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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI1994

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 2, July-December 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 179 Consideration of Postaccident Consequences in the Determination of Safety Objectives for Future Nuclear Power Plants in France, D. Queniart, A. Sugier, and J. Lochard; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 187 Nuclear Safety Research: The Phebus FP Severe Accident Experimental Program, P. von der Hardt, A. V. Jones, C. Lecomte, and A. Tattegrain; 205 Containment Performance Analysis of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, S. H. Kim, R. P. Taleyarkhan, and V. Georgevich; 213 Assessment of Fission Product Deposits in the Reactor Coolant System: The DEVAP Program, G. Le Marois and M. Megnin; 222 Erratum to “A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion," Vol. 35, No. 1, CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 223 Effects of Normal Aging on Calibration and Response Time of Nuclear Plant Resistance Temperature Detectors and Pressure Sensors, H. M. Hashemian; DESIGN FEATURES: 235 Defense in Depth Against the Hydrogen Risk—A European Research Program, F. Fineschi; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 246 Technical Note: A Preliminary Analysis of the Risks to Hong Kong Resulting from Potential Accidents of Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant, Z. Shi and X. Wei; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 253 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; SPECIAL SECTION ON TMI-2 VESSEL INVESTIGATION PROJECT: 256 Three Mile Island—New Findings 15 Years After the Accident A. M. Rubin and E. Beckjord; 269 Relocation of Molten Material to the TMI-2 Lower Head, J. R. Wolf, D. W. Akers, and L. A. Neimark; 280 Insight Into the TMI-2 Core Material Relocation Through Examination of Instrument Tube Nozzles, L. A. Neimark; 288 Physical and Radiochemical Examinations of Debris from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. W. Akers and B. K. Schuetz; 301 Results of Metallographic Examinations and Mechanical Tests of Pressure Vessel Samples from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. R. Diercks and G. E. Korth; 313 Margin-to-Failure Calculations for the TMI-2 Vessel, J. Rempe, L. Stickler, S. Chavez, G. Thinnes, R. Witt, and M. Corradini; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 328 1993 Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program Results, L. N. Vanden Heuvel, J. W. Cletcher, D. A. Copinger, J. W. Minarick, B. W. Dolan, and P. D. O’Reilley; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 339 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 345 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 234 Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements; 356 1995 International Incineration Conference; 358 Fifth International Controls and Instrumentation Conference; 359 ANS International Topical Meeting on Safety of Operating Reactors; 359 Fifth International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety; 360 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment Methodology and Applications; 351 The Authors; 357 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Dark Energy Survey year 6 results: Magnification modeling and its impact on galaxy clustering and galaxy-galaxy lensing cosmology

Gravitational lensing magnification alters the observed spatial distribution of galaxies and must be accounted for to prevent biases in cosmological probes of the large-scale structure. We investigate its effects on the Dark Energy Survey Year 6 galaxy clustering and galaxy-galaxy lensing analyses using the fiducial lens (position tracer) sample M ag L im++. Magnification bias is parameterized by a coefficient that describes the response of the number of selected objects per unlensed area element to a change in the lensing convergence. We quantify this coefficient using the BALROG synthetic source injection catalog to account for the complexity of the selection function, and compare these results with simplified estimates. The resulting values of the magnification coefficients for each redshift bin are [3.16 ± 0.08, 2.76 ± 0.21, 4.09 ± 0.15, 4.42 ± 0.16, 4.90 ± 0.29, 4.83 ± 0.25]. Relative to Year 3, this analysis provides more precise and accurate magnification bias estimates through a larger BALROG area and reweighting to better match the data properties. Here, the cosmological results are robust when tested against various magnification parameter prior choices and also when adding cross-clustering between lens redshift bins. Neglecting magnification, however, introduces significant systematic shifts: relative to the fiducial analysis with Gaussian priors centered on the BALROG -derived estimates, we observe shifts of 1.37σ in S 8 and -0.84σ in Ω m (with cosmic shear included: -0.61σ in S 8 and -0.71σ in Ω m ), in agreement with findings from simulated data, demonstrating that magnification must be modeled to avoid biases. Freeing the magnification bias in lens bin 2 leads to unphysical negative values, further justifying its exclusion from the fiducial Year 6 analysis.

