Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Nuclear security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7

Fundamentals of Nuclear Security Culture [PowerPoint]

We examine the following topics: Nuclear and Radiological Security Culture; Threats and consequences ; The Human Factor; Legal and Regulatory Basis for Security Culture; Security Culture basic concepts; Systematic SC program; Enhancing SC; and, Situational Awareness. We will discuss these aspects and conduct exercises to apply them

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Pulsed Power Science and Technology: A Strategic Outlook for the National Nuclear Security Administration (Summary)

Major advances in pulsed power technology and applications over the last twenty years have expanded the mission areas for pulsed power and created compelling new opportunities for the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). This summary document is a forward look at the development of pulsed power science and technology (PPS&T) capabilities in support of the next 20 years of the SSP. This outlook was developed during a three-month-long tri-lab study on the future of PPS&T research and capabilities in support of applications to: (1) Dynamic Materials, (2) Thermonuclear Burn Physics and Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF), and (3) Radiation Effects and Nuclear Survivability. It also considers necessary associated developments in next-generation codes and pulsed power technology as well as opportunities for academic, industry, and international engagement. The document identifies both imperatives and opportunities to address future SSP mission needs. This study was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). A copy of the memo request is contained in the Appendix. NNSA guidance received during this study explicitly directed that it not be constrained by resource limitations and not attempt to prioritize its findings against plans and priorities in other areas of the national weapons program. That prioritization, including the relative balance amongst the three focus areas themselves, must of course occur before any action is taken on the observations presented herein. This unclassified summary document presents the principal imperatives and opportunities identified in each mission and supporting area during this study. Preceding this area-specific outlook, we discuss a cross-cutting opportunity to increase the shot capacity on the Z pulsed power facility as a near-term, cost-effective way to broadly impact PPS&T for SSP as well as advancing the science and technology to inform future SSMP milestones over the next 5-10 years. The final page of the summary presents two timelines that couch the opportunities discussed here in terms of the broader strategic timelines encapsulated in the fiscal year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Comprehensive Characterization of Silicon Photomultipliers for Nuclear Security Applications

Scintillation detectors are an essential instrument in a variety of fields, serving as an effective means of detecting radiation for industrial, defense, medical, and basic-research applications. Light sensors are an integral part of all scintillation detectors and can affect detector performance as much as the scintillator itself. The photomultiplier tube (PMT) has been the standard light sensor for over half a century, but alternatives have been developed recently, and the silicon photomultiplier (SiPM) is perhaps the most promising of these new technologies. SiPMs can produce gains of the same order of magnitude as most PMTs and have shown reduced noise levels in the newest generations. Additionally, they posses benefits characteristic of solid-state devices such as insensitivity to magnetic fields, mechanical ruggedness, compactness, low operating voltages, and high quantum efficiencies. The timing properties of light sensors are an important characteristic for many applications, including nuclear security. For example, accurate timing is necessary for time of flight experiments, scatter cameras, and background suppression. This work aims to characterize the time resolution of many commercially available new-generation SiPMs, specifically in a time coincidence setting. SiPMs have been acquired from five leading manufacturers possessing a variety of pixel and microcell sizes. Results are presented with an organic scintillator p-terphenyl and coincidence time resolution of less than 300 picoseconds is achieved. Comparison with PMTs shows that the PMT pair tested has a superior time resolution of 83 picoseconds.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Colloquium : Neutrino detectors as tools for nuclear security

For over 40 years, physicists have discussed possible uses for neutrino detectors in nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and fissile materials security. Neutrinos are an attractive fission signature because they readily pass through matter. The same property makes neutrinos challenging to detect in systems that would be practical for nuclear security applications. This Colloquium presents a broad overview of several potential neutrino applications, including the near-field monitoring of known reactors, far-field monitoring of known or discovery of undeclared reactors, detection of reactor waste streams, and detection of nuclear explosions. Recent detector advances have made near-field monitoring feasible, whereas farther-field reactor detection and waste stream detection monitoring may be possible in some cases with further research and development. Very long-range reactor monitoring and nuclear explosion detection do not seem feasible for the foreseeable future due to considerable physical and/or practical constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Floating Chameleon: Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Nexus of Maritime and Nuclear Security Law

During the 63rd regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, as part of Norway's statement to the General Conference, Mr. Auden Halvorsen, State Secretary for Norway, made the following statement about transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs): "Deployment of transportable nuclear power plants—TNPPs—demands our attention. The Agency must intensify its conversations of all aspects of the safety and security of such facilities. . . . The scope and applicability of existing requirements and instruments need to be clarified and developed including dialogue with the International Maritime Organization [IMO]." Ensuring the security of TNPPs is essential for their deployment and implementation. TNPPs may be floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs), which bring together elements of nuclear security related to the nuclear power plant with elements of maritime security. Insofar as an FNPP weds the principles of nuclear and maritime security, it also weds the two domains, the ancient traditions and contemporary practices of maritime law with the contemporary practices of nuclear law. Fundamentally, this raises the question, what are the legal requirements for the security of a FNPP? Although both maritime law and nuclear law have established regimes for security through various legal instruments, does an FNPP expose gaps between the current international legal instruments? The previous question of whether international legal regimes define requirements for the security of FNPPs, but a threshold question remains: what is an FNPP? For purposes of nuclear and maritime security, is an FNPP a facility, is an FNPP a vessel and therefore a transport, or does an FNPP change its status based upon temporal and spatial considerations such as when it is docked at a port generating power or in transit to its destination? This set of questions, and others addressed later in this article, highlights that the issue is not merely a question about security but intersects elements of safety whether an FNPP is in uncharted waters of the international regime for both nuclear and maritime law. Here, this paper addresses many of the questions posed above related to the security regulations for an FNPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

