two exremely complex systems associated with humans-Mars missions: the technical, engineering, and architectural system of systems that enable the mission and the humans. Both need to be mutually configured and operated to mitigate the overall risks and hazards of the mission. Regarding the humans that mitigation includes both the mission risks and supporting-to-increasing the human immune and other concomitant physiological systems. This report will summarize the risks, current mitigation approaches, and putative approaches including lifestyle, nutrition, and “wellness” approaches to possibly improve the human capacity to withstand the large number of combinatorial human physiological rigors of the missions. The wellness observations also apply to and are derived from Earth terrestrial applicable research.

Dennis M Bushnell↗

In-Time Non-Participant Casualty Risk Assessment to Support Onboard Decision Making for Autonomous Unmanned Aircraft

Numerous operational paradigms, technologies, and missions are emerging as newcomers to the National Airspace System (NAS) develop small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS), personal air vehicles and other Urban Air Mobility (UAM) concepts. As the list of applications expands, maintaining the safety of the current airspace system remains one of the core concerns preventing widespread commercial implementation of these concepts. Further, the risks associated with unmanned aircraft operations themselves have to be recognized and mitigated in a timely manner. Safety-critical risks include, but are not limited to, flight outside of approved airspace, unsafe proximity to people or property, critical system failures, loss-of control, and cyber-security related risks. Instead of reacting to accidents, a set of predictive and data-driven risk monitoring, assessment, and mitigation capabilities are envisioned to help capture and eliminate hazards as these systems become operational. NASA’s System-wide Safety project is performing R&D on such a safety assurance concept. As part of this concept, this paper describes an architecture that continuously monitors a diverse set of onboard and ground-based sources to estimate and predict non-participant casualty risk during flight. Timely identification of the changing nature of this risk can inform decision making processes to mitigate current and impending situations.

Ancel, Ersin↗

Considerations in Assuring Safety of Increasingly Autonomous Systems

Recent technological advances have accelerated the development and application of increasingly autonomous (IA) systems in civil and military aviation. IA systems can provide automation of complex mission tasks-ranging across reduced crew operations, air-traffic management, and unmanned, autonomous aircraft-with most applications calling for collaboration and teaming among humans and IA agents. IA systems are expected to provide benefits in terms of safety, reliability, efficiency, affordability, and previously unattainable mission capability. There is also a potential for improving safety by removal of human errors. There are, however, several challenges in the safety assurance of these systems due to the highly adaptive and non-deterministic behavior of these systems, and vulnerabilities due to potential divergence of airplane state awareness between the IA system and humans. These systems must deal with external sensors and actuators, and they must respond in time commensurate with the activities of the system in its environment. One of the main challenges is that safety assurance, currently relying upon authority transfer from an autonomous function to a human to mitigate safety concerns, will need to address their mitigation by automation in a collaborative dynamic context. These challenges have a fundamental, multidimensional impact on the safety assurance methods, system architecture, and V&V capabilities to be employed. The goal of this report is to identify relevant issues to be addressed in these areas, the potential gaps in the current safety assurance techniques, and critical questions that would need to be answered to assure safety of IA systems. We focus on a scenario of reduced crew operation when an IA system is employed which reduces, changes or eliminates a human's role in transition from two-pilot operations.

Alves, Erin E.↗

Flight Simulator Demonstration and Certification Implications of Powertrain Failure Mitigation in a Partial Turboelectric Aircraft

The Single-aisle Turboelectric AiRCraft with Aft Boundary Layer propulsor (STARC ABL) is a concept aircraft with a partial turboelectric powertrain. The complexity and integrated nature of the partial turboelectric powertrain architecture presents failure modes and hazards not found in conventional aircraft propulsion designs. Previously, various electrical and mechanical faults and associated recovery modes were demonstrated in a dynamic model of the powertrain. It was shown that certain faults were catastrophic without recovery logic, due specifically to the interaction of the subsystems. However, in each case, the logic, known as a reversionary control mode, enabled continued operation with assumed sufficient thrust to maintain safe flight. The current work evaluates the powertrain faults and recovery strategies using a full aircraft model in a piloted flight simulator, and places it in the context of current regulatory practice. Faults initiated in flight were successfully mitigated, with the accommodated aircraft subsequently evaluated against certification requirements for three-engine aircraft, which were shown to be appropriate for the STARC-ABL configuration.

STARC-ABL↗

Flight Simulator Demonstration and Certification Implications of Powertrain Failure Mitigation in a Partial Turboelectric Aircraft

The Single-aisle Turboelectric AiRCraft with Aft Boundary Layer propulsor (STARC ABL) is a concept aircraft with a partial turboelectric powertrain. The complexity and integrated nature of the partial turboelectric powertrain architecture presents failure modes and hazards not found in conventional aircraft propulsion designs. Previously, various electrical and mechanical faults and associated recovery modes were demonstrated in a dynamic model of the powertrain. It was shown that certain faults were catastrophic without recovery logic, due specifically to the interaction of the subsystems. However, in each case, the logic, known as a reversionary control mode, enabled continued operation with assumed sufficient thrust to maintain safe flight. The current work evaluates the powertrain faults and recovery strategies using a full aircraft model in a piloted flight simulator, and places it in the context of current regulatory practice. Faults initiated in flight were successfully mitigated, with the accommodated aircraft subsequently evaluated against certification requirements for three-engine aircraft, which were shown to be appropriate for the STARC-ABL configuration.

STARC-ABL↗