Cosmological parameters↗
NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype

Automating prelaunch diagnostics for launch vehicles offers three potential benefits. First, it potentially improves safety by detecting faults that might otherwise have been missed so that they can be corrected before launch. Second, it potentially reduces launch delays by more quickly diagnosing the cause of anomalies that occur during prelaunch processing. Reducing launch delays will be critical to the success of NASA's planned future missions that require in-orbit rendezvous. Third, it potentially reduces costs by reducing both launch delays and the number of people needed to monitor the prelaunch process. NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle to bring the Orion capsule and its crew of four astronauts to low-earth orbit on their way to the moon. Ares I-X will be the first unmanned test flight of Ares I. It is scheduled to launch on October 27, 2009. The Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype is a prototype ground diagnostic system that will provide anomaly detection, fault detection, fault isolation, and diagnostics for the Ares I-X first-stage thrust vector control (TVC) and for the associated ground hydraulics while it is in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and on the launch pad. It will serve as a prototype for a future operational ground diagnostic system for Ares I. The prototype combines three existing diagnostic tools. The first tool, TEAMS (Testability Engineering and Maintenance System), is a model-based tool that is commercially produced by Qualtech Systems, Inc. It uses a qualitative model of failure propagation to perform fault isolation and diagnostics. We adapted an existing TEAMS model of the TVC to use for diagnostics and developed a TEAMS model of the ground hydraulics. The second tool, Spacecraft Health Inference Engine (SHINE), is a rule-based expert system developed at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. We developed SHINE rules for fault detection and mode identification. The prototype uses the outputs of SHINE as inputs to TEAMS. The third tool, the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS), is an anomaly detection tool developed at NASA Ames Research Center and is currently used to monitor the International Space Station Control Moment Gyroscopes. IMS automatically "learns" a model of historical nominal data in the form of a set of clusters and signals an alarm when new data fails to match this model. IMS offers the potential to detect faults that have not been modeled. The three tools have been integrated and deployed to Hangar AE at KSC where they interface with live data from the Ares I-X vehicle and from the ground hydraulics. The outputs of the tools are displayed on a console in Hangar AE, one of the locations from which the Ares I-X launch will be monitored. In a previous publication, we discussed how we selected the three tools based primarily on their ability to be certified for human spaceflight and described our plans for the prototype. This abstract is due October 23, 2009, and the Ares I-X launch is currently scheduled for October 27, 2009. If this abstract is accepted, then the full paper will describe how the prototype performed before the launch. It will include an analysis of the prototype's accuracy, including false-positive rates, false-negative rates, and receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves. It will also include a description of the prototype's computational requirements, including CPU usage, main memory usage, and disk usage. If the prototype detects any faults during the prelaunch period then the paper will include a description of those faults. Similarly, if the prototype has any false alarms then the paper will describe them and will attempt to explain their causes. Also, the paper will describe the three tools and how they are used in the prototype. It will include a description of the TEAMS models of the Ares I-X first-stage TVC and associated ground hydraulics and how we adapted the TVC model for use in real-time diagnostics. It will describe the SHINE rules used for fault detection and mode identification and the software architecture that interfaces the various pieces of existing software that are part of the prototype to one another. It will describe how we selected the sensor values and commands that were used to train the IMS model and how we optimized the number of clusters in the IMS model. It will include screen shots of the graphical display that we developed in Java to display the outputs of the three tools. Because Ares I-X data was not yet available to us while we were developing the prototype, we used historical data from the Space Shuttle's Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) TVCs and the associated ground hydraulics to train IMS and to test the entire prototype. Because most of the failure modes that we modeled have never occurred in the Shuttle we inserted simulated failures into the Shuttle data. The Ares I-X first-stage TVC is very similar to the SRB TVC and we expect the data will be very similar. After the launch, we will determine how similar the data actually is and report how any differences in the data affected the diagnostic accuracy of the prototype. Finally, although we did not get the prototype certified, we designed it in a way that it could be certified and wrote a preliminary certification plan. The paper will include a brief summary of how we considered the need for certification in the design of the prototype, how we tested the prototype before deploying it to Hangar AE, and how we would propose to get it certified if it were deployed as an operational system. The paper will conclude with a description of some of the challenges we faced and some of the lessons learned in developing and deploying the prototype.

International Space Station↗