National Nuclear Security Administration International Safeguards Education & Training Program(s)

The introduction of nuclear power is a challenging, time-consuming and complex endeavor. After lengthy deliberations and research, some discover they are not prepared to take on the responsibilities or make the necessary investments to pursue nuclear power at this time. In particular, as countries begin to study their education systems with a critical eye, they discover they are unlikely to produce the requisite people to support the new plant they had hoped to introduce in the next ten to fifteen years. Without experienced personnel who can manage, operate, regulate and inspect the new plant, there is no point to building a plant in the first place. This paper will begin with an overview of various challenges associated with establishing and implementing a safe, secure and sustainable nuclear program and describe the some of the key issues that need to be addressed while planning to introduce nuclear power into an energy portfolio. Subsequent sections will describe how the United States is assisting countries in this planning process and in developing an effective workforce capable of supporting the nuclear program. Next, the paper will look at the key documents countries need to prepare in order to develop an effective workforce. The final section will offer some potential measures for success to ensure the long-term viability of the education system.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Study of Applications of Radiological Data Fusion for Nuclear Security and Non-proliferation Applications

This report describes the radiological Scene Data Fusion (SDF) technology and the potential to apply the SDF technology to a variety of problems related to nuclear non-proliferation, radiological security, and other missions related to the national nuclear security agency and the US government, more broadly. The application space was conceived by both the authors of this report and the many scientists and stakeholders they interviewed. In order to successfully apply the SDF technology to the various applications, further research and development is often necessary and those R&D steps are also outlined herein.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Fostering Nuclear Security Culture through Effective Leadership: An Operational Perspective

Security culture plays a critical role in determining the effectiveness of an organization's security performance, making its significance impossible to overemphasize. It encompasses the collective values, shared perceptions, and habitual actions embraced by all individuals within a nuclear organization—from leadership to frontline staff. When the entire workforce recognizes the reality of potential threats, accepts that security is a shared duty, and integrates security-minded behavior into everyday routines, it fosters an environment where strong security practices are the norm. In such a setting, everyone can take pride and feel reassured in being part of an organization where a strong security culture is deeply embedded. Security culture is based on the broader concept of organizational culture. All organizations—whether families, social clubs, religious institutions, businesses, non-governmental organizations, or governments—possess an underlying culture shaped by core values and beliefs. These values and beliefs influence attitudes and drive behavior throughout the organization. While multiple factors contribute to the development of a strong security culture, leadership plays a particularly pivotal role. In organizations where security culture is well-established, leaders go beyond rhetoric; they demonstrate a genuine commitment to security through their actions. They implement policies and procedures that actively engage all employees, foster open dialogue around security concerns, and encourage teamwork in resolving issues. Furthermore, they reward proactive behavior and ensure that corrective actions are taken promptly. Regular assessments of the organization's security culture allow such leaders to gauge its effectiveness and take strategic steps to strengthen it when necessary. This paper leverages practical, real-world experience to guide leadership and senior management within nuclear organizations through the foundational steps of cultivating a robust, organization-wide culture of nuclear security. It emphasizes the critical importance of early leadership engagement in shaping this culture and outlines a comprehensive approach that includes strategic, tactical, and operational measures. Additionally, it explores methods for fostering a unified vision across all levels of the organization to ensure alignment, commitment, and continuous improvement in nuclear security practices.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Radioisotope identification method for poorly resolved gamma-ray spectrum of nuclear security concern

Gamma-ray signal can be used as a fingerprint for radioisotope identification. In the context of radioactive and nuclear materials security at the border control point, the detection task can present a significant challenge due to various constraints such as the limited measurement time, the shielding conditions, and the noise interference. This study proposes a novel method to identify the signal of one or several radioisotopes from a poorly resolved gamma-ray spectrum. In this method, the noise component in the raw spectrum is reduced by the wavelet decomposition approach, and the removal of the continuum background is performed using the baseline determination algorithm. Finally, the identification of radioisotope is completed using the matrix linear regression method. The proposed method has been verified by experiments using the poorly resolved gamma-ray signals from various scenarios including single source, mixing of natural uranium with five of the most common industrial radioactive sources (57Co, 60Co, 133Ba, 137Cs, and 241Am). The preliminary results show that the proposed algorithm is comparable with the commercial method.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗

Perspectives on Regulatory Design and Development for Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with the State but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes that a cornerstone in the development of a nuclear security regime is the development of regulations that address security of nuclear material and other radioactive material in transport. While the IAEA provides recommendations and guidance for security of materials in transport through Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents, the challenge of integrating those recommendations into a Member State’s national legal framework is significant. Specifically, the development of transport security regulations requires coordination between both legal and technical experts within the country’s competent authority and multiple governmental agencies, as well as input from transport operators and other stakeholders. In addition to these interactions, the regulations must reflect the legal traditions of the Member State to fit within its overall national legal framework. Recognizing the challenge, the IAEA has requested input from international legal and technical experts to develop a methodology for drafting regulations on transport security of nuclear material and other radioactive material. This paper discusses the progress made so far in developing the methodology and provides a perspective on the need for transport security regulations and the challenges associated with their development. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to introduce the IAEA-proposed methodology and to facilitate the discussion of this methodology with Member States that need support in developing their transport security regulations.

Ladsous, David